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FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

The Will to Power

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FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE was born near Leipzig in 1844, the son of a Lutheran clergyman who died when Nietzsche was four. He attended the famous Pforta School, then went to university at Bonn and at Leipzig, where he studied philology and first became acquainted with Richard Wagner. When he was only twenty-four he was appointed to the chair of classical philology at Basel University; he stayed there until his health forced him into retirement in 1879. While in Basel, he participated as an ambulance orderly in the Franco-Prussian War and published *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), *Untimely Meditations* (1873–6) and the first part of *Human, All Too Human* (1878). From 1880 until 1889, except for brief interludes, he divorced himself from everyday life and, supported by his university pension, lived mainly in France, Italy and Switzerland. Works published in the 1880s included *Dawn*, *The Joyous Science*, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *On the Genealogy of Morals* and *The Case of Wagner*. In January 1889, Nietzsche collapsed on a street in Turin and was subsequently institutionalized in Basel and Jena. He spent the remaining years of his life in a condition of mental and physical debility, cared for by his mother and later his sister Elisabeth. The last works published during his lifetime were *Twilight of the Idols* (1889), *The Anti-Christ* (1895) and *Nietzsche contra Wagner* (1895). After Nietzsche's death in 1900, Elisabeth assembled *The Will to Power* based on her brother's notebooks and published it the following year; a greatly expanded edition appeared in 1906. *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche's autobiography, was published in 1908.

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FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE

The Will to Power

Selections from the Notebooks of the 1880s

Translated by
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Edited, with an Introduction and Notes, by
R. KEVIN HILL

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Contents

Chronology vii
Introduction xi
Note on the Text and Translation xxvii
Further Reading xxxv

THE WILL TO POWER

Preface 7

Book I
European Nihilism

1 Nihilism 15
2 On the History of European Nihilism 49

Book II
Critique of the Highest Values Hitherto

1 Critique of Religion 91
2 Critique of Morality 159
3 Critique of Philosophy 239

Book III
Principle of a New Determination of Values

1 The Will to Power as Knowledge 281
2 The Will to Power in Nature 355

3 The Will to Power as Society and Individual 407
4 The Will to Power as Art 447

Book IV
Discipline and Cultivation

1 Hierarchy 489
2 Dionysus 553
3 The Eternal Recurrence 579

Notes 587
Concordance 627
Name Index 643

Chronology

1844 Birth of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche on 15 October in Röcken, Prussian Saxony, to the pastor Karl Ludwig Nietzsche and his wife Franziska, née Oehler.
1846 Birth of Elisabeth Nietzsche on 10 July.
1848 Birth of Joseph Ludwig Nietzsche.
1849 Death of Karl Ludwig Nietzsche on 30 July.
1850 Death of Nietzsche's brother, Joseph Ludwig. Family moves to cathedral city of Naumburg.
1855 Nietzsche enters school associated with the cathedral.
1858 Accepted at prestigious Pforta school, where he receives a traditional classical education.
1864 Matriculates at Bonn University to study theology and classical philology.
1865 Transfers to the University of Leipzig, where he becomes Friedrich Ritschl's favourite student. First acquaintance with the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer.
1866 Friendship with Erwin Rohde. Reads Friedrich Albert Lange's *History of Materialism*.
1867 First publication in classical philology. Enters military service in October.
1868 Riding accident in March leads to discharge from military service on 15 October. First meeting with Richard Wagner in November.
1869 Appointed to special professorship in Basel in classical philology (January). Awarded doctorate by Leipzig (23 March). Gives up Prussian citizenship. Holds inaugural lecture on 'Homer and Classical Philology' (28 May). Meets

colleagues: historian Jacob Burckhardt and the theologian Franz Overbeck.

1870 Professorship regularized. Public lectures on 'The Greek Music Drama' (18 January) and 'Socrates and Tragedy' (1 February). Serves in France as an orderly in Franco-Prussian War with Prussian army; contracts dysentery and diphtheria. Discharged in October.

1871 Granted leave of absence from Basel due to ill-health.

1872 Publication of *Birth of Tragedy* (January), which was largely ignored by the academic world. Series of five public lectures on education ('On the Future of Our Educational Institutions'). Present at laying of foundation stone for Bayreuth opera house (22 May).

1873 Publication of first *Untimely Meditation*: *David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer*. Befriends Jewish student and moral philosopher Paul Rée.

1874 Publication of second and third *Untimely Meditation*: *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life* and 'Schopenhauer as Educator'.

1875 Meets Heinrich Köselitz (to whom Nietzsche gives the pseudonym Peter Gast in 1881). Elisabeth moves to Basel and sets up home for herself and her brother.

1876 Publication of fourth *Untimely Meditation*: *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*. Attends first Bayreuth festival (July). Granted one-year leave of absence from the university. Lives in Sorrento with Rée and Malwida von Meysenbug. Sees Wagner for last time.

1877 Returns to Basel and resumes teaching. Lives with Elisabeth and Köselitz.

1878 Publication of *Human, All Too Human*, which finalizes break with Wagner.

1879 Publication of second volume of *Human, All Too Human* (*Mixed Opinions and Maxims*). Resignation from professorship due to ill-health; granted pension. Travels in Switzerland, then to Naumburg.

1880 Publication of *The Wanderer and His Shadow*. Travels to Riva del Garda, Venice, Marienbad, Naumburg, Stresa and Genoa, where he spends the winter.

1881 Publication of *Dawn*. Travels to Recoaro Terme and Riva with Köselitz; alone to St Moritz and Sils-Maria. Winter in Genoa.

1882 Publication of *The Joyous Science*. Meets Lou Salomé in Rome at the home of Malwida von Meysenbug (May). Returns to Naumburg; visits Berlin and Tautenburg, where Lou joins him. With Lou and Rée in Leipzig (October). Break with Lou and Rée; leaves for Rapallo (November).

1883 Publication of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, parts one and two. Death of Wagner (13 February). Travels to Genoa, Rome, Sils-Maria, Naumburg, Genoa and Nice. In Naumburg learns of Elisabeth's engagement to anti-Semite Bernhard Förster, a member of the extended Wagner circle.

1884 Publication of *Zarathustra*, part three. Stays in Venice, Sils-Maria, Zürich and Nice.

1885 Publication of *Zarathustra*, part four (published privately). Travels to Venice, Sils-Maria, Naumburg and Nice. Marriage of Elisabeth and Förster, who leave together for the colony Nueva Germania in Paraguay.

1886 Publication of *Beyond Good and Evil*. Stays in Naumburg, Leipzig, Genoa and Nice.

1887 Publication of *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Travels to Sils-Maria, Venice and back to Nice.

1888 Publication of *The Case of Wagner*. Stays in Turin and Sils-Maria; returns to Turin in September. Composition of last sane writings.

1889 Publication of *Twilight of the Idols* (completed in 1888). Collapses on street in Turin (3 January). Retrieved by Overbeck. Enters clinic in Basel (10 January). Transferred to clinic in Jena (17 January). Förster commits suicide in Paraguay after embezzling colony's funds.

1890 Franziska Nietzsche takes her son to Naumburg, where he remains in her care. Elisabeth returns from Paraguay.

1892 Plan for first edition of Nietzsche's published works (discontinued after volume five), edited by Köselitz but arranged by Elisabeth, who then returns to Paraguay to clear up business of the colony.

1893 Elisabeth returns from Paraguay for good.

1894 Founding of the Nietzsche Archive.
1895 Publication of *The Anti-christ* and *Nietzsche contra Wagner* (both completed in 1888). Elisabeth acquires all rights to Nietzsche's writings.
1896 Archive transferred to Weimar.
1897 Death of Nietzsche's mother. Elisabeth takes Nietzsche to Weimar.
1900 Death of Nietzsche (25 August); buried in Röcken.
1901 First version of *The Will to Power* (second, expanded edition 1906), edited by Elisabeth and Köselitz; based on Nietzsche's notebooks and plans in his notebooks.
1908 First publication of *Ecce Homo* (written in 1888).

Introduction

During the 1880s, not long after he had completed *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Friedrich Nietzsche intended to write a magnum opus that would articulate the full range of his mature thought. The book was announced in 1886 as being 'in preparation' on the back cover of *Beyond Good and Evil*. He mentions it again in *On the Genealogy of Morals* in 1887. 'I intend to deal with these things more thoroughly and rigorously in another connection (under the title "A Contribution to the History of European Nihilism", to be included in a work which I am now preparing: *The Will to Power, an Attempt at a Re-valuation of All Values*, to which I refer the reader).'[1] Throughout the period from 1885 to 1888, Nietzsche kept extensive notebooks in which he developed material for this project. During Nietzsche's final productive summer of 1888, while he was staying as he had for many prior summers in a rented room in Sils-Maria, Switzerland, he made one last attempt to organize his notes into this work, without success.

Sometime between 26 August and 3 September, Nietzsche abandoned the project in frustration – at least as he had previously conceived it. Instead, he envisioned reworking some of the material collected thus far into texts that would become *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Anti-Christ*, regarding the latter as the first of a new, re-envisioned magnum opus in four parts to be called *Revaluation of All Values*. The other three parts were never drafted, and Nietzsche concluded that with *The Anti-Christ*, the *Revaluation* project could be regarded as completed. Thus a longer book was never written; instead we have

a variety of works he published or prepared for publication, from *Beyond Good and Evil* forwards, and his notebooks.[2]

After Nietzsche's breakdown in 1889, and the passing of control over his literary estate to his sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, Nietzsche's friend Heinrich Köselitz ('Peter Gast') conceived the notion of publishing selections from these notebooks as a means of communicating the scope and systematic character of Nietzsche's thought, using one of his simpler outlines for the magnum opus as a guide to their arrangement. It would appear that his justification for this was that Nietzsche's late conception of *The Anti-Christ* as the completed *Revaluation* ought not to be credited. As he explained to Elisabeth on 8 November 1893:

> Given that the original title appears as: *The Anti-Christ. Revaluation of All Values* (and therefore not 'The first book of the revaluation of all values'), you may think that your brother at the time of his incipient madness thought the book *completed* . . . Nevertheless, the *consequences* of this revaluation must also be explicitly illustrated in the field of morality, philosophy and politics. No one today is able to imagine such consequences – that is why the vast preparations by your brother, the other three books of the *Revaluation*, must be ordered according to my suggestion and gathered into a kind of system.[3]

Eventually, Elisabeth warmed to this idea and the project was undertaken. Most of the editorial work was done by Köselitz and his associates, not by Elisabeth (as she herself explains in the preface to the 1901 edition, where she 'stresses explicitly' that she is 'not even the editor of the book but at most and in the most modest sense of the word, a collaborator'),[4] whose particular gifts lay more in the areas of administration and promotion. Köselitz appears to have made a good-faith effort to select the material that was of the greatest interest, and much of the editorial activity was merely 'tidying'. Nor was it ever his intention, as some have claimed, to convey the misleading impression of a magnum opus. As David Marc Hoffmann explains, 'The editors, H. Köselitz, E. & A. Horneffer, had

originally chosen the title which mirrored the other volumes: "*Unpublished material from the years [1882/83–1888] (the period of the Revaluation)*" and in an introduction had discussed Nietzsche's procedure and the emergence of the late literary remains. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche suppressed this introduction and replaced it with her own, and gave the volume the title "*The Will to Power. Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values. (Studies and Fragments)*".'[5]

The result of these two changes was to convey the *impression* that Elisabeth had successfully restored a lost magnum opus, though to be fair to her, she never asserted that the book was anything but an attempt to transcribe and publish a portion of Nietzsche's literary remains from the 1880s; what is more, he did in fact produce these notes in the hope that some kind of magnum opus would emerge from them. Hers was a project not unlike the English archaeologist Arthur Evans' contemporaneous attempt to restore the ancient Minoan frescoes at Knossos: bold to the point of folly surely, a mutilation of historical remains perhaps, but not fundamentally dishonest. And unlike Evans, Elisabeth did not have to ruin the texts themselves in the process, a fact which has made it possible for us to improve upon her editors' work here.

A first edition was brought out in this somewhat misleading form in 1901 and contained 483 sections; the second, definitive edition expanded the number of sections to 1,067. Little effort was made to render the material consistent with any of Nietzsche's projected plans for it, plans he had abandoned in any case. In many instances, longer discussions were cut up and their portions given separate numbers without any indication that this had been done, perhaps more out of pressure to produce more material than a desire to mislead about its content. Elisabeth's editorial contribution seems to have been limited to her insistence that Nietzsche had produced a philosophical system that could compete with the systems of such figures as Kant and Hegel (for without that achievement, Nietzsche might be regarded as nothing more than a belletrist, an impression reinforced by the aphoristic style of many of his other works) and that the text presented that system. Köselitz's editorial

sin lay more in his silent acquiescence to her overall characterization of the material as Nietzsche's crowning achievement, rather than in his manipulation of the materials themselves, which was primarily intended to make them more accessible. The book that resulted from these peculiar circumstances, *Der Wille zur Macht*, is the book you hold in your hands, in English translation.

Elisabeth's publication of the book was to have further, fateful consequences. By 1930, Nietzsche was in vogue in Germany just as the Nazis were coming into power and the material in *The Will to Power* was being represented as the system of the thinker of first importance to the Nazis by figures as negligible as Alfred Baeumler, whose postscript accompanied the one-volume edition and whose own philosophical writings characterized Nietzsche as a Nazi prophet, or as significant as Martin Heidegger, who regarded *The Will to Power* as containing the essence of Nietzsche's philosophy, a philosophy which in his view was the culmination of the entire Western tradition. This close association of the book with Nazism has been further reinforced by the existence of a now famous photograph of Elisabeth shaking hands with Adolf Hitler.

However, not long after the Second World War, the rehabilitation of Nietzsche's reputation was under way both in France and the English-speaking world, and putting distance between Nietzsche and *The Will to Power* was central to that task. In one sense, this was easily accomplished: *The Will to Power* was in no way the magnum opus some took it for, and was, at most, the shadow of an imaginary book which had existed only in Nietzsche's mind as an unfulfilled possibility, an anthology of Nietzsche's notes to himself.

Unfortunately, these circumstances have conditioned the way in which we view these texts, as if the published works were 'canonical' and the notebooks 'apocryphal'. Matters are not helped by the fact that Nietzsche seems here to speak glowingly of domination and war, of *Zuchtung* (which we translate as 'cultivation' but which others have translated as 'breeding', thus suggesting eugenics) and even occasionally of a 'master race'. The impression conveyed by such remarks was far more

troubling after the Second World War. As a result, some of Nietzsche's advocates sought to delegitimize the notebooks, as if one could confine everything distasteful about Nietzsche within them and then somehow attribute it all to Elisabeth, who bears ultimate responsibility for their publication in this form (and who is known to have forged some of Nietzsche's letters, and thus seemed to be an unreliable custodian of the Nietzsche corpus in any case). This problem was exacerbated by the widespread myth that the Nietzsche of the notebooks was more of a 'traditional' philosopher who offers a sweeping metaphysical theory, that the world is 'will to power', while the published Nietzsche is something far superior: an opponent of metaphysics and a forerunner of deconstruction. The method was to exorcize him of his colonialist and vitalist demons, drive that legion into Elisabeth, and thence off a cliff.

One means by which this was accomplished was to suggest that Nietzsche's failure to publish the material implied a decision not to do so, a rejection of some kind. Now one might think that not getting around to publishing something was not a sufficiently effective repudiation. Consequently, stories began to circulate that Nietzsche had literally abandoned the material, with instructions that it be destroyed. According to R. J. Hollindale, when Nietzsche left Sils-Maria on 20 September 1888, he left with his landlord some significant quantity of what would become his literary remains from which *The Will to Power* was constructed, with instructions to *burn* it.[6] But on this account, might we not say that, like Franz Kafka's friend Max Brod, who received a similar request which would have engulfed *The Trial* and *The Castle* in flames, the landlord, by silently ignoring the request, saved Nietzsche from himself?

However that may be, there does not appear to be much reason to regard the 'burning' story as true. If one goes back to the 1893 report by Fritz Koegel of his friend visiting the locale and finding the materials, it turns out that what Nietzsche wished to dispose of were largely *printer's proofs*, precisely the sort of thing one might abandon to destruction.[7] And if Nietzsche did leave behind manuscripts at Sils-Maria (and there is no reason to doubt it), it would be utterly without significance, for he no

doubt left materials there in September after *every* previous summer he had spent there. To leave them there would not be to abandon them. After all, he would no doubt return, in the summer of 1889, or so he thought. It was his unexpected collapse into madness, not careful deliberation, which stranded these texts.

But might not Nietzsche have *tacitly* repudiated all this material? This view makes little sense on closer inspection. He had been drawing from these notebooks continuously through the 1880s for his published writings, and apart from his own crossing-out of paragraphs, it is simply unknowable what value he assigned to the notes he left unused. Even if we take the completion of the longer books, *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morals*, before his final productive year of 1888 as evidence that material left unused which was prior to or contemporaneous with the composition of these books was therefore abandoned, this accounts for at most a portion of the material here; well over half of our texts were written after *On the Genealogy of Morals* was completed. From that point forwards, Nietzsche was writing at a frantic pace, turning out short work after short work, *The Case of Wagner*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *Ecce Homo*, *The Anti-Christ* and hundreds of pages of notes, from which much of *The Will to Power* was taken. While we might speculate that Nietzsche might not have returned to earlier notes, it is simply absurd to *presuppose* that the material from the last year of his authorship which did not find its way into the final works was therefore *rejected. There simply wasn't enough time* for Nietzsche to formulate and manifest such an intention; he had been attempting to fashion some sort of unified work from this material as late as August 1888 and his collapse was to come the following January. In any event, it might be thought a bit strange to suppose that as Nietzsche approached his final breakdown, the acuity of his judgement about the worth of his own writings could only improve. Nietzsche's abandonment of the *Will to Power* project seems to imply frustration with his inability to fashion them into a coherent whole, rather than any rejection of their content. If that is correct, the editors may have done him a favour, not a disservice.

In a sense, these questions are all irrelevant, for it was only Elisabeth's presentation of the text in light of Nietzsche's intention to produce a magnum opus that has made the question of his intentions relevant in the first place. Once the shadow cast by the imaginary work is eliminated, the text can be judged for what it is: a posthumously published anthology of literary remains. In essence, what the editors provided was but one possible path through the vast and dense forest of Nietzsche's thought; in so doing, they ended up giving prominence to certain aspects of his thinking which were less obvious in his published writings. Three topics stand out in particular: nihilism, metaphysics and the future of Europe.

In the notes that comprise the first book, 'European Nihilism', Nietzsche attempts to describe and diagnose this pernicious cultural condition which he believed was gradually overtaking European civilization. Nietzsche had long sensed that *something* was wrong with modernity, and the root diagnosis he offered in 1874 in his essay 'Schopenhauer as Educator' was to remain fundamentally the same henceforth:

> The explanation of this spiritlessness and of why all moral energy is at such a low ebb is difficult and involved; but no one who considers the influence victorious Christianity had on the morality of our ancient world can overlook the reaction of declining Christianity upon our own time. Through the exaltedness of its ideal, Christianity excelled the moral systems of antiquity and the naturalism that resided in them to such a degree that this naturalism came to excite apathy and disgust; but later on, when these better and higher ideals, though now known, proved unattainable, it was no longer possible to return to what was good and high in antique virtue, however much one might want to. It is in this oscillation between Christianity and antiquity, between an imitated or hypocritical Christianity of morals and an equally despondent and timid revival of antiquity, that modern man lives, and does not live very happily; the fear of what is natural he has inherited and the renewed attraction of this naturalness, the desire for a firm footing somewhere, the impotence of his knowledge that reels back and forth

> between the good and the better, all this engenders a restlessness, a disorder in the modern soul which condemns it to a joyless unfruitfulness.[8]

Though much would deepen and become shaded with irony as Nietzsche came to regard the 'unattainability' of Christianity's ideals as grounds for rejecting the assessment that they were 'higher and better', this account remained at the centre of Nietzsche's concerns. Finding some cure for this cultural ailment is rendered all the more urgent when we consider that the condition nihilism destroys, 'joyful fruitfulness', in his view should be the central aim of human existence. And a solution becomes all the more difficult if it is to meet the stringent standards of our intellectual conscience by being altogether *secular*.

As Nietzsche sought to identify the central causes of nihilism, he came to see Christianity as but one version of a deep-seated human tendency to respond to our sense of fragility and insecurity by imagining a world very different from the world in which we live: a world which possesses a meaningfulness, coherence and stability which the real world actually lacks, a world in which conflict, suffering and death prove to be illusions, appearances beyond which a more satisfying reality lies. Some of the material in the first book represents Nietzsche's most sustained and incisive discussion of this subject, particularly the so-called 'Lenzerheide fragment' of 10 June 1887 (most of which the editors used for § 55).

The notes that fill the remaining three books of *The Will to Power* represent various attempts both to deepen the account of nihilism and, more importantly, offer intellectual and practical responses to it. But underlying all these exercises lies one comprehensive thought: the reason why we have tended to reject the real world, whether this rejection takes moral, religious or philosophical form, is that it is pervaded with conflict and domination. Not only does the intent to dominate manifest itself clearly in the political sphere, but many social and psychological phenomena can be shown to harbour it in concealed forms. When we turn to the natural world viewed from a post-Darwinian perspective, competition seems

pervasive there as well. Nietzsche even entertains the hypothesis (following the inspiration of the great Croatian natural philosopher Roger Boscovich) that all mechanical processes can be reduced to a single physical force in which attraction and repulsion ('attack' and 'defence') are but two sides of the same tendency. As he puts it in the final words with which the editors chose to end the volume, '*This world is the will to power – and nothing besides!* And even you yourselves are this will to power – and nothing besides!'

Such a hypothesis serves many purposes in the course of Nietzsche's argument. The first and most important is that Nietzsche identifies the will to power with creativity, which he sees as the heart of what *value* is. If we are to be radically *secular* thinkers, our standards of value must not lead us to condemn the fundamental character of life and the world itself as worthless. To discover that the world is will to power and nothing besides is to discover that our prior scheme of values, which inspired Christianity and which Christianity in turn has propagated, is itself inherently nihilistic and thus must be replaced with something in harmony with the world as we find it. Since everything is motivated by the will to power anyway, the act of valuing itself is invariably an expression of it, the scheme of values associated with Christianity very much included. But this scheme of values condemns itself once we see that it is the expression of the will to power of the very people who fail to achieve power by more ordinary means: *the weak*. It is because they are weak that they fail to respond creatively and efficaciously to life, and it is because they are weak that a world of conflict, suffering and death *discourages* them. Our traditional values are nothing but the sour grapes of fragile and insecure human animals, and we can do better than that. Once we adopt a more pagan, more robust, more *aggressive* scheme of values, the realization that the world is a world of will to power should not only *encourage* us, but make us feel *more at home* in the cosmos.

In the second book, 'Critique of the Highest Values Hitherto', Nietzsche sets himself the task of exposing the role that the will to power of the weak has played in shaping our

moral, religious and philosophical thinking and valuing for a variety of reasons: to confirm the will to power hypothesis, to deepen the explanation of the genesis of nihilism, to condemn these modes of thought and evaluation and, finally, to pave the way for new values which are consistent with the will to power hypothesis and contribute to the overcoming of nihilism.

The 'Lenzerheide fragment' had argued, however, that our tendency to regard the real world as an illusion is inspired not only by suffering, but by the failure to find within experience the purpose, unity and coherence our intellects expect reality to possess. This theme introduces the 'Kantian' dimension of Nietzsche's thought, for like Kant, Nietzsche viewed these intellectual expectations not as signs of what reality must be like (that way lies rationalist metaphysics, and again, nihilism, once we discover that the world is fundamentally irrational) but as artefacts of how the mind (the brain) *organizes* the raw materials of experience. But whereas Kant regarded the point of these organizing processes to be the achievement of scientific *knowledge*, Nietzsche viewed them pragmatically, as tools for better dominating our environment: in other words, the intellect is also 'will to power and nothing beside'. Some of Nietzsche's most interesting and obscure notes lie along these lines, and collectively constitute his own naturalistic 'critique of pure reason', which we find at the beginning of the third book, 'Principle of a New Determination of Values'. And again, if the 'categories of reason' are nothing but tools for coping with and ultimately dominating our environments, it would be unreasonable to demand that ultimate reality must conform to them. This in turn destroys one central motivation for positing a hidden, 'better' reality behind the veil of appearance, and thus undermines the nihilism we would otherwise fall into when we find, as we must, that there is no such reality. The balance of the third book is taken up with the attempt to interpret various natural, psychological and social phenomena in terms of the will to power, once we have removed the false unities of 'substance', 'causal law' and 'teleology' from them.

If the first three books of *The Will to Power* were all there were, the publication of these notes would have been far less

controversial than it has been. Much of what Nietzsche has to say up to that point has echoes in anti-Christian polemicists like Voltaire, vitalists like Henri Bergson, pragmatists like John Dewey and critics of modern culture and society like Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill. However, in the fourth book, 'Discipline and Cultivation', Nietzsche hints at a practical, perhaps even a *political*, solution to the crisis of nihilism. For a part of Nietzsche's diagnosis of modernity is that centuries of Christian influence have made us so submissive and mediocre that we willingly allow ourselves to become exploited politically and economically; as a result the world has become a kind of vast social machine with human beings as its cogs and wheels. Cultural creativity, 'joyful fruitfulness', becomes impossible for people like ourselves, and as a result higher culture begins to die. The principal modes of revolt against these conditions, whether liberal or Socialist, are rooted in levelling doctrines of egalitarianism which are themselves just so much secularized Christianity; only a renewed aristocratic sensibility, a new cultural elitism, can save us.

In the end, Nietzsche does not seek to turn back the tide of levelling and the reduction of most people to mere social functions, even though he perceives this to be modernity's own form of slavery. Rather, noting that in the past, cultural achievement has always been the product of an aristocracy, and that every aristocracy presupposes *some* form of exploitation, he embraces this otherwise horrifying development (which in places he claims may culminate in some form of Socialism) as precisely the desired precondition for the emergence of a new cultural elite, an elite which will feed off this great social machine and use it in pursuit of its own ends. In order to do this, these new aristocrats will have to reject the enervating, egalitarian values which have prevailed among the many; for them to recognize that the world is will to power means to recognize that being a part of a dominating and exploiting elite is *good*. When the final book is not developing this account, it devotes itself to sketching what these new aristocrats will be like. Taken in the abstract, these sketches represent the beginnings of a new virtue ethic, one which conceivably could have

been put to partial use by liberal or progressive individualists. Indeed, much of the account resembles John Stuart Mill's own description of individual self-formation and development once the individual is given freedom from the stultifying effects of the conformist many, but whereas Mill wants to get *away* from the many, Nietzsche wants to get *above* them, and to *use* them. And given his metaphysical setting, the world as will to power, the sensibility of Nietzsche's imagined elite proves to be far more *aggressive*, as befits a people whose task will involve, in part, maintaining their dominance and perpetuating the exploitation their lives require.

It was this book that Alfred Baeumler fastened upon and tried to promote in the 1930s and 1940s as a kind of Nazi bible, a gospel of what he called in his book *Nietzsche: der Philosoph und Politiker* (Leipzig: Reclam, 1931) 'heroic realism'. Although Nietzsche is quite vague about the political basis of this new elite which is supposed to save Europe from itself, his celebration of conflict, domination and exploitation seemed to Baeumler to dovetail sufficiently with Hitler's actions and goals to justify claiming for Nietzsche the status of chief ideologue for National Socialism. But there were problems all along, and even dissenters from this view among the Nazis themselves. For one thing, race was ultimately not a central category for Nietzsche in the way that it was for the Nazis. Like most people of his time, Nietzsche thought that there were human populations with their distinctive characteristics and histories, but his refusal to reify racial essences precluded him from regarding them as fundamental, despite the biologistic character of many of his remarks. Moreover, any detailed and plausible history of Europe, whether cultural or biological, could not possibly identify some alleged ancient Aryan race with any particular European nationalities, and then in turn ascribe all cultural achievements to it as the Nazis had rather absurdly tried to do.[9]

For Nietzsche, the cultural achievements of Europe were the product of an enormously complex and multifarious process, one to which Germans had contributed many unfortunate elements (e.g. the Protestant Reformation), and one

in which the Jews had played an essential role, albeit an ambiguous one: they *invented* Christianity after all, but those who remained Jewish contributed greatly to Europe's intellectual development, especially the Enlightenment, to which Nietzsche himself owed a considerable debt. Furthermore, he regarded anti-Semitism as a manifestation of the resentment of the less gifted many. As for nationalism, Nietzsche had nothing but contempt for it, regarding it as an expression of the gregarious mentality of the levelled masses, and German nationalism, the variety closest to home, was an object of his especial wrath. The desire for Socialism he also regarded as more a symptom of modernity's shortcomings and a problem to be solved than a noble sentiment to be embraced. Indeed, as the Nazi ideologue Ernst Krieck sarcastically put it, 'All in all, Nietzsche was an opponent of Socialism, an opponent of nationalism, and an opponent of racial thinking. Apart from these bents of mind, he might have made an outstanding nazi.'[10]

That said, Nietzsche's proposed elite remains a troublingly ambiguous notion. It presupposes the synthesis of a wide diversity of European cultures and populations, both within itself and in the world it bestrides. It may indeed dominate and exploit nations and perhaps even Socialist ones, but it cannot itself *believe in* doctrines like National Socialism, which are barbaric communal ideologies beneath its dignity. Few of the prominent figures associated with the Third Reich could be mistaken for the virtuous nobles and creative dynamos he foresaw; men like Goebbels and Himmler were little more than pretentious bigots and thugs. And yet, in the end, the views that emerge from 'Discipline and Cultivation' are sufficiently vague and disturbing that thay give one pause, or even lead one to *hope* that these were not Nietzsche's considered views. By rendering them far more accessible than thousands of pages of chaotic, sometimes indecipherable manuscripts, *The Will to Power* has arguably done Nietzsche's reputation some harm. However, whether it has done so justly or not remains to be seen; while many have argued that Nietzsche's notebooks should be ignored in preference to his published writings, no one has ever satisfactorily shown that *The Will to Power* is *unrepresentative*

of his unpublished writings or the thoughts which animated them throughout the 1880s. By offering this corrected and, we hope, more clearly translated edition, we offer what is at the very least a fascinating collection of fragments penned by one of the great minds of modernity, and what was at one time thought by some to express the very essence of his thought. To paraphrase Nietzsche's own late self-description, it is not so much a book as it is 'dynamite', and, as such, should be read and handled with extreme caution.

I am indebted to the support and assistance of numerous people, but most notably and in no particular order: Portland State University for sabbatical support; Iain Thomson at the University of New Mexico for innumerable stylistic suggestions; Jessica Harrison at Penguin for rescuing the project from near-oblivion; David Marc Hoffmann at Nietzsche House in Sils-Maria, and Beat Röllin at the University of Basel, for their insights into the editorial history of the text; Gerald Simon of the Nietzsche Channel for help with identifying sources; Carmel Swann for assistance with the French passages; Chiara Brown for assistance with the Italian passages; Anna Hervé, Linden Lawson and Michael Brown for editorial assistance; my mentor Richard Schacht, for his insights into Nietzsche and his persistent championing of this text in the teeth of overwhelming academic opposition; my late mother-in-law, Marguerite Wichowski, whose bequest made the completion of this project possible at all; and my wife, LisaMary, for her endless patience and generosity.

R. Kevin Hill
1 September 2016

NOTES

1. *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Michael A. Scarpitti, ed. Robert C. Holub (London: Penguin Classics, 2014), p. 142.
2. Mazzino Montinari, *Reading Nietzsche*, trans. Greg Whitlock (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), pp. 98–9.

3. David Marc Hoffmann, *Zur Geschichte des Nietzsche-Archivs. Chronik, Studien und Dokumente* (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1991), p. 15.
4. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, *Vorwart, Der Wille zur Macht* in *Nietzsche's Werke*, 15 vols (Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von C. G. Naumann, 1901), XV, p. 22.
5. Hoffmann, *Nietzsche-Archivs*, pp. 49–50. Hoffmann himself leaves the dates blank, presumably because while the prior volumes he is referring to read '1882/83–1888', in fact two notes in *The Will to Power* (the unnumbered material between § 134 and § 135, along with § 149) pre-date 1882.
6. R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), p. 298. This story was subsequently removed from the Cambridge edition of Hollingdale's biography, but has taken on a life of its own.
7. Fritz Koegel, 'Friedrich Nietzsche. Ein ungedrucktes Vorwort zur Götzendämmerung', *Das Magazin für Literatur* 62 (1893), pp. 702–4.
8. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 133.
9. For a detailed discussion of this, see David B. Dennis, *Inhumanities: Nazi Interpretations of Western Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
10. Quoted in Max Whyte, 'The Uses and Abuses of Nietzsche in the Third Reich: Alfred Baeumler's "Heroic Realism"', *Journal of Contemporary History* 43(2) (2008), p. 188.

Note on the Text and Translation

Even apart from the question of whether these notes had Nietzsche's imprimatur, they would still be of value in the way that the notebooks of any important author can be of value; as our predecessor Walter Kaufmann put it, they afford a glimpse into Nietzsche's workshop. However, they *are* fragmentary and chaotic, hopscotching from one topic to another. A purely chronological presentation, while immeasurably valuable for scholarship, renders them all but unreadable. Happily, the original editors of *The Will to Power* solved this problem for us: the material was rearranged topically, following a rough, four-part outline taken from Nietzsche (one of many and by no means the latest), and further subdivided by a scheme of the editors' own devising. This rendered the material readable. Our solution to the problem of how to present this material has thus involved the same compromise that Walter Kaufmann followed: preserve the thematic ordering, while correcting errors and flagging or removing editorial creativity as much as feasible. Unfortunately, Walter Kaufmann's translation was made prior to the publication of the German historical-critical edition of Nietzsche's writings, which Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari began to edit in 1967, continuing work which they had begun in the late 1950s for an Italian translation of Nietzsche's works. Though Kaufmann in principle had access to the original manuscripts, our research suggests that he did not always avail himself of them, and that much of the editorial activity which created the German editions of *The Will to Power* was thus largely invisible to him. By contrast, we have benefited from the opportunity to compare the German edition

with the manuscripts transcribed in the Colli–Montinari edition (and in light of subsequent, published corrections of these), in order to see what exactly was done with these texts.

If our research had shown that the editorial activity so thoroughly modified the texts as to make them useless as sources of information about Nietzsche's thought and writing, then we would never have decided to translate a new edition of *The Will to Power* for publication. But neither is the text a successfully reconstituted magnum opus: we find that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. In most cases, breaking up the manuscripts into fragments and rearranging them obscured Nietzsche's meaning no more than tidying up his punctuation and paragraphing did. A more serious difficulty involved the editors' occasional preference for crossed-out rough drafts over Nietzsche's final draft. Also, the editors failed to note that some passages are merely Nietzsche's reading notes about passages from other authors (many of Nietzsche's remarks on the difference between the ethics of Jesus and the culture of the Church are merely reader's notes on Tolstoy, and express Tolstoy's views, albeit views Nietzsche would appropriate and repeat in *The Anti-Christ*). Perhaps the worst practice involved combining sentences and paragraphs from different manuscripts into single, apparently continuous notes and sometimes modifying sentence order within a note (fortunately, this is quite rare; where this has occurred, we have indicated the independence of the various portions of text by separating them with a centred asterisk). Thus, while the textual foundation of this translation is *Der Wille zur Macht. 1884/88. Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe* (the second, expanded edition contained in vols 9 and 10 of *Nietzsche's Werke, Taschen-Ausgabe*, Leipzig: C. G. Naumann Verlag, 1906), all of its discrepancies with the original manuscripts have been corrected.[1] In all instances we have followed the most recent draft short of a published text, taking full account of Nietzsche's own corrections. If the entire section was crossed out, we ignored Nietzsche's rejection of it rather than leave a section blank, but indicate this fact in an endnote. Where Nietzsche quotes from material in a language other than German, we have reproduced or translated the

original text. The topical arrangement of the material, as well as the chapter titles, are the product of its original editors, and do not in any way correspond to Nietzsche's own intentions for this material at any time. However, everything in the main body of this edition is a translation of something Nietzsche himself wrote. In a separate publication (omitted here because of its length) we will refer the more scholarly reader to the original German materials, and report every difference between the manuscripts and the published text (with the exception of minor spelling and punctuation issues) which came to light in the course of preparing this translation.

A few remarks on the translation itself: though correcting errors introduced by the original editors of *The Will to Power* might seem a sufficient justification for producing a new translation to supersede Walter Kaufmann's and R. J. Hollingdale's earlier effort, one might think that their work should at least serve as an admirable model of how to approach translating Nietzsche's prose. Because what we have done is quite different, a few words about our methodology are in order. Our goal is to simulate the experience an Anglophone reader might have reading Nietzsche, had he written in English. This is not an alternative to literal faithfulness, but rather our conception of what faithfulness demands. Now it goes without saying that a 'literal' translation would not adhere to the word order of a German sentence, because of certain characteristic differences between English and German grammar. But to make Nietzsche speak English, we must take more licence than simply modifying word order, for there are many grammatical constructions which, while equally possible in both languages, are far more natural in German than in English. Rather than preserve such constructions and convey the impression that Nietzsche's writing is far clunkier in the original than it actually is, we have attended as much to what constitutes a natural turn of phrase in English as we have to Nietzsche's specific choices. Our ethic is to keep faith with what Nietzsche is trying to say, and his manner of saying it, rather than to produce a near one-to-one mapping from the lexicon of one language to another. That said, where there is a specific difference between the manuscript

text and the *Will to Power* text, we have been especially punctilious and exceptionally sparing in the use of individual words which appear in the latter but not the former.

Second, we have been far more sensitive to the dangers of anachronism in style and usage than is typically the case, and so our guide to English usage is largely restricted to what would have been considered appropriate and graceful to Nietzsche's Anglophone contemporaries, though out of consideration for the reader we have avoided expressions that would be so unfamiliar to a twenty-first-century reader as to be unclear. A graceful and idiomatic Nietzsche who writes as only a twenty-first-century Anglophone would is not Nietzsche. Constrained by this ethic of eschewing anachronism, our translation has involved an extensive amount of actual research into nineteenth-century prose style; the result, we hope, is as close as an English reader could get to hearing Nietzsche's voice, short of learning German and reading him in the original.

Third, certain recurring difficulties in prior Nietzsche translations have been avoided, difficulties we did not anticipate when we began, some of which were common enough to bear mention. Often, Nietzsche employs a perfectly ordinary German idiom for which there is a closely corresponding English idiom, but the translator, either out of ignorance of the one or the other, translates quite unnaturally with a word-for-word equivalent, or worse, a paraphrase that misses the point. Relatedly, Nietzsche often uses expressions that are dead metaphors in German, and which therefore should be rendered by equally dead metaphors in English, lest he seem to be engaged in (often seemingly bizarre) poetic flights of fancy when he isn't. When the translator fails to take this properly into account, the result is to convey an impression of haziness, oddity and excitement that is simply lacking in the original. Lastly, some of Nietzsche's vocabulary is archaic by our standards, and failing to notice instances of this can lead to strange and even unintelligible results. In our striving for idiomatic English we have produced a Nietzsche who is surprisingly more clear and straightforward than hitherto suspected.

Another point concerns what one might call Nietzsche's 'slogans'. Translations of Nietzsche's writings have brought to English and popularized a number of expressions and phrases which unfortunately seem to be best characterized as mistranslations; the difficulty is the trade-off between accuracy and grace in our translation, and honouring the measure of likely prior familiarity in the reader. The largest problem is perhaps with the phrase 'will to power' itself. This phrase is rare to the point of non-existence in English before Nietzsche, not because English-speakers were unfamiliar with that passion, but because English typically appends verbs, not nouns, to the expression 'will to'. The more proper expression would be 'the desire for power'; however, we retain 'the will to power', in part because of its greater familiarity, and in part because there is an important difference between 'willing' and 'desiring' which Nietzsche himself at one point calls to our attention. The German words 'Wille' and 'willen' are indeed connected to wanting, but also to *intending*, being *intent on* or *determined* to attain something. In the end, we have chosen to leave this peculiar if famous expression (and with it, related phrases such as 'the will to truth') in its currently familiar form.

Another example is 'eternal recurrence'. Here too we have retained the familiar phrase, but with reservations. It is far more natural to say that things recur *perpetually* rather than *eternally*, but not only would this be unfamiliar, it would also fail to pick up the wordplay, and some of its philosophical implications, in Nietzsche's reflections on eternity, eternal life, etc.

A final example is the cluster of terms in Nietzsche involving 'values'. Our impression is that prior translators have adverted to Latinate forms somewhat too often, when simple cognates like 'worth' will do. It is also far more common in German to nominalize verbs, whereas in English this conveys a somewhat technical tone. Thus we have avoided terms like 'valuation' where possible, lest Nietzsche seem more like a tax assessor than a philosopher (that said, the number of commercial and financial metaphors in *The Will to Power* is extraordinary and seldom commented upon). When Nietzsche's wordplay and famous slogans require these Latinate forms, we

have tolerated them, as in 'revalue the values', 'values devalue themselves' and the like.

In prior translations there has been a certain amount of confusion about Nietzsche's use of foreign expressions. Contemporary German is, among other things, the product of an extensive purge of French borrow-words, and thus a contemporary reader may be under the impression that Nietzsche is using a French word (typically a noun) when in fact he is using an obsolete but ordinary German expression which is similar or even identical to its French counterpart. Thus we have been more cautious than prior interpreters in reading expressions as French. In some cases it is difficult to say whether Nietzsche regards a term as French or German, so we have somewhat arbitrarily relied (in the case of nouns) on capitalization to resolve the uncertainty, giving preference to regarding a French borrow-word as German unless its first letter is lower-case.

Lastly, a point about gender-inclusiveness. As is well known, English contains forms in which the masculine includes the feminine, and a common contemporary practice is to eschew them if possible. Since rendering these expressions in gender-neutral English, either out of literal fidelity to the German, or out of concern for contemporary sensibilities, far too often leads to awkwardness, we have generally preferred masculine forms. Were Nietzsche noteworthy for his feminist convictions, this might be a cause for concern, but his hypermasculinism is so evident that it would be doing him an unearned ideological kindness by our lights at the expense of stylistic injury. Consequently we have often preferred 'man', especially when Nietzsche is effusing about 'strength', 'superiority' and the like.

In one further respect, this book follows in the footsteps of our predecessors Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. For this project I enlisted the assistance of the independent scholar and translator Michael Scarpitti, who produced a complete draft of the text, which I subsequently corrected and completely revised, after comparing it with the original German, both of *The Will to Power* and the manuscripts, word by word, sentence by sentence. My debt to Mr Scarpitti's labours and especially to his conception of translation is enormous;

however, final responsibility for the published text, and any errors or infelicities it may still contain, is entirely my own.

R. Kevin Hill
1 September 2016

NOTE

1 The manuscripts from which all but one section (§ 705) of *The Will to Power* were taken have been subsequently transcribed in *Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke* (henceforth *KGW*), ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967ff.). See the Concordance below for more details.

Further Reading

Carol Diethe, *Nietzsche's Sister and the Will to Power: A Biography of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003).

Hugo Drochon, *Nietzsche's Great Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016)

Mazzino Montinari, *Reading Nietzsche*, trans. Greg Whitlock (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003).

Bernard Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

John Richardson, *Nietzsche's System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

William H. Schaberg, *The Nietzsche Canon: A Publication History and Bibliography* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

Julian Young, *Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

The Will to Power

Selections from the Notebooks of the 1880s

A book for thought, nothing more: it belongs to those who *delight* in thought, nothing more . . .

The fact that it is written in German makes it unfashionable, to say the least: I wish it had been written in French so that it does not seem to endorse any German national aspirations.

Books for thought – they are for those who *delight* in thought, nothing more . . . The Germans of today are no longer thinkers: they are pleased and impressed by something else. The will to power as a principle would be difficult for them to understand . . . For that very reason, I wish my *Zarathustra* had not been written in German.

I distrust all systems and systematists, and avoid them: perhaps one will discover just behind this book the system which I *avoided* . . .

The desire for a system, for a philosopher, morally speaking, is a refined form of depravity, a disease of character; immorally speaking, it is the willingness to appear more stupid than one is – more stupid, that is, stronger, simpler, more untutored, more formidable, commanding, tyrannical . . .

I no longer respect the reader: how could I write for readers? . . . But I make notes for my own use.

Autumn 1887

First book.
European nihilism.

Second book.
Critique of the highest values.

Third book.
Principle of a new determination of values.

Fourth book.
Discipline and cultivation.

Draft dated 17 March 1887, Nice

Preface

1

What has greatness must be spoken of with greatness, cynically and without shame, or not at all.

2

What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what is inevitable: *the rise of nihilism*. This tale can already be told, for necessity itself is at work here. This destiny speaks in a hundred different signs, announcing itself everywhere; for this 'music of the future' all ears are already pricked. The whole of our European culture has long been in an agony of suspense, increasing with each passing decade, as if in anticipation of disaster, like a torrent, restlessly, violently rushing *to its end*, refusing to reflect, afraid to reflect.

3

On the other hand, the present writer has done nothing thus far *but* reflect: as a philosopher and instinctive hermit, who found an advantage in remaining aloof and alien, in being patient, in hesitating and hanging back; as a bold, venturesome spirit, one who has already lost his way in every labyrinth of the future; as a spirit who, like some bird of augury, in *turning towards the past* foretells what is to come; as the first perfect European nihilist, but as one who has already outlived the nihilism he contains within himself – who has left it behind him, considers it beneath him, no longer a part of him . . .

4

Do not mistake the meaning of the title by which this gospel of the future shall be known. *The Will to Power: An Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values* – with this formula a *contrary movement* finds expression, in regard to both principle and mission: a movement which at some point in the future will supersede this perfect nihilism, but which nevertheless *presupposes* it, both logically and psychologically, and which simply cannot arise, except from *within it*. Why is the rise of nihilism *inevitable* now? Because our previous values themselves, when pushed to their ultimate consequences, lead to it; because it is the logical outcome of our greatest values and ideals – because we must first experience nihilism before we can determine what these 'values' were actually *worth* . . . Sooner or later we shall stand in need of *new values* . . .

BOOK I

EUROPEAN NIHILISM

For the Plan

1

Nihilism stands at the door; whence comes this most uncanny of all guests?

(1) In the first place, it is a *mistake* to attribute it to 'social distress', 'physiological degeneration' or even corruption. This is the most honourable and considerate age. Hardship, whether physical or psychological, intellectual hardship, cannot in and of itself give rise to nihilism, i.e. the radical rejection of everything worthwhile, meaningful or desirable. These are susceptible of quite different interpretations. Rather, the nihilism lies in a *very specific interpretation*, the Christian moral interpretation.

(2) Christianity's downfall comes about through its morality, which is inseparable from it and which turns us against the Christian God. Our sense of truthfulness, which has been highly developed by Christianity, is *disgusted* with the falsehood and hypocrisy of the whole Christian interpretation of the world and its history. And so we swing from the extreme of believing that 'God is truth' to the opposite extreme of fanatically believing that 'all is false', to an *active* Buddhism . . .

(3) Scepticism about morality is what is decisive. The *moral* interpretation of the world loses all *justification* once it tries to flee into transcendence – a process which ends in nihilism and leads to its downfall. 'Everything is meaningless': when tremendous energy has been expended on an interpretation of the world that proves impracticable,

it arouses the suspicion that *all* such interpretations are false. The result is a Buddhistic disposition, a yearning for nothingness. (By contrast, what lies behind Buddhism in India is *not* at bottom a development involving morality, thus its nihilism is nothing more than the expression of moral prejudices it has not yet overcome: a combination of existence as a punishment with existence as an error, and therefore error as punishment – a value judgement.) Philosophical attempts are made to overcome the 'moral God' (e.g. Hegel, pantheism). Popular ideals, such as that of the wise man, the saint and the poet, are also overcome. Antagonisms arise between the 'true', the 'beautiful' and the 'good' . . .

(4) If we are to be opposed to 'meaninglessness' on the one hand, and moral value judgements on the other, must we not ask to what extent science and philosophy themselves have previously developed under the auspices of moral judgements? Would we not earn the enmity of science as well? Or become opposed to science ourselves? The critique of Spinozism belongs here. Obsolete Christian value judgements are ubiquitous in Socialistic and positivistic systems. What we lack is a *critique of Christian morality*.

(5) Nihilistic consequences appear in contemporary natural science (along with its attempts to escape into transcendence). In the end, scientific undertakings inevitably *lead* to the self-dissolution of science, to science turning on *itself*, to an opposition to science. Since Copernicus man has been rolling away from the centre towards *x*.

(6) Nihilistic consequences appear in political and economic ways of thinking, where every 'principle' borders on the histrionic: the hint of mediocrity, wretchedness, dishonesty, etc. in them. Nationalism, anarchism, etc. Punishment. What we lack is a *redeeming* social class or man who justifies it all.

(7) Nihilistic consequences appear in historiography and in the '*practical* historians', i.e. the Romantics. There is an

absolute *dearth* of originality in the position assumed by artists in the modern world. They are sunk in despondency. Goethe is taken for some sort of Olympian.

(8) Art prepares the way for nihilism, e.g. Romanticism (the conclusion of Wagner's *Ring of the Nibelung*).

Part 1. Nihilism

1. Nihilism as a Consequence of the Previous Interpretation of the Value of Existence

2

Nihilism: there is no goal, no answer to the question: why? What is the significance of nihilism? – *that the highest values devalue themselves*.[1]

3

Radical nihilism is the conviction that existence itself is absolutely indefensible, in the light of the highest values we recognize; it also includes the *insight* that we have not the least right to assume the existence of a beyond or an intrinsic nature of things which is said to be 'divine', which is said to be morality incarnate.

This insight is a consequence of a carefully cultivated sense of 'truthfulness', which is itself a consequence of the belief in morality.

4

What *advantages* did the Christian hypothesis of morality offer?

(1) It conferred an absolute *value* on man, in contrast with the trifling and accidental role he plays in the stream of becoming and passing away.

(2) It served the advocates of God, in as much as it permitted them to characterize the world as *perfect*, despite all sorrow and evil, because it included 'freedom' – thus evil seemed full of *meaning*.

(3) It assumed that man has *knowledge* of absolute values, and thus *adequate knowledge* of precisely that which is most important.

It prevented men from feeling contempt for themselves as human beings, from siding against life and from being driven to despair by their ignorance; it was a *means of self-preservation* – in sum, morality was the great *antidote* to practical and theoretical *nihilism*.

5

But among the virtues cultivated by morality was *truthfulness*: in the end, it is *this* which turns us against morality, and discovers its *function*, its *partiality*. At this point, our *insight* acts as a stimulant to nihilism. We notice that by having interpreted the world in terms of morality for so long, we have acquired needs for what is apparently untrue, a dishonesty so inveterate that we despair of ever shaking it off. On the other hand, what makes life bearable and gives it value seems to depend on these very needs. A conflict then arises between assigning *no* value to what we know, and being *forbidden* to assign any value to the lies we want to tell ourselves – and this antagonism results in a process of disintegration.

6

This is the antinomy: in so far as we believe in morality, we *condemn* existence.

7

The supreme values in whose service man is *supposed to* live, especially when being at their disposal is difficult and costly – these *social* values have been raised above man for purposes of *amplification*, to convey the impression that they were God's commands, or 'reality', or the world of 'truth', or the hope of a *future* life. Now that the base origin of these values has become obvious, everything seems to have lost its value and to have become 'meaningless' . . . but this is only an *intermediate stage*.

8

This *nihilistic* outcome (that all is worthless) is the result of a moral value judgement. *We have come to find selfishness disgusting* (even though we have realized that altruism is impossible). *We have come to find necessity disgusting* (even though we have realized that a *liberum arbitrium* and an 'intelligible freedom' are impossible). We see that the sphere in which we have placed our values is beyond our reach – and yet that other sphere in which we live has *by no means* gained value as a result: on the contrary, we have grown *weary* of it because we have lost the mainspring of our actions. 'Everything up to now was in vain!'

9

Pessimism as the prototype of nihilism.

10

This is our point of departure: pessimism may be regarded as a sign of strength, but in what respect? In the power of its logic and analysis, or when it takes the form of anarchistic and nihilistic tendencies. Pessimism may also be regarded as a sign of decline, but in what respect? When it seems to be the result of pampering, of cosmopolitan dilettantism, of historicism and an effort '*tout comprendre*'[2] . . .

The *critical tension*: the extremes appear and become predominant.

11

The logic of pessimism leads ultimately to nihilism, but what motivates it? The notion that everything is *worthless, meaningless*, the way that moral judgements lie behind all other high ideals. Result: *moral value judgements are condemnations, repudiations; morality is the renunciation of the will to live* . . .

12

Critique of nihilism

(1)

In the *first* place, nihilism as a *psychological condition* is bound to arise when we have sought a 'meaning' in all that

occurs which is not to be found; so that in the end we become discouraged. Nihilism, then, is the process of becoming aware of a great waste of energy extending over a long space of time, and suffering at the thought that it was all 'in vain'; we feel unsteady, and lack opportunities to recuperate or to regain our composure – but most of all, nihilism comes about because we are mortified by our own persistent self-deception . . . The meaning that we seek might be the existence of a moral world order, the 'compliance' of everything with a supreme canon of morality; or an increase of love and harmony in our intercourse with our fellow creatures; or something approaching a general state of happiness; or even a headlong rush into utter annihilation – aims of any kind still constitute a source of meaning. What all these notions have in common is that something is to be *achieved* through the world process itself; and now we grasp that the process achieves *nothing*, accomplishes *nothing* . . . That is why disappointment in regard to the alleged *purpose of the process* is a cause of nihilism, whether the disappointment is with respect to a very specific purpose, or is a general sense of the inadequacy of every previous hypothesis about the whole 'development' that makes use of the notion of final cause. (Man can no longer think of himself as a fellow labourer in the process, much less the centre of it.)

In the *second* place, nihilism as a psychological condition arises when man imagines that there is a *wholeness*, a *system*, even an *organization* to all that occurs, so that the mind, longing for something to admire and worship, revels in the general idea of a supreme form of governance and administration (if it is the mind of a logician, perfect consistency and objective dialectic will suffice to reconcile it to everything). When man believes in a kind of unity, in some form of 'monism', he feels a profound sense of relation to and dependence upon a whole that is infinitely superior to him, and feels himself to be a mode of the divine. 'The greater good demands the surrender of the individual . . .' but lo and behold, there *is* no greater good! In essence, man loses all belief in his own worth if there is no whole of infinite worth encompassing him, no power

working through him; or, to put it differently, he conceived of such a whole *in order to prop up his own sense of self-worth.*

Nihilism as a psychological condition takes yet a *third* and *final* form. Given these two insights, that the world process accomplishes nothing, and that it has no great unity by virtue of which the individual might become a part of a larger whole, as if he were completely immersing himself in an element of supreme value, one means of *evasion* remains: to condemn the whole thing as an illusion, and to invent a world that lies beyond it, a world of *truth*. As soon as man finds out that this world was merely pieced together to meet his psychological needs, and that he has absolutely no right to it, the final form of nihilism emerges: the nihilism which involves disbelief in *a metaphysical world*, and which forbids itself any belief in a world of truth. From this standpoint, he must admit that process and change are the *only* reality, and must deny himself any short cuts to other worlds or false gods – *but the world that he has no wish to deny is a world that he cannot endure . . .*

What has actually happened? The sense of *worthlessness* arises when it is understood that the general character of existence does not admit of interpretation in terms of the notions '*purpose*', '*unity*' or '*truth*'. Existence achieves nothing and accomplishes nothing; it lacks an overarching unity in the multiplicity of events which compose it; the character of existence is not '*true*', but *false*; there is utterly no reason to believe in a world of *truth* . . .

In short, the categories 'purpose', 'unity', 'being' are no longer available to us, and since these were the categories which invested the world with value, the world now seems *worthless* . . .

(2)

Suppose we were to realize how impossible it is for us to interpret the world in terms of these three categories, and having gained this insight we began to find the world worthless, we would have to ask ourselves where our belief in these three categories came from in the first place – and instead of condemning *everything* as an illusion, we must see if it is not possible to suspend our belief in *them*. Once we deprive *them* of their value,

we will no longer consider the proof of their inapplicability a reason to deprive everything *else* of its value.

Thus it is the *belief in the categories of reason* which produces nihilism – we have measured the world's worth by categories *which pertain to a purely fictitious world.*

Therefore, all the values which have previously rendered the world worthy of our esteem ultimately render it worthless when they prove to be inapplicable; examined psychologically, all these values are the products of specific perspectives which proved useful for maintaining and increasing the power of specific forms of domination, perspectives which we have falsely *projected* into the nature of things. It remains man's *supreme naïveté* to regard himself as the meaning and measure of all things.

13

Nihilism represents an *intermediate* pathological state (what is pathological is the immense generalization, the inference *that life has no meaning whatsoever*), whether it be that the productive forces are not yet strong enough, or that *décadence* still hesitates and has not yet devised its expedients.

*

The presupposition of this hypothesis is that there is *no truth*, no absolute nature of things, no 'thing-in-itself' – *this is itself a form of nihilism, and the most extreme form at that.* This latter nihilism about the value of things lies precisely in maintaining that these value judgements correspond to *nothing* in reality, but are instead merely symptomatic of the vigour with which such value judgements are *made.* They are a simplification *for the sake of life.*[3]

14

A *change in values* is commensurate with the *growth of power* in the *one who determines them.*

The measure of *disbelief, and* of the 'intellectual freedom' which we allow to ourselves, may be viewed as an *expression of the growth of our power.*

'Nihilism' may be viewed as the ideal of the *supreme intellectual power*, of the superabundant life; it is partly destructive and partly ironical.

15

What is a belief? What gives rise to a belief? Every belief is an act of taking something to be true.

The most extreme form of nihilism would be to think that every belief, every act of taking something to be true, is necessarily false: because there is no *world of truth* at all.

Therefore, the world with which we are acquainted is an illusion seen from a particular point of view whose origin lies in ourselves, to the extent that we are always in need of a more limited, abridged and simplified world – and that it is a *measure of our strength* how much illusoriness, how much necessary falsehood, we are able to acknowledge without going to pieces.

From this standpoint, nihilism, as the *denial* of a world of truth and of being, might be a divine way of thinking . . .

16

If we are 'disillusioned', it is not with respect to life; it is rather because our eyes have been opened to all kinds of 'aspirations'. We look down in scorn and wrath at what the word 'idealism' really means; it is only in consequence of our occasional inability to suppress this perverse impulse that we truly despise ourselves. On those occasions, the wrath of our *disillusionment* is weaker than the *force of habit* . . .

17

The extent to which Schopenhauer's nihilism is still the result of the same ideal which gave rise to Christian theism. The degree of assurance in regard to the highest aspiration, the highest values and the highest perfection, was so great that the philosophers *trusted* it as an *absolute certainty a priori*, as a truth which we may take for *granted*, as 'God' first and foremost. 'To become like God', 'to become one with God' – for millennia people have been naïvely convinced of the desirability of these

things (as a parenthetical remark for my more asinine readers, what convinces us is not therefore true: it is merely *convincing*).

We know better now than to take for granted this juxtaposition of ideal and *personal reality*: we have become atheistic. But has the ideal really been abandoned? In essence, the most recent metaphysicians still seek an underlying 'reality' for it, the 'thing-in-itself' in relation to which everything else is merely illusory. Their dogma is that because our world of illusion is so obviously *not* the expression of that ideal, and cannot even be traced back to that metaphysical world as its cause, it therefore cannot be 'true'. The unconditioned, so long as it is that supreme perfection, cannot possibly furnish the basis of everything conditioned. Schopenhauer, who wished it otherwise, was obliged to conceive of this metaphysical basis as the opposite of the ideal, as 'an evil, blind will', in such a way that it could be 'that which appears', that which manifests itself in the world of illusion. But even so, he did not abandon that one absolute, the ideal itself – instead, he smuggled it in . . . (Kant seemed to think that the hypothesis of 'intelligible freedom' was necessary in order to relieve God, the *ens perfectum*, of responsibility for *this* world's being such-and-such – in short, in order to explain evil and mischief: a scandalous abuse of logic for a philosopher . . .)

18

The most ubiquitous sign of modern times. Man has suffered an incredible loss of *dignity* in his own eyes. For a long time he thought that he played the central part and tragic hero in the drama of existence; then he made a concerted effort to prove himself at least related to the intrinsically valuable and decisive aspect of existence – as do all metaphysicians who want man to retain his *dignity*, in their belief that moral values are cardinal values. He who has let go of God clings all the more tenaciously to his belief in morality.

19

Every merely moral determination of values (as, e.g., that of Buddhism) *ends in nihilism*; the same thing awaits Europe! We

think we can dispense with a religious background when we moralize, but this *inevitably* leads to nihilism. In religion, nothing compels us to admit that we and we alone determine what is valuable.

20

The question which nihilism poses, namely, 'To what end?', springs from the previous habit of regarding ends as set for us, given to us and required of us by something external – that is, by some supernatural authority. Although we have been weaned from believing in this sort of thing, the force of habit still leads us to look for *another* authority, which could speak to us in a peremptory manner, assigning to us our tasks and aims. The authority of *conscience* now steps into the foreground (the more we emancipate ourselves from theology, the more morality couches itself in the imperative mood), offering itself as compensation for a personal authority; and if not conscience, then the authority of *reason*, or the social instinct (the herd), or *history* with an immanent spirit, which has its own end to which we can resign ourselves. We would like to circumvent the will, its exercise in action directed towards an end and the risk involved in proposing ends to ourselves; we would like to avoid responsibility (which is why we would happily accept fatalism if we could). Finally, we allow happiness to become an obligatory end, and then, with a bit of Tartuffery,[4] the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Notice how the individual ends conflict with one another, and the collective ends conflict with the individual ones. Everyone will become a party to this, even the philosophers. We tell ourselves (1) that a definite end is quite unnecessary, and (2) is quite unlikely in the foreseeable future in any case.

Especially now, when what is needed most is a supreme effort of will, we find ourselves weak-willed and faint-hearted.

We have no confidence whatsoever in the ability of the will to organize the whole.

21

The *perfect nihilist*. The eye of the nihilist, *which idealizes into ugliness*, is unfaithful to his memories: it discards them as a tree

sheds its leaves in autumn; it does not protect them from that deathly pallor which infirmity casts over what is distant and past; the nihilist treats the whole past of mankind no better than he treats himself – he discards it.

22

It can *mean two different things*:

(a) Nihilism as a sign of an increase in mental power, as *active nihilism* . . .

*

(b) Nihilism as a decline and retrogression of mental power: *passive nihilism.*[5]

23

Nihilism is the *normal* condition.

*

It may be a sign of *strength*: mental vigour may have grown so much that the ends which have been pursued *thus far* ('convictions', articles of faith) are no longer appropriate – for generally speaking, a faith is an expression of the *exigencies* to which a living creature is subject, the conditions under which it *prospers*, *grows* and *gains power* . . .

On the other hand, it may be a sign of *insufficient* strength to create one's *own* aims, purposes or beliefs.

It reaches its *maximum* of relative vigour as a violent and *destructive* force, as *active nihilism*. Its opposite would be a *weary* nihilism which no longer *attacks* anything, its most famous form being Buddhism, a *passive* nihilism . . .

*

. . . as a sign of weakness. Mental vigour may become weary and *exhausted*, so that the *previous* aims and values have ceased to be appropriate and have ceased to carry conviction – so that the synthesis of values and aims (the foundation of every strong culture) dissolves, and the particular values contend with one another – *disintegration* – so that everything which refreshes, heals, soothes or stupefies comes into the foreground under various *disguises*, be they religious, moral, political, aesthetic, etc.[6]

24

The advent of nihilism. Nihilism is not merely a state of contemplativeness about everything having been 'in vain!', nor is it merely the belief that all that exists deserves to be destroyed; the nihilist takes matters into his own hands and *destroys.* This is, if you will, *illogical*; but the nihilist does not feel any obligation to be logical . . . Nihilism is the condition of strong minds and wills; and to such it is not possible to stop at negative 'judgements'; for their nature demands *negative actions.* Annihilation by judgement is accompanied by annihilation by hand.

25

On the genesis of the nihilist. The courage to face what we already *know* only comes late in life. I have only quite recently admitted to myself that I was the quintessential nihilist all along: the energy and radicalism with which I progressed as a nihilist deceived me about this fundamental fact. When we are making progress towards a goal, it is hard to believe that our fundamental tenet is 'strictly speaking, there are no goals'.

26

The pessimism of energetic men. The question: to what end? may supervene after a terrible struggle, even after a victory. However, we who are naturally strong instinctively regard something as a hundred times *more important* than our *own* welfare – and consequently, more important than *others'* welfare. In short, we have an *aim* which requires us to offer *human sacrifices*, run any risk and assume the most terrible responsibilities; we have the *great passion.*

2. Further Causes of Nihilism

27

The causes of nihilism:

(1) *The superior species is lacking, i.e.* the species whose inexhaustible fertility and power would sustain our faith in

man (think of what we owe to Napoleon: almost all the higher hopes of this century).

(2) *The inferior species*, the 'herd', the 'masses', 'society', has lost the habit of humility, and by means of puffery they make *cosmic* and *metaphysical* values out of their needs. In this way the whole of existence is *vulgarized*, for in as much as the *masses* prevail, they tyrannize over the *exceptions*, so that these lose faith in themselves and become *nihilists*.

All attempts *to conceive of higher types have failed* (as witness 'Romanticism', and its conceptions of the artist and the philosopher, notwithstanding Carlyle's attempt to procure for them a reputation for being supremely moral). As a result, the *higher* type meets with *resistance*. The position of all higher types becomes *insecure* and they go into *decline*; the inferior contend with genius (as witness 'folk poetry', etc.). The measure of a man's compassion for the lowly and the suffering comes to be the *measure* of the *loftiness of his soul*.

Actions speak loudly enough, but a philosopher is needed to interpret what they say and not merely paraphrase it. *Such philosophers are entirely lacking*.

28

We are surrounded by the forms of *imperfect* nihilism. *Attempts to escape nihilism* without revaluing those values produce the opposite of the intended effect; they aggravate the situation.

29

In one's heart of hearts: not knowing where to go. *Emptiness*.

The attempt to surmount it by means of intoxication.

Intoxication of music.

Intoxication by taking a sort of cruel pleasure in the tragic ruin of the noblest.

Intoxication of blind enthusiasm for *individuals* (or *periods*) (as hatred, etc.).

The attempt to distract oneself by labouring in the service of science.

To be alive to the many little pleasures of, e.g., seeking knowledge. Modesty towards oneself.

A reticence to generalize about oneself, to the point of pathos.

Mysticism, the voluptuous *enjoyment* of eternal emptiness.

Art for art's sake, '*le fait*', 'pure perception' as a drug to render oneself insensible to *self-disgust*.

Any kind of regular work, *any* kind of silly little fanaticism.

A shambles made of all moderation – illness from general licentiousness. (Excess kills enjoyment.)

(1) As a result, weakness of will.

(2) A *felt* contrast between extreme pride on the one hand, and the humiliation of petty weakness on the other.

30

The time is coming when we shall have to *pay* for having been *Christians* for two thousand years; we have lost the *essential thing* on which our lives depend; for a long while we will not know what to do with ourselves. We are rushing headlong towards the *opposite* values, with the same amount of energy with which we have been Christians – with which we [have embraced] senselessly exaggerated Christian [values].

*

Now, everything is false through and through, nothing but 'words, words, words', confused, feeble or overwrought.

(a) We attempt some kind of *secular solution* which retains the same meaning as the Christian one, a solution in which truth, love and justice (i.e. the Socialists) *triumph in the end*: 'the equality of persons'.

(b) We likewise try to cling to the *moral ideal* (which gives precedence to altruism, self-sacrifice and denial of the will).

(c) We even try to cling to a 'beyond', albeit only as an unknown postulated in defiance of all logic; but it is immediately decked out in such a way that some good old-fashioned metaphysical comfort might be derived from it.

(d) We try to see *the good old-fashioned hand of God* in all that occurs, something in the order of things which rewards, punishes, educates, *ameliorates*.

(e) We continue to believe in good and evil, and we feel an *obligation* to bring about the triumph of good, the destruction of evil (this is English, and is typical of that numbskull John Stuart Mill).

(f) The contempt felt for what is 'natural', for the appetites and for the ego; we try to regard even supreme intellectual and artistic achievement as a result of impersonality and *désintéressement*.

(g) We continue to allow the *Church* to intrude upon all the vital experiences and important milestones in the life of an individual, in order to *consecrate* them and give them a *higher meaning*; we even have a 'Christian state' and Christian 'marriage'.

31

European pessimism is still in its infancy and has not yet acquired what it once had in India: the immense longing for transcendence, the hypnotized fixity of gaze in which nothingness is reflected. It is much too contrived, and not something into which Europeans have 'grown', being too much a pessimism of the pedant and poet. What I mean is that to a great extent it is an elaboration and an embellishment, 'artificial' but not yet a *motive for conduct*; [as I say,] it is contrived and not 'grown'.

There have been more intellectual and analytical times than ours, for example when the Buddha appeared. After centuries of sectarian disputes, even common people found that they were as deeply lost in the gorges of philosophical doctrine as at times European peoples had been with the subtleties of religious dogma. By contrast, our 'literature' and press would be least likely to tempt us to a high opinion of the 'intellect' of our age. For all that, millions of spiritualists, and a Christianity that involves hideous gymnastics typical of the English, prove to be more revealing – a self-incriminating witness.

32

Critique of the current pessimism. The pessimist's gloom, the pessimist's question of what it all *means*, finally reduces to a defence of eudaemonistic considerations. By contrast, *our* pessimism consists in thinking that the world is not worth what we thought it was worth; this *has to* be said, if we are honest with ourselves, if our appetite for knowledge, whetted by our faith itself, has made us so. We therefore regarded it as less valuable; and so it *seemed at first*. This is the only sense in which we are pessimists, that is, we are determined to unreservedly acknowledge to ourselves the necessity of this revaluation, without droning on and on, telling ourselves lie after lie as we had in the past . . . It is precisely in this way that we find the pathos which perhaps urges us to seek *new values. In summa*, the world might be worth more than we thought – our *ideals* must stand convicted of *naïveté*, for it is possible that in our conscious effort to give human existence the highest interpretation, we have not assessed it at even a moderately fair value.

What has been *deified*? The *community's* propensity to value whatever enabled it to survive. What has been *maligned*? Propensities to create gulfs separating the superior men from their inferiors.

33

The reasons for the *emergence of pessimism*:

(1) Life's most powerful and promising impulses have thus far been so *maligned* that life itself is cursed.

(2) Man's increasing bravery, honesty and unflinching scepticism enable him to comprehend that *these instincts are inseparable* from life, and these virtues turn him against life altogether.

(3) Only the most *mediocre* kind of man who is not even *aware* of this conflict prospers, while the superior kind of man comes to grief, and as a product of degeneration excites antipathy – on the other hand, when the *mediocre* kind of man gives himself out as the alpha and omega, it excites *indignation* (no one can any longer answer the question: *to what end?*).

(4) Degradation, susceptibility to pain, hurry, restlessness and crowds are constantly increasing – all this hustle and bustle, this so-called 'civilization', is becoming more and more conspicuous, and in the face of this vast machine the individual *surrenders in despair.*

34

Modern pessimism is an expression of futility, but it is the futility of the *modern* world – not of the world and existence as such.

35

For a critique of pessimism. The doctrine of the 'preponderance of *pain over pleasure*' and its reverse (hedonism) are already indications of nihilism, are already *nihilistic*, for in both cases it is assumed that in the end, nothing is of any *significance* other than the phenomenon of pleasure and pain.

Only a man who no longer dares to desire anything, to intend anything, or even to attach significance to anything speaks in this way – for every healthy man, the value of life is certainly not measured by such trifles. There might very well be a *preponderance* of pain, and a mighty will capable of *affirming life just the same*; there might even be need of this preponderance.

'Life is not worth living'; 'resignation', 'why so many tears? . . .'[7] – these words betray a sickly and maudlin sensibility. '*Un monstre gai vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux.*'[8]

36

The nihilistic philosopher is convinced that all that happens is gratuitous and meaningless, and that reality should not contain anything gratuitous and meaningless. But whence comes this 'should not'? But whence comes *this* particular 'meaning', *this* particular standard? In the nihilist's opinion, the sight of a world so desolate and barren leaves the philosopher *dissatisfied*, desolate and desperate; such a spectacle offends the philosopher's delicate sensibilities. It amounts to nothing more than a preposterous value judgement: the nature of existence is utterly inexcusable *if it is not sufficiently pleasing to the philosopher* . . .

Now it is easy to understand that the pleasure and pain occasioned by events can only serve as a means; what remains to be seen is whether we will ever be *able* to discern the 'meaning' and 'purpose' of things, whether the problem of meaninglessness or its opposite is not a problem which for us admits of no solution.

37

The development of nihilism from pessimism. The denaturalization of *values*, the Scholasticism of values. Values become detached from their natural purposes, and become mere ideals which, instead of governing and guiding conduct, turn *against* it and condemn it.

Diametrical opposites are introduced in lieu of natural ranks and degrees, out of hatred of that hierarchy. Opposites are better suited to a plebeian age; the plebs find them easier to *comprehend.*

The world is then *rejected*, in favour of an artificially constructed 'true and valuable' one.

Eventually we discover from what material we have constructed the 'world of truth'; now, all that we have left is what we have rejected, and *we add this, our greatest disappointment, to all the other reasons for rejecting it.*

Thus we arrive at *nihilism*: we have retained the *values by which we judge* – nothing else remains!

Hence arises the *problem of strength and weakness*:

(1) The weak are broken by it,

(2) The strong destroy all that remains unbroken,

(3) The strongest overcome the values by which we judge.

All told, this is what constitutes the tragic age.

3. The Nihilistic Movement as an Expression of *Décadence*

38

There has recently been a great deal of idle talk using a loose and altogether inapplicable term: *pessimism.* Everywhere the talk is about pessimism, and everywhere people (occasionally

even sensible people!) are wrangling over a specific question which they think admits of an answer: whether optimism or pessimism is correct. What they do not understand, although it is palpable, is that pessimism is not a problem but a symptom, that the term should be replaced by *nihilism*, that the question of whether it is better to be or not to be, is itself an illness, a decline in strength, a kind of hypersensitivity.

The pessimistic movement is only an expression of physiological *décadence* . . .

39

We need to *understand* that every kind of disease and decay is constantly making some contribution to the common fund of our value judgements, and that *décadence* even constitutes the bulk of the prevailing value judgements. Not only do we have to combat the present misery which is the consequence of this degeneration, we also have to combat *all* the previous *décadence* that remains behind, i.e. that remains *virulent*. How such a total aberration of human instinct is even possible, how value judgements could come to be so thoroughly affected by *décadence* remains the question mark *par excellence*, the real enigma which the animal 'man' presents to all philosophers.

40

The notion 'décadence'. Degeneration, decay and waste are not to be condemned per se: they are the natural consequences of life and growth. The phenomenon of *décadence* is just as necessary to life as its progress and ascent, and we are in no position to *eliminate* it. On the contrary, it is only reasonable to give *décadence* its *due*.

It is disgraceful that all the advocates of Socialist theories believe that there could be circumstances and social arrangements which would no longer promote vice, disease, crime, prostitution and even *poverty* . . . But that amounts to a condemnation of *life itself* . . . A society is not at liberty to remain young, and even at the height of its powers a society still produces refuse and waste. The more bold and energetic its

progress, the more prolific it is in failures and defectives – and the nearer its destruction. One cannot ward off decrepitude, or disease, or vice with better institutions; it is folly to think otherwise.

41

Fundamental insight into the nature of *décadence*: *what have been considered its causes are in fact its consequences*, and that entirely alters our perspective on the *problems of morality*. Vice, luxury, crime, disease even: the whole moral struggle against vice, luxury, etc. seems naïve and superfluous . . . There is no such thing as '*betterment*' – against *remorse*.

Décadence itself is not to be *resisted*: it is absolutely necessary, and is found in every age and people. What ought to be resisted with all our might is the contagion spreading to the healthy parts of the organism. Is that being done? No, on the contrary, precisely the opposite is being done, on behalf of *mankind*. How do the previous *supreme values* of philosophy, religion, morality, art, etc. stand in relation to this fundamental question in *biology*?

Ever since Napoleon (a man who regarded civilization as his natural enemy), the remedy for all this has been *militarism* . . .

42

The consequences of *décadence* include: vice, viciousness; sickness, sickliness; wrongdoing, criminality; celibacy, sterility; hysteria, weakness of will; alcoholism; pessimism; anarchism.

Regarding *degeneracy*, the first principle is that everything which has previously been regarded as a *cause of degeneration* is really its *consequence*.

Vice as a consequence. Sickness, sterility. Wrongdoing: slanderers, subversives, unbelievers, destroyers; scepticism, asceticism, nihilism, otherworldliness. *Libertinage* (including the *intellectual* kind) as well as celibacy. Weakness of will, pessimism, anarchism.

But even those things which have been regarded as the *remedies* of fatigue are only *palliatives* of some of its effects; the '*cured*' are merely *degenerate types*.

43

On the notion '*décadence*' –

(1) Scepticism is a consequence of *décadence*, as is intellectual *libertinage*.

(2) Moral corruption is a consequence of *décadence* (weakness of the will, the need for powerful stimulants).

(3) The standard methods of treatment, whether psychological or moral, neither alter nor arrest the course of *décadence*; physiologically speaking, they amount to *nothing*. Insight into the *utter insignificance* of these 'responses', notwithstanding their pretensions. They are forms of anaesthesia which merely render the patient insensible to the pain of certain subsequent, fatal symptoms, without removing the morbid condition which causes them. They are often heroic measures taken to reduce the decadent man's *deleterious influence* to a minimum by subjecting him to a kind of quarantine.

(4) Nihilism is not the cause but only the rationalization of *décadence*.

(5) 'Good' and 'bad' are merely two different types of *décadence*; they are fundamentally similar phenomena.

(6) The *social problem* is a consequence of *décadence*.

(7) Diseases, most notably diseases of the brain and nerves, are indications of a constitutional lack of *resistance*, a sure sign of the irritability which regards *pleasure* and *pain* as paramount considerations.

44

On the history of *nihilism. The most common types of décadence*:

(1) Remedies are chosen in the *belief* that they are efficacious, despite the fact that they only hasten exhaustion; these remedies include Christianity (to mention the principal example of instinct gone awry); they also include the pursuit of 'progress'.

(2) The power of *resistance* to stimuli is lost, and everything is left to chance; experience is crudely understood and given a disproportionate importance . . . things are taken

more 'impersonally', efforts become increasingly divided and action loses all unity of purpose; this loss of resistance includes a whole strain of moralizing, the altruistic kind, which has compassion on its lips and whose essence is personal weakness. At the sound of suffering it is thrown into *sympathetic vibration*, like some high-strung instrument perpetually trembling in a state of extreme irritability . . .

(3) Cause and effect are confounded: *décadence* is not recognized as a physiological condition and its consequences are taken to be the real cause of the illness; this confusion includes the whole of religious moralizing.

(4) *Décadence* ultimately creates a longing for a state in which there will be no more suffering; life is actually felt to be the root of all *evil*; *unconscious* and insensible states (sleep, fainting) come to be prized as incomparably more valuable than conscious states; from which a *method* is derived . . .

45

On the hygiene of the 'weak'. All that is done in weakness ends in failure. The moral should be to do nothing. The only trouble is that the very strength required to defer action, to *suppress* reaction, is most subject to the pathological influence of weakness; one never reacts more hastily or more blindly than when one should not react at all . . . The strength of a man's character shows itself in patience and forbearance; it is marked by a certain ἀδιαφορία,[9] just as weakness is marked by involuntary reaction, by uninhibited and precipitate 'action' . . . The will is weak, and the recipe for preventing follies would be to have a strong will and to do *nothing* . . . *Contradictio* . . . It is a form of self-destruction, in which the instinct of self-preservation is compromised . . . *Weak men injure themselves* . . . That is the very *type* of *décadence*. As a matter of fact, we find a vast amount of thought is given to the practices by which one may become *impassive*. To this extent, the instincts are on the right track; for to do nothing is more useful than to do something . . . All the practices of religious orders, solitary philosophers and fakirs are inspired by the correct assessment that for a certain

kind of man, he will do himself the *most good* when he prevents himself from acting as much as possible. *Means of relief* include absolute obedience, mechanical activity, separation from men and things that might encourage immediate decisions and actions.

46

Weakness of will can be a misleading metaphor, for there is no will, consequently there are neither strong nor weak wills. The multiplicity of the impulses and their disarray, the want of system in their relationships with one another, is what results in a 'weak will'; their coordination, under the hegemony of a single impulse, results in a 'strong will': in the first case vacillation and a lack of emphasis, in the second, precision and a clear direction.

47

Décadence. That which is inherited is not disease but the *tendency* to disease, a diminished power of resistance to disease, a failure to guard against the danger of infection, etc.; prostration – expressed *morally*: resignation and cowardice in the face of the enemy.

I have often wondered whether it would not be possible to compare the supreme values of the previous philosophies, moralities and religions with the values of the enervated, the *insane* and the neurasthenic; in a milder form, they represent the *same evils.* The value of these morbid conditions is that they serve as a magnifying glass for certain conditions which are normal, but which are normally invisible to the naked eye . . .

'*Health* and *sickness* are not two essentially different modes, as the ancient physicians believed and as some practitioners still believe. Do not make them into separate principles, beings which vie for the living organism, and make of it their battlefield. That is antiquated stuff and nonsense which is good for nothing. In reality, between these two ways of being there are only differences of degree; exaggeration, disproportion, disharmony of normal phenomena is what constitutes the diseased state' (Claude Bernard).[10] Just as *evil* may be regarded as

exaggeration, disharmony and disproportion, so too can good be regarded as a sort of *preventive regimen* against the dangers of exaggeration, disharmony and disproportion.

Hereditary weakness as the *dominant* feeling is the cause of the supreme values. NB. People *prefer* weakness, but why? . . . Mostly because they *cannot help being weak*. *Weakening* is considered a *duty*: weakening of the desires, of the feelings of pleasure and of pain, of the will to power, to a sense of pride, to possessions and still more possessions; weakening as humility; weakening as faith; *weakening* as shame and disgust in the face of everything natural; as the denial of life, as disease and chronic weakness . . . *Weakening* as the renunciation of vengeance, resistance, enmity and anger.

Errors in treatment: there is no attempt to combat weakness by means of a *système fortifiant*;[11] rather, there is an attempt to justify it by turning it into a *moral* phenomenon, i.e. to combat it by means of an *interpretation* . . . Two totally different conditions are *confounded*, e.g. the *repose of strength*, which is essentially the ability to refrain from reacting, the model of which is a god who remains unmoved by anything[12] . . . and the repose of exhaustion, rigidity to the point of anaesthesia. All these philosophic and ascetic procedures are methods of producing the latter, but remarkably enough are believed to produce the former . . . and we know this because the condition which these procedures achieve is described by the procedures themselves in terms corresponding to those in which a divine condition would be described.

48

Religion as décadence; *the most dangerous misconception.* There is one notion which would seem to admit of no ambiguity or confusion, and that is *exhaustion.* Exhaustion may be both acquired and passed on to the next generation, but in any case it changes the aspect of things and the *value of things* . . .

Unlike those who have no choice but to *give* to things a portion of the abundance they represent and feel within themselves, who leave things looking fuller, more powerful and more promising, who at least *can* give of themselves – the exhausted

botch and bungle everything they see; they *cheapen* things. The exhausted are harmful . . .

A mistake on this point would seem impossible, and yet history bears witness to the terrible fact that the exhausted have always been *confounded* with the most richly endowed – and the most richly endowed with the most harmful.

Those whose lives are impoverished, the weak, impoverish life even more; those whose lives are rich, the strong, enrich it . . . The former are life's parasites, the latter its benefactors . . . How is it even possible to confound them? . . .

When the exhausted appear with the air of the supremely active and energetic, when degeneration entails excessive mental or nervous discharge, people have *confounded* them with the rich . . . They inspired fear . . . The cult of the *fool* remains the cult of the richly endowed, of the mighty. The fanatics, the possessed, the religious epileptics and all the other eccentrics have been perceived as supreme examples of power, as *divine*.

This kind of strength which inspires *fear* was regarded as especially divine; it was hither that authority took its origin; it was here that people sought, interpreted and hearkened to words of *wisdom* . . . From this there developed, almost everywhere, a *desire* for one's own 'deification', i.e. a desire for the characteristic degeneration of mind, body and nerves which would lead to a higher order of being. To invite disease and madness, to provoke the symptoms of derangement, meant to grow stronger, more superhuman, more terrible and more wise – people believed that by so doing they would acquire so much power that they would be able to *give*; in all ages and places, where people have worshipped they have sought someone with the power to give. They took the fool for something superhuman, and believed that terrible powers were active in epileptics and persons afflicted with nervous disorders.

Here the experience of *intoxication* proved to be misleading. Intoxication intensifies the *feeling* of power to an extraordinary degree, leading to the unsophisticated judgement that power *itself* has increased. The ecstatic, the *most intoxicated* man was therefore expected to have the highest degree of power . . . but there are two sources of *intoxication*: superabundant vitality

and cerebral malnutrition. Nothing has been more costly than confounding the physiology of these two things.

49

The forms of *acquired*, as opposed to inherited, exhaustion include the following:

Inadequate nutrition, often the result of ignorance concerning nutrition, e.g. among scholars.

Sexual precocity, the bane especially of French youth, Parisians above all, who have been polluted and ruined by the time they leave the *lycées*[13] and take their first steps into the world, youths who, with all their refinement, are mere galley slaves, filled with irony and self-contempt for being unable to break the chains of their reprehensible tendencies. And incidentally, in most cases precocity is already a symptom of racial and familial *décadence*, as all excessive irritability is, just as susceptibility to one's *milieu* is, for to be influenced by one's environment is also a part of *décadence*.

Alcoholism, *not* the instinct but the habit acquired by foolishly aping others, the timid or thoughtless acquiescence to a dominant *regime*. Observe among Germans (and what a blessing a Jew is by contrast!) the blond-haired, blue-eyed obtuseness, the lack of *esprit* in voice, expression and demeanour, the slouching gait and the characteristically German need for relaxation, not to recuperate from an excess of work but to recuperate from an excess of nervous irritation, that is, the untoward effects of alcoholic beverages . . .

50

A theory of exhaustion. The vice-ridden, the insane (or the artists . . .), the criminals, the anarchists – these do not have their origin in the *oppressed* races, but are superfluous people found in every class of existing society; they are the scum of the earth.[14] Once we have seen that all social strata are permeated with these elements, we have understood that *modern society* is not a 'society' at all, that it is not a 'body' but a diseased mass composed of chandalas,[15] a society which no longer has the ability to *excrete*.

To what extent has living together for centuries made us more profoundly *sick*? Modern virtue, modern intelligence, our science: as pathologies.

51

The will to power as morality. It should be understood that the forms of corruption are all of a piece; the Christian form (of which Pascal is the archetype) should no more be forgotten than the Socialistic or Communistic (which are consequences of it). The corrupt nature of the Christian ideal consists in imagining a world 'beyond', as though outside the actual world of becoming there were a world of being.

Here there can be no *truce*, but eradication, annihilation and war – the nihilistic, Christian standard of value in all its guises must be dragged *out into the open* and combated . . . in modern *sociology*, for example, modern music, for another, and, of course, in modern pessimism (all of them being forms of the Christian ideal of what is most valuable).

Either one thing *or* the other is *true*, true, i.e. improves the breed called 'man' . . .

The priest, the pastor, should be looked upon as reprehensible forms of life. All education so far has been unanchored and helplessly adrift, laden with contradictory values.

52

There is no immorality in nature's want of compassion for the degenerate. It is quite the reverse: the growth of physiological and moral evils in the human race is the *result of morbid and unnatural morality*. The sensibility of the majority [of] men is both morbid and unnatural. How is it that mankind comes to be so *corrupt*, both morally and physiologically? On what does it depend? The body perishes if a single organ is *altered*. Altruistic duty has no more basis in physiology than do the right to assistance and an equal share, which are nothing but windfalls for degenerates and unfortunates. There can be *no solidarity* in a society where there are barren, unproductive and destructive elements,

elements which, incidentally, will have even more degenerate descendants than themselves.

53

The unconscious influence of décadence on the ideals of science. *Décadence* exercises a profound and perfectly unconscious influence, even on the ideals of science; all our sociology stands in proof of this assertion. That sociology knows from experience only the present *degenerate state* of society, and inevitably takes its own degenerate instincts as the standard of sociological judgement, goes without saying. The *declining* people of modern Europe follow these instincts in formulating their social ideals, which all look confusingly similar to the ideals of *old* and *exhausted* races. The *gregarious instinct*, then – which has lately become a sovereign power – is something essentially different from the instinct of an *aristocratic society*; and the significance of the sum depends upon the value of the *units* constituting it . . . All our sociology knows no instinct but the gregarious instinct, the instinct of a *sum of zeros*, in which every zero has 'equal rights', and where it is virtuous to be a zero . . . The standard by which the various forms of society are judged today is absolutely the same as that which assigns a greater value to peace than to war; but this judgement is hostile to life, is itself the monstrous offspring of the *décadence* of life . . . Life is a result of war, society itself a means to war. Mr Herbert Spencer is a *décadent* as a biologist – and usually also as a moralist (he regards the triumph of altruism as desirable!!!).

54

A Preface. After thousands of years of error and confusion, I have had the good fortune and, still more, the honour to have rediscovered the way that leads to a 'yes' and a 'no'.

I teach that one must say 'no' to everything that weakens and exhausts.

I teach that one must say 'yes' to everything that strengthens, promotes the accumulation of power and [increases] pride.

So far, neither of them have been taught, but instead virtue, selflessness, compassion, even the negation of life itself. These are all the values of exhausted men.

After long reflection on the physiology of exhaustion, I am compelled to ask the following question: to what extent have judgements held by exhausted men penetrated into the world of values?

I received the most unexpected answer possible, even for me, who am already at home in so many strange worlds: I found that all the supreme value judgements, all the values which have lorded it over men (or at least over tamed men) are traceable to judgements held by exhausted men.

First of all, I need to teach that crime, celibacy and disease are consequences of exhaustion . . .

I have extracted from things given the holiest of names evidence of the most destructive tendencies; men have deified everything that produces weakness, teaches weakness, infects with weakness . . . I found that the 'good man' is nothing but a form of *décadence* affirming itself.

That virtue – compassion – which even Schopenhauer taught as the sole and supreme virtue, as the foundation of all virtues, is the one which I recognized as more dangerous than any vice. To essentially prevent natural selection from purging the dross from the species: up to now, this has been called virtue *par excellence* . . .

The race is ruined not by its vices, but by its ignorance; it is ruined because it has not recognized exhaustion for what it is: confusions about physiology are the root of all evil; exhausted men have misled mankind's instincts, concealing their best qualities, attaching little importance to them . . . rapid decline and life-denial were even supposed to be regarded as transcendence, as transfiguration, as deification.

Virtue is our greatest misunderstanding.

The problem is, how did these exhausted men come to legislate values? In other words, how did 'they who are last' come into power? . . . Know the history! How did it come about that the instincts of the animal called 'man' were turned upside down? . . .

*

One ought to have more respect for the *death sentence* meted out to the weak. But instead one called resistance to it 'God', thereby corrupting and ruining mankind . . . But thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain . . .

4. The Crisis: Nihilism and the Idea of Recurrence

55

However, an extreme position is not supplanted by a more moderate one, but by its *opposite* extreme. Thus the belief that nature is utterly immoral, that everything is purposeless and meaningless, is a psychologically inevitable *sentiment*, when belief in God and in an essentially moral world order is no longer tenable. Nihilism appears at this point, *not* because the pain of existence is greater than formerly, but because the idea that evil, or for that matter existence itself, has a 'meaning' is regarded with the utmost suspicion. *One* interpretation has failed, but since it was considered *the* interpretation, it now seems as if there is no meaning in existence at all, as if all is *in vain*.

It remains to be seen whether this sense of futility characteristic of our current nihilism is warranted. We have become so suspicious of our former value judgements that we are apt to ask, 'are all "values" nothing but plot devices, whose sole purpose is to prolong the farce without bringing it any nearer to a conclusion?' The thought that existence *goes on and on*, gratuitously, without aim or purpose, *paralyses* us more than any other, especially when we grasp that we are being played for fools, yet powerless to prevent it.

Let us pursue this thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, but ineluctably recurring, without ending in nothingness: 'the eternal recurrence'.

This is the most extreme form of nihilism: nothingness (that is, 'meaninglessness') for ever!

It is a European form of Buddhism; the energy of matter and of force *requires* such a belief. It is the *most scientific* of all possible hypotheses. We deny that there is any ultimate aim

of existence; if there were one, it would necessarily have been reached.

It should be understood that what we envisage here is the opposite of pantheism; for the belief that 'everything is perfect, divine, eternal' *also* requires belief in the 'eternal recurrence'. The question is: is this pantheistic affirmation of all things also rendered impossible along with morality? Strictly speaking, we have only overcome the notion of a moral God. Is there any sense in the notion of a God who is beyond 'good and evil'? Is pantheism in *this* sense possible? If we remove the idea of purpose from the process, can we still affirm the process? We could if something were *accomplished* at every moment of the process – and it was always the same thing.

Spinoza came to occupy just such a position, in as much as he considered every moment *logically* necessary; and his instincts, which were fundamentally logical, gloried in such a world.

However, this is but a single case. If an individual were to see *himself* in *the fundamental characteristic* that underlies and finds expression in *every* event, it would also necessarily impel him to accept, approve and glory in every moment of existence in general. What matters is that the fundamental characteristic be experienced as commendable, valuable and enjoyable.

It is powerlessness against *men*, not powerlessness against *nature*, that engenders the most desperate bitterness towards existence. It is abuse and oppression that drive whole classes of men to the brink of despair and suicide, and it is *morality* that protects them from this. Morality treated despots, tyrants and 'masters' in general as enemies against whom the common man must be protected, i.e. first of all, *encouraged and strengthened*. Morality has therefore always taught the most profound *hatred* and *contempt* for the fundamental characteristic of all rulers: *their will to power*. To deny, subvert and suppress this morality would mean to feel differently about this most hated of all impulses, and to provide it with an assessment that is quite the *reverse*. If the suffering and the oppressed no longer believed that they were *justified* in their contempt for the will to power, they would proceed to the next stage of

their condition: hopeless desperation. This would be the case if this characteristic were essential to life, if it could be shown that even the 'will to be moral' was merely the 'will to power' in disguise, and that even the hatred and contempt they feel for the will to power is itself a form of power-seeking. The oppressed would then see that they were on an *equal footing* with their oppressors, and that they have no special *privileges* or *superiority* in this respect.

On the *contrary*! Nothing in life has any value apart from the degree of power it represents – assuming, of course, that life itself is the will to power. Morality protected these *unfortunates* from nihilism, in that it attributed to each and every one of them an infinite value, a metaphysical value, and assigned them a place in a hierarchy which did not correspond with that of the secular power and hierarchy: it taught submission, humility, etc. *Suppose that belief in this morality were to disintegrate*, well then, these unfortunates would no longer have their consolation – and they too would *disintegrate*.

This *disintegration* presents itself as a *slow suicide*, as an instinctive tendency to select that which is *inevitably destructive*. The *symptoms* of these unfortunates' self-destruction are self-vivisection, poisoning, intoxication, Romanticism and, above all, the instinctive compulsion to act in ways that make *mortal enemies* of the powerful (grooming one's own executioner, so to speak), the *will to destroy* as the will of a still deeper instinct, of the instinct to destroy oneself, of the *will to embrace nothingness*.

Nihilism is a symptom of the fact that these unfortunates no longer have any consolation. They destroy in order to be destroyed. Having been relieved of morality, they no longer have any reason for 'submission' – they establish themselves on the basis of the opposite principle, and *want power* for themselves by *compelling* the powerful to become their executioners. This is the European form of Buddhism, the *active negation* that comes after life has lost all 'meaning'.

It is not that they endure greater 'hardships' now; on the contrary! 'God, morality and submission' were remedies prescribed for people in terrible depths of misery; the circumstances

under which *active nihilism* arises are comparatively more favourable. Already, the fact that morality is regarded as conquered presupposes a high degree of intellectual culture; this, in turn, presupposes living in comparative luxuriousness. The sophistication of these nihilists is also indicated by their irredeemable scepticism towards philosophers, the symptom of a certain intellectual fatigue brought about by the long conflict of philosophical opinions; their position is by no means that of the *commoners*. Think of the situation in which the Buddha appeared. The teaching of the eternal recurrence would rest upon learned assumptions (such as those Buddha the teacher had, e.g. the notion of causality, etc.).

What is here meant by the expression 'unfortunates'? Above all, it is being used in a *physiological* (?) and not in a political sense. The *most unhealthy* kind of men in Europe (in all classes) form the basis of this nihilism. They will experience belief in the eternal recurrence as a *curse*, and men who are stricken with this curse will not be content to wait patiently for their own annihilation; on the contrary, they will not hesitate to *bring about* the annihilation of all that is aimless and meaningless, though this is only a paroxysm of blind rage at the thought that all things have existed from eternity, including this period of nihilism and its appetite for destruction.

The *value* of such a crisis is that it *purifies*, that it forces together related elements to their mutual destruction, that it assigns common tasks to men of opposite ways of thinking – bringing to light the weaker and more insecure among them, thus giving impetus to the establishment of a *hierarchy of forces* with respect to health: recognizing commanders as commanders, subordinates as subordinates, though not within the existing social order, it goes without saying.

Who will prove to be the *strongest* in this situation? The most moderate, those who have no need of extreme beliefs; those who not only accept but embrace a great deal of contingency and absurdity; those who can contemplate a significant reduction in man's value, but without thereby becoming weak and petty; who are richest in health, who are able to cope with misfortune, and therefore do not fear misfortune – men who

are *sure of their power*, and who with conscious pride represent the accumulated strength of the whole human race.

What would such a man think of the eternal recurrence?

56

On the history of European nihilism. In the *period of confusion*, there are all sorts of attempts to conserve the old without abandoning the new. In the *period of clarity*, it becomes *apparent* that the old and the new are fundamentally opposed; that the old values are born of declining life, and that the new ones are born of ascending life; that knowledge of nature and history no longer allowed us such 'hopes'; that *all old ideals* are deadly (born of *décadence* and constitutive of it, however much they may come to us splendidly clad in morality like a suit of Sunday's best). We understand the old, but are not nearly strong enough for the new. *The period of the three great passions*: contempt, compassion and destructiveness. *The period of catastrophe*: the rise of a doctrine which will *sift* men . . . by which both weak and strong are driven to extremities and forced to a decision.

Part 2. On the History of European Nihilism

1. Modern Gloom

57

My friends, we had a hard time when we were young: we even suffered from youth itself as from a severe illness. This is due to the times into which we were thrown – a period of great, ever-worsening decline and disintegration, which, in all its weaknesses, and even in its greatest strength, is inimical to the spirit of youth. Disintegration, and thus uncertainty, is peculiar to this age: nothing stands on a firm footing or rests on an unwavering faith: men live for tomorrow, as the day after tomorrow has become doubtful. Everything on our way is slippery and dangerous, and while we have not yet fallen through the ice, it is getting very thin: we feel the baleful breath of the warm, thawing wind – *where* we tread, soon no one will be *able* to follow.

58

If this is not an age of decline and diminishing vitality, an age rife with melancholy, then it is at the least one of reckless, indiscriminate experimentation – which may give rise to a general impression of decline, and perhaps even *decline itself*, given its profusion of failed experiments.

59

On the history of modern gloom

The nomads of the state (officials, etc.) have no sense of 'homeland' – the family is in decline.

'The good man' is a symptom of exhaustion.
Justice is the will to power (cultivation).
Lasciviousness and neurosis.
Sombre music – where has the refreshing music gone?
The anarchist.
Misanthropy. Disgust.
The most profound distinction is whether hunger or abundance has become *creative*? It is the former that creates the *ideals of Romanticism.*
Nordic unnaturalness.
The need for alcoholic beverages in the worker – 'hardship'.
Philosophical nihilism.

60

NB. The slow emergence and rise of the middle and *lower* classes (including those intellectually and physically inferior) was already abundantly foreshadowed prior to the French Revolution and would have gone forwards just as well without it. As a whole, then, the preponderance of the herd over all shepherds and bellwethers brings in its train:

(1) A melancholy disposition: that Stoicism which accompanies a frivolous *appearance* of happiness peculiar to noble cultures is on the decline; much that was once suffered in silence is now allowed to be *seen* and *heard.*
(2) *Moral* hypocrisy, a way of trying to *distinguish* oneself through morality, but by means of the virtues of the herd (sympathy, solicitude, good deeds), which are recognized and honoured only to the extent that the herd is capable of them.
(3) The *very* great deal of sympathy and conviviality, the satisfaction of great fellowship which is peculiar to all herds – 'public spirit', 'patriotism', everything in which the individual is immaterial.

61

Our age, in its endeavour to alleviate misfortune and wage preemptive war against every unpleasant eventuality, is an age of

the *poor*. Our 'rich' – *they* are the poorest of all! The real *purpose* of all wealth has been *forgotten*!

62

Critique of modern man (and of his moralistic dishonesty). The idea that 'the good man' has merely been corrupted and led astray by bad institutions (by tyrants and priests). The elevation of 'reason' to a position of authority, with history regarded as the overcoming of error, the future regarded as progress. The Christian state, 'the Lord of hosts'. Christian sexual relations, or marriage. The realm of 'justice', the cult of 'humanity', 'freedom'.

The *Romantic* posturing of modern man: the noble (Byron, V. Hugo, G. Sand), and their noble indignation, their sanctification by passion (as one's true 'nature'). The espousal of the oppressed and unfortunate becoming a motto for historians and *romanciers*. Modern Stoics and their 'duty'. The value placed on 'selflessness' in art and knowledge. Altruism as the most mendacious form of egoism (utilitarianism), the most sentimental form of egoism.

All this smacks of the eighteenth century. But there are other qualities of that age which we have *not* inherited: *insouciance*, cheerfulness, elegance, clearness of intellect; the intellectual *tempo* has changed; the enjoyment of intellectual subtlety and lucidity has given way to the enjoyment of colour, harmony, composition, realism, etc. Empiricism in the intellectual realm. In short, it is the eighteenth century of *Rousseau*.

63

Broadly speaking, modern man has become exceedingly *humane*. That this is not generally perceived demonstrates that we are now so sensitive to *petty hardships* that we unreasonably disregard what has been achieved. Here we must make allowances for the fact that our world is rife with *décadence*, and seen from that point of view would *have to seem* corrupt and miserable. But from a decadent point of view, the world has *always* seemed that way . . .

Two things taken together have aided this impression: a certain oversensitiveness, even of the moral sentiments, and a measure of bitterness and gloom with which pessimism colours judgements. As a result, the *opposite* idea prevails that morality *is in a very bad way.*

Also contributing to this impression is the disentanglement of science from moral and religious intentions; as a matter of fact, this is a very good sign, though it is for the most part misunderstood.

In support of the proposition that we have become more humane, I would mention the fact of credit, international commerce and transportation, all of which are expressions of an extraordinary degree of genial *trust* among men . . .

In my own way, I am attempting a justification of history.

64

The second Buddhism: the nihilistic catastrophe that put an end to Indian culture. Portents of it: the prevalence of compassion, intellectual fatigue, the reduction of all problems to questions of pleasure and pain, the glory of war which prompts a counterstroke, just as national distinctions prompt a contrary movement in the form of the most cordial 'fraternity', the impossibility of religion continuing any longer with nothing but dogmas and fables.

65

It is the sense of tradition, the desire for tradition, that nowadays seems most thoroughly attacked. All of the institutions out of which an instinctive sense of tradition has grown previously are anti-modern. The modern intellect takes nothing seriously; in essence, unless it involves destruction no one nowadays does anything which is not somehow an attempt to weaken precisely that sense of tradition. Tradition is regarded as inevitable; it is studied, it is acknowledged (for example, as an 'inheritance', that false notion with which even science is still not finished) but ultimately *rejected.* For an individual or a nation to extend its will over long stretches of time, choosing just those conditions, customs and evaluations which render it possible, taking

its future into its own hands – nothing is more specifically *anti-modern* than this. Modern man lives for today, with great haste and recklessness: he calls this his 'freedom' . . .[16]

66

'Be simple' – a demand which, when made to us complicated and unfathomable triers of the hearts and reins,[17] is simply foolish . . . Be natural! But what if 'unnatural' is what one *is*?

67

The means formerly employed to produce enduring *consistency* of character through many generations: entailed property[18] and the respect for elders (the origin of the belief in gods and *heroes* as ancestors).

Now, the *breaking-up of estates* is of the opposite tendency: a *newspaper* (instead of daily *prayers*), railway, telegraph. The centralization of a vast number of different interests in one soul: which, *for that very reason*, must be very strong and versatile.

68

Why does everything become a charade? Modern punishment is no longer guided by a sure instinct (which is the result of particular kinds of men *engaging in the same occupations generation after generation*); the inability to attain perfection in anything is merely the result of a want of such schooling, for which no individual alone can ever fully compensate.

*

What creates moralities and codes of law is a profound and instinctive conviction that only *automatism* makes perfection in life and work possible. But now we have gone quite deliberately to the opposite extreme – we have become extremely self-conscious, subjecting everything human or historical to the most severe self-scrutiny; and thus have strayed almost as far away as we could from perfection in being, doing and willing: every one of our desires, even our desire for knowledge, is a symptom of our extraordinary *décadence*. What we are striving for is the opposite of what *strong races* and *strong natures* strive for . . . What we are striving for is comprehension as

an *end in itself* . . . The manner in which science is conducted today proves that all the elementary instincts, the instincts of *self-protection* and *self-defence*, no longer perform their functions properly. We no longer accumulate capital, but are squandering the capital of our forefathers, even in our way of seeking *knowledge*.[19]

69

The note of *nihilism* in the natural sciences. 'Meaninglessness', causality, mechanism. The notion 'regularity' is merely an interlude, a remnant.

Likewise in politics: there is a lack of faith in one's *own* right and innocence. Chicanery and opportunism reign supreme.

Likewise in political economy: the abolition of slavery, the lack of a redeeming class, of someone who *justifies* it all, hence the rise of anarchism. The question of education.

Likewise in history: fatalism, Darwinism, the final attempts to read reason and divinity into history fail. Sentimentality towards the past; biographies have become insufferable! Phenomenalism applies even here: character is a mask, there are no facts.

Likewise in art: Romanticism and the *violent reaction against it* (an aversion to Romantic ideals and lies). The pure 'artists' (with their indifference as to subject matter): this latter group is influenced by moral considerations, in the sense of a greater truthfulness, but is overcome by pessimism.

Confessional psychology and puritanical psychology are both forms of psychological Romanticism; but even in the violent reaction against it, in the attempt to adopt a purely artistic attitude towards 'men' – even there, no one *dares* to make the *contrary* value judgement!

70

NB. *Contrary to* the doctrine of the influence of the *milieu* and external causes, inner strength is infinitely *more important*; much of what appears to be influence from without is merely adaptation from within. Precisely the same *milieu* can

be interpreted and exploited in opposite ways: there are no facts. Geniuses are *not* explained by the circumstances of their origin –

71

'*Modernity*' may be interpreted on the analogy of nutrition and digestion.

Sensibility (dressed in moralistic attire as an increase of *compassion*) has become unspeakably more irritable. The abundance of disparate impressions is greater than ever – the *cosmopolitanism* of cuisine, of literature, newspapers, forms, tastes, even landscapes, etc.

The *tempo* with which these impressions come flooding in is *prestissimo*, each wave of them being washed away by the next; man instinctively guards against being profoundly affected by things, and refuses to assimilate or 'digest' them – and a *weakened* digestion is the inevitable result. He becomes *accustomed* to being overwhelmed with impressions; he loses the ability to take the *initiative*; all he can do is *react* to external stimuli. He *squanders his strength*: partly on *assimilation*, partly on *parry* and partly on *riposte*.

Spontaneity has become profoundly weakened: the historian, the critic, the analyst, the interpreter, the observer, the collector, the reader – each possesses talents only for *reaction*, for scholarship!

Each has artificially arranged his nature into a 'mirror', taking an interest in things, but only superficially, 'epidermically', if you will; each maintains an invariable coolness and equipoise, a *low* temperature just below the thin surface on which there is warmth, movement, 'storm' and the play of waves.

Yet in opposition to this *external* mobility one detects a *profound sense of weight and weariness*.

72

Is this modern world of ours a rising civilization or an exhausted one? Its trouble and complexity are caused by the highest form of consciousness.

73

Overwork, curiosity and sympathy – our *modern vices.*

74

On what characterizes 'modernity'. Modernity is characterized by: the abundant development of intermediate forms and the degeneration of pure types; the breaking-up of traditions and schools; the predominance of the instincts, which occurs after a weakening of will-power, of the ability to will an end *and* the means to attain it . . . However, we are philosophically prepared for this; we know that the unconscious is *worth more.*

75

NB. A skilful artisan or scholar cuts a fine figure if he takes pride in his art, finds that sufficient and looks upon life with satisfaction; and there is no sight more pathetic than that of a cobbler or schoolmaster who, with a pained expression, gives one to understand that he was born for something better. Nothing surpasses being good! Which means having some kind of ability and making something of it, *virtù* in the Italian sense, as in the Renaissance.

NB. Nowadays, when the state has a preposterously fat belly, we find within every field of enquiry and department of action, besides those who do the actual work, 'spokesmen'. E.g., in addition to scholars, there are journalists; in addition to the suffering classes, there are the pretentious, prating ne'er-do-wells who 'speak' for them, not to mention the self-satisfied professional politicians whose windbaggery in parliament gives 'voice' to their 'plight'. Modern life is extremely *expensive* owing to all these middlemen; whereas in the ancient city, and its distant echo afterwards still found in many a Spanish or Italian city, the man himself came forwards and had nothing to do with such modern spokesmen or intermediaries – except perhaps to give them a swift kick!

76

The preponderance of *merchants* and *middlemen*, even in the most intellectual matters: the belle-lettrist; the 'proponent'; the

historian (the kind who makes a jumble of the past and of the present); the purveyors of the exotic and the cosmopolitan; the middlemen between natural science and philosophy; the half-theologians.

77

So far I have found nothing more disgusting than these intellectual parasites who, with the best conscience in the world, have ensconced themselves everywhere in our disease-ridden Europe. They may be a bit gloomy, they may have an *air pessimiste* about them, but on the whole they are voracious, filthy, larcenous and scabby, worming their way into, nestling in and contaminating everything – all in perfect innocence, like the petty sinners and microbes that they are. They survive because others possess intelligence and squander it; they know that it belongs to the very essence of those with a wealth of intelligence to take no thought for the morrow but to spend themselves blithely, heedlessly, even lavishly – for the intellect is no adept in the art of husbandry, and pays no heed to the things that live and feed on it.

78
The Charade

The variegated nature of modern man and its charm: it is essentially a mode of concealment, an expression of weariness.

The belle-lettrist.

The politician (in the 'national swindle').

Charade in the arts:

- The lack of probity in preparing and schooling oneself for the arts (Fromentin).
- The Romantics (a lack of philosophy and science, but a superfluity of literature).
- The novelists (e.g. Walter Scott, but also the monsters of the Nibelung with the most nervous musical accompaniment).
- The poets.

The pretence of being 'scientific'.

Virtuosos (Jews).

The popular ideals (the saint, the sage, the prophet) have been transcended, but not yet *in the eyes of the people.*

79

The *want of discipline in the modern intellect* dressed in all sorts of moralistic attire. The grand words are:

'Tolerance' (that is, the inability to affirm or negate).

'*La largeur de sympathie*',[20] or, equivalently, indifference, curiosity and morbid excitability, in equal measures.

'Objectivity', or, equivalently, the want of personality, want of will and the inability to love.

'Freedom' as opposed to rule (Romanticism).

'Truth' as opposed to forgery and chicanery (*naturalisme*).

'Scientific' (the '*document humain*')[21] or, as we would say, the colportage novel,[22] addition instead of composition.

'Passion' as a name for disorder and intemperance.

'Profundity' as a name for confusion, for a medley of symbols.

80

Towards a critique of big words. I am suspicious and ill-disposed towards the so-called 'ideal'; *my* pessimism lies in recognizing the extent to which 'lofty sentiments' are a source of mischief, i.e. things which disgrace and diminish us. We are very much mistaken if we expect any 'progress' to be made by pursuing an ideal; the triumph of an ideal has so far invariably been a *retrograde movement.* Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equality, philanthropy, pacifism, justice and truth – all these big words bear but little relation to reality; they are of little worth except as battle cries and banners, as *grand words* for something quite different (indeed, for their opposites!).

81

We know the sort of person who is enamoured of the sentence '*tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*'.[23] They are weak and, above all, frustrated; but if there is something to be forgiven in all, is there not also something to be despised in all? It is the

philosophy of frustration, which so humanely wraps itself up in the mantle of pity and seems so sweet.

They are Romantics, whose faith is but a dying echo: well, at least they still want to *watch* while everything passes by and passes away. They call it *l'art pour l'art*,[24] 'objectivity', etc.

82

The principal symptoms of pessimism. The *dîners chez* Magny.[25] Russian pessimism. Tolstoy, Dostoevsky. Aesthetic pessimism, *l'art pour l'art*, '*la description*', the Romantic and the anti-Romantic forms of pessimism. Epistemological pessimism. Schopenhauer. 'Phenomenalism'. Anarchistic pessimism. The 'religion of compassion', the advance of Buddhism. Cultural pessimism (exoticism, cosmopolitanism). Moral pessimism: I myself.

83

Without the Christian faith, Pascal opined, 'you yourself, like nature and history, would be *un monstre et un chaos*'.[26] We have *fulfilled* this prophecy, whereas previously the frail and optimistic eighteenth century had sought to render human nature both more *attractive* and more *rational* than it is.

Schopenhauer and *Pascal*: in an important sense, *Schopenhauer* is the first to resume Pascal's argument: *un monstre et un chaos*, hence something to be negated . . . history, nature and man himself!

According to Pascal, *our inability to know the truth* is the result of our *corruption*, of our moral decline; likewise according to Schopenhauer, whose position is essentially similar. 'The deeper the corruption of reason, the more necessary the doctrine of salvation' – or, in Schopenhauerian terminology, negation.

84

Schopenhauer as atavism; *conditions before the Revolution.* Compassion, sensuality, art, weakness of will, the Catholic character of even the most intellectual passions: that is good eighteenth century *au fond*.[27] *Schopenhauer's* fundamental

misunderstanding of the *will* (as if passion, instinct and impulse were the very *essence* of willing) is typical; it betrays an exhaustion to the point of atrophy of the will's power to make value judgements. Likewise the hatred of willing; the attempt to see in ceasing to will, in being a 'subject *without* aim or intention' (in being a 'pure will-less subject'), something superior, the superior *as such*, the intrinsically valuable. This is the great symptom of *exhaustion*, or of *weakness of the will*; for it is this alone which treats the passions as master, determining their course and extent . . .

85

Some have made the unworthy attempt to portray Wagner and Schopenhauer as examples of mental derangement; an incomparably deeper insight would be gained by describing with scientific precision the type of *décadence* they both represent.

86

Your Henrik Ibsen has become very clear to me. For all his 'will to truth', he has not yet made an effort to break free from the moral illusionism which speaks of 'freedom', but refuses to acknowledge what freedom really is: the second stage in the metamorphosis of the 'will to power' by those who lack it. In the first, one demands to be treated justly not only by one's equals, but also by those who have power. In the second, one speaks of 'freedom', i.e. one wishes to be *liberated* from those who have power. In the third, one speaks of '*equal rights*', i.e. as long as one is not yet predominant, one wishes to prevent one's competitors from also growing in power.

87

The decline of Protestantism. Protestantism must be understood both theoretically and historically as a half-measure. Catholicism is actually predominant; a Protestant sensibility is so nearly extinct that the strongest *anti-Protestant* developments (e.g. Wagner's *Parsifal*) are no longer perceived as such. The intellectual elite of France is thoroughly *Catholic* in its

instincts; Bismarck himself realized that there was no longer any such thing as Protestantism.

88

Protestantism is the intellectually unfastidious and protracted form of *décadence* in which Christianity has managed to survive in the mediocre North; nonetheless, it remains a most valuable object of enquiry as an elaborate compromise between experiences of fundamentally different kinds and origins, all brought together into the same heads.

89

What has the German spirit made out of Christianity! And to dwell on Protestantism for a moment, how beery Protestant Christianity is! Can a more stupefied, sluggish or supine form of Christian belief be *imagined* than that of the ordinary German Protestant? . . . Now that is what I call an unassuming, diluted Christianity! A homeopathic Christianity is what I call it! I am reminded that nowadays there is a *presumptuous* kind of Protestantism as well, that of the royal chaplains and anti-Semitic speculators; but so far no one has maintained that any 'spirit' 'moves' upon the face of those waters. It is merely a more disreputable form of Christianity, though by no means a more sensible one . . .

90

Progress. Let us not deceive ourselves! We would like to believe that the advance of time brings with it the advance of everything in it, that further development always means further improvement. That is a superficial impression which leads even the most sober-minded astray. However, the nineteenth century is not a century of progress, and does not represent any kind of advance on the sixteenth; the German spirit in 1888 has if anything retreated from the position it held in 1788.

'Mankind' does not advance; it does not even exist. Rather, the general impression is of an immense laboratory where a few successful experiments crop up from time to time and an appalling number of others fail, where all order, logic, bond

and obligation are utterly lacking. Who can fail to recognize that the rise of Christianity is a movement of *décadence*? That the German Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism? That the Revolution destroyed the instinct for organization on a grand scale, that it destroyed the very possibility of society?

Man does not represent any kind of advance over the animals. The cultured weakling is misbegotten compared with the Arab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a well-constituted type, hardier than the European . . .

2. The Preceding Centuries

91

On German pessimism. Of necessity, things take on a gloomy and pessimistic hue in consequence of the Enlightenment. Towards 1770 a certain despondency was already noticeable; women, with that feminine instinct which always takes the side of virtue, believed that immorality was to blame. Galiani hit the mark when he quoted Voltaire's line.[28] Now if I suppose Voltaire and even Galiani – who was much more profound – to be a century or two ahead in enlightenment, how much deeper must I have sunk into gloom! And this too is true: from early on I was cautious and had compunctions about the Germanic-Christian provincialism (and consequent inaccuracy) inherent in Schopenhauer's or, worse still, Leopardi's, pessimism. I sought the most rigorous forms of pessimism (those native to Asia). (Among the more recent exponents of pessimism I do *not* include Eduard von Hartmann and rather place him among the writers of 'light reading' . . . etc.) But in order to endure *this* form of extreme pessimism (to which my *Birth of Tragedy* gives a hint of expression here and there), to live alone 'without God or morality', I had to invent a counterpart for myself. Perhaps I know best why man alone laughs: only he suffers so profoundly that he was *bound to* invent laughter. Naturally, the unhappy and melancholy animal is also the most cheerful.

92

Regarding the Germans, I have always had a sense of *decline*, and the fact that I first became acquainted with a kind of culture in decline has *prejudiced* me against the *whole* of European culture.

Kant's senile, Chinese-like music is coming to an *end*. The Germans always come long after the fact: they carry something into the *depths*, as indicated by their dependence upon the *foreign* (quite polyphonic!). For example, *Kant*: Rousseau, the Empiricists, Hume, Swedenborg; *Schopenhauer*: the Indians and Romanticism, Voltaire; *Wagner*: the French cult of the grotesque and of grand opera, *Paris* and the escape into *primitivism* (the marriage between siblings). The law of *stragglers* (first Paris then province, France before Germany): *in this very fashion the Germans* of all people *discovered* the *Greek spirit*.

The more one strengthens and develops an instinct, the more *tempting* it is to become *lost* in its opposite. *Style* reflects *degeneracy* in Wagner: the isolated expression becomes sovereign, subordination and classification become incidental. Bourget p. 25.[29]

93

Renaissance and Reformation. What does the Renaissance *demonstrate*? That the reign of the 'individual' can be but a short one. Such times are far too profligate; they lack the ability to accumulate any capital, and exhaustion follows hard on their heels. These are times when all is *wasted*, even the energy required to accumulate capital, to heap riches upon riches . . . Even the opponents of such movements are compelled to waste an absurd amount of energy; and then they too are exhausted, empty, spent.

What we have in the Reformation is a wild and uncouth counterpart of the Italian Renaissance, arising from similar impulses, except that in the primitive and vulgar North, they had to dress themselves up in religious garb – there the notion of a higher life had not yet been divorced from that of a religious one.

With the Reformation, as with the Renaissance, the individual wanted to be free; 'every man his own priest' is little more than a formula for libertinism. In truth, one phrase, 'evangelical freedom', sufficed, and all the instincts that had reason to remain hidden sprang out like a pack of wild dogs; the most brutal needs suddenly found their courage; everything seemed justified . . . People took care not to grasp exactly what kind of freedom they meant; they turned a blind eye to themselves. But the fact that people gave fanatical sermons with closed eyes and moistened lips did not prevent them from grabbing everything they could get their hands on; it did not prevent their guts from becoming their god, the god of the 'free gospel'; and it did not prevent them from indulging all their passions for revenge and murder with an insatiable fury. So, this lasted for a while, and then exhaustion supervened, just as it had done in Southern Europe; and here too, the exhaustion was of a *vulgar* kind, a general *ruere in servitium* . . .[30] For Germany, it was the beginning of a century of *ill-repute.*

94

Chivalry is characteristic of those who have attained power; it gradually disintegrates (and in part, descends into the larger middle class). In La Rochefoucauld we find a consciousness of the true mainsprings of a *noblesse* of disposition – together with the dim view Christianity takes of them.

The *French Revolution* is the *continuation* of *Christianity.* Rousseau is the seducer: he once again emancipates woman, who thenceforth is depicted in an ever more interesting way – as *suffering.* Then come the slaves and Mrs Stowe. Then the poor and the workers. Then the dissolute and the diseased – all this is placed in the foreground. (For 500 years there has been no other way to elicit our sympathy for the genius than to present him as the great sufferer!) Then comes the condemnation of lust (Baudelaire and Schopenhauer), the firm conviction that ambition is the greatest vice, the absolute certainty that morality and *désintéressement* are identical notions [and] the 'happiness of all' a goal worth striving for (i.e. Christ's heavenly

kingdom). We are well on the way to it: the heavenly kingdom of the poor in spirit has begun.

Intermediate stages: the bourgeois (a consequence of the moneyed *parvenu*) and the worker (a consequence of the machine).

Compare Greek and French culture of the time of Louis XIV. We find a decided belief in oneself, a leisure-class which delights in difficult undertakings and exercises much self-control. There is an ability and will to make something of *oneself*. 'Happiness' is the admitted object of endeavours. Much force and energy lies *behind* the formalities. There is a real pleasure at the sight of a life *seemingly so easy*. The *Greeks* seemed like *children* to the Egyptians.

95

The three centuries. Their different *sensibilities* are best expressed as follows: the age of *aristocratism*, of Descartes, upholds the supremacy of *reason*, which attests to the sovereignty of the *will*; the age of *feminism*, of Rousseau, upholds the supremacy of *feeling*, which attests to the sovereignty of the *senses* (it is meretricious); the age of *animalism*, of Schopenhauer, upholds the supremacy of *appetite*, which attests to the sovereignty of animality (it is more honest, but gloomy).

The seventeenth century is *aristocratic* in marshalling its forces, haughty towards things of the flesh, prim and proper in matters of the heart, 'unsentimental', even to the point of being devoid of sentiment, 'un-German', averse to anything burlesque or natural, sweeping and imperious towards the past: for it believes in itself. It is quite predatory *au fond*, quite habitually ascetic, the better to keep the upper hand. It is the century of *strong will* and strong passion.

The eighteenth century is dominated by *woman*: it is enthusiastic, witty and vapid, but with its intellect placed in the service of its aspirations and of its heart, libertine in its enjoyment of the intellect, eager to undermine all authorities; rapturous, cheerful, clear, humane, self-deceived, sociable and quite plebeian *au fond* . . .

The nineteenth century has a more *fleshly* character: it is more subterranean, *uglier*, more realistic, more vulgar and on that very account 'better', 'more honest', more submissive to 'reality' of every kind, *truer*, and without doubt *more natural*; but irresolute, melancholy, fatalistic and full of obscure longings. It has no awe or reverence for the 'head' or the 'heart', deeply convinced as it is of the supremacy of appetite. (Schopenhauer spoke of 'will', but nothing is more characteristic of his philosophy than that the 'will' is missing in it, the absurd denial of actual *volition*.) Even morality is reduced to an instinct ('compassion').

A. Comte represents a *continuation of the eighteenth century* (the supremacy of *coeur* over *la tête*, empiricism in the theory of knowledge, altruistic enthusiasm).

The fact that *science* has become as sovereign to the extent that it has proves that the nineteenth century has *emancipated* itself from being dominated by *ideals*. Our aspirations are tempered by a certain 'frugality' which renders possible our scientific curiosity and rigour – this is our kind of virtue . . .

Romanticism is a kind of *nostalgia* for the eighteenth century; a pent-up longing for its grandiose enthusiasm (as a matter of fact, this was largely a charade and a form of self-deception: the wish was to pose as a person of *strong character* and *grand passions*).

The nineteenth century instinctively seeks *theories* that enable it to feel justified in its *fatalistic submission to facts*. *Hegel's* success in his struggle against 'sentimentality' and Romantic idealism lay in the fatalistic tendency of his thought, in his belief that the victorious have reason on their side and in his justification of the actual 'state' (rather than 'mankind', etc.). Schopenhauer thinks that we are something rather stupid, and ideally something that transcends itself. The success of determinism, the genealogical derivation of *obligations* which were formerly regarded as absolute, the doctrine of *milieu* and adaptation, the reduction of the will to reflex movements, the denial that the will is an 'efficient cause'; finally – an actual rechristening: so little choice and intention can be discerned in willing that the word 'will' becomes *free* to mean something else.

Further theories include the doctrine of *objective* 'willless' contemplation, as the only way to truth; *or to beauty*; mechanism, the strictly calculable nature of the mechanical process; so-called '*naturalisme*', the elimination of the choosing, directing, interpreting subject, on principle – also the belief in '*genius*', in order to have the right to be *submissive.*

Kant, with his notion 'practical reason', with his *moral fanaticism*, is of a piece with the eighteenth century – to wit, he is entirely untouched by historicism, and has barely glimpsed the real face of his own era, e.g. the Revolution; he is unaffected by Greek philosophy, delusional about the notion of duty, an empiricist given to backsliding into dogmatism – the *return to Kant* in our century means a *return to the eighteenth century*: the Neo-Kantians contrived to inveigle themselves back again into a right to the *old ideals* and the old enthusiasm – hence a theory which 'sets limits' to knowledge, i.e. which says that we may, *at our discretion, add something beyond the realm of reason . . .*

Hegel's thought is not so far removed from that of *Goethe's*; notice how Goethe talks about *Spinoza*. The desire to deify everything, to deify life, in order to find *peace* and *joy* in contemplating and investigating them; Hegel seeks a reason for everything – for one can *resign* and *reconcile* oneself to reason. In Goethe we find an almost *joyous* and *confident* kind of *fatalism*, which is neither weary nor rebellious; Goethe, who aspired to educate himself into a totality, in the belief that only in totality does everything redeem itself, only in totality does everything seem good and justified.

96

The age of the *Enlightenment*, followed by the age of *sentimentality*; in what sense does Schopenhauer represent 'sentimentality' (or Hegel intellectuality)?

97

The seventeenth century *suffers from mankind* as from a *mass of contradictions, 'l'amas de contradictions'*[31] that we are.

Schopenhauer seeks to discover man, to *classify* him, to unearth what one can about him: whereas the eighteenth

century tries to forget what is known about human nature, in order to adapt him to its utopia. 'Superficial, soft, humane' – enthusiastic about 'humanity'.

What the seventeenth century seeks is to obliterate all traces of the individual so that the work resembles life as much as possible. The eighteenth century seeks through the work to arouse *interest in the author*.

What the seventeenth century seeks in a work of art is *art*, a bit of culture; what the eighteenth strives for is political and social reform, and art as propaganda for it.

'Utopia', the 'ideal man', the idolizing of nature, the vain posturing, the subordination to the propaganda of *social* ideals, charlatanism – all this we derive from the eighteenth century.

The style of the seventeenth century: '*propre, exact et libre*'.

The strong individual who is sufficient unto himself, or in zealous effort before God – and the intrusiveness and obtrusiveness of these modern authors – they are *opposites*. 'Exhibitionism' – compare that with the scholars of Port-Royal.

Alfieri had a feeling for the *grand style*.

A hatred of the *burlesque*[32] (that which lacks dignity), and a *lack of feeling for nature* are what distinguish the seventeenth century.

98

Against Rousseau. Alas! Man is no longer sufficiently evil. Rousseau's opponents say that 'man is a beast of prey', but unfortunately they are wrong; man's curse is not that he has become depraved, but that he has become gentle and well-behaved. In the eighteenth century, the strongest and most well-constituted kind of man, *comparatively* speaking, could still be found in precisely the sphere which Rousseau had most vigorously opposed – the kind of man in whom the grand passions were still intact, the passion for power, the passion for pleasure, the passion for (and ability to) command. In order to gain a sense of the difference, we must compare the man of the eighteenth century with the man of the Renaissance (also with the man of the seventeenth century in France). Rousseau is a symptom of self-contempt and of inflamed vanity – both

signs that the dominating will is lacking; he brings morality into everything and seeks the *cause* of his wretchedness as an embittered man would – in the *ruling* classes.

99

Against Rousseau. The state of nature is terrible, man is a beast of prey, our civilization is an unheard-of *triumph* over man's predatory nature – *Voltaire concluded thus.* He was sensible of the comforts, the refinements, the intellectual joys of the civilized condition; he despised narrow-mindedness, even in the form of virtue; and the lack of delicacy even in ascetics and monks.

Rousseau seemed to be preoccupied with the *moral degradation* of man; with the words 'unjust' and 'cruel' you can easily arouse the instincts of the oppressed, who would otherwise find themselves under the ban of the *vetitum*[33] and in fear of disgrace – *conscience would prevent them from indulging the desire for rebellion.* That is why these emancipators seek *one thing* above all else: to give their party the great accents and postures of *better men.*

100

Rousseau. The rule founded on sentiment; nature as the source of justice; man becomes more perfect in proportion as he *comes nearer to nature.* According to Voltaire, in proportion as he *gets further away from nature.* The very same epochs which for the one represent the progress of *mankind*, for the other represent the aggravation of injustice and inequality.

Voltaire still understood *umanità* in the sense of the Renaissance, likewise *virtù* (as 'high culture'); he fought for the cause of the *honnêtes gens* and *de la bonne compagnie*, of taste, of science and art, even for the cause of progress and civilization.

The fighting broke out around 1760 between the citizen of Geneva and *le seigneur de* Tournay. From that moment on Voltaire became the man of his century, the apostle of tolerance and the trumpet of incredulity (up to that point he had only been *un bel esprit*). His envy and hatred of Rousseau's success drove him onward and upward, 'to the heights'.

Pour 'la canaille', un dieu rémunérateur et vengeur – Voltaire.

The *value of civilization* viewed from their respective critical standpoints. *Social invention* is the finest thing there is for Voltaire, there is no higher goal than to work to maintain and perfect it; *l'honnêteté* consists only in the observation of social usages, just as virtue even consists only in obedience to certain necessary 'prejudices' which favour the preservation of 'society'.

Missionary of culture, aristocrat, representative of the victorious ruling classes and their values. But Rousseau remained a *plebeian*, even as an *homme de lettres*, which was *unheard of*; his insolent contempt for everything he was not himself.

The *unhealthy* element in Rousseau is what is most admired and *imitated*. (Lord Byron was a kindred spirit; he too worked himself up to a pitch of sublime postures and rancorous resentment; a sign of 'vulgarity'; later on, when *Venice* restored his equilibrium, he understood that nothing is more conducive to ease and wellbeing than . . . *l'insouciance*.)

He is proud of himself despite his origins, but he is beside himself when he is reminded of them . . .

In Rousseau there was undoubtedly some *mental disorder*; in Voltaire unusual health and ease. The *rancour of the sick*: his periods of insanity are also those of his misanthropy, and of his distrust.

Rousseau's defence of *Providence* (against Voltaire's pessimism): he *has need* of God to be able to condemn society and civilization; everything must be inherently good, because God has created it; *only man has corrupted man*. The 'good man' as natural man was pure fantasy; but with the dogma of God's authorship, he became something both probable and reasonable.

The influence of Rousseau: folly is expected of greatness; Romanticism (of which he is the first example, though *by no means the most famous*); 'the *souveraine* right of passion'; 'the monstrous exaggeration of the "ego"'; 'the feeling for nature'; 'for a hundred years now, we have chosen a sick man as guide in politics'.

Romanticism à la Rousseau: passion; 'naturalness'; the fascination with madness; the rancour of the mob as *judge*; the absurd vanity of the weak.[34]

101

Kant makes English epistemological scepticism *possible* for Germans:

(1) By appealing to their religious and moral needs (just as the later Academic Sceptics had employed scepticism for the same reasons, as a preparation for Platonism (*vide* Augustine); just as Pascal used even *moral* scepticism in order to awaken ('to justify') the need for faith.

(2) By presenting it in the form of a baroque and ornate scholasticism, thereby making it more acceptable to German scientific tastes (because Locke and Hume in themselves were too clear, too explicit, i.e. instinctively judged by the Germans to be 'too superficial').

Kant is a poor psychologist and a worse judge of human nature; grossly mistaken in his appraisal of great historical events (the French Revolution); a moral fanatic *à la* Rousseau with a subterranean current of Christian values; a thoroughgoing dogmatist who is profoundly wearied by this inclination to the point of wishing to bend [it] to his will, but who quickly tires of scepticism as well; he is as yet unaffected by the slightest breath of cosmopolitan taste or of the beauty of antiquity . . . He is a *conservative* and a *mediator*, and not at all original (just as *Leibniz* had mediated between mechanism and spiritualism, just as *Goethe* had mediated between the taste of the eighteenth century and that of the 'historical sense' (which is essentially a sense of exoticism), just as *German composers* had mediated between French and Italian music, just as *Charlemagne* had mediated between the Roman Empire and nationalism). Instead of making a clean break, they *built bridges* – in this they were *conservatives par excellence.*

102

NB. The degree to which the pessimistic *Christian* centuries, like the *tragic* age of the Greeks, have been *stronger* centuries than the eighteenth, which was weaker, more scientific and . . .

The nineteenth century as *against* the eighteenth – in what respect an heir, in what respect a retreat (because lacking in

'wit', taste), in what respect an advance: gloomier, more realistic, *stronger.*

103

The Président de Brosses says of the *campagna Romana*:[35] *'il fallait que Romulus fût ivre, quand il songea à bâtir une ville dans un terrain aussi laid.'*[36]

Fénelon compares the Gothic style with a poor sermon.[37]

Chateaubriand in 1803 in a letter to M. de Fontanes gives his first impressions of the *Campagna Romana.*[38]

Lamartine found the words to describe Sorrento and Posillipo.[39]

V. Hugo raves about Spain, *parce que 'aucune autre nation n'a moins emprunté à l'antiquité, parce qu'elle n'a subi aucune influence classique'.*[40]

Even Delacroix would have nothing to do with Rome, it frightened him.[41] He raved about Venice, just as Shakespeare, Byron and G. Sand did. Even Th. Gautier had an aversion to Rome – as did R. Wagner.

*

What does the fact that we intuitively understand the *campagna Romana mean*? Or the high mountains? What does our nationalism *mean*?

Idealism, or self-deception. Critique of civilization. The metamorphoses of the cross. The refinements of fear, voluptuousness, contempt.[42]

104

Two great attempts were made to transcend the eighteenth century: Napoleon, by awakening the man, the soldier and the great struggle for power – and by formulating the idea of the political unification of Europe; and Goethe, by envisioning a European culture that inherits the full extent to which Europeans have already become humane.

German culture in this century arouses suspicion – the music lacks a certain wholehearted, redemptive, captivating quality, to wit, Goethe. (The Austrians have remained German only by virtue of their music.)

105

The borrowed forms, e.g. Brahms, as a typical 'epigone', likewise Mendelssohn's more gentlemanly Protestantism (the 'soul' of an earlier era captured in poetry *after* it is gone . . .).

The moral and poetical substitutions effected by Wagner, who used one art to compensate for his deficiencies in the others.

The 'historical sense', inspiration derived from poems and legends. That typical transformation of which the most conspicuous example among Frenchmen is G. Flaubert, and among Germans, Richard Wagner.

How the Romantic faith in love and the future transforms itself into a longing for nothingness, 1830 into 1850.

*

The preponderance of *music* in the Romantics from 1830 to 1840. Delacroix.

Ingres, a passionate musician, with his reverence for Gluck, Haydn, Beethoven, Mozart, said to his pupils in Rome: '*si je pouvais vous rendre tous musiciens, vous y gagneriez comme peintres.*'[43] Likewise Horace Vernet, who had a particular passion for Don Juan (as Mendelssohn assures us in 1831).[44]

Stendhal, too, who says of himself, '*Combien de lieues ne ferais-je pas à pied, et à combien de jours de prison ne me soumettrais-je pas pour entendre* Don Juan *ou le* Matrimonio Segreto*! Et je ne sais pour quelle autre chose, je ferais cet effort.*'[45] He was then fifty-six years old.

106

How is it that German music reaches its culmination in the age of German Romanticism? How is it that Goethe's qualities are entirely absent from German music? Notice how much of Schiller, or more precisely, how much of 'Thekla', there is in Beethoven![46]

Schumann has hints of Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffmann, Tieck in him.

Richard Wagner has *Freischütz*, Hoffmann, Grimm, Romantic legend, an instinctively Catholic mysticism, symbolism, 'free-thinking' about passion, Rousseau's intention.

The Flying Dutchman[47] smacks of France, when '*le ténébreux*'[48] of 1830 was the stock character of the seducer.

The cult of music: the revolutionary Romanticism of form.

Wagner is the culmination of both German and French Romanticism –

107

Judged merely from the point of view of his value to Germany and to German culture, Richard Wagner is still a great question mark; for Germany, his appearance was perhaps an unfortunate one; in any case, it was a fateful one. But what does it matter? Was it not very much more than merely a German event? It actually seems to me that he could scarcely be more out of his element than among Germans; nothing had prepared them for him; among Germans, such a figure is simply strange, odd, uncomprehended and incomprehensible. But they are careful not to admit this; they are too good-natured, too stolid, too German for that. '*Credo quia absurdus est*':[49] Germans have always been fond of this kind of thinking, and so it was in this case as well – hence they are content for the time being to believe everything Richard Wagner wanted to believe about himself. German thinking has always been lacking in subtlety and insight *in psychologicis*. These days, when German thinking is under great pressure from jingoism and self-admiration, and has become tough-minded and simplistic, how could it be expected to solve the problem of Wagner!

108

The Germans *are* still nothing, but they are *becoming* something; therefore they have no culture as yet – they *cannot* have any culture as yet! This is my proposition, however much it may offend some people: to wit, those who suffer from (or brandish) their Teutomania! They are not yet anything: that means they are all sorts of things. They are *becoming* something: that means that they will one day cease to be all sorts of things. This is merely a wish, scarcely even a hope; fortunately it is a wish that can be brought to life, it is only a question of will, discipline, labour and cultivation, as well as of dissatisfaction,

longing, privation, discomfort and even bitterness: in short, we Germans *want* something of ourselves, something not yet wanted of us – something *more*!

This 'German who is becoming but not yet is' deserves better than contemporary German 'culture'; all those who are 'becoming' must be incensed to find in this area complacency, presumptuous 'resting on one's laurels' or 'self-sanctification'. That is my second proposition, and I still adhere to it.

3. Signs of Increasing Strength

109

NB. Principle: there is something like decay in everything modern, but alongside the prevailing sickness there are signs of an inner strength yet to be tested. *The very things that diminish us the most drive the stronger and more exceptional to greatness.*

110

General observation. The ambiguous character of our modern world lies in the fact that precisely the same symptoms might indicate either decline or strength. Furthermore, the signs of strength and maturity might be *misunderstood*, on the basis of traditional (i.e. more *primitive*) derogatory sentiments, as signs of weakness. In short, the sense of value might be behind the times.

Generally speaking, the sense of value is *always* outmoded, because the conditions of conservation and growth which find expression in it are those of much earlier times. These sentiments conflict with new conditions of existence from which they did not arise, which they inevitably misunderstand and teach us to view with distrust, etc.; they obstruct and arouse suspicion of anything new. For example . . .

111

The problem of the nineteenth century. The question is whether its strong and weak aspects belong together, whether they have been cut from the same cloth, whether the variety of its

contradictory ideals are conditioned by some higher purpose. For it might be to some extent *foreordained* that *greatness* grows under severe stress. Discontent and nihilism *might be* a *good sign.*

112

General observation. As a matter of fact, great growth is always accompanied by tremendous *fragmentation* and *destruction*; suffering and the symptoms of decline are *a part of* every period of tremendous progress. Every fruitful and powerful development of mankind has at the same time helped to create a corresponding nihilistic development. It might be a sign of the most essential and decisive growth, of the transition to new conditions of existence, were the most extreme form of pessimism, genuine *nihilism*, to come into the world. *This is what I have comprehended.*

113

(a)

We begin with a thoroughly hearty *admiration* for the man of today. We must not let ourselves be deceived by appearances: this man may be less 'striking' than the man of yesterday, but unlike him, promises to *endure* – his *tempo* is slower, but his time signature is much more complex, so to speak. There has been an improvement in general *health*; the actual conditions of bodily strength have been recognized, and are gradually being established; 'asceticism' is treated *ironice* – there is an avoidance of extremes, a certain confidence in the 'right way',[50] and an absence of fanaticism; for the time being, one confines oneself to more limited concerns, such as 'fatherland', 'science', etc. Nonetheless, this whole picture remains *ambiguous*: it could be an ascending or a *descending* movement of life.

(b)

Faith in 'progress' – in the lower sphere of intelligence, it appears to be a form of ascending life, but this involves a certain amount of self-deception; in the higher sphere of intelligence it appears to be a form of *descending* life. The description of

their respective symptoms. Uniformity of treatment; uncertainty as to how valuable they are. *Fear* that a sense of futility, a sense that all is 'in vain', may become general: nihilism.

114

As a matter of fact, an antidote against the first kind of nihilism[51] is no longer necessary; the Europe in which we live is not filled with as much uncertainty, contingency and absurdity as it once was. We have less need of the enormous exponential *increase* in the sense of human *worth*, in the importance of evil, etc. that Christianity provides; we tolerate a significant *reduction* in it, and accept much absurdity and contingency. The *power* man has attained now permits a *relaxation* of disciplinary measures, the strongest of which was the moral interpretation. The 'God' hypothesis is far too extreme.

115

If anything shows that our *humanization* is a sign of genuine and real *progress*, it is the fact that we no longer think in terms of unconditional and absolute opposites, that we no longer think in terms of opposites at all . . . We are now free to love the senses, for we have entirely spiritualized them and rendered them entirely artistic; we are now entitled to all those things which were once considered terribly *disreputable*.

116

The reversal of the hierarchy. Those pious counterfeiters, the priests, have now become the chandalas among us; they occupy the same position as charlatans, quacks, counterfeiters and magicians; we hold them responsible for corruption of the will, and regard them as *rebels* among those unfortunates who slander and seek revenge against life itself.[52]

By contrast, we who were the chandalas in the past are now in the ascendant, especially the blasphemers, the *immoralists*, the broad-minded (in all sorts of ways), the artists, the Jews, the minstrels – in essence, all *disreputable* classes of men. We have elevated ourselves to *honourable* thoughts; moreover, it is we who *determine* what on earth is to be deemed honourable,

and who is to be the '*nobility*' . . . We alone are now *advocates of life*. We *immoralists* are now the *strongest power*, i.e. other great powers have need of us . . . we are interpreting the world after our own image. We have transferred the notion of the chandala to the *priests*, the *transcendentalists* and to the *Christian society* which has grown up alongside them, to which one may add pessimists, nihilists, compassionate Romantics, criminals, profligates and others of similar origin: the whole sphere in which the term 'God' conjures up the image of a *saviour* . . .

We are proud of the fact that we need no longer be liars, slanderers and detractors of life . . . NB. Even if the existence of *God* were proven to us, we should know better than to have faith in Him.

117

The *advance* of the nineteenth century over the eighteenth (*in essence, we good Europeans are carrying on a war against the eighteenth century*).

(1) We increasingly understand the 'return to Nature' in a sense which is decidedly the opposite of Rousseau's. *Away with these idylls and operas!*

(2) We are increasingly anti-idealistic, objective, fearless, industrious, temperate, decidedly suspicious of sudden changes, *anti-revolutionary.*

(3) Increasingly, we give the question of the *health of the body* decided priority over that of 'the soul', the former being understood as sufficient for the latter, or at least as its necessary condition . . .

118

If we have achieved anything at all, it is a more innocent relation to the senses, a more joyful, benevolent, Goethean attitude towards sensuality; similarly a greater sense of pride regarding knowledge: the 'pure fool'[53] is given little credit.

119

We who are 'objective'. For *us* at least, it is not our 'compassion' which opens the door to the most remote and alien cultures or

ways of life, but our receptivity and impartiality. This is *not* a matter of 'shared suffering',[54] but rather of finding enjoyment in a hundred things which were formerly a source of suffering (things which excited indignation or agitation, or which were viewed with hostility or indifference). We now view suffering in all its nuances with great interest; but, for all that, rest assured that we have not become compassionate. Even if we are shaken to the very core and break into tears at the sight of suffering – we have not the slightest inclination to rush to anyone's assistance.

In this *deliberate* desire to observe all manner of misery and destruction, we have grown stronger and more vigorous than the men of the eighteenth century; it is a proof of our growing vigour (we have *drawn closer* to the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries . . .). But it would be a profound mistake to regard our 'Romanticism' as some sort of proof that we have transformed ourselves into 'beautiful souls' . . .

We want *strong sensations*, just as all *ruder* ages and classes have wanted . . . This is quite different from the needs of neurasthenics and *décadents*, who have a need to spice up their lives, even with a dash of cruelty . . .

We are *all* trying to find circumstances in which bourgeois morality, not to mention priestly morality, no longer has a say (every book that smacks of the parsonage or the seminary gives us the impression of pitiful *niaiserie*[55] and impoverishment . . .). *My* idea of 'polite society' would be one in which essentially nothing excites interest unless it is *forbidden* and considered disreputable in bourgeois society: likewise with books, music, politics and one's opinion of women.

120

The naturalization of man in the nineteenth century. The eighteenth century was one of elegance, refinement and *généreux sentiments*. We have not 'returned to Nature', because there never was any natural mankind. The scholasticism of unnatural values, of values contrary to nature, is the rule and the starting point; naturalness comes to man only after a long struggle – he never 'returns' to her . . . To be natural, i.e. to dare to be as immoral as nature is.

We are ruder, more direct, richer in irony towards *généreuse* feelings, even when we are subject to them.

Our high *society*, the rich and idle, is more natural: they pursue each other, sexual love being a kind of sport in which marriage serves both as the obstacle and the allure; they amuse themselves and live for the sake of pleasure; they hold physical attributes in the highest esteem; they are curious and bold.

Our attitude towards *knowledge* is more natural: we quite innocently manifest an intellectual *libertinage*; we hate pathetic and hieratic manners; we delight in that which is most forbidden; we would scarcely have any interest in knowledge if the road to it were a tedious one.

Our attitude towards *morality* is also more natural: principles have become ridiculous; we forbid ourselves to speak of 'duty' without irony. But we hold a helpful, benevolent disposition in high esteem. (We find our morality in our *instincts*, and disdain the rest.) Aside from that, one or two things are points of honour with us.

Our attitude *in politicis* is more natural: we see problems of power, of one quantum of power against another. We do not believe in a right one has no power to enforce; we perceive all rights as conquests.

Our attitude towards *great men and things* is more natural: we account passion as a privilege, and find nothing great which does not include a great crime; we conceive of everything great as a special exception with respect to morality.

Our attitude towards '*Nature*' is more natural: we no longer love her for her 'innocence', for the 'reason' or 'beauty' in her; we have made her beautifully 'devilish' and 'foolish'. But instead of despising her, we feel related to and at home with her. She does *not* aspire to virtue: therefore we respect her.

Our attitude towards *art* is more natural: we do not demand beautiful illusions from her; a brutal positivism dispassionately recording brutal facts is the order of the day.

In summa, there are signs that the European of the nineteenth century is less ashamed of his instincts; he has gone a long way towards admitting to himself his unconditional naturalness, i.e.

his immorality, *without bitterness*: on the contrary, he is strong enough that he can only just endure the sight of it.

To some ears this sounds like the progress of *corruption*; and, to be sure, man has not come any closer to the '*Nature*' of which Rousseau spoke, but a step further in the civilization which he regarded with such *abhorrence*. We have grown *stronger*: we have come closer to the seventeenth century, and to the taste of the late seventeenth century in particular (Dancourt, Lesage, Regnard).

121

The high points of culture and civilization stand far apart; one must not be led astray as regards the profound antagonism between culture and civilization. The great moments in the history of culture have always been, morally speaking, ages of corruption; while on the other hand, those epochs in which man was deliberately and forcibly *tamed* ('civilized') like an animal have always been ages of intolerance towards the men who were by nature the most intellectual and most audacious. The goal of civilization is altogether different from the aspirations of culture, and perhaps even at odds with them . . .

122

What I warn against: confounding the instinct of *décadence* with being *humane*; confounding the *instruments* of civilization, which *lead to disintegration* and *inevitably to décadence*, with those of *culture*; confounding *libertinage*, and the principle '*laisser aller*', with the will to power (which is the *contrary* principle).

123

Among the unanswered questions which I raise anew is the *question of civilization*, the struggle between Rousseau and Voltaire around 1760.

Man becomes more profound, more distrustful, more 'immoral', stronger, more self-confident – and therefore '*more natural*' – *that* is 'progress'.

In so doing, by a sort of division of labour, the more barbaric strata and the milder and tamer strata become separated, so that the *general fact* escapes notice . . . It is in the nature of *strength*, and of the self-control and fascination exercised by the strong, that these stronger strata possess the gift of making others take their barbarization for a kind of *superiority*. For every step of 'progress' includes a reinterpretation of the strengthened elements as 'good', in other words . . .

124

Man must have the *courage* of his natural impulses restored to him.

He must hold himself in *higher esteem* (*not* as an individual but as *nature* . . .).

We must stop seeing *contradictions* between things, once we understand that we put them there in the first place.

We must stop seeing *social idiosyncrasies* (guilt, punishment, justice, honesty, freedom, love, etc.) in existence for the same reason.

Problem of *civilization* posed. Progress towards '*naturalness*': all political questions, in the relations between parties, and even in the commercial, business and labour parties, are questions of *power* – only after asking 'what *can* be done?' may one ask 'what *ought* to be done?'

125

Socialism – or the *tyranny* of the lowest and stupidest, the superficial, the envious and the more-than-half actors – as a matter of fact *is* the logical conclusion of 'modern ideas' and their latent anarchism: but alas in the genial atmosphere of democratic wellbeing, the ability to draw conclusions, or even draw *to a close at all*, slackens. One follows a crowd – but no longer follows an argument. That is why Socialism is on the whole a bitter, hopeless affair: and nothing is more amusing than to observe the inconsistency between the venomous and desperate faces made by contemporary Socialists – as well as the miserable, bruised feelings to which their prose style bears witness! – and the innocent, lamb-like beatitude of their hopes and desires. Nevertheless, in many places in Europe they may

strike a blow here or there: the coming century is likely to hear the occasional intestinal 'rumbling', and the Paris Commune, which has its defenders and advocates even in Germany (e.g. that philosophical grimacer and swamp-newt Eugen Dühring in Berlin), was perhaps only a touch of indigestion, measured against what is to come. Be that as it may, there will always be too many of the well-to-do for Socialism to signify more than a temporary illness: and the well-to-do are as one in believing that 'one must possess something in order to *be* something'. This, however, is the oldest and most wholesome of instincts: I should add, 'one must want more in order to *become* more'. For this is the doctrine life itself preaches to all living things: the morality of development. To have and to want to have more, in a word, growth – that is life itself. 'A will to deny life' is but poorly concealed in Socialism; only ill-constituted men or races could have come up with such a doctrine. In fact, I wish that Socialism were discredited by a few great experiments showing that, in a Socialist society, life denies itself and cuts itself off at the roots. The earth is big enough, and man still has enough to spare, even though such practical instruction, such a *demonstratio ad absurdum*, would seem undesirable, given its immense cost in human lives. For all that, like a restless mole burrowing under a society sunk in its own stupidity, Socialism could prove useful and beneficial. It delays 'peace on earth' and the reduction of the democratic and gregarious animal to complete amiability. It compels the European to keep his wits (namely, his cunning and caution) about him. It demands that he not entirely give up the masculine and martial virtues, that he retain some remnant of cold, clear intellect and dry wit – thus Socialism safeguards Europe awhile against the threat of *marasmus femininus*.[56]

126

The most *beneficial inhibitors of, and remedies for, 'modern' tendencies*:

(1) *Compulsory military service*, with actual wars and no time left for trifles.

(2) *National* narrow-mindedness (it simplifies matters and concentrates them, although for the time being it also leaves us wrung out and exhausted through overwork).

(3) Improved *nutrition* (meat).
(4) Greater *cleanliness* and healthiness of the household.
(5) The predominance of *physiology* over theologians, moralists, economists and politicians.
(6) Military severity, both in discharging our 'duties' and in demanding that others do the same (one no longer *praises* . . .).

127

I am *heartened* by the military development of European societies, and by the anarchist element within them: the nineteenth century of tranquillity and Chinadom which Galiani predicted is already a thing of the past. There is a renewed appreciation of *masculine* prowess, both personal and physical. Concerns are more bodily and diet more carnivorous. Attractive men are again possible. The lily-livered (with mandarins at their forefront, as Comte dreamed) are also a thing of the past. The barbarian and even the beast in every man *meets with approval. Precisely on that account*, genuine philosophers stand a chance. Eventually, a philosopher like Kant will be nothing but a bugbear!

128

As yet I see *no* reason to be discouraged. He who is *strong-willed*, and has a capacious intellect, will find his prospects more favourable than ever. For man has become quite *amenable* in democratic Europe; men who learn easily and adapt themselves readily are the rule: gregarious animals have been prepared who are even of the highest intelligence. He who would command finds those who *must* obey: I have in mind e.g. Napoleon and Bismarck. There is very little competition with the strong-willed man who is *lacking* in intelligence, which otherwise would be a great hindrance. And who could not knock down such weak-willed, 'objective' gentlemen as Ranke and Renan!

129

I am hostile to all that smacks of the literati and the popularizers, especially those who corrupt or spoil women – for

intellectual enlightenment is an infallible means of making men more uncertain, weak-willed and in need of companionship and support, in short, of bringing out the *gregarious animal* in them. That is why all the great practitioners of the *art* of government (Confucius in China, the *imperium romanum*, Napoleon, the papacy when it had power and not merely the desire for it), where the instinct to govern has thus far *culminated*, also availed themselves of intellectual enlightenment; or at least could *exercise* it (as did the popes of the Renaissance). The self-deception of the multitude on this point, e.g. in all things democratic, is most valuable: everything that makes men inconsequential and easier to govern is sought in the name of 'progress'!

130

Being most equitable and mild indicates *weakness* (the New Testament and the early Church), which manifests itself as utter *bêtise* in the Englishmen Darwin and Wallace.

Your fair-mindedness, your natural superiority, will lead you to *suffrage universel*, etc. and your 'humanity' to toleration of crime and folly. *In the long run, it will seal the victory of the foolish and the inoffensive.* Folly and complacency – *the mean* (e.g. Bismarck).

Outwardly: the age of tremendous wars, revolutions, explosions.

Inwardly: men grow ever more feeble. *Events then serve as stimulants for them.* In Europe, the Parisian represents the extreme of this tendency.

Consequence.

(1) *Barbarians*, at first, of course, in the guise of the previous culture (e.g. Dühring).
(2) *Sovereign individuals* (the intersection between barbaric *masses of force* and an utter lack of restraint with respect to all that has gone before).

It is the age of greatest stupidity, brutality and wretchedness among the *masses*, and at the same time the age of *the greatest individuals.*

131

During the Renaissance, countless individuals of a more exalted kind perished: but then as now *he who survives* is as strong as the Devil.

132

Good Europeans as we are, what distinguishes us from those who only live among their fellow countrymen?

In the first place, we are atheists and immoralists, but for the time being we support the religions and morality which spring from the gregarious instinct; through them, a kind of man is being prepared who will eventually fall into our hands, and who *demands* to be taken in hand.

We are beyond good and evil, but insist that gregarious morality be regarded as absolutely sacrosanct.

We have in reserve several strains of philosophy which may need to be taught: under certain circumstances pessimism might be wielded as a hammer – a European Buddhism may perhaps be indispensable and perhaps more logical.

We are liable to support the development and maturation of the democratic system, which trains men to be easily swayed. In 'Socialism' we see a thorn that [protects] against complacency.

Our attitude towards peoples: we pay attention to the results of their intermingling, in light of our preferences.

We are aloof, wealthy, strong: we indulge in irony at the expense of the 'press' and its culture. We are concerned that scientists not become literati. We disdain any culture on good terms with reading newspapers, or worse, writing for them.

We accept (as Goethe and Stendhal did) our accidental positions and experiences, as a wanderer might put up with lodgings – we are careful not to be too much at home in them.

We require a *disciplina voluntatis* before our fellow man. All our efforts are directed towards *developing self-control* and a *dispassionate* understanding (even, for a time, a 'supra-European' one), an art which allows us to wear masks.

This is our preparation for becoming lords of the earth, legislators of the future, at least through our children. To that end, the character of marriages becomes a fundamental consideration.

133
The twentieth century

The Abbé Galiani says somewhere, 'Foresight is the cause of the current wars in Europe. Because we expect the House of Austria to grow more powerful, because the Americans in a few centuries, and the English, French and Spanish within a century, will or will not do certain things, we proceed to slaughter one another immediately. If we wanted to make the effort not to predict anything, all would be calm and I don't think we should be less happy in not waging war.'[57] Well, since I do not quite share the unwarlike views of my late friend Galiani, I am not afraid to predict a thing or two, and thus possibly conjure up reasons for wars.

After a terrible earthquake, a tremendous *reflection*, with new questions.

134

(1) There is a fundamental contradiction between civilization and the elevation of man. It is the time of the great noon, of the most terrible illumination: my kind of pessimism: – the great starting point.

(2) Moral value judgements are to be regarded as a history of lies and the art of slander in the service of the will to power, of the will of the *herd* in rebellion against the stronger men.

(3) The conditions of any elevation of culture (in facilitating a *selection* of a few at the expense of the many) are the conditions of all growth.

(4) The *ambiguity* of the world is a matter of *strength*, which sees all things from the *point of view of their growth*. The *Christian moral value judgements* are to be regarded as slaves' revolt and slaves' dishonesty (as against the aristocratic values of the *ancient* world).

How far does *art* reach down into the essence of *strength*?

BOOK II

CRITIQUE OF THE HIGHEST VALUES HITHERTO

Part 1. Critique of Religion

All the beauty and sublimity which we have ascribed to real and imagined things, I will reclaim as the property and product of man: as his most eloquent apology. Man as poet, as thinker, as god, as love, as power – oh, the royal liberality with which he has lavished gifts upon things in order to *impoverish* himself and make *himself* feel wretched! His greatest feat of selflessness has been that he admired and worshipped, and knew how to conceal from himself that it was *he* who had created what he admired.

1. On the Origin of Religions

135

Contrary movement; the origin of religion. Just as the uneducated man of today believes that when he is angry, his anger is the cause, that when he thinks, his mind is the cause, that when he feels, his soul is the cause – in short, just as a number of psychological entities are still unhesitatingly recognized as causes, in a still naïve age the same phenomena were explained with the help of person-like entities. Man attributed the conditions which struck him as strange, captivating or overwhelming to being under the influence of a demon or witch, i.e. a person. Thus the Christian, the most naïve and backward man of today, ascribes hope, serenity and a sense of 'deliverance' to a psychological inspiration from God; as one accustomed to suffering and distress, the Christian would rightly regard feelings of happiness, exaltation and serenity as strange, and in

need of some explanation. Among intelligent, strong and vigorous races it was primarily the epileptic who inspired the belief that a strange power was at work here; but also any similarly involuntary condition, like that of the zealot, of the poet, of the great criminal, or passions like love or revenge, are conducive to the invention of superhuman powers. An abstract condition is made concrete by being identified with a person, and when the condition occurs, it is claimed to be the effect of that person. In other words, in the psychological genesis of God, an internal condition is personified as its own external cause, in order for the condition to be the effect of something other than itself.

The psychological reasoning is as follows: when a man is suddenly and overwhelmingly affected with a *sense of power* (as is the case with all great passions) it excites a doubt in his mind as to whether his own person could possibly be the cause of such an astonishing sensation; he dares not think so, and thus he posits a *stronger* person, in this case a deity.

In summa, the origin of religion lies in an exaggerated sense of power, which strikes people as *strange*; and just like the sick man who, finding that one of his limbs feels heavy and peculiar, comes to the conclusion that another man must be sitting on it, the naïve *homo religiosus* divides himself up into *several people*. Religion is an example of the '*altération de la personnalité*'.[1] He experiences something like a sense of awe and dread before himself . . . But likewise a sense of *extraordinary happiness* and *elevation* . . . Among the sick, a sense of health suffices to make one believe that God exists, that God is near.

136

The primitive psychology of the religious man. Man reasons that all changes are effects, and all effects are the effect of volition (any conception of 'nature' or of 'natural law' being entirely absent here) – that every effect has its agent. His primitive psychology consists in thinking that he himself is a cause only when he is aware of having willed something. As a result, powerful states convey to man the impression that he is *not*

their cause, that he is *not responsible* for them. Such states arise involuntarily; consequently he cannot be their author. The unfree will (i.e. the consciousness of an involuntary change in our internal condition) requires the existence of an *alien* will.

In consequence, man has never dared to attribute all of his strong and startling moments to himself; he has always thought of them as 'passive', as 'suffered', as overwhelming. Religion is the outgrowth of a *doubt* as to the unity of the person; it is an *altération* of the personality. In so far as everything great and strong in man was thought of as *superhuman* and *alien*, man diminished himself; he divided himself into two parts, one very wretched and weak, the other very strong and startling, and set them in their separate spheres, calling the one 'Man' and the other 'God'.

And he has persisted in doing so: during the period of *preoccupation with morality* he did not interpret his lofty and sublime moral states as 'voluntary' or as the 'work' of the person. Even the Christian divides his personality into a weak and *mesquine*[2] fiction which he calls Man and another fiction which he calls God (redeemer, saviour).

Religion has degraded the very idea of 'man'; its ultimate consequence is that all goodness, greatness and truth are superhuman, and are bestowed by grace alone.

137

A form of religion to create national pride. The theory of affinity was another way of lifting man out of the degradation brought about by the rejection of his own lofty and strong states as something alien to him. These lofty and strong states could at least be interpreted as the influence of our ancestors, with whom we are related and stand in solidarity; we grow in our own estimation by acting in accordance with the familiar standard they represent. This is an attempt on the part of noble families to reconcile their religion with their own sense of self-respect.

Transfiguration, temporary metamorphosis. Poets and seers do the same thing; they feel proud to have been *singled out* for

the honour of such dealings, and place great value on not being regarded as individuals, but as mere mouthpieces (Homer). Yet another form of religion: God chooses, God becomes man, God dwells among men, bestowing great blessings; a local legend is presented as an immortal 'drama'. Man gradually takes possession of the loftiest and proudest states, of his works and deeds. Formerly, people believed that they honoured themselves by assigning responsibility for their loftiest deeds, not to themselves, but to God. The *involuntariness* of a deed was thought to give it greater value; at that time a god was taken to be its author . . .

138

Priests are actors who play the role of something superhuman which must be made manifest, be it ideals, or gods and saviours; they have an instinct for this sort of thing and have made it their vocation; in order to make all this as credible as possible, they must go as far as possible in assimilating themselves to their role; above all, their actor's cunning must obtain for themselves a *good conscience*, by the aid of which alone can they be truly convincing.

139

Origin of morality. The priest wants to establish that he is to be regarded as the highest type of man, that he reigns, even over those who possess worldly power, that he is invulnerable, unassailable . . . that he is the strongest power in the community, absolutely not to be superseded or underestimated.

The *means* he employs are as follows: he alone is all-knowing; he alone is virtuous; he alone has an indomitable will; he alone is, in a certain sense, God, and has his origin in the Godhead; he alone is the intermediary between God and others; the Godhead punishes every passing thought in opposition to the priest, and every disadvantage imposed on him.

Further means he employs include: the *truth* exists. There is only one way of obtaining it, and that is to become a priest. Everything which is good, in the social order, in nature or in tradition, can be traced back to the wisdom of the priests. The

Holy Book is their work; the whole of *nature* is but an execution of its laws. No source of goodness exists apart from the priests. Every other kind of excellence, e.g. that of the *king*, is of an entirely different order from that of the priest.

In consequence, if the priest is to be the highest type of man, then the hierarchy of his virtues must constitute the hierarchy of value among men. *Study, detachment, inactivity, impassibility, imperturbability, solemnity*; the *opposite* of all this is found in the *lowest* breed of men . . . The inculcation of fear, the gestures, the hieratic manners, the excessive *contempt* for the body and the senses – the *unnatural* as a sign of the *supernatural*.

The priest has taught one kind of morality in order to be considered the *highest type* of man. He then conceives of the *opposite* type of man, the chandala, the outcaste, whom the priest now denigrates by every available means, so that the outcaste might serve as a *foil* to the order of castes. Similarly, his extreme fear in the face of *sensuality* is also due to the *realization* that sensuality is the most serious threat to the *order of castes* (i.e. to *order* in general) . . . After all, every 'more liberal tendency' *in puncto puncti*[3] throws the marriage laws *to the winds*.

140

The philosopher *as the further development of the* priestly *type*. The philosopher comes from a long line of priests, and that is what he is to the marrow of his bones; even as a rival he is obliged to use the same weapons as the priests of his day; and like them he aspires [to] *supreme authority*. What is it that confers *authority* upon men when they wield no earthly power (no army, no *weapons*) whatsoever? In particular, how do they gain authority *over* those who *do* possess earthly authority and might? How can they inspire more awe than princes, conquering heroes and wise statesmen?

Only by inspiring the belief that they wield an even higher and greater power: the power of *God*. And because there is nothing else so powerful, everyone must *depend upon* the mediation and the service of the priest. They present themselves as indispensable *intercessors*. For them it is vital: (1) that people

believe in their God, in the absolute superiority of their God; and (2) that there is no other direct access to God. The *second* condition alone gives rise to the notion 'heterodoxy'; the *first* gives rise to the notion of an 'infidel' (i.e. he who believes in *another* god).

141

'*Betterment*'. *A critique of the holy lie.* It is a part of the theory of every priesthood that a lie is to be allowed for the furtherance of pious purposes; the subject of this investigation is to what extent it is also a part of their practice. But philosophers, who share the same ulterior motives as priests, have also never failed to arrogate to themselves the right to lie whenever they have intended to take the direction of mankind into their hands, Plato first and foremost. The most impressive of these is the double lie, developed by the typically Aryan philosophers of the Vedanta, in which there were two systems that contradicted each other in all their main points, but which for educational purposes are detached from one another, completing and complementing each other.

The lie of the one is supposed to create a condition in which the other truth becomes *discernible* at all . . . *To what lengths* have priests and philosophers gone with the pious lie? Here we must ask what they require with regard to education, and what dogmas they are compelled to *invent* in order to satisfy these requirements?

First, they must have power, authority and absolute credibility on their side.

Second, they must have the whole course of nature in their hands, so that everything affecting the individual seems to be conditioned by their law.

Third, their power must have an even wider scope than that; they must exercise a control over those they have subjugated which is well-nigh invisible, by punishment in the hereafter, in the 'afterlife' – and, of course, by knowing the way and means of beatitude.

They have to remove the notion of a natural course of events, but as they are wise and thoughtful people they are able

to *promise* that, through prayers or the strict observance of their laws, a multitude of effects naturally ensue . . . They can, moreover, *prescribe* a multitude of things which are perfectly reasonable – provided that they do not attribute this wisdom to empirical knowledge and experience, but instead to revelation, and the fruits of the 'most severe self-mortification'. The *holy lie* therefore pertains principally to the *purpose* of an act (the natural purpose of the act, its real reason, is rendered invisible, and a moral purpose, compliance with some law, service to God, appears in its stead). The *holy lie* pertains to the *consequence* of an act as well (the natural consequence is interpreted as something supernatural, and in order to produce a certain effect, the prospect is held out of still more uncontrollable supernatural consequences).

In this way a conception of *good* and *evil* is created which appears to be entirely detached from the natural notions 'useful', 'harmful', 'life-promoting', 'life-diminishing'; indeed, in so far as *another* life is conceived, it may even be directly *antagonistic* to a naturalistic conception of good and evil. In this way, the famous notion 'conscience' is finally created: an inner voice which does *not* evaluate an act by its consequences, but by its intention and conformity of that intention to the 'law'.

As a result, the holy lie has invented: a God who *rewards* and *punishes*, who endorses none other but the code of the priests, who sends no one but them into the world as His mouthpieces and plenipotentiaries; an *afterlife* in which the great punitive machine is intended to operate from the outset, and to this end the '*immortality of the soul*'; the *conscience* in man, as consciousness that good and evil are immutable, that when the voice of conscience recommends conformity with priestly precepts it is the voice of God Himself who speaks; *morality* as the *denial* of any natural course of events, as the reduction of every event to an event conditioned by morality, to moralization (i.e. the notion of punishment and reward), as pervading the world, as the only power, as *creator* of all change; *truth* as given, revealed and in concurrence with the teaching of the priests, as the condition for all salvation and

happiness in this life and the life to come. In short, what price is paid for moral *betterment*?

The suspension of *reason* and the reduction of all motives to hope and fear (reward and punishment); *dependence* on the tutelage of the priesthood, and on exactitude in the observance of formalities claimed to express a divine will; the implantation of a 'conscience' that substitutes a *false knowledge* for trial and error, as if it had already been determined what should or should not be done – which amounts to a sort of castration of the enquiring and progressive mind; in short, the worst *mutilation* of man one [can] imagine, done ostensibly to make man 'good'.

In praxi, all reason, the entire inheritance of wisdom, subtlety and foresight which the priestly canon presupposes, is subsequently reduced in an arbitrary manner to a mere *mechanism*; conformity with the law becomes an end in itself, and the highest one too, for that matter. *All the problems of life are solved.*

The whole conception of the world is besmirched with the notion of *punishment* . . . Owing to the fact that the *priestly* life is upheld as the *non plus ultra* of perfection, life itself is reconceived in order to defame and defile it . . . The notion 'God' represents an aversion to, and a critique of, life; it represents a condemnation of life itself . . . Truth itself is recast as the *priestly* lie; the pursuit of truth as the *study of the Scriptures*, as the means of becoming a *theologian* . . .

142

Towards a critique of the laws of Manu.[4] The whole book rests upon the holy lie. Was it the good of mankind that inspired this whole system? Was this kind of man, who believes that every action is guided by *self-interest*, interested or not in imposing this system? What inspires a man to form the intention of improving the human race? How does one arrive at the notion of betterment? Here we find a kind of man, the *priest*, who considers himself the standard, the pinnacle and the supreme expression of the human type. He comes to the conclusion that others stand in need of 'betterment' by comparing them to himself. He believes in his own inherent superiority, and *intends* to

be superior to them in actual fact: the cause of the holy lie is the *will to power* . . .

In order to establish his own supremacy, he must establish the supremacy of ideas which place a *non plus ultra* of power with the priesthood. He seeks power by the holy lie in recognition of the fact that he does not already possess it in a physical, military sense . . . The holy lie augments his power – and furnishes him with a new notion: 'truth'.

It is a mistake to assume that this is some kind of *unconscious* and *naïve* development, some kind of self-deception. It is not fanatics who invent such carefully considered systems of oppression . . . Cold-blooded premeditation was at work here, the same sort of premeditation in which Plato engaged when crafting his *Republic*. The political insight, 'he who wills the end, wills the means', is one about which legislators have always been perfectly clear.

We possess the classical model in its specifically *Aryan* form; we can therefore hold the most gifted and most sober-minded of men responsible for the most fundamental lie that has ever been told . . . It has been imitated almost everywhere, and thus we can say that *Aryan influence* has corrupted the world . . .

143

Much is said today about the *Semitic* spirit of the *New Testament*, but it is merely priestly, and in the Aryan code of the purest race, with Manu, this kind of 'Semitism', i.e. *priestly spirit*, is worse than anywhere else.

The development of the Jewish priestly state is *not* original; they learned the scheme in Babylon, and it is an Aryan scheme. When later, with the preponderance of Germanic blood, the same thing again became dominant in Europe, this was in accordance with the spirit of the *master* race: a great atavistic reversion. The Germanic Middle Ages was an attempt to restore the *Aryan hierarchy of castes*.

Muhammadanism learned from the Christians in turn the use of an 'afterlife' as an instrument of punishment.

The scheme of an *unalterable polity*, with priests at its head: the oldest and greatest product of Asian culture in the domain

of organization was naturally bound to prompt reflection and imitation in every respect – even on the part of Plato, but above all on the part of the Egyptians.

144

Moralities and religions are the principal expedient by which men can be moulded into any desired form, provided one possesses an abundance of creative power and can enforce one's creative will over long periods of time, in the form of legislation, religions and customs.

145

Exercise in obedience: the pupil of the Brahmins. The Templars' vows, the Assassins. The deification of the feeling of power in Brahmins: interesting that it arose in the *warrior* caste and was only later passed to the priests.

*

This is what an affirmative Aryan religion, the product of the *ruling* classes, looks like: the laws of Manu.

This is what an *affirmative* Semitic religion, the product of the *ruling* classes, looks like: the laws of Muhammad, the Koran, or the earlier portions of the Old Testament.

This is what a *negative* Semitic religion, when it is the product of the *oppressed* classes, looks like, expressed in Indo-Aryan terms: the New Testament – a *religion for the chandala.*

This is what a *negative* Aryan religion, the product of the *ruling* ranks, looks like: Buddhism.

It is perfectly proper that we have no Aryan religion of the *oppressed* races, for that would be a contradiction: a master race is either in the ascendant, or it perishes.

*

Muhammadanism, as a religion for *men*, has profound contempt for the sentimentality and hypocrisy of Christianity . . . which Muhammadans feel to be a woman's religion.[5]

146

Religion as such has nothing to do with morality; but both descendants of the Jewish religion are *essentially* moral religions

which issue precepts as to how one *should* live, and which enforce their demands with rewards and punishments.

147

Pagan–Christian. To be *pagan* is to have an affirmative attitude towards what is natural, a sense of innocence about what is natural; it is to be 'natural'. To be *Christian* is to have a negative attitude towards what is natural, a sense of unworthiness about what is natural; it is to be unnatural. Petronius, e.g., is 'innocent'; unlike this happy man, a Christian has irrevocably lost his sense of innocence. However, in the end the *status of being a Christian* is nothing but a natural condition, which means that to be *Christian* just *is* to make a principle of *the spurious interpretation of psychological phenomena* . . .

148

From the very beginning, the Christian priest was the mortal enemy of sensuality; it is difficult to imagine a greater contrast to this attitude than the feeling of innocent anticipation, the feeling of solemnity with which the presence of sexual symbols [was experienced], e.g. by women in the most venerable cults of Athens. In all non-ascetic religions the act of procreation was regarded as inherently mysterious: a sort of symbol of perfection, and of mysterious intent – a symbol of the future (rebirth, immortality).

149

To us, belief is the strongest fetter, the most painful scourge – and the *strongest wing.* Christianity should have elevated the innocence of man to an article of faith – then men would have become gods: in those days believing was still *possible.*

150

The great lies in history. As if it were the *corruption* of paganism that paved the way to Christianity! Rather, it was the enervation and *moralization* of the man of antiquity that did so! The reinterpretation of natural impulses into *vices* had already preceded its appearance!

151

NB. Religions are destroyed by moral faith: the idea of the God of Christian morality becomes untenable: hence 'atheism' – as though there could be no other god.

Similarly, culture is destroyed by faith in morality: for when its necessary conditions are discovered, the conditions from which alone it springs, then it is no longer *desirable* – hence Buddhism.

152

The physiology of nihilistic religions, a typical prognosis. NB. The *nihilistic* religions are *systematized histories of disease* described using religious and moral nomenclature. In the pagan cult it is around the interpretation of the great *annual cycles* that the cult turns; in Christianity it is around a cycle of *paralytic phenomena.* 'Faith' is a form of mental illness; repentance, redemption and prayer are all *neurasthenic* phenomena; sin is nothing but an obsessional condition; Christianity is rooted in the hatred of nature and of reason – it is a disease, a symptom of physiological *décadence.*

153

This nihilistic religion brings together all the *elements of decadence* and such like from antiquity, namely:

(a) The party of those who are *weak* and *ill-constituted* (the detritus of the ancient world, that which it most forcibly expelled).
(b) The party of those who have become *imbued with morality*, who have become *anti-pagan.*
(c) The party of those who are *weary of politics* and indifferent (the *blasé* Romans), those who have *lost their nationality* and in whom only a void remains.
(d) The party of those who are sick of themselves, who are eager to join an *underground* conspiracy.

154

Religion as *décadence; Buddha versus 'the Crucified'.* Within the larger nihilistic movement, it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between *Christianity* and *Buddhism.* Buddhism is the

expression of a *fine evening*, of a perfect sweetness and gentleness, a sort of gratitude for everything left behind; it lacks bitterness, disappointment and rancour. Finally, it possesses a superior, intellectual love; the purification of a physiology at cross-purposes with itself is behind it now, and it is resting even from this, though it is precisely from this that it derives its intellectual glory and its blazing sunset (it has its origin in the higher castes).

Christianity is a movement bearing all the marks of degeneracy, consisting of all sorts of refuse and waste; it is *not* the expression of the downfall of a race, but from the very beginning an aggregate of morbid elements which huddle together, which seek each other out . . . It is therefore *neither* a national phenomenon, *nor* is it due to the influence of some particular *race*; rather, it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; at bottom, it is an expression of rancour against all that is well-constituted and dominant, of the need for a *symbol* to represent a curse on everything well-constituted and dominant. Moreover, it is contrary to all *intellectual* movements, to all philosophy; it takes the part of idiots, and utters a curse against the intellect. It is full of rancour against those who are gifted, learned, intellectually independent, for it suspects that they are *well-constituted* and *dominant*.

155

In Buddhism the predominant thought is that 'all desire, everything that makes one passionate or sanguine, leads to action' – to this extent, and no more, are its adherents *warned* against evil. And action is pointless, for it merely impels one to cleave to existence; however, existence itself is pointless. Buddhism regards evil as an irrational striving, as an affirmation of means whose end it renounces. It seeks a way to non-being, and therefore every kind of striving is regarded as an abomination. E.g. take no revenge! Be no one's enemy! Here the hedonism of the weary has become the highest standard. Nothing could be further removed from Buddhism than the Jewish fanaticism of a Paul; nothing could be more instinctively repugnant to Buddhism than the tension, fire and unrest of the religious man, especially that form of sensuality which Christianity has sanctified under the name of 'love'.

Moreover, it is the educated and even the over-intellectual classes who discover in Buddhism a way of holding themselves accountable for their actions: a race concentrated and exhausted by centuries of philosophical conflict, but not so base as to be *devoid of all culture*, as were the strata of society from which Christianity arose . . . In the ideal of Buddhism, emancipation from good and evil seems to be essential; what is envisioned here is a refined transcendence of morality which coincides with the nature of perfection, the assumption that even good actions are only a temporary expedient – that is to say, a means of becoming free from action *altogether*.

156

A *nihilistic* religion, sprung from and befitting a decrepit but tenacious people who had outlived all strong instincts, gradually transferred to another *milieu* and in the end coming to youthful peoples who *had not yet lived at all* . . .

How very curious! The happiness of the end, of shepherds and eventide, being preached to barbarians and Germans! How Germanic, how barbaric it would all have to be made first for those who had dreamed of a Valhalla, who were happy only in war! A *supra-national* religion being preached in the midst of a chaos where *no nations yet existed* . . .

157

The only way to refute priests and religions is to show that their errors have ceased to be *beneficial* – that they do more harm than good; in short, that their own 'demonstration of power'[6] no longer holds good . . .

2. On the History of Christianity

158

Christianity should not be confounded with that one root from which it takes its name. The other roots from which it has sprung have been far more powerful, more important in forming its nucleus, than this one. It does an unparalleled injustice to

his holy name to identify it with such horrible forms of deformity and decay as the 'Christian Church', 'Christian faith', 'Christian life'. What did Christ deny? Everything that now goes by the name of Christian.

159

All the doctrines that Christianity requires us to believe, all its 'truths', are mere lies and deception, and exactly the opposite of what the Christian movement had been at first . . .

That which is especially Christian in the *ecclesiastical* sense, is *anti-Christian* from the outset; conformity to things and people instead of to symbols; conformity to history instead of to eternal truths; conformity to formulas, rituals and dogmas instead of to a practice, a way of life . . . To be Christian is to be perfectly indifferent to dogmas, worship, priests, churches and theology . . .

The practice of Christianity is no fantasy any more than the practice of Buddhism is: it is a means to happiness . . .[7]

160

Jesus goes straight to the point: the 'kingdom of heaven' is in the heart, and he does *not* find the means of attaining it in Jewish observances; even the reality of Judaism itself (its need to preserve itself) counts for nothing with him; he possesses *inward* purity. Nor does he care about all the crude formulas relating to our communion with God: he opposes the whole doctrine of repentance and atonement; he shows us how to live so as to feel 'deified', and how we do not come to feel that way by repentance and contrition for our sins. '*Sins are of no importance*' is his principal judgement. In order to become 'divine', the main thing is that we be sick of sin; in this respect, therefore, the sinner is in an even better position than the righteous . . . Sin, repentance, forgiveness – all of these have no place here . . . that is the admixture of Judaism, or else it is pagan.[8]

161

The 'kingdom of heaven' is within the hearts of men (about children it is said, 'for theirs is the kingdom of heaven'):[9] heaven has nothing to do with being 'above the earth'.[10] The kingdom

of God does not 'come', in a chronological or historical sense, by the calendar, something that would be here one day, and not the day before; it is a 'change of heart in individuals',[11] and thus something about which, at any given moment, one could say that its time has come, and that its time has not yet come.

162

Christian misunderstandings. The thief on the cross: when the criminal himself, suffering a painful death, judges 'the way this Jesus suffers and dies, without rebellion, without enmity, graciously yielding, this alone is right', he affirms the gospel; and with that, *he is in paradise* . . .

163

You shall not resist him who does you evil, either in thought or deed. You shall recognize no cause for divorcing your wife; perhaps you should even 'prune' yourself.[12] You shall make no distinction [between] strangers and neighbours, foreigners and fellow countrymen. You shall be angry with no one, you shall despise no one . . . Give alms in secret – you shall not want to get rich – you shall not swear – you shall not judge – you shall be reconciled, you shall forgive – do not pray in public – let your good works be seen, let your light shine![13] Who shall enter into heaven? He that does the will of my Father which is in heaven.[14] '*Salvation*' is not something promised: it is present, if you live and act in such and such a manner.[15]

164

The whole pose of the prophet and miracle-worker, the wrath, the evoking of the spirit of the courtroom, is a horrible corruption (e.g. Mark 6:11: 'And whosoever shall not receive you . . . Verily I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah', etc.). The 'fig tree'.[16] 'A prophet is not without honour, but in his own country, and among his own kin, and in his own house'[17] is nonsense; the opposite is true . . . And as for the *prophecies*: all of them were doctored and tidied up in order to seem *fulfilled*![18]

165

'False prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves': is that not exactly what the Church is?[19] . . . 'Prophesying, working wonders, casting out devils – all this is nothing'[20] . . . The *doctrine of rewards and punishments* obtrudes in the most absurd manner, and everything is thereby ruined. In the same way, we are given a very misleading representation of the *practice* of the first *ecclesia militans*,[21] of the Apostle [Paul] and his comportment, as if it had all been *commanded* or determined *in advance*. The subsequent glorification of the actual *lives* and *teachings* of the first Christians is presented as if everything had already been *prescribed* and were merely a matter of following what had been laid down before . . .[22]

166

Jesus distinguished between a real life, a life in truth, and ordinary life; nothing could have been further from his mind than the crude nonsense of a 'Peter made immortal', of the eternally continued existence of a person.

What he fought against was *self*-importance, the importance attached to the 'person'; how could he have wanted to immortalize *that*? He likewise fought against the hierarchy within the community; he never promises reward in proportion to desert; how could he have meant punishment and reward in the afterlife![23]

167

The humour of the thing, the tragic humour, is that Paul reestablished on a grand scale precisely what Jesus had nullified by the example of his life. And when at last the Church was completed, even the *existence of the state* received its sanction . . . NB. Paul took the rudiments of a new *peace movement* not unlike Buddhism, a possible cure for *ressentiment* which had arisen in the very focus of the epidemic . . . and transformed it into its opposite, a pagan mystery religion, which eventually learns how to get along with the entire *organization of the state* . . . which eventually wages war, condemns, tortures, swears and hates.

Paul's point of departure is the great majority who are prone to religious excitement, and their need for mysteries. He is looking for a *sacrifice*, a bloody phantasmagoria which may rival the images of a secret cult: God on the cross, the drinking of the blood, the *unio mystica* with the 'sacrifice'.

He is trying to forge a link between *sacrifice* (after the model of Dionysus, Mithras, Osiris) and *resurrection* (understood as the *continued existence* of the individual soul, after it has been absolved and blessed).

He needs to bring the notions of *sin* and *guilt* into the foreground: *not* a new way of life (as Jesus himself demonstrated and taught), but a new cult, a new faith, a faith in a miraculous transformation ('salvation' through faith).

He understood that *the pagan world* had *great need* for such a thing; to that end, he arbitrarily selected and newly accentuated certain facts from Christ's life and death, giving them an emphasis that was generally misplaced . . . and thereby essentially *nullified* Christianity in its original form . . .

Thanks to Paul, the attempt to do away with *priests* and *theologians* led to a new priesthood and theology – a *ruling* class and a *church*.

The attempt to do away with *self*-importance, the importance attached to the 'person', led to belief in an eternally existing 'personal identity', to concern about 'eternal salvation' . . . and to the most paradoxical exaggeration of personal egoism.

One can see what came to an end with the death on the cross. *Paul* appears as the demonic bearer of bad tidings . . .

168

The Church is precisely that against which Jesus preached and against which he taught his disciples to fight.[24]

169

There is no God who died for our sins, no salvation through faith and no resurrection after death: this is all false coin when compared with true Christianity, and for which that sinister, pig-headed fellow [Paul] must be held responsible.

The *exemplary life* is one of love and humility, a life whose large-heartedness does not exclude even the lowliest; a life which formally renounces entitlement, self-defence and victory (in the sense of personal triumph); a life which has faith in a beatitude here on earth, in spite of hardship, opposition and death; a life full of forgiveness and devoid of wrath or scorn; a life which seeks no reward and is bound to no one; a life of the most spiritual and intellectual emancipation; a life in which pride is subordinated to voluntary poverty and service.

Once the Church had taken away the *whole of Christian practice*, and had expressly sanctioned life in the state, the kind of life which Jesus had opposed and condemned, it had to find the *meaning* of Christianity elsewhere: in the *faith* in incredible things, in ceremonial prayer, worship, feasts, etc. The notions 'sin', 'forgiveness', 'punishment', 'reward', which are all quite insignificant for, and almost *precluded* by, early Christianity, now came to the fore.

A dreadful mishmash of Greek philosophy and Judaism; asceticism; perpetual judgements and condemnations; hierarchy . . .[25]

170

From the very beginning, Christianity has done nothing but transform the symbolic into *crudities*:

(1) The opposition between 'true life' and 'false life' is misunderstood as an opposition between 'an immanent life' and 'a transcendent life'.

(2) The notion 'eternal life', in opposition to an ephemeral, personal life, is misunderstood as 'personal immortality'.

(3) The brotherhood formed by the common partaking of food and drink according to the Hebrew-Arabic custom is misunderstood as the 'miracle of transubstantiation'.

(4) The 'resurrection' is misunderstood as the entrance to the 'true life' in the sense of a physical 'rebirth', and hence a historical contingency which occurs sometime after death.

(5) The teaching about man in general, of the vital relationship between man and God, is misunderstood as being about the 'son of God', and hence about the 'Second Person of the Trinity' – and it is just that which is *done*

away with: the filial relationship of every man, even the least among us, to God.

(6) Salvation through faith, namely, that there is no other way to become sons of God save through the *way* of *life* taught by Christ, is turned into its opposite: salvation through believing that there is some miraculous *redemption* from *sin* which is not accomplished by man but by Christ's act. To that end, 'Christ on the cross' had to be reinterpreted.

In itself, this death was hardly the most important part of his work . . . it was only another indication of how to behave in the face of authority, in the face of the world's laws . . . not defending oneself . . . *Therein lay the example.*[26, 27]

171

Conviction: on the psychology of Paul. For *Paul*, the inescapable fact is the death of Jesus, a fact that is in crying need of an *interpretation* . . . That an interpretation might be true or false simply never occurs to such people; one day a sublime possibility crosses their minds, 'His death *might* mean such-and-such', and without hesitation they conclude that it *does* mean such-and-such! An hypothesis is proved by the sublime *enthusiasm* it inspires in its originator . . . This is an example of 'the demonstration of power'; i.e. a thought's truth is demonstrated by its *effects* ('by their fruits',[28] as the Bible ingenuously says); that which a man finds delightful, that for which a man sheds his blood, must be *true*.

In such cases, generally speaking, the sudden sense of power which a thought arouses in its originator is attributed to the thought itself – the thought seems to be intrinsically *valuable* – and since he knows no other way of honouring it than by calling it *true*, that is the first predicate he applies to it . . . How else could it be so effective? He imagines that the thought comes to him from a higher power, and if the power were not real, it could not be effective at all . . . The thought is regarded as *inspired*; the influence it exerts has something of the authority of the supernatural about it. A thought which such a *décadent* finds irresistible, and to which he becomes completely addicted, is therefore 'demonstrably' *true*. None of these holy epileptics

and visionaries had a fraction of the integrity, of the capacity for self-critique, which a philologist today brings to the reading of a text, or to the testing of an account of some historical event for accuracy . . . compared to us, such people are moral cretins.

172

Christianity's indifference as to *whether a thing is true* provided it is *effective* betrays an *utter want of intellectual integrity*. Everything is acceptable, including lying, slander or the most shameless hypocrisy, provided it serves to raise the temperature – until people 'believe'.

Christianity is a formal school in the means of indoctrination, i.e. *seduction*, means which include: a fundamental contempt for those spheres from which opposition might be expected (for reason, for philosophy and wisdom, for careful and sceptical investigation); outrageous praise and glorification of the doctrine, with continual reference [to the fact] that it was God (and not the apostle) who gave it to us; that it is not open to question, but is to be accepted on faith; that it is the most extraordinary grace and favour to receive such a doctrine of salvation; that it is to be received with the deepest gratitude and humility . . .

Christianity is always betting on the *ressentiments* which people of low condition feel against everything held in high esteem; what seduces them into accepting this doctrine is the fact that it is presented to them as the counter-doctrine to the wisdom of this world, to the powers of this world. Outcasts and unfortunates of every kind find it convincing; it promises blessings, advantages and privileges to the most humble and unimpressive; it incites these poor little foolish heads to fanaticism, filling them with unreasonable presumption, as though they were the point of everything, the salt of the earth –

As I said, one cannot sufficiently despise all of this. We have been spared the necessity of *criticizing the doctrine itself*; it suffices to consider the means it employs to know what it is with which we are concerned. In the whole history of the intellect

there has never been a more brazen, barefaced lie, a more carefully considered piece of unworthiness, than Christianity – and yet this doctrine aligned itself with *virtue*, shamelessly availing itself of the whole *fascinating power of virtue* . . . it aligned itself with the power of paradox, with ancient civil-ization's taste for pepper and appetite for absurdity; it excited amazement and indignation; it provoked persecution and ill-treatment.

It is exactly the same kind of *carefully considered piece of unworthiness* with which the Jewish priesthood established its power and created its church . . .

One must be able to distinguish between that warmth of the passion called 'love' (resting on a foundation of ardent sensuality) and the thoroughly *ignoble character* of Christianity, as manifested in:

— its constant exaggeration and garrulousness;
— its lack of dispassionate intellectuality and irony (there aren't any bad wits, let alone any good ones);
— its instinctively unmilitary character;
— its priestly prejudices against masculine pride, sensuality, the sciences and the arts.

173

Paul seeks the power to *oppose* the dominant form of Judaism, but his movement is too weak . . . He revalues the notion 'Jew'; 'race' is set aside, but that means negating the very *foundation* of Judaism. Instead, we have the 'martyr', the 'fanatic', the 'value' of all *strong* belief. One must *never* concede that Christianity's *humanitarian effects* speak in its favour . . . Christianity represents antiquity's *decline* into profound impotence, so that the most diseased and pathological strata and needs come into the ascendant.

Consequently, in order to create a unity, a power capable of defending itself, *other* instincts had to come into the foreground, and a kind of emergency was necessary to call them forth, an emergency much like the one from which the Jews themselves had acquired their *instinct for self-preservation* . . . For this, the persecution of the Christians proved invaluable. Christians shared a common danger, and only *wholesale*

conversion could put an end to individual persecution. (This is why one made the notion 'conversion' as elastic as possible.)

174

In the *Judeo-Christian* life, *ressentiment* was *not* prevalent. Only the great persecutions could have provoked so much passion and *fervour* – of *love* as well as of *hate*.

Whenever for the sake of his faith a man must witness the sacrifice of his loved ones, he becomes *aggressive*; we owe the victory of Christianity to its persecutors.

NB. *Asceticism* is not peculiar to Christianity; that was Schopenhauer's misunderstanding; asceticism only becomes intertwined with Christianity wherever there had also been asceticism without Christianity.

NB. *Hypochondriacal* Christianity, the torment and 'vivisection' of the conscience, is likewise associated only with a particular soil in which Christian values have taken root; it is *not* Christianity as such. Christianity has absorbed all sorts of diseases from contaminated soil; the only reproach which could be brought against it is that it does not know how to guard against infection. But *that* is precisely the essence of the thing, for Christianity is a form of *décadence*.

175

Christianity was able to build on the foundation of the small *Jewish families* of the Diaspora: with their warmth and tenderness; with their willingness to help and to take responsibility for one another – a thing unprecedented (and perhaps misunderstood) throughout the entire Roman world; with their secret pride at being 'chosen', a pride which they disguised as humility; with their inward opposition to whatever was in the ascendant, to whatever was glorious and powerful, an opposition all the more remarkable for being utterly devoid of envy. *Paul's genius was to have recognized how powerful this thing was*, to have recognized this state of *mind* as communicable, seductive and infectious even to pagans; he divined that his mission was to exploit this fund of latent energy, of happiness born of wisdom, for the sake of 'a Jewish church of more

liberal confession', drawing on the whole of Jewish experience, the Jewish community's ability to *survive* under foreign domin-ation, as well as its mastery of the art of propaganda. What he discovered was precisely a people who held themselves entirely aloof from politics, this *little people*, with their talent for self-assertion and self-promotion, cultivated in a number of virtues – in the only sense the word 'virtue' can have, i.e. 'the means by which a certain kind of man preserves and improves himself'.

The principle of *love* comes from this little Jewish community: it is a *passionate* soul that glows here, beneath the ashes of humility and poverty; it is neither Greek, nor Indian, nor even German. The song in praise of love which Paul composed[29] is nothing Christian, but a Jewish blaze of that eternal flame which is Semitic. If Christianity has done anything of importance, psychologically speaking, it is that it has *elevated the temperature of the soul* among those colder, nobler races who were in the ascendant; it was the discovery that the most miserable life could be made rich beyond compare, by elevating the temperature of the soul . . .

It goes without saying that this could *not* be conveyed to the ruling classes: the Jews and Christians were at a disadvantage owing to their bad manners – and inward power and passion, when accompanied by bad manners, are disagreeable, and even disgusting. I can *see* these bad manners when I read the New Testament! One has to have shared the humiliation and distress of the baser people who wrote it to feel its attraction . . . There is no better proof of *classical taste* than how a man reacts to the New Testament (cf. Tacitus): whoever is not revolted by it, whoever does not roundly and honestly feel himself to be in the presence of something of a *foeda superstitio*[30] when reading it, something from which he recoils lest he besmirch himself by contact with it – such a man does not know what 'classical' means. One must feel about the 'cross' as Goethe did . . .[31]

176

The contrary movement of religion; morality as décadence; the reaction of little people. Love affords the greatest sense of

power. The task is to understand to what extent it is not man in general, but rather a certain kind of man that is speaking here. This should be more closely scrutinized. 'By receiving divine love we become divine, we become "children of God"; God loves us and wants nothing from us, save love'; that is, no morality, obedience or action produces the same sense of power and freedom as love does; we do nothing bad out of love – we do much more good than we would have done out of mere obedience and virtue. Herein lies the happiness of the herd, the sense of community in things great and small, a lively sense of unity perceived as the *be-all and end-all of life's experiences*. Helping and caring for others, being of use to others, constantly excites a sense of power; evident success and an expression of pleasure in doing so only serve to emphasize the sense of power; nor is there any lack of pride felt as a community, as the dwelling place of God, as the 'chosen people'. In fact, man has once again undergone an *alteration of personality*:[32] this time it is his feeling of love that he calls 'God'. One must try to imagine the awakening of such a feeling as a sort of rapture, a strange speech, a 'gospel'; it was this novel experience which prevented him from attributing this love to himself; he thought that God was walking before him and was alive within him. 'God has come to man', the 'neighbour' is transfigured into something divine (in as much as he evokes a feeling of love in him). *Jesus became the neighbour* as soon as he was reconceived as the Godhead, as the cause which *excites a sense of power.*

177

The faithful are aware that they are endlessly indebted to Christianity, and therefore conclude that its originator must have been a personage of the first rank . . . This conclusion is false, but it is characteristic of worshippers. *First*, viewed objectively, they could have been mistaken about the value of what they owed to Christianity, however firmly they may be convinced of it; to be convinced that something is true proves nothing, and when it comes to religion, convictions are, if anything, somewhat suspect . . .

Second, it could be that what they owe to Christianity should not be attributed to its originator at all, but to the completed structure, to the whole of the Church that was derived from him. The very notion of an 'originator' is itself rather ambiguous, in that it may only stand for the cause which occasioned a movement; the stature of the founder may have increased in proportion as the Church has grown, but the very fact that he is seen through the distorting lens of worship gives us reason to think that, at one time or another, this founder was something very uncertain and indeterminate, at least at first . . .

Just think of the *liberties* Paul takes in handling the problem of the historical Jesus, how Paul makes him disappear as if by sleight of hand; Jesus becomes merely someone who died, someone who was seen again after his death, someone who was betrayed by the Jews and put to death, etc. etc.; a mere 'leitmotif' out of which Paul then composes his music . . .[33] In the beginning, Jesus may well have been nothing –

178

The founder of a religion *may* be insignificant, a match to gunpowder, nothing more!

179

On the psychological problem of Christianity. The driving force is resentment, popular revolt, the revolt of the unfortunates. (Things are different in Buddhism: it is not *born* of a movement which is filled with *resentment*. Buddhism combats resentment because it leads to *action*.) This party of peace understands that it must *abstain from hostility in thought and deed* if it is to distinguish and preserve itself. Herein lies the psychological difficulty which has prevented Christianity from being properly understood: the impulse which *created* it leaves it no choice but to fight with itself, as a matter of principle.[34] If this movement of revolt is to have any chance of success, it must be as a *party of peace and innocence*; it instinctively understands that it can only prevail by being extremely mild, sweet and meek. Its *trick* is to deny and condemn the impulse whose expression it is, and always to make a great show of the opposite impulse, in word and deed.[35]

180

The pretence of youth. We deceive ourselves if we imagine that the early Christians were a naïve and youthful people, as contrasted with an old culture; it is a superstition to think that in the lowest strata of society, where Christianity grew and took root, deep springs of vitality were welling up afresh; we fail to understand the psychology of Christianity when we take it to be the expression of the newly emerging youthfulness of a people or the strengthening of a race. On the contrary, it is a typical form of *décadence*: the moral pampering and hysteria of an unhealthy, heterogeneous population that has become weary and aimless. The strange company which gathers around this master at the seduction of peoples, well, the whole lot of them actually, belong in a Russian novel; all nervous disorders meet in them . . . the absence of employment, the instinctive belief that everything is nearing its end, that things are no longer worthwhile, and that contentment lies in *dolce far niente*.[36] The strength and assuredness of the Jewish instinct, the tremendous tenacity of its will to live, its will to power, lies in its ruling class; the strata which were elevated by primitive Christianity are distinguished by nothing except instinctual exhaustion. On the one hand, they are sick to death of the world around them; on the other hand, they are really quite pleased with *themselves*.

181

Like a nobility which, having sprung from a particular soil and race, finally emancipates itself from these conditions and *goes in search of* kindred elements, Christianity may be regarded as a form of *emancipated Judaism*,[37] in so far as it is:

(1) A church (i.e. a community) covering the same territory as the state, but as an unpolitical formation;
(2) A life, a discipline, a practice, an art of living;
(3) A religion in which an offence *against God* is the *sole* kind of transgression and the sole cause of any suffering at all, that is, a *religion of sin*, with a universal remedy for it. We can only sin against God; whatever wrongs

are done to man should neither be judged nor called to account, unless it be in God's name. Similarly, every commandment (e.g. the commandment to love one another) is referred to God, and obeyed by men for God's sake alone. Herein lies great wisdom – the only way a greatly circumscribed life (such as that of the Eskimo) can be borne is with a peaceable and lenient disposition, which is why Judeo-Christian dogma turned against sin for the good of the 'sinner' . . .

182

The Jewish priesthood recognized the necessity of presenting every act on which they insisted as *divinely ordained*, as obedience to a commandment of God . . . and, by the same token, of presenting every act which served *to preserve Israel* and rendered its existence *possible* (e.g. a number of works:[38] circumcision and the sacrificial cult as the centre of the national consciousness), not as nature, but as 'God'. *This process continued; within* the Jewish community, where the necessity for these 'works' was not felt (namely, as a way of maintaining the separateness of the Jewish people from outsiders), a priestly kind of man could be conceived whose comportment towards the aristocrat is like that of one who is noble, not by accident of birth, but by nature; a casteless and quasi-spontaneous priestliness of the soul which now, in order to draw a sharp contrast between itself and its opposite, values, not the 'works', but the 'spirit' in which they are performed . . .

With regard to Christianity, in essence it was again a matter of a *certain kind of soul prevailing*; it was, so to speak, a *popular uprising within* a priestly people – a pietistic movement coming up from below the priesthood (sinners, publicans, women and the sick). Jesus of Nazareth was the sign by which they recognized each other. And again, in order to have faith in themselves, they needed a *theological transfiguration*; in order to create this faith in themselves, nothing less than 'the Son of God' would do . . . And just as the priesthood had

falsified the whole history of Israel, a further attempt was made here to place the history of mankind *in an entirely false light* so that the appearance of Christianity could be its turning point. This movement could only have arisen from the soil of Judaism, whose principal deed was to intertwine guilt with misfortune, and to reduce any debt we might owe to each other to a debt we owe to God.[39] *Christianity raised all of this to a higher power.*

183

Christian symbolism is based on *Jewish* symbolism, which had already resolved *all of reality* (history, nature) into something numinous, unnatural and unreal . . . which was no longer willing to see history for what it is, which was no longer interested in natural success.

184

The Jews made an attempt to assert themselves after they had lost two whole castes, the warriors and the farmers. In this sense, they are 'eunuchs'; they have priests and chandalas, and nothing in between . . . As one might expect, a rupture occurs between them, a revolt of the chandalas, which is the origin of *Christianity*. Because they had known *warriors* only as their masters, they incorporated into their religion enmity against the *nobility*, against the man who is noble-minded and proud, against the mighty, against the *ruling* classes; they are pessimists from *indignation* . . . Accordingly, they created an important and novel position, that of the priest who leads the chandalas against the *noble estates* . . . The Christians carried this movement to its logical conclusion; even in the Jewish priesthood they still perceived a higher caste, a privileged nobility, and so they *abolished it*. Christ is the chandala who rejects the priest . . . the chandala who finds his own salvation . . . That is why the *French Revolution* is the daughter of *Christianity*, and its continuation; it was instinctively opposed to the Church, the nobility and the few remaining privileges.

185

'*The Christian ideal*' was staged with characteristic Jewish shrewdness. These are its *fundamental psychological impulses*, its 'nature':

– the revolt against the ruling spiritual powers;

– the attempt to make the virtues which render possible the happiness of the lowliest the ideal standard by which we judge all other values – and to call that ideal God: an attempt which expresses the instinct for self-preservation of the poorest, feeblest strata of society;

– the complete abstinence from war, resistance, justified by this ideal, likewise obedience; and

– loving one another, as a consequence of loving God.

Their trick is to *renounce all natural mobilia and* invert them into a transcendent spiritual realm . . . to exploit the *veneration of virtue* for their own benefit, and step by step to *deny* everything that is not Christian.

186

The *profound contempt* with which Christians were treated by the remaining nobility of the ancient world is of the same order as the instinctive aversion with which Jews are treated today; it is the hatred which free and self-respecting classes feel towards those who manage to combine *self-promotion* and a diffident, awkward demeanour with an absurd sense of self-importance.

The New Testament is the gospel of an utterly *ignoble* kind of man; his pretensions to being more valuable, nay, to being exclusively valuable, are, in fact, rather revolting – even now.

187

What little difference the subject matter of a book makes! It is the spirit which gives it life! What a sick and stubborn air all this excited chatter about 'salvation', love, 'beatitude', faith, truth, 'eternal life' has! Take a truly *pagan* book, e.g. Petronius, in which almost nothing is done, said, desired or appreciated which is not, according to hypocritical Christian standards, sin, even mortal

sin. And yet, does it not exude a sense of wellbeing, of purer air, of superior intellectuality, of quicker pace, of liberated, extravagant, confident power? In the whole of the New Testament there is not a single piece of buffoonery; but with that, a book is refuted . . . Compared to Petronius, the New Testament remains a symptom of decline and cultural *corruption* – and as such it has acted as a ferment of decomposition.

188

The dreadful abuses Christianity has perpetrated with the idea of a future existence. The *Last Judgement* is a Christian idea, *not* a Jewish one; it is an expression of resentment, the fundamental thought of all revolutionaries.

The judgement of *deep unworthiness* which Christians render against every life other than their own: it is not enough for them to think ill of their actual opponents – they require nothing less than a wholesale slander of all that they lack . . . Pious arrogance is quite compatible with a base and mischievous soul: witness the early Christians.

The *future existence*: they see to it that they are *richly rewarded* . . . The Christian intellect is the *most intellectually unscrupulous kind of intellect* there is. For example, the whole of Christ's life is depicted as if it were the fulfilment of *prophecy*; he is made to act as he does *in order to* fulfil it . . .

189

The dishonest interpretation of the words, the gestures and the condition of the *dying*: e.g. the fear of death is invariably mistaken for the fear of the 'afterlife' . . .

190

The *Christians* also did what the Jews had done: they put words in their master's mouth which they felt were innovations necessary to their own survival, and for that reason embellished his life. They likewise attributed all of their wise sayings to him – in short, they represented the way in which they already

lived as a form of *obedience*, and thereby as sacrosanct, for propaganda purposes.

What evidence could they bring forward to support any of this? If the epistles of Paul are any indication, the answer is: *not much*. The rest is the elaboration of what they regarded as saintly into the archetype of a saint.

The whole of 'thaumatology', including the resurrection, is a consequence of the community's self-glorification: it took the virtues for which it had given itself credit, and then credited them to its master to an even greater extent (or, derived its vigour *from* him . . .)

191

Christians have never practised what Jesus preached; the chief and only significance of the shameless cant about 'faith' and the 'justification by faith' is that it is the result of the Church having neither the courage nor the will to espouse the *works* that Jesus commanded – this and nothing more.

The Buddhist acts differently from the non-Buddhist; *but the Christian acts as all the world does*, and partakes of a Christianity of ceremonies and *moods*.

The profound and contemptible hypocrisy of Christianity in Europe demonstrates that we really do deserve the contempt of the Arabs, Hindus and Chinese . . . If you listen to the speeches of the first German statesman,[40] concerning the topic which has preoccupied Europe for lo! these forty years, you can hear the voice of the court chaplain Tartuffe.[41]

192

On the idealism of those who despise themselves; 'faith' or 'works'? It is just as natural for 'works', the habit of performing certain actions, to produce a certain value judgement or even a *disposition* as it is unnatural for 'works' to proceed from mere value judgements. We need practice, *not* in strengthening sentiments but in performing actions; we must first be *able to do* something . . . Luther's Christianity is sheer *dilettantism*, his faith a cheat.[42] Lurking in the background is the personal fact that Luther and others like him had a deep conviction,

bordering on an instinctive awareness, of their inability to do Christian 'works', a sense of inadequacy masquerading as a strong suspicion that action of *any* kind is sinful and comes from Satan: so that the value of existence lies in various forms of rapt and solitary *idleness* (prayer, effusive writing, etc.). Ultimately, Luther was right: in their every deed, the Reformers gave expression to the most brutal instincts imaginable. Only by utterly *turning away* from themselves and submerging themselves in their *antithesis*, only by looking upon life as an *illusion* (by having 'faith'), could they make their own lives tolerable.

193

'What must I do to believe?' is an absurd question.[43]

What is missing in Christianity is that it does not comply at all with what Christ has commanded. It is a *mesquine* life, but seen through the eye of contempt.

194

The entrance into the *true* life – *one saves one's personal life from death by living the common life.*[44]

195

The practice of 'Christianity' has become something fundamentally different from what its founder intended or how he lived. It is the great *anti-pagan movement* of antiquity, formulated by utilizing the life, teachings and 'sayings' of the founder of Christianity, but interpreted in an entirely *arbitrary* manner, according to a scheme embodying *fundamentally different needs*, translated into the language of all the underground religions already in existence. It is the rise of pessimism (whereas Jesus wished to bring peace and happiness to the lambs), that is to say the pessimism of the weak and suffering, of the downtrodden and oppressed. Its mortal enemy is paganism, whether in the form of *power*, that is, worldliness in character, intellect and tastes, or in the form of 'happiness', that is, a noble facility and scepticism, a bitter pride, an eccentric profligacy, a coldly self-sufficient sagacity and a refinement of bearing,

speech and manners – in short, its mortal enemy is the *Roman* as much as the *Greek*.

Anti-paganism, in an attempt to justify itself philosophically, creates favourable conditions for the reception of all the ambiguous figures of ancient culture, above all Plato, who was instinctively Semitic and anti-Hellenic . . . and likewise for Stoicism, which is essentially the work of Semites – 'dignity' as severity and obedience to law, virtue as greatness, self-responsibility and authority, as supreme personal sovereignty: all that is Semitic. The Stoic is an Arab *sheikh* clothed in Greek drapery and notions.

196

Christianity only took up the fight against the *classical* ideal and *noble* religion which was already in progress. In point of fact, the whole *reconstruction* was only an attempt to translate that earlier fight into something intelligible to the *religious masses* of that period, in light of their needs and level of understanding, masses which believed in Isis, Mithras, Dionysus and the 'Great Mother', and who demanded a religion providing:

(1) Hope of an afterlife.
(2) A bloody phantasmagoria of the sacrificial animal, 'the Mystery'.[45]
(3) A redemptive *act*, the sacred legend.
(4) Asceticism, renunciation of the world, superstitious 'purification'.
(5) A hierarchy, a means of forming a congregation.

In short, Christianity adapted itself to an already entrenched *anti-paganism*, to the cults which Epicurus combated . . . or, more precisely, to the *religion of the inferior masses, the women, the slaves, the non-noble classes.*

So we have the following misunderstandings:

(1) Personal immortality.
(2) An alleged *other* world.
(3) The absurdity of placing the notions of crime and punishment at the centre of one's interpretation of existence.
(4) Man undeified instead of *apotheosized*, the opening-up of the deepest chasm, which can be bridged only

by a miracle, only by prostrating oneself in the deepest self-contempt.

(5) A whole world of depraved imagination and morbid emotion, instead of a life of kindness and simplicity, instead of an attainable Buddhistic happiness here on earth.

(6) An ecclesiastical order with priesthood, theology, worship, sacraments; in short, everything that Jesus of Nazareth *combated*.

(7) Superstition, everywhere you turn there is a *miracle*, whereas the distinguishing mark of both Judaism and primitive Christianity was precisely their *aversion* to miracles, their relative *rationalism*.[46, 47]

197

'Except ye become as little children':[48] oh, how far removed we are from this psychological naïveté!

The *psychological presuppositions: lack of knowledge* and *lack of culture*, the sort of ignorance which knows no shame: imagine those impudent saints in the heart of Athens.

Their *instinctive* tendency, appropriated from the *Jews*, is to regard themselves as a '*chosen*' people; without further ado, they lay claim to *all the virtues* and count the rest of the world as their opposite, which is a profound sign of *vulgarity of soul*.

In reality, they are distinguished by no particular virtues other than those of hypocrites, *lacking any real aims or tasks which require them*; the state, by furnishing them with aims of its own, *has spared them the necessity of having any*. And yet these impudent people acted as if they had no need of a state.

198

The *moral* of the story is that the founder of Christianity had to pay dearly for having appealed to the lowest stratum of Jewish society and intelligence. The spirit in which such people formed their conception of him was determined by what they themselves understood . . . It was a real disgrace to have fabricated events of salvation, a personal god, a personal saviour, a personal immortality, and to have retained all the trifling 'personal' and 'historical' incidents of someone's life

in a doctrine which denies the reality of everything personal and historical. The tale of salvation has taken the place of the symbolic 'now' and 'always', 'here' and 'everywhere', just as the miracle has taken the place of the psychological symbol.

199

Nothing is less innocent than the New Testament. We know the soil whence it sprang. These people, possessed of a relentless desire to assert themselves, who, after they had lost their grip and had long since forfeited their right to exist, nevertheless knew that if they were to prevail they would need to establish themselves on utterly unnatural, purely imaginary assumptions (that they were the chosen people, the promised people, the congregation of saints, the 'Church'): these people plied the *pia fraus*[49] with such perfection, and with so good a conscience, [that] we cannot be too cautious when they preach morality. When Jews are made to look like innocence itself, then we are in grave danger: while reading the New Testament we should always have on hand a small *fond*[50] of understanding, of distrust, of malice.

They are people of the lowliest origin, partly rabble, outcasts not only from high society but even from respectable society, people reared far from even a *whiff* of culture, without discipline, knowledge or even an inkling that there is such a thing as intellectual conscientiousness, as a conscience of the 'spirit' (the word 'spirit' always creates all sorts of misunderstandings: what all the world calls 'spirit' is still 'flesh' to these people); they are, simply put – Jews: people who (even if we give them the benefit of ignorance) seem instinctively able to create a *temptation* out of every superstitious assumption.

200

I consider Christianity the most fateful and seductive lie that ever existed, as the great *impious lie*: I prune off every shoot and sprout from the stump of its ideal, no matter how well disguised they are; I take exception to any half or three-quarter measures with regard to it – there is no alternative here but war.

The *morality of little people* has been made the measure of all things: this is the most horrible kind of degeneration that our culture has hitherto exhibited. And this *kind of ideal* is still hanging over our heads . . . in the form of 'God'!!

201

However modest may be one's claim to intellectual integrity, when one comes into contact with the New Testament one cannot help experiencing an inexpressible revulsion. The sordid and unbridled insolence with which rank amateurs express the desire to participate in a discussion of the great problems, and what is more, claim the right to sit in judgement on such matters, knows no bounds. The sheer casualness with which the most intractable problems are spoken of there, as if they were not problems at all (e.g. life, the world, God, the purpose of life) but rather simple things which these little hypocrites fully understood, is nothing less than outrageous.

202

The most disastrous form of megalomania that has ever existed on earth appeared when these misbegotten, lying little hypocrites began to arrogate to themselves the words 'God', 'last judgement', 'truth', 'love', 'wisdom' 'Holy Spirit', etc. intending thereby to distinguish themselves from 'the worldly'. When such men begin to *model values on themselves, thereby inverting them*, as though *they* were the meaning of everything, the salt of the earth, the bar of judgement before which all the rest of mankind will be brought and the standard by which it will be judged, then there is nothing for it but to build madhouses for them. To have *persecuted* them was one of the extravagant follies of antiquity, for that was to take them far too seriously, to make them into something *to be* taken seriously.

This whole disaster was made possible by the fact that a similar form of megalomania was *already in existence, Jewish* megalomania: once the rift began to widen between the Jews and the Christian Jews (and without the Jews, the Christians had *no right to exist at all*), the Christian Jews were *compelled* to use once more, and in one final crescendo, the same means

of self-preservation which the Jews themselves had instinctively adopted – at the same time Greek moral philosophy had done everything possible to prepare a kind of *moral fanaticism*, even among Greeks and Romans, and to render it palatable . . . We have Plato, that great conduit of corruption, to thank for this – Plato, who was the first to deliberately misunderstand the natural forces at work in morality, who [regarded] morality as [the] meaning [and] purpose [of life], who had already devalued the Greek gods with his notion of *goodness*, who had already been influenced (perhaps in Egypt?) by *Jewish intolerance*.

203

On the *denaturalizing of morality*. The petty little virtues of these gregarious animals by no means lead to 'eternal life'; and while it may be very shrewd to make a show of them – and themselves with them – for those who have eyes to see it nevertheless remains the most ridiculous of spectacles. A man does not in the least deserve special treatment, on earth or in heaven, just because he perfectly embodies the virtue of moderation . . . like some dear little lamb; even in the best cases, he remains only a dear, silly little ram with horns – provided he is not bursting with vanity like some kind of court chaplain and making a scandal of everything with his magisterial posturing.

Just look at the immense range of colours with which these petty little virtues are illuminated and transfigured here – as though they were the reflection of divine qualities.

The *natural* purpose and utility of every virtue is invariably concealed; a virtue is only valuable with regard to a *divine* command or model, or with regard to otherworldly and spiritual goods. (How marvellous! As if virtue were a question of '*the salvation of the soul*' rather than a way of using fine sentiments to make things here as 'bearable' as possible.)

204

Moral castratism. The ideal of the castrati.

(1)

The *law*, which is the thoroughly realistic formulation of certain conditions necessary for the self-preservation of a

community, prohibits certain actions tending in a certain direction, namely, in so far as they go against the community: it does *not* prohibit the disposition from which these actions flow – for it has need of these self-same actions when they tend in another direction – namely, against its *enemies*. The moral idealist appears and says: 'God sees into men's hearts: the action itself counts for nothing; we must extirpate the hostile disposition from which it flows . . .' Under normal conditions men laugh at such things; it is only in those exceptional cases where a community lives *utterly* beyond the necessity of waging war for its very existence that anyone listens to such things. The disposition from which no further *utility* is anticipated is soon abandoned.

This was the case e.g. when the Buddha appeared in a peaceable and even mentally exhausted society.

This was likewise the case with respect to the early Christian community (as well as the Jewish), something which presupposed an absolutely *unpolitical* Jewish society. Christianity could only spring from the soil of Judaism, i.e. from a people who had already renounced all political claims, and led a sort of parasitic existence within the Roman order of things. Christianity goes a step *further*: men dare to 'emasculate' themselves even more – circumstances allow it.

NB. We *expel nature* from morality when we say, 'love your enemies', for now *nature's* law (instinct), as expressed in the maxim '*love* your neighbour and *hate* your enemy', has become meaningless; now, even *love of one's neighbour* must first be re-established on some other basis (i.e. *the love of God*). *God* is brought into everything, and '*utility*' taken out; everyone denies where morality *comes from*: the acknowledgement of nature involved in *the recognition of a morality of nature* is *destroyed root and branch* . . .

What is the *allure* of such an emasculated human ideal? Why are we not disgusted by it, as we are by (say) the idea of the castrato? . . . The answer is exactly this: despite the cruel mutilation required to produce it, we are *not* revolted by the voice of the castrato, which has, after all, grown sweeter . . . It is precisely because virtue has had its 'male member' excised

that its voice has acquired a more feminine timbre it did not previously possess.

Consider on the other hand the terrible hardship, danger and unpredictability which a life of manly virtues involves – the life of a Corsican, even today, or that of a heathen Arab (which resembles the Corsican's down to the smallest detail: the Arab's songs could have been written by Corsicans) – we can easily imagine how it is precisely this robust type of man who would be disturbed and fascinated by the voluptuous sound of 'goodness' and 'purity' . . . A pastorale . . . an idyll . . . the 'good man': such things have the strongest effect in ages when conflict does great harm (the Roman invented the idyllic pastoral play, i.e. *needed to have it*).

(2)

We have also herewith recognized to what extent the 'idealist' (the castrato being the ideal in question) also emerges from a *particular* set of circumstances and is not merely a visionary . . . He is especially aware of the fact that, given the realities of his situation, a broad rule *prohibiting* certain actions in the broad popular manner of the law is meaningless (because the instinctive propensity to act in precisely this way has been *weakened* for want of exercise, or of anything which requires its exercise). The castratist has to establish a new set of conditions for the preservation of a particular species of men; in this respect he is a realist. The *means* of enforcing his legislation are the same as with older legislation: appealing to all kinds of authority, to 'God', using the notions of 'guilt and punishment' – i.e. he makes use of all the paraphernalia of the older ideal, but with a new interpretation, e.g. punishment is made more internal (as remorse, say).

In praxi, this species of man *perishes* as soon as the exceptional conditions in which they live (a kind of idyllic, Polynesian existence) come to an end – the very conditions in which little provincial Jews found themselves. Their only *natural* enmity is towards the soil from which they sprang: they need to contend with it, they have to allow their aggressive and *defensive* passions to re-emerge; their foes are the devotees of the old ideal

(this species of hostility is admirably represented by Paul in relation to Judaism, and by Luther in relation to the priestly, ascetic ideal). Buddhism is therefore the most perfect form of moral castratism, because it has no enmity and may devote its whole energy to the extirpation of hostile feelings. The struggle against *ressentiment* almost seems to be the Buddhist's primary task: only in this way is his *peace of mind* secured. The goal is to become detached without bitterness; that, however, requires a humane disposition, a disposition rendered mild and sweet, it requires, in short, goodness . . .

(3)

The shrewdness of moral castratism. How does one wage war against the masculine passions and values? One cannot resort to physical violence; one can only wage a war of cunning, fascination and deceit, in short, a war of 'wits'.

First prescription: claim a monopoly on virtue, and dismiss the older ideal as the *opposite of all ideals.* This requires the most artful slander.

Second prescription: propose one's own type of man as the sole *standard of value* and project it into everything, behind everything, behind the fate of everything – as God.

Third prescription: declare the opponents of one's ideal the opponents of God, confer on oneself the right to great pathos, to power, to bless and to curse.

Fourth prescription: attribute all the suffering in the world, every terror, every omen, every catastrophe, to opposition to one's *own* ideal; interpret all suffering as *punishment*, even the suffering of one's followers (unless it is a *test*, etc.).

Fifth prescription: go so far as to undeify nature as the opposite of one's ideal; consider it a great trial of patience, a kind of martyrdom, to endure natural conditions for so long; practise *dédain* of mien and manner towards all 'natural things'.

Sixth prescription: project the victory of anti-naturalism and ideal castratism, the victory of the world of the pure, good, sinless and blessed, into the future as the end, the finale, the great hope and the 'coming of the kingdom of God'.

I hope that one may still be allowed to *laugh* at the way this small species of man has spiralled upwards into an absolute standard of value? . . .

205

What I do not at all like in Jesus of Nazareth and his apostle Paul is that they *put so many ideas into the heads of little people*, as if their modest little virtues had any bearing on anything. We have had to pay dearly for it, for they have brought the more valuable qualities of both virtue and man into disrepute; they have set the noble soul's bad conscience and the sense of self-worth at odds, and led the strong soul's *brave, magnanimous, daring and exuberant* inclinations astray – even to the point of self-destruction . . . [Christianity appeals to that within us which is] touching, childlike, devoted, girlishly infatuated and shy; [it possesses all] the charm of a virginal and enthusiastic precursor to sensuality – for chastity is nothing but the outline of a sensuality to be filled in later (a preliminary sketch of it).

206

In the New Testament, especially in the gospels, I hear absolutely nothing '*divine*' speaking: what I hear is an unfathomable rage of defamation and destruction presented in *indirect form* – which is one of the most dishonest forms of hatred. It shows not the least familiarity with the qualities of a *loftier nature*. It does not shy away from abusing all manner of platitudes; a whole treasury of proverbs is usurped and exploited; apparently it was necessary for a *god* to come in order to say to the publicans this, that and the other thing . . .

Nothing could be more undistinguished than this struggle with the *Pharisees*, aided by an absurd and impractical moral posturing (such a *tour de force* has always delighted the people). And to think that they lay the charge of 'hypocrisy' against them! That's rich! 'Hypocrisy' coming from those lips! No, nothing could be more undistinguished than this treatment of one's opponents – an *indicium* of the most captious kind of high-mindedness, or rather, *not*-so-high-mindedness . . .

207

Christianity in its original form would be tantamount to the *abolition of the state*: it prohibits oaths, military service, courts of justice, self-defence or the defence of a community, and distinctions between fellow countrymen and strangers; likewise it prohibits *social hierarchy*.

Christ's example: he does not resist those who do him evil (he prohibits defence); he does not defend himself; what is more, he 'turns the other cheek'. (To the question: tell us if you are the Messiah, he replies: 'From now on you will see', etc.)[51] He forbids his disciples to defend him; he makes it clear that he could get help if he wanted to, but that he does not *want* to. Christianity would also be tantamount to the abolition of *society*: it favours all that society disregards, it grows out of that which is disreputable and condemned, out of leprosy in every sense; it thrives on 'sinners', 'publicans' and prostitutes; it is led by the most foolish of men (the 'fishermen'); it disdains the rich, the learned, the noble, the virtuous and the 'proper' . . .[52]

208

New Testament. The war in the New Testament against the noble and the powerful, the manner in which it is prosecuted, reminds one of nothing so much as of *Reynard the Fox*[53] and his methods; but anointed with priestliness and a resolute refusal to admit to itself how shrewd it is.

209

The nihilist. The gospel brings the good tidings to the meek and the poor that the door to happiness is open to them: all they have to do is liberate themselves from the institutions, traditions and tutelage of the upper classes. To this extent at least, Christianity is the result of nothing more than *typical Socialist doctrine*. Estate, possessions, country, status and rank, tribunals, police, state, church, education, arts, military affairs: all these are so many hindrances to happiness, errors and

en-tanglements, works of Satan which the gospel brings before the bar of judgement . . . this too is typical of Socialist doctrine.

Lurking in the background there is turmoil, the explosion of a pent-up loathing for the 'masters', an instinctive awareness of how much happiness is already inherent in a sense of freedom . . .

For the most part, this is a symptom of the fact that lower strata have received excessively humane treatment, that they have already had a taste of happiness forbidden to them . . . It is not hunger that engenders revolutions, but rather the fact that for the people, [*l'appétit vient] en mangeant*[54] . . .

210

For once, read the New Testament as a *book of seduction*:

It commandeers *virtue*, instinctively aware that this is the way to have public opinion on one's side, admittedly an altogether modest *virtue*, which acknowledges the value of perfectly gregarious sheep (along with their shepherds) and nothing more; a little, affectionate, benevolent, helpful and enthusiastically pleased kind of virtue which to all appearances is perfectly unassuming – which sets itself apart from the 'world'.

The *absurd conceit* of the thing – as if the fate of mankind revolved around them to such an extent that the congregation on the one hand is always to be regarded as right, and the world on the other is always to be regarded as wrong and reprehensible, and consequently to be rejected.

The *senseless* hatred it bears towards everyone in power, but which never goes so far as to disturb them! It shows a kind of *inward detachment* which outwardly leaves everything as it was (servitude and slavery); it knows how to make *everything* into an instrument in the service of God and virtue.

211

Christianity is possible as the *most private* mode of existence; it presupposes a closely knit, secluded and absolutely unpolitical society – it belongs in the convent. A 'Christian *state*', by contrast, a 'Christian policy' – this is mere bombast for those who

have *reason* to be bombastic. They even dare to speak of 'the Lord God of hosts' as Chief of the General Staff, and no one is deceived by it. *In praxi*, even the Christian prince pursues the policy of Machiavelli – assuming, that is, that he does not pursue bad policy.[55]

212

Christianity is still possible at any time. It is not bound to any of the untenable dogmas which are emblazoned with its name; it requires neither the doctrine of the *personal God*, nor of *sin*, nor of *immortality*, nor of *salvation*, nor of *faith*; it has absolutely no need for a metaphysics, let alone asceticism or Christian 'natural science'.

Now, were a man to say, 'I will not serve as a soldier', 'I will not seek redress in the courts', 'I will not call upon the service of the police', he would be a Christian . . . 'I will do nothing that disturbs my peace of mind, and if I have to suffer on that account, well, nothing preserves that peace more than suffering.'[56, 57]

213

On the history of Christianity. The continual change of *milieu* means that Christian doctrine continually changes its *emphasis*. The favouring of *lowly* and *little* people . . . The development of *caritas* . . . The typical 'Christian' gradually comes to embrace all the things that he originally rejected (*the very rejection of which defined him as a Christian*). The 'Christian' becomes a citizen, a soldier, a magistrate, a worker, a merchant, a scholar, a theologian, a priest, a philosopher, a farmer, an artist, a patriot, a politician, a 'prince'; he takes up the same *activities* which he had abjured (self-defence, litigation, punishment, the swearing of oaths, discrimination between one people and another, deprecation, rage). *Christ himself preached* that the kind of life Christians now lead is ultimately the very life from which we should strive to *disentangle* ourselves . . . The *Church* is just as much a part of the *triumph* of what is anti-Christian, as the modern state and modern nationalism . . . The Church is the barbarization of Christianity.[58]

214

The following have lorded it over *Christianity*: Judaism (Paul); Platonism (Augustine); the mystery cults (the doctrine of salvation, the emblem of the 'cross'); asceticism (hostility towards 'nature', 'reason', the 'senses', i.e. the Orient . . .).[59]

215

Christianity is the morality of the gregarious animal after it has *lost its natural character*; it labours under a complete misapprehension and self-delusion.

Democratization yields a *more natural* form of it, one that is less dishonest.

Fact: the oppressed, the lowly, the whole throng of slaves and half-slaves, *want power.*

Step 1: they free themselves – they release themselves from bondage, though only in their imagination at first, they recognize one another, they assert themselves.

Step 2: they enter the fray, they demand recognition, equal rights, 'justice'.

Step 3: they demand privileges (they draw the representatives of power over to their own side).

Step 4: they insist upon *exclusive* power, and they *receive* it . . .

There are *three elements* in Christianity which must be distinguished:

(a) The oppressed of all kinds;
(b) The mediocre of all kinds;
(c) The diseased and dissatisfied of all kinds.

With elements of the *first* kind, it struggles against the political elite and their ideal.

With elements of the *second* kind, it struggles against all sorts of privileges, against anyone who is exceptionally intelligent or sensitive.

With the third element, it struggles against the *natural instinct* of the happy and healthy.

Whenever victory comes, the *second* element steps into the foreground, for then Christianity has won over the happy and

healthy (as its champions); likewise the powerful (who are interested because Christianity has subdued the multitude); and now it is the *gregarious instinct*, the ever-precious *mediocrity*, which, through Christianity, receives its highest sanction. This *mediocrity* ultimately becomes so self-confident (gets its courage up to such an extent) that it even grants itself *political power* . . .

Democracy is Christianity made natural: a kind of 'return to Nature', as the contrary estimation could only be vanquished By an extreme anti-naturalism. That is why the *aristocratic ideal begins to lose its natural character* ('the superior man', 'noble', 'artist', 'passion', 'knowledge', etc.). Romanticism as the cult of the exceptional, genius, etc.

216

How even 'the masters' could become Christians. A community (tribe, lineage, herd, congregation) instinctively regards all those conditions and desires to which it owes its preservation as intrinsically valuable, e.g. obedience, mutual aid, respect, moderation, compassion – and therefore suppresses everything that opposes or obstructs them.

Likewise, *rulers* (whether they are individuals or classes) instinctively patronize and distinguish those virtues which make the people whom they have subjugated *industrious* and *submissive* (conditions and passions which may be utterly different from their own).

The *gregarious instinct* and the *instinct of the rulers* concur in finding a certain number of conditions and qualities praiseworthy, but not for the same reason; the former do so out of direct egoism, the latter out of indirect egoism.

The *submission of master races* to Christianity is essentially due to their recognition that Christianity is a *gregarious religion*, that it teaches *obedience*: in short, that Christians are more easily ruled than non-Christians. Even in this day and age the Pope, having some inkling of this, recommends Christian propaganda to the emperor of China.

It should also be added that perhaps no one is more strongly affected by the seductive power of the Christian ideal than those whose nature is to love danger, adventure and conflict;

those who love anything *which involves putting themselves in peril*, which involves the possibility of attaining a *non plus ultra* of the sense of *power*. Think of Saint Theresa, surrounded by the instinctive heroism of her brothers; Christianity appears here as a form of dissipation of the will and of will-power, as a quixotic type of heroism . . .

3. Christian Ideals

217

War against the *Christian ideal*, against the doctrine of 'beatitude' and salvation as the aim of life, against the supremacy of the simple-minded, the pure in heart, the sufferers, the unfortunate, etc. (And anyway, what is God or faith in God to us now! 'God' today is merely a faded word, we no longer have the slightest notion what it means!) But, as Voltaire said on his deathbed: 'Do not speak to me of that man here!'[60]

When and where did any considerable man bear the least *resemblance* to the Christian ideal? At least in the eyes of those who are psychologists and triers of reins! Skim the pages of a copy of Plutarch; all of his heroes fall short of it.

218

What gives us precedence. We live in the age of *comparison*; as historians, we are revisionists the like of which has never been seen; we are the self-consciousness of history par excellence . . . Our enjoyments and sufferings, being the product of an instinctive comparison of an unheard-of multitude of things, are different from those of other men . . . We understand everything; we experience everything; we have no more hostility towards anything . . . Although we ourselves may lose by it, our amiable and almost affectionate inquisitiveness boldly charges at the most dangerous of subjects . . . 'There is some good in everything,' we say, finding it something of an effort to say no to anything . . . And should we ever be so unintelligent as to take sides against something, it pains us . . . Actually, it is we scholars today who most closely follow Christ's teaching.

219

It is ironic that some people believe that modern natural science has *vanquished* Christianity. Christian value judgements have *by no means* been vanquished. 'Christ on the cross' is still the most sublime symbol – even now.

220

The two great nihilist movements: (a) Buddhism (b) Christianity; the latter has only recently reached something like the cultural condition in which it can fulfil its earliest purpose – a *level appropriate* for it . . . where it can reveal itself in all its *purity* . . .

221

We have *recovered* the Christian ideal; what remains is to *determine its value.*

(1) Which values does it *reject*, and what does the *opposing ideal* include? Pride, pathos of distance, great responsibility, exuberant spirits, splendid animalism, an instinctive delight in war and conquest, the deification of passion, revenge, cunning, anger, wantonness, adventure and knowledge . . . Christianity rejects the *noble ideal*: the beauty, wisdom, power, splendour and dangerousness of the human type; the man who has his own aims, the 'prospective' man (here Christianity presents itself as the *logical outcome of Judaism*).

(2) Is the Christian ideal *feasible*? Yes, although its feasibility depends on climatic conditions . . . This is similar to the Indian ideal . . . It requires an absence of *labour*. It separates a man from a people, a state, a cultural community and jurisdiction; it rejects education, wisdom, the cultivation of good manners, acquisition and commerce . . . it supplants everything which makes him useful and valuable to other men – it *perfects* him through a sense of idiosyncrasy – devoid of political or national loyalties, neither aggressive nor defensive – it is only possible within the most well-ordered political and social life, which allows these *holy parasites* to flourish as a part of society's general overhead . . .

(3) The Christian ideal remains a consequence of the desire for pleasure – and nothing else! The value of 'beatitude' is considered self-evident, standing in need of no further justification – the rest (the way one is supposed to live and let live) is only a means to an end . . . But it is *low-minded* to regard fear, fear of pain, fear of defilement, fear of corruption, as itself a sufficient motive to let go of everything . . . This is a *poor* man's way of thinking . . . The sign of an *exhausted* race . . . Do not be deceived. ('Become as little children.') *Similar natures* include Francis of Assisi (neurotic, epileptic, visionary, like Jesus).

222

The *superior* man differs from the *inferior* with respect to fearlessness and defiance of misfortune; it is a sign of *decline* when a man allows eudaemonistic considerations to take priority over all others (owing to physiological exhaustion and loss of will-power). Christianity, with its views about 'beatitude', is a way of thinking characteristic of a suffering and impoverished breed of men: men with an abundance of energy wish to create, suffer and suffer destruction; they find Christianity's salvation for hypocrites dissonant, and its hieratic gestures annoying.

223

Poverty, humility and chastity. These three are dangerous and slanderous ideals, but like poisons that are useful remedies for certain diseases, as were used e.g. in the Roman Empire.

All ideals are dangerous, because they debase and stigmatize actuality; they are all poisonous, but as temporary remedies, indispensable.

224

God made man to be happy, idle, innocent and immortal; our actual life is an existence filled with falsehood, apostasy and sin, a penal existence . . . Suffering, struggle, work and death are deemed objections to life, question marks placed after life, something unnatural, something that is not supposed to last, for which one requires – and *has!* – a remedy.

From Adam down to the present day, mankind has found itself in an abnormal condition. God Himself sacrificed His son for Adam's sin, to put an end to this abnormal condition; the natural character of life is a *curse*; to those who believe in Him, Christ restores to them a normal condition; He makes them happy, idle and innocent. But the world has not become fertile without toil; women do not bear children without pain; sickness has not ceased; the most devout are no better off than the infidels in this respect. All that has happened is that man has been made free from *death* and *sin*, assertions which admit of no proof and which, therefore, the Church asserts all the more firmly. 'He is free from sin,' it says, not through his own actions, not through a rigorous struggle on his part; rather, he is *ransomed* through the *act* of *deliverance* – and thus made perfect, innocent and heavenly . . .

The *true* life is merely a belief (i.e. self-deception, madness). The whole of struggling, fighting, splendour-filled, darkness-filled, real existence is only a bad and false existence; the task is to be *delivered* from it.

*

NB. NB. 'Man, innocent, idle, immortal and happy' – this notion, 'highest aspiration', must be criticized first and foremost.

Why should guilt, work, death and suffering (*and*, Christianly speaking, *knowledge* . . .) be *contrary* to the highest aspiration?

The lazy Christian notions 'beatitude', 'innocence', 'immortality' . . .[61]

225

The eccentric notion 'holiness' is empty – 'God' and 'man' have not been sundered. 'The miracles' are lacking – there is simply no such thing as the sphere of miracles . . . The only sphere with which we are concerned here is the 'spiritual' (i.e. the symbolically psychological), the spiritual as a form of *décadence*: a counterpart to 'Epicureanism' . . . *Paradise*, according to the Persian conception of it, is only the 'garden of Epicurus'.

Such a life lacks *purpose*; it *strives for* nothing, it resembles that of 'the Epicurean gods', it has no *reason* any longer to

have an aim beyond itself, no reason to have children . . . for everything has been accomplished . . .[62]

226

They despised the body; they did not take it into account; even worse, they treated it as an enemy. Their delusion was to think that a 'beautiful soul' could be carried about in a misbegotten, cadaverous body . . . In order to make this credible to others, they had to present the notion 'beautiful soul' differently, to revalue the natural value, until eventually a pale, sickly, idiotically enthusiastic being came to be thought of as perfection, as 'angelic', as transfiguration, the superior man.

227

Ignorance in physiologicis. Apparently, the Christian has no nervous system – that might explain: his contempt and deliberate disregard for the demands of the body, and for any *discoveries* about the body; his assumption that this is in accordance with man's higher nature, and necessary *for the good of the soul*; his reduction of all general bodily sensations to moral values, as a matter of principle. The Christian thinks that illness itself is due to his moral status, whether as a punishment or as a test, or even as a state of salvation – a state in which man becomes more perfect than he could be in a state of health (Pascal's idea) – and under certain circumstances, voluntarily makes himself ill in order to attain it.

228

What is this struggle of the Christian 'against nature'? Let us not be deceived by his words and explanations! It is nature struggling against nature. For many it is fear, for others aversion, for others still it is the sign of a certain intellectuality. In the most exalted Christian, who actually wants to be equal to his ideal, it is the love of a condition free from the desires of the flesh, the love of himself as a 'compendium of nature'.[63] It goes without saying that self-abasement in place of self-confidence, anxious vigilance over the passions, disregard of ordinary duties (which creates a sense of elevated rank), the agitation

of constant struggle involving tremendous issues, the habit of emotional effusiveness – all this goes to constitute a type in which the *irritability* of a wasting body preponderates, but the nervousness and inspiration it engenders are *interpreted* differently. The *taste* of this type inclines to anything (1) pedantic, (2) ornate or (3) intensely felt. The natural inclin-ations – pride, lust, etc. – *are* satisfied, but interpreted in a new way, e.g. as 'justification before God', 'salvation through grace' (as an undeniable *sense of wellbeing* is invariably interpreted!). The general problem is, what happens to the man who slanders and in effect denies what is natural and lets it waste away? In fact, the Christian is an example of *exaggerated* self-control: in order to moderate his passions, he seems to find it necessary to crush or crucify them.

The Epicurean sort of Christian and the Stoic – the former includes François de Sales, the latter Pascal.

The victory of Epicurus – but precisely this kind of man is not well understood, and *inevitably* so. The Stoic type (who has great need of struggle and *as a consequence* sets undue value on it) always slanders the 'Epicurean'!

229

Of Christian practice. Down through the ages man did not know himself physiologically; even today he does not know himself. The knowledge that e.g. man has a nervous system (but no 'soul') is still the privilege of the best-informed. But man has not had the slightest suspicion that he did not know these things about himself. A man must be quite affable to be able to say: 'I do not know this,' in order to be *content* with his own ignorance . . .

Suppose he is suffering or is in a good temper, he has no doubt that he could find the reason for his condition were he but to look for one . . . so he looks for it. In truth, he cannot find the reason, for he does not have even the slightest idea where to look . . . So what happens? . . . He mistakes the *consequence* of his condition, e.g. the success of a work undertaken in a good temper (and which was undertaken at bottom because his good temper had already given him the courage to

do so), for its *cause*; *ecco*, the work must be the *reason* why he is in a good temper . . . As a matter of fact his success, in turn, had the same cause as his good temper: the happy coordination of physiological forces and systems.

He feels bad, and *consequently* is not finished with some worry, misgiving or self-examination . . . He really believes that his bad condition is the consequence of his misgivings, of his 'sins' or of his 'self-examination'.

But often, after profound exhaustion and prostration, he recovers. 'How is it possible that I feel such a sense of freedom and liberation?' 'It is a miracle which only God could have accomplished.' Conclusion: 'He has forgiven my sins' . . .

And that implies a practice: to encourage a sense of sin, in order to prepare the way for acts of contrition, it is necessary to reduce the body to a morbidly nervous condition. The method of doing this is well known. As one might imagine, no one suspects the necessary connection between these facts; since the mortification of the flesh is given a religious interpretation, it seems like an end in itself, whereas it is only a *means* of bringing about remorse, that morbid indigestion of the soul (with the aid of the '*idée fixe*' of 'sin', that chalk-line for hypnotizing hens).[64]

The maltreatment of the body lays the groundwork for a series of 'guilty feelings', that is, for a general distress which *is ready to be furnished with an explanation* . . .

On the other hand, the method of 'salvation' emerges in a similar way: every kind of excess of feeling is provoked through prayer, bodily movements, gestures and oaths, and exhaustion ensues, often quite abruptly and often accompanied by forms of epilepsy. And after this condition of profound torpor comes the apparent recovery or, in religious parlance, 'salvation'.

230

Because the conditions and consequences of *physiological exhaustion* abound in what is sudden, terrible, inexplicable and imponderable, formerly they were considered more important than healthy conditions and their consequences.

People feared them, and so people added a *higher* world to this one. Sleep and dreams, shadows, night, the terror of nature, have been held responsible for the emergence of additional worlds; but first and foremost, the symptoms of physiological exhaustion should be taken into account. Ancient religions actually disciplined the pious in such a way as to throw them into a state of exhaustion, a state in which experiencing such things was *inevitable* . . . It was thought that one would thereby enter into a higher order of things, an order where everything ceased to be familiar. The *appearance* of a higher power . . .

231

Religion as décadence. Sleep is a consequence of exhaustion; exhaustion is a consequence of excessive irritation . . . The need for sleep, the deification and even adoration of the notion 'sleep', is characteristic of all pessimistic religions and philosophies – in this instance, the kind of exhaustion is racial exhaustion; sleep, regarded physiologically, is only an analogue of a much deeper and more protracted *need for rest* . . . *In praxi*, it is Death, under the guise of his brother Sleep, which is found so alluring here . . .

232

The whole training that Christians receive concerning prayer and salvation may [be] regarded as an indiscriminately produced *folie circulaire*;[65] although, to be fair, it can only be produced in individuals who are predestined to it (that is, those with a morbid disposition).

233

Décadence, and religion as décadence; against remorse and purely psychological treatment. (For the treatment of *the pang of conscience* I recommend *Mitchell's cure*.)[66] To be unable to have done with an experience is already a sign of *décadence.* This reopening of old wounds, this wallowing in self-contempt and contrition, is something from which no 'salvation of the soul' can come, but only a further illness, a new form of prior illness . . .

These 'conditions of salvation' of Christians are merely variations of the same morbid condition – interpretations of an epileptic fit according to a particular formula which is provided, *not* by science, but by religious mania.

When a man is himself morbid, he will also be *good* in a morbid manner . . . We now regard the greater portion of the psychological apparatus which Christianity has used as among the forms of hysteria and the various epilepsies.

Our whole approach to mental restoration must be put back on a sound *physiological* footing; the 'pang of conscience' itself hinders recovery; one must seek through new activities to compensate for the underlying *décadence*, and the subsequent lingering illness of self-torture, as quickly as possible . . . The purely psychological approach of the Church and of the various sects should be brought into disrepute as injurious to health. No one was ever cured by prayers, incantations or exorcisms; the state of 'repose' which occurs under such influences is far from inspiring confidence in them as physiological treatments . . .

A man is *healthy* when he derides the earnestness and eagerness with which he allowed any particular of his life to *hypnotize* him in this fashion, when his conscience biting him feels like a dog biting a stone – when he is ashamed of his own remorse.

The previous approach, which was purely psychological and religious, was satisfied merely with *controlling the symptoms*; it held a man restored when he prostrated himself before the cross and swore to be good . . . But a criminal who, with a certain grim earnestness, embraces his fate and refuses to disavow his actions *has better mental health* . . . The criminals with whom Dostoevsky was imprisoned had, without exception, unbroken constitutions – are they not a hundred times more valuable than a 'broken' Christian?

234

The good. The *pang of conscience* is a sign that a man's character is not yet equal to his deed. There is even such a thing as a pang of conscience after *good works* due to their exceptional

character, that which distinguishes them from the familiar *milieu* –

235

Against remorse. I do not care for this sort of cowardice in the face of one's own actions; one must not abandon oneself under the impetus of unexpected shame and distress. *Extreme* pride is more appropriate here. What difference does it make in the end! No action can be undone by repentance, any more than it can be by 'forgiveness' or 'expiation'. One would have to be a theologian to believe in a power to absolve sin: we immoralists prefer not to believe in it. We believe that at bottom each and every one of our actions is of equal value – and likewise that actions which run counter to *our* interests may for that very reason still be economically useful and desirable, if by so doing they promote the *general* interest.

In particular cases, we will concede that we could have easily *refrained* from an action – had the circumstances not encouraged us to commit it. Who among us would not have already run through a gamut of crimes had circumstances *encouraged* it? . . . That is why one should never say, 'You should not have done such-and-such', but rather, 'How strange that I have not already done so hundreds of times.'

In the end, few actions are *typical* of, and truly epitomize, a personality; and considering how few human beings actually *have* personalities, particular actions rarely *characterize* them. Actions born of circumstances are merely skin-deep, merely reflexive, occurring as a response to a stimulus, before the depths of our beings have been affected by it or even consulted in the matter. A fit of rage, a grasp, a knife-thrust: how little there is of 'personality' in that!

An action very often brings with it a kind of blank stare and paralysis, so that the offender is transfixed by its recollection, and feels as though he were merely an *accessory* to it. This mental disturbance, a form of hypnotism really, must be resisted at all costs: a particular action, whatever it may be, in comparison to all that one does, may amount to almost *nothing* and may be *deducted* from the total without rendering the

account inaccurate. The reasonable interest which society may have in recalculating the value of our whole existence only in one direction, as though the meaning of our existence were that it produced a particular action, should not infect the offender; but unfortunately this occurs almost constantly. This depends upon the fact that some kind of mental disturbance follows every action which has unexpected consequences; whether the consequences are good or bad is a matter of indifference. Just look at a lover who has become engaged, or a playwright who has brought down the house; as far as *torpor intellectualis* is concerned, they do not differ from the anarchist who has been caught unawares by a search of the premises.

There are some actions which show us to be *unworthy*: actions which, if they were regarded as typical, would lower us to the level of an inferior breed. The sole error to be avoided here lies in *regarding* them as typical. There are actions of the opposite kind, those which are unworthy of *us*: exceptional cases, born of an especial abundance of happiness and health, our highest waves, driven so high by a chance storm; such actions and 'works' are not typical. An artist should never be judged by his works.

236

(a) To the extent that Christianity still seems necessary, men are still brutal and dangerous . . .

(b) From another standpoint, it is not necessary, but extremely pernicious, acting rather as something attractive and seductive, because it is in accordance with the *morbid* character of whole strata and types of modern man . . . such people follow their inclinations when they aspire to Christianity – they are *décadents* of all kinds.

(a) and (b) must be sharply distinguished. *In the case of* (a), Christianity is a cure, or at least a method of taming (under certain circumstances it makes people ill, and this is sometimes useful in breaking a brutal savage). In the case of (b), it is a symptom of illness itself. It spreads the disease of *décadence*; here it counteracts a system of treatment for which there is

some *evidence*; here it is the invalid's instinct working *against* that which would be most salutary for him.

237

On one side, the *serious, dignified and reflective people*, and on the other, the brutal, filthy and capricious beasts; it is a mere problem of *animal-taming* in which the tamer must be severe, cruel and terrifying to the beasts he tames. All essential demands must be made with a brutal clarity, i.e. *exaggerated* a thousandfold. Even *compliance* with the demand must be presented in the form of an oversimplification, so that it may inspire awe, e.g. the Brahmins' denial of sensuality.

The struggle with the canaille and the cattle. If a certain degree of tameness, a certain measure of order, has been achieved, the *gulf* between those who have been *purified* and *reborn* and the rest must be widened and made as formidable as possible . . . This rift increases the higher caste's self-respect and belief in what they represent – hence the *chandala*. This contempt and its excesses are perfectly correct psychologically; that is, it has to be exaggerated a hundredfold in order to be understood at all.

238

The struggle against the *brutal* instincts is different from the struggle against the *morbid* instincts; it can even be a means of overmastering brutishness to induce *sickness*. The psychological treatment practised by Christianity often comes down to turning a brute into a sick and *consequently* tame animal. The struggle against those of a rough and rude nature must employ means which are effective against such men; to this end, *superstitions* prove to be indispensable and irreplaceable . . .

239

Our age is, in a certain sense, *ripe* (that is, *décadent*), just as Buddha's age was . . . That is why something like Christianity no longer requires absurd dogmas . . . The most monstrous

outgrowth of an ancient hybridism. The barbarizing of Christianity.

240

Even if a reply to objections raised against the tenets of Christianity could not be given, Pascal held that in view of the *terrible* possibility that they were nevertheless true, it was in the highest degree prudent to be a Christian. As a sign of how much Christianity has lost its formidableness, today there are those other attempts at justification, to wit, that even if Christianity were a mistake, we still enjoy great advantages and benefits in the course of our lives from making this mistake; it therefore seems that we should uphold this belief for its *tranquillizing* effect – thus not out of fear of an imminent possibility, but rather out of fear of a life that has lost its charm. This hedonistic turn, the demonstration from *pleasure*, is a symptom of decline; it replaces the demonstration from *power*,[67] the demonstration from the one truly shocking thing[68] in the idea of Christianity, the demonstration from *fear*. Actually, with this interpretation Christianity approaches exhaustion: people are satisfied with a *narcotic* form of Christianity because they have neither the strength to seek, to struggle, to dare, to be willing to stand alone, nor the strength to espouse Pascalism along with its deep, brooding self-contempt, its belief in human worthlessness and its anxiety about 'possible damnation'. But a Christianity which before all else is supposed to tranquillize diseased nerves *hardly requires* the terrible solution of a 'God on the cross', which is why Buddhism is quietly gaining ground all over Europe.

241

The amusing thing about European culture is that people think one thing and then do *another*; e.g. what good is philology, the skill of reading critically, if the ecclesiastical interpretation of the Bible (Protestant as well as Catholic) remains unchallenged?

242

People have failed to devote sufficient attention to the barbarous notions according to which Europeans still live. Case in

point: the fact that they have been able to believe that 'the salvation of the soul' depended on a book! . . . And I am given to understand that this is believed to this day. What use is all this scientific education, critique and hermeneutics if the absurd interpretation of the Bible upheld by the Church has not yet stained us for ever red with shame?

243

Something to consider. The fatal belief in *divine providence* is easily the most *debilitating* belief there ever was, both practically and intellectually. But to what extent does it still persist under other guises? To what extent does Christianity as a tacit assumption and interpretation live on under the guise of such formulas as 'nature', 'progress', 'perfectibility' and 'Darwinism', or the superstition that there is a certain relationship between happiness and virtue, between unhappiness and guilt? That absurd *confidence* in the course of things, in 'life' and in the 'instinct of life'; that petty-bourgeois *resignation* which believes that if everybody did his duty *all* would go well – this sort of thing only makes sense on the assumption that things are directed *sub specie boni.*[69] Even *fatalism*, the current form taken by our philosophical sensibility, is the result, albeit an unconscious one, of an *enduring* belief in divine providence. To wit, we think that how everything goes has nothing to do with *us*, and so we might as well let things take their own course, the *individual* being only a *modus*[70] of absolute reality . . .

244

It is an extremely meretricious piece of psychology for man to work out for himself the idea of a being meant to serve as both the origin and the 'in itself' of things, according to his own peculiar standard of what seems good, wise, powerful and valuable – and to do so in abstraction from *all the causal conditions* by virtue of which every kind of goodness, wisdom and power exists and has value. In short, it is meretricious to suppose that elements of the most recent and contingent origin have not developed over time, but rather

that they exist 'in themselves', and are perhaps even the cause of all development! Experience shows that in every case where a man has raised himself to a level significantly higher than that of ordinary men, we observe that higher degrees of power include a certain freedom from good and evil, as well as from 'true' and 'false', and preclude any consideration of the demands of goodness; the same holds true for high degrees of wisdom – goodness is transcended just as much as truthfulness, justice, virtue and other popular velleities of value judgement are. Finally, as regards any high degree of goodness, is it not evident that it already presupposes a certain intellectual myopia and lack of sophistication? And that it likewise presupposes the inability to distinguish at any great distance between true and false, useful and harmful? Not to mention the fact that higher degrees of power in the hands of the highest degree of goodness would lead to the most disastrous consequences ('the elimination of evil')? In fact, one need only consider what tendencies the 'God of love' inculcates in the faithful: they ruin mankind for the benefit of the 'good'. In light of the way the world actually is, this same God has proven *in praxi* a *God of the greatest degree of shortsightedness, devilry and impotence*; whence it emerges how much value this conception possesses.

Knowledge and wisdom have no value in themselves, any more than goodness does; what remains to be determined is the aim from which these qualities derive their desirability; *there could be aims* for which the utmost knowledge was highly undesirable (such as when the utmost illusion would be a prerequisite to the improvement of life; likewise, when goodness would perhaps hinder and discourage the mainsprings of great longing) . . .

Given that our human life is as it is, all 'truth', 'goodness', 'holiness' and 'godliness' in the Christian vein have thus far proven themselves to be great dangers – even now mankind is in danger of perishing from an ideality inimical to life.

245

Consider the *losses* suffered by all human institutions, if we fasten upon a divine and transcendent, *higher sphere* in order

to give these institutions a prior *sanction*. Once we have become accustomed to seeing their value in terms of this sanction (e.g. as in marriage) their *natural value is neglected*, and under certain circumstances *denied* . . . Nature gives offence in proportion as anti-nature – God – is given honours. 'Nature' becomes equivalent to 'contemptible', 'bad' . . .

The disastrous nature of a belief in *God as the embodiment of the highest moral qualities*: all genuine values were thereby denied and held to be *worthless* as a matter of principle. Thus, the *anti-natural* ascended the throne, and with inexorable logic we arrived at the absolute requirement: *the rejection of nature.*

246

Altruism. By bringing the doctrine of disinterestedness and love into the foreground, Christianity by no means set the interests of the species above the interests of the individual. The disastrous thing about its real *historical* effect remains precisely the *increase of egoism*, of individual selfishness taken to extremes (to the extreme of expecting individual immortality). Christianity considered the individual to be of such absolute importance that he could no longer be *sacrificed*, even though the survival of the species depends upon human sacrifice . . . Before God, all 'souls' shall be *equal*, even though that is the most dangerous of all possible value judgements! To treat individuals as equals is to call the welfare of the species into question, and thus to favour practices which are tantamount to its ruin; Christianity is the opposing principle, the principle that *opposes selection*. If the degenerate and diseased man ('the Christian') is accorded the same value as the healthy man ('the pagan'), if not more, as Pascal would have it,[71] then the natural course of development is interfered with, and the *unnatural* becomes law . . .

In praxi, what this universal philanthropy amounts to is *preferential treatment* for the sufferers, the unfortunates, the degenerates; as a matter of fact, it has impaired and weakened the ability, responsibility and high obligation to sacrifice men. According to Christianity's scheme of assessment, all that remained was to sacrifice oneself, but this *remnant* of human

sacrifice, which Christianity conceded and even recommended, makes no sense from the standpoint of the overall development. The sacrifice of one individual is a matter of indifference to the welfare of the species (whether it be in the monastic and ascetic manner, or with the help of crosses, pyres and scaffolds, as 'martyrs' to an error). What the species demands is the elimination of the ill-constituted, the weak, the degenerate; but it was precisely these people that Christianity availed itself of, as a *conservative* force; it further enhanced the already very powerful instinct of the weak to protect themselves, to preserve themselves, to support each other. What is 'virtue', what [is] 'philanthropy' in Christianity, if not precisely this mutual preservation, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting of selection? What is Christian altruism if it is not the collective egoism of the weak which has guessed that if they all care for each other, each individual will last the longest? . . .

He who does not consider such an attitude *immoral* in the extreme, a crime against life, is a part of a morbid band and shares their instincts . . . Genuine philanthropy demands sacrifice, human sacrifice, for the good of the species – it requires severe self-control for that very reason. And it is precisely this which the seemingly humane sentiment called Christianity wants to insist upon: that *no one should be sacrificed.*

247

Nihilism. Nothing would be more helpful than to encourage nihilists to *act* consistently on their nihilism for once. As I understand all the phenomena of Christianity and of pessimism, what they express is, 'We are ripe and ready to be plucked; it is reasonable that we be plucked.' The voice of 'reason' in this instance is simply the voice of *natural selection.*

What is to be condemned in no uncertain terms is the way that the equivocal, cowardly half-measures of a religion like *Christianity*, or, to put it more clearly, of the *Church*, instead of encouraging the death and self-destruction of the ill-constituted and the infirm, protect them and thus ensure their reproduction.

The problem is to determine by what means a severe and highly contagious form of nihilism might be obtained, one in which

voluntary death, *not* a feeble pining for some afterlife, would be practised and taught with scientific conscientiousness . . .

Christianity cannot be sufficiently condemned for having deprived us, through the idea of personal immortality and the hope of resurrection, of the *value* of a great *purifying* nihilistic movement such as was perhaps already in progress – in short, by always dissuading people from committing the *nihilistic act* of suicide . . .

For this it substituted slow suicide; and then, by degrees, a meagre but long life; and then, by degrees, an entirely ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre life, etc.

248

When I gaze upon the spectacle of Christian moral quackery, my compassion and contempt follow each other in rapid succession; sometimes I am outraged by it, as by a despicable crime. Here, error is made obligatory – a 'virtue' even – one takes matters in hand by failing to grasp them; the destructive instinct is systematized as 'redemption'; here, to operate is to eviscerate, to remove the very organs without whose energy a return to health is impossible. And, in the best of cases, one array of symptoms is exchanged for another, while the underlying malady remains uncured . . . And this pernicious nonsense, this systematized castration and rape of life, is considered sacred and inviolable; to live in its service, to be an instrument of this healing art, to be raised to the *priesthood*, makes one venerable, makes one sacred and inviolable oneself. The only possible author of such a supreme art of healing is the Godhead itself; the only way to understand salvation is as a revelation, as an act of grace, as an unmerited gift conferred upon the creature.

First proposition: psychological health is regarded as pathological, suspicious . . .

Second proposition: the prerequisite for a strong and prosperous life, strong desires and passions, is considered an objection to a strong and prosperous life.

Third proposition: everything which poses a threat to man, everything which might overmaster him and ruin

[him], is evil and reprehensible and should be eradicated from his psyche.

Fourth proposition: man rendered harmless to himself and others, weak, prostrate in humility and self-effacement, aware of his weakness, in other words, man the 'sinner' – this is the most desirable type, and one which can even be *produced* by means of a little psychological surgery . . .

249

Against what do I protest? That this equanimity, this placid little mediocrity which knows nothing of the great impetus given by a great accumulation of strength, should be regarded as something superior, or perhaps even as the *measure of the man.*

NB. *Bacon of Verulam: 'infimarum virtutum apud vulgus laus est, mediarum admiratio, supremarum sensus nullus.'* However, as a religion Christianity belongs to the *vulgus*: it has no feeling for the highest kind of *virtus.*

250

Let us see what 'the first Christian'[72] proceeds to do with everything that he instinctively avoids: he *besmirches* and accuses the beautiful, the brilliant, the rich, the proud, the self-assured, the knowledgeable and the powerful – in sum, *all culture*; his intention is to deprive it of its *good conscience.* Sometime try reading Petronius immediately after reading the New Testament: one can breathe freely again! One can blow away the damned air of hypocrisy!

251

Christianity. Previous attacks on Christianity have not been merely too cautious but altogether wrong-headed. As long as Christian morality was not felt to be a *capital crime against life*, its apologists had an easy time of it. The mere question of Christianity's 'truth', whether in regard to the existence of its God or the historical accuracy of the legend of its origin, not to mention its astronomy and natural science, is of secondary importance, as long as the question of the value of its morality

is not touched upon. Is Christian morality *good for* anything, or is it a shame and a disgrace, despite all the holiness of its wiles? There are all kinds of ways of shielding Christianity from any attempt to determine its truth or falsity; and ultimately, the most credulous can always avail themselves of the logic of the incredulous, in order to give themselves the right to regard certain positions as irrefutable – that is, as *beyond* all possibility of refutation (the current expression for this clever dodge is 'Kantian critique').

252

Christianity can never be forgiven for ruining men like Pascal. This is the thing which must be fought incessantly, Christianity's determination to break the spirit of the strongest and the noblest men in particular. We can know no peace until the following has been destroyed root and branch: the ideal of man which Christianity has invented, its demands on man, [its] 'no' and its 'yes' with respect to man. All the rest of it, the tales it tells, the tissue of abstractions (the 'theology') it weaves – these need not detain us; they could be a thousand times more preposterous than they already are, and we would not lift a finger against them. What we fight against, rather, is that ideal whose morbid beauty and feminine wiles, whose insidious and slanderous eloquence, speaks to all the cowardice and vanity in wearied souls: even the strongest have their moments of weariness; as though everything which seems most useful and desirable in such circumstances – trust, guilelessness, modesty, patience, love of one's equals, resignation, submission to God and a kind of relaxation and relinquishment of one's whole ego – were useful and desirable as such; as if these modest little misbegotten souls, these virtuously mediocre human sheep, not only took precedence over the stronger, more evil, more covetous, more truculent and more profligate type of man, over men who are for that very reason a hundred times more vulnerable, but actually constituted an ideal for man more generally, something to be aimed at, a standard, the highest aspiration. The establishment of *this* ideal was the most sinister temptation to which man has been exposed; for once it *had* been established,

the exceptional men who are stronger, who are nature's strokes of good fortune and who represent progress in the development of mankind's will to power and growth, came to be threatened with destruction; indeed, once its values prevailed, these more promising men who, for the sake of their superior claims and tasks, were willing voluntarily to assume the risks of a more dangerous life (in economic terms, their greater entrepreneurial costs are proportional to the improbability of their success), saw their growth nipped in the bud. What is it we fight against in Christianity? The fact that it is determined to break the strong man's spirit, to dampen his courage, to exploit his moments of weariness and vulnerability, and to turn his proud assurance into anxiety and remorse; that it knows how to poison and corrupt the noble instincts until their strength, their will to power, turns around and attacks itself, until the strong perish from an excess of self-loathing and self-injury, that horrible kind of perishing, the most famous example of which was Pascal.

Part 2. Critique of Morality

1. Origin of Moral Value Judgements

253
For the Preface to the Dawn

This is an attempt at investigating morality without falling under its spell, suspicious all the while of its beautiful gestures and glances.

A world which we are able to admire, one which accords with our instinctive need to worship – one which, by providing guidance to both the individual and the collective, is continually *proving* itself – this [is] the Christian view from which all our thinking originates. But as we have grown in acuity, distrust and scientific rigour (also through a more highly developed instinct for truth, which, again, is due to Christian influences), *this* interpretation has become for us increasingly untenable.

The subtlest solution to date has been Kantian critique, in which the intellect denied itself both the right to such an interpretation and the right to *reject* such an interpretation. People satisfied themselves with a *larger* amount of trust and faith, with a renunciation of demonstrability for their faith, and with an ineffable and higher 'ideal' (God) to serve as a stopgap.

The Hegelian solution, following Plato, is a piece of Romanticism and reaction, and at the same time a symptom of the historical sense, a new *power*: we put our faith in the 'spirit' itself, as the self-revealing and self-realizing ideal which is always manifesting itself to an ever-greater extent in the 'process', in 'becoming' – thus the ideal realizes itself, faith is directed towards the *future*, where it can find an object of worship adequate to its noble requirements. In short,

(1) God is unknowable and indemonstrable to *us* – the hidden meaning behind the epistemological movement;
(2) God is demonstrable, but as something evolving, and we are part of it, even our striving towards the ideal – the hidden meaning behind the historicist movement.

But the same historical sense, straying into natural history, has [given us Darwinism] . . .

Notice that critical attention is *never* devoted to the ideal itself, but only to the problem of where the discrepancy between it and the world comes from, why it has not yet been achieved or why it is not demonstrable in all things great and small.

To what degree has the ideal of the wise hitherto been essentially moral? It makes all the difference whether one has felt the crisis to be a crisis with passionate longing, or if one has just barely discovered the problem after a great deal of thought, and by dint of a certain historical imagination . . .

Even setting aside the consideration of religion and philosophy, we find the same phenomena: utilitarianism (Socialism, democracy) criticizes the origin of moral value judgements, *though it believes in them* just as much as the Christian does. (It is naïve to think that morality could remain in the absence of the *deity* that sanctions it. The 'afterlife' is absolutely necessary, if faith in morality is to be maintained.)

The fundamental problem is, where does this omnipotence of *faith* come from? *Of this faith in morality?* (A faith which is also betrayed by the fact that even the fundamental conditions of life are misinterpreted in its favour, despite our knowledge of the animal and vegetable kingdoms.)

'Self-preservation', the Darwinian perspective on a conciliation[73] of the altruistic and egoistic principles.

(Critique of egoism, e.g. La Rochefoucauld.)

254

Contrary to what is often believed, the question of the origin of our value judgements and tables of goods[74] is altogether unrelated to the critique of them; although it cannot be denied that an insight into some *pudenda origo* brings with it the

impression that something which arose in this way is of lesser value, and predisposes us against it.

What are our value judgements and moral tables of goods themselves worth? The question is whether something has been *gained* by their authoritative influence, and if so, by whom and in what respect. The answer is: by life. But what *is* life? Before we can answer that question, we must have a new and more determinate conception of what life is, my formula for which is: life is the will to power. *So what does judging the value of something imply?* Does it somehow point to another, metaphysical world, as Kant (who lived before the great historicist movement) still believed? In short, *how did it arise?* Did it 'arise'? The answer is that a value judgement is a kind of *interpretation*. Interpretation itself is a *symptom* of a determinate physiological condition, as well as of a certain intellectual level of prevailing opinion. *Who is it that interprets?* Our passions.

255

Compassion and love for mankind is a development of the sexual instinct, justice a development of the passion for revenge. Virtue is the pleasure in resistance, the will to power; honour is the recognition of one's peers and equals in power. I have an aversion to calculating *frogs* [whose higher qualities are not determined in this manner].

All virtues are physiological *states*, in particular they are the principal organic functions experienced as necessary and good. All virtues are really refined *passions* and elevated states.

256

By morality I understand a system of value judgements which touches on the conditions of a creature's life.[75]

257

Formerly it was said of every kind of morality, 'by their fruits ye shall know them'; I say of every kind of morality that it is a fruit by which I recognize the *soil* whence it sprang.

258

What I have attempted to do is understand all moral judgements as symptoms and sign languages in which the processes of physiological success or failure, as well as the consciousness of the conditions of preservation and growth, reveal themselves: a mode of interpretation roughly as valuable as astrology. Prejudices, prompted by the instincts (of races and communities, of different stages of life, youth or decrepitude, etc.).

If we apply this principle specifically to Christian morality, to European morality, what we find is that our moral judgements are indications of degeneracy, of a lack of confidence in *life*; they are a preparation for pessimism.

What does it mean that we have read a *contradiction* into existence? This is of paramount importance: those moral judgements stand behind and dictate all our other value judgements. Supposing they were to fall by the wayside, by what standard would we measure then? And what value would knowledge have then, etc. etc.???

My fundamental theorem is that there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of these phenomena. This interpretation itself has its origin outside morality.

259

Insight: in every value judgement there is a definite point of view: the *preservation* of an individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a faith or a culture.

One and the same man may, by virtue of forgetting that all judging has its point of view, esteem all sorts of contradictory things, and *therefore* be teeming with *contradictory impulses*. This is an *expression of the disorder in man*, as opposed to the animals, where for any particular task all present instincts suffice.

However, this creature so full of contradictions is endowed with an excellent method of acquiring *knowledge*: he weighs the pros and cons, he attains *justice* – to a comprehension *beyond merely thinking things good or evil*.

The wisest man would be *the richest in contradictions*, having fingertips, as it were, for reading all kinds of men; but occasionally he would have his consummate moments of *grand*

harmony, which are highly *unlikely* in us as well! A kind of planetary motion –

260

But to want is to want to achieve some purpose. The notion of a purpose necessarily involves a value judgement. How do we come by these judgements? Do they rest on a fixed standard 'pleasant or painful'?

But in innumerable cases we first of all *make* a thing painful, by virtue of how we judge it.

The compass of moral value judgements: they play a part in almost every sense impression. For us the world is *coloured* by them.

We have ascribed purposes and values to things: owing to this we possess an immense fund of *latent energy*; but the study of *comparative* values teaches us that incompatible things have been considered valuable, that there have been many different tables of goods, which means that nothing is 'intrinsically' valuable.

The analysis of individual tables of goods has revealed that they were established (often in error) as the *conditions of existence* for limited groups of people, for their preservation.

An examination of *modern* man shows that we employ a *wide variety* of value judgements, and that they no longer have any creative power – moral judgement is no longer based on 'conditions of existence'. It has become quite superfluous; to be judged and found wanting is not nearly so painful. Judgement has become *gratuitous*; the result is chaos.

Who furnishes *the goal* which stands above mankind and above the individual? Formerly morality was intended for *preserving the species*. But nobody wants to *preserve* any longer, there is nothing left to preserve. Therefore all that remains is the possibility of an *experimental morality*, of *giving* oneself a goal.

261

What is the criterion of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness, (2) its universality, etc. But this is just the moralizing of the salons. Rather, one must study various peoples, and in each case ascertain what their criterion is, as well as what beliefs it

expresses. For example, the belief that 'such behaviour is one of the primary conditions of our existence'. Immoral means 'anything which brings about our downfall'. Now all these communities in which these principles were discovered have perished; but particular principles are repeatedly re-emphasized, because each newly formed community has need of them, e.g. 'thou shalt not steal'. During ages in which one could not expect any sense of fellowship (e.g. *imperium romanum*), one fell back on the 'salvation of the soul', to put it religiously; or 'the greatest happiness', to put it philosophically. For even the Greek moral philosophers no longer had any feeling for their πόλις.[76]

262

The necessity of having the wrong values. An opinion may be refuted by establishing its conditional nature, but that does not eliminate the necessity of having it. Reasons can no more extirpate *wrong opinions as to what is valuable* than they can correct a patient's astigmatism. The necessity for their *existence* must be understood; they are the *result* of causes which have nothing to do with reasons.

263

To *ascertain* and *indicate* the problem of morality – that seems to me to be the new and most important task. I deny that this has been done before in moral philosophy.

264

How wrong, how meretricious people have always been about the basic fact of their inner world! Here, of all places, to have no eyes; here, of all places, to hold one's tongue, or loosen it –

265

Knowledge or awareness of the many twists and turns which moral judgement has since taken is utterly lacking, or of how 'evil' in the most profound sense of the word has actually been renamed 'good' several times already. One of these shifts I have [previously discussed] in terms of the opposition between 'the morality of custom' and ['the morality of self-interest'].[77]

Even conscience has traded one sphere for another: there used to be such a thing as a group conscience. We might well ask in what way our conscience too, and the sense of personal responsibility that accompanies it, is a group conscience, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.

266
Morality as the work of immorality

(1) So that moral values may come to *dominate*, a great many immoral forces and passions must come to their aid.
(2) The *emergence* of moral values is itself the work of immoral passions and considerations.

Morality as the work of error.

Morality gradually comes to contradict itself.

Its comeuppance. Truthfulness, doubt, ἐποχή,[78] judgement. The 'immorality' of believing in morality.

The steps:

(1) The absolute supremacy of morality; all biological phenomena measured and *judged* in accordance with it.

(2) The attempted identification of life with morality (symptom of an awakening scepticism: morality should no longer be felt as standing in opposition); several means, even a transcendent way.

(3) The *confrontation* between *life* and *morality*: morality judged and sentenced by life.

In what way has morality been *harmful* to life:

(1) To the enjoyment of life, the gratitude towards life, etc.;

(2) To the embellishment and refinement of life;

(3) To the knowledge of life;

(4) To the development of life, in so far as it sought to set the *highest* manifestations of it at variance with themselves.

Contrary account: its *usefulness* to life.

Morality as a principle of preservation in the service of the greater whole, as a limitation placed upon its members: 'the instrument'.

Morality as a principle of preservation in relation to the internal dangers which arise from man's passions: 'the mediocre'.

Morality as a principle of preservation directed against the devastating effects of severe hardship and stunted growth: 'the sufferers'.

Morality as a principle of opposition directed against the terrible paroxysms of the powerful: the 'meek'.

The narrow-minded arrogance of individual philosophers masquerading as pure *reason*; the utter opposition to sentiment in morality (Kant); the opposition to compassion; the opposition to the passions.

267

It is good to take 'right', 'wrong', etc. in a certain narrow bourgeois sense, as 'do right and fear no one', i.e. do one's duty, according to a particular crude scheme within which a community exists. Let us not think too meanly of what a couple of thousand years of morality have cultivated in our minds!

268

Décadence. There are two types of morality which must not be confounded: a morality by which the instincts that remain healthy defend against an incipient *décadence*, and another morality by which this very *décadence* expresses and justifies itself, driving one ever faster downhill . . . The former fosters a Stoical, severe, tyrannical character – Stoicism itself was just such a 'brake-shoe' morality – the other is enthusiastic, sentimental, mysterious; it has the women and the 'fine sentiments' on its side.

269

The apparently insane idea that a man should hold in higher regard the actions he performs for others than the ones he performs for himself, and that others should do likewise, etc.,

[that we] should call good only those actions taken with a view, not to one's own interests but to the welfare of [others], has a point to it: namely, as a way of instilling an instinctive sense of fellowship, based on the assessment that although individuals are of small importance, when taken together their importance is very great – provided they are united in *one common society*, with one common feeling and one common conscience. It is therefore a kind of exercise in casting one's eyes in a certain direction, in a determination to gain a vantage-point from which it is impossible to see oneself.

My idea is that aims are lacking, and *these must be individuals!*

We see the public bustle: every individual is sacrificed and serves as an instrument. Walk the streets and tell me if th people you encounter are not all 'slaves'. Where will it all end? What is it all for?

Moral phenomena have interested me as a riddle. Today I would be able to give an answer. What are we to make of the fact that I am *supposed* to assign a higher value to the welfare of my neighbour than to my own? But that the neighbour himself is *supposed* to assign a value to his own welfare differently than I do, namely, to give priority to *my* welfare?

If a man is accustomed from childhood [to act in a certain way, it becomes second nature]. There is an advantage to having some distance from one's own time.

What I want is to bring into view the phenomenon of moralizing, the *enigma* of moralizing, in its entirety.

What is it that 'thou shalt' means, and that even a philosophy regards as 'given'?

270

How is it possible for someone to respect himself *only* with regard to moral values, and to slight all else and *subordinate* everything to matters of good and evil, social reforms, salvation of the soul, etc.? E.g. Amiel. What is the meaning of this *preoccupation* with morality? I ask this in a psychological sense, but also in a physiological one, e.g. Pascal. Thus in cases in which *other* great qualities are not wanting (even in the case of Schopenhauer, who evidently prized what he did not and could not have) is it not merely the result of a habitual *moral interpretation*

of extraneous conditions of pain and discomfort? Is it not a particular form of *sensibility* which *does not understand* the cause of its many unpleasant sensations, but *thinks it can explain them* with the aid of *moral hypotheses*? So that even an occasional sense of wellbeing and *strength*, when seen through the lens of the good conscience, always immediately appears to be inseparably connected with nearness to God and the consciousness of *salvation*? . . . Thus the *morally preoccupied man*:

(1) *Either* he has actually acquired his own worth by approximating the virtuous type as society understands it, by being 'the well-behaved man', '*the upright man*' – an ordinary state of high respectability – of *mediocre* ability, but *honnête*,[79] conscientious, sound, respected and reliable;

(2) *Or* he thinks that he has, because he thinks that none of his states can be understood in any other way . . . He is unknown to himself, so he interprets himself as moral.

Is morality, as the only *scheme of interpretation* by which man makes himself tolerable to himself, a form of arrogance?

271

The will to power as morality; *the hegemony of moral values*. The effects of this hegemony include the corruption of psychology, etc.; fatal consequences everywhere follow in its train. But what does this hegemony *mean*? What does it indicate?

A *greater sense of urgency* for a definite decision in this matter.

That all kinds of *imperatives* have been used in order to make it appear that moral values are firmly established: they have been commanded for so long that they *seem* to be instinctive, like internal commands.

That it is an expression of *society's conditions of preservation* that moral values be felt to be *beyond question*.

That the practice, which is to say, the *utility*, of agreement with one another concerning the highest values has been given a kind of sanction.

We observe that *every effort is made* to ensure that reflection and critique in this area are doomed to *paralysis*, which is the posture that even Kant adopts, not to mention those who believe that it is immoral to conduct 'research' in these matters.

How morality was made to prevail.

272

My intention is to show that all events are absolutely homogeneous, and that the application of a moral distinction *requires a perspective*; to show how everything that is praised as moral is of the same essence as everything that is immoral, and how every development of morality is only made possible through immoral means and for immoral purposes . . . and conversely, to show how everything that is held in disrepute as immoral is, economically considered, more important and more fundamental – and how a development leading to a greater abundance of life necessarily requires the *progress of immorality* . . . 'Truth' is the degree to which we allow ourselves to *understand this fact* . . .

273

In the end, we actually require a great deal of morality to be immoral in this subtle way; allow me to use an analogy.

A physiologist who is interested in an illness and a patient who wishes to be cured of it do not have the same interest. Let us suppose that the illness is morality – for it is an illness – and that we Europeans are the ones who are ill; what sort of acute agony and oppression would arise, supposing we Europeans were at the same time its curious observers and physiologists! Would it be desirable to rid ourselves of morality? Would we even want to? We disregard the question of whether it would be *possible*, of whether we can be 'cured'. We refrain from asking, e.g. the question of pessimism, whether pleasure or pain predominates; likewise the question as to the value of our knowledge.

2. The Herd

274

Whose will to power does morality represent? The *common thread* running through all of European history since *Socrates* is the attempt to make *moral values* supreme over all other

values; so that they should be the guide and judge not only of life, but also of

(1) Knowledge
(2) The arts
(3) Political and social aspirations.

'Reform' is regarded as the sole task, and everything else as a means to it (or else as an interference with, as an obstacle and danger to, reform, and consequently to be fought until it is annihilated . . .). A similar movement occurred in *China*. A similar movement occurred in *India*.

What is this *will to power on the part of moral values*, which has played itself out in three enormous developments on earth?

The answer is that three corresponding powers lie behind it: (1) the instinctive opposition of the *herd* to the strong, independent men; (2) the instinctive opposition of the *suffering* and unfortunate to the fortunate; (3) the instinctive opposition of the *mediocre* to the exceptional. *There is an enormous advantage to this movement*, however much cruelty, duplicity and narrow-mindedness may have helped it along (for the history of the *struggle of morality with the fundamental instincts of life* is in itself the greatest piece of immorality that has ever existed on earth . . .).

275

The good. Very few succeed in seeing a problem in that to which we are accustomed from time [immemorial], since it is precisely that for which we have no eyes; in regard to our morality, it seems to me that this has not yet happened.

The problem of why the highest honours are bestowed upon the principle 'every man should take *others* as the object of his solicitude'. Is the rival principle 'every man should take *himself* as the object of his solicitude' as well regarded? Not at all!

The problem of 'thou shalt': an inclination which is no more able to justify itself than the sexual instinct, and yet it enjoys *immunity* from the condemnation to which all the other instincts are subject; on the contrary, it is made to be their criterion and judge!

The problem of equality, even though we all thirst for distinction: here, on the contrary, we are supposed to make exactly the same demands of ourselves as we do of others.

That is so preposterous, so obviously mad; but – because it is felt to be sacred and superior in rank, its unreasonableness is scarcely noticed.

Sacrifice and selflessness as a source of distinction, unconditional obedience to morality and the belief that all are equal before it – these are the three problems.

The neglect and abandonment of wellbeing and vitality as a source of distinction, the complete renunciation of one's own estimation of things and the strict requirement that everyone else be seen to relinquish theirs as well. 'The value of actions has *already been established*; each individual is subject to this assessment.'

We see that an authority speaks – but who is it that speaks? It is an excusable piece of arrogance, if man sought to make this authority as high as possible, in order to feel as little humiliated by it as possible. Therefore – it is God who speaks!

God was needed as an unconditional sanction from which there is no appeal, as a 'categorical imperative' – or, in so far as one believed in the authority of reason, one needed a metaphysical system, by virtue of which it was required by logic.

Now, suppose that faith in God has died: the question arises anew: *who* is it that speaks? My answer, taken from animal physiology and not from metaphysics, is that *the gregarious instinct speaks*. It is *determined* to be master, hence its 'thou shalt!'. It will accept individuals only as a part of a whole, only for the sake of the whole; it hates those who prise themselves away from it – it turns the hatred of all individuals against them.

276

NB. The whole of European morality is based upon the utility to the herd; what grieves every select and superior man is the fact that his consciousness of all his distinguishing characteristics is accompanied by a sense of being belittled and disparaged because of them. The *strengths* of a man today are what cause

his pessimistic gloominess; those who are mediocre, as members of the herd tend to be, neither ask too many questions nor have too much conscience – they are cheerful. On the gloominess of the strong: Schopenhauer, Pascal.

NB. *The more dangerous a trait seems to the herd, the more thoroughly it is placed under ban.*

277

The morality of *truthfulness* in the herd. 'You shall be open with us, you shall give voice to what is within you by clear and reliable signs – otherwise you are dangerous; and if you are evil, your facility for disguise is the worst thing for the herd. We despise the underhanded and inscrutable. *Consequently* you must regard yourself as recognizable, you must not *hide* from yourself, you must believe that you *never change*.' So, the demand for truthfulness presupposes that personal identity is *constant* and *recognizable*. In fact, it is the object of education to inculcate in every member of the herd a *firm belief* about the nature of man; it *first creates this belief* and then demands 'truthfulness'.

278

Within a herd, within each community and therefore *inter pares*, it is sensible for truthfulness to be *overrated*. No one wishes to be deceived – and *consequently*, each adopts as a personal principle, do not in turn deceive! A mutual obligation among equals! In contact with the *outside* world, danger and vigilance require that one *guard against deception*; but the psychological prerequisite for this is to also guard against those *within*. Suspicion is the source of truthfulness.

279

The good; towards a critique of the gregarious virtues. The effects of *inertia* are present in:

(1) Trust, because distrust requires apprehension, vigilance and deliberation.

(2) Reverence, where the disparity in power is great and submission necessary: so as not to fear, one tries to love, to

esteem and to interpret the difference in power as a difference in *worth*, so that one *no longer revolts* against the relationship.

(3) The sense of truth. What is truth? That explanation which requires of us a *minimum* of mental effort. Moreover, lying is very tiring.

(4) Sympathy. It is quite a relief to identify oneself with others, to try to feel what they feel, to *assume* a feeling already in existence; it is something passive, as opposed to the *activum* which upholds and persistently exercises the right to one's own value judgements. The latter gives us no rest.

(5) Impartiality and dispassionate judgement: one eschews the effort involved in having emotions, and prefers to be detached and 'objective'.

(6) Rectitude: one would rather obey an existing law than *create* a law oneself, than command oneself and others. The fear of commanding – better to submit than to react.

(7) Toleration: the fear of exercising one's rights or of passing judgement.

280

The gregarious instinct regards the *middle* and the *middling* as most precious and of paramount importance, for this is where the majority finds itself, and the mode and manner in which it finds itself there; consequently it is opposed to all hierarchy, and views an ascent from below to above as simultaneously a descent from the majority to the minority. The herd perceives the *exception*, the inferior as well as the superior, as hostile and pernicious. Their trick in dealing with the exceptional man who stands above them, the stronger, the more powerful, the wiser and the more productive man, is to persuade him to assume the role of guardian, shepherd or custodian – to become their *first servant*;[80] thus they turn to their advantage what would otherwise be dangerous. In the middle, fear dissipates; here one is never alone; here there is little room for misunderstanding; here there is equality; here one's own presence is not felt to be a reproach, but is felt to be a *welcome* presence; here comfort is

the order of the day. Distrust is reserved for the exceptions; the exception is to be deemed guilty.

281

'If we, out of an instinctive sense of community, make rules and prohibit certain actions, we reasonably refrain from prohibiting a way of "being", a "disposition", but only a practical application of this "being", this "disposition" in a certain direction. But then the ideologue of virtue, the moralist, comes and says: "God looks into the heart! What does it matter that you abstain from certain of your actions? That does not make you any *better*!"' The answer is that we have no desire at all to be *better*, Mr Long Ears and Virtuous; we are quite pleased with ourselves as we are; all we want is not to injure each other, and that is why we prohibit certain actions with regard to certain people, namely, ourselves; whereas these same actions, provided that they pertain to our opponents – you, for example – we cannot speak highly enough of them. We teach them to our children; we cultivate them as much as possible. Were we to share that 'well-pleasing to God' radicalism which your holy madness commends to us, if we were naïve enough to prohibit not only actions but the prerequisite to them, our 'disposition', we would be excising our *virtues*, the very thing which constitutes our honour and our pride. And that is not all. By abolishing our 'disposition', we would by no means be 'better' – we would no longer exist at all; we would have thereby abolished ourselves . . . If this is what you want, then you are merely a nihilist . . .[81]

282

The notion 'duty' is an attempt to justify a submission due to weakness, in order no longer to have to question and choose. This *weakness* of the *gregarious animal* produces a morality which is just like the one produced by the weakness of *décadent* men: they understand each other; they *band together* (the great religions of *décadence* always count on the support of the *herd*) . . .

There is nothing about the gregarious animal which is pathological per se; in itself it is an invaluable creature. But it

is incapable of self-direction and must have a 'shepherd' – the priests understand this . . . The 'state' is not intimate or private enough; the art of 'moral leadership' eludes its grasp. *Is that how the gregarious animal is made ill by the priest?*

283

The good and the reformers. The hatred of the privileged in body and soul: rebellion of the ugly and ill-constituted against the beautiful, the proud and the light-hearted. The means: suspicion of beauty, of pride, of joy.

The anti-natural as higher: 'there is no such thing as merit'; 'the danger is immense, and so one *should* tremble and feel bad'; 'naturalness is evil, and is at odds with rightness, *even with* "reason"'.

Again, it is the *priests* who exploit this condition, and who win the 'people' over to themselves. 'The sinner', in whom God has more joy in heaven than in the 'righteous'.

This is the struggle against 'paganism' (the pang of conscience as a means of destroying harmony of soul).

The hatred of the average for the *exceptional*, and of the herd for the independent.

Custom as the proper 'morality'; turning against 'egoism'; only that which is done 'for others' has value; 'we are all equal'; against the desire to rule, against 'ruling' altogether.

Against privilege; against sectarians, free-thinkers and sceptics; against philosophy (as opposed to the instinctive tendency towards mechanical activity and specialization); in philosophers themselves 'the categorical imperative', the essence of morality, 'general and universal'.

284

The conditions and desires which are *praised*: peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty, loyalty, fidelity, rectitude, confidence, resignation, sympathy, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good-naturedness, industry.

NB. We must ascertain to what extent *such qualities* are:

– required as *means* to definite aims and *ends* (often '*evil*' ends)
– the natural *results* of a dominating passion (e.g. *intellectuality*)
– an expression of the plight of, for example, the *bourgeoisie*, slaves, women, etc., that is to say, required for *survival*.

Summa: none of them are considered 'good' in and of themselves, but rather because they are already considered good according to the standard of 'society', of the 'herd', as a means to its ends, as necessary for preservation and advancement, as the result of a true *gregarious instinct* in the individual, thus in the service of an instinct which is *fundamentally different* from these *virtuous* conditions; for the herd is *selfish*, *hostile* and *merciless* to the outside world, full of ambition, distrust, etc.

In the '*shepherd*' this *antagonism* is revealed; for he must have the *opposite* qualities of those of the herd.

The mortal enmity of the herd towards all *hierarchy*: its instinct favours the *leveller* (Christ); towards all *strong individuals* (*les souverains*) it is hostile, unreasonable, intemperate, arrogant, impudent, inconsiderate, cowardly, hypocritical, false, merciless, insincere, envious, vindictive.

285

I teach that the herd seeks to preserve one type of individual, and that it defends itself on both sides, as much against those who degenerate from that type (criminals, etc.) as against those who would dominate it. The trend of the herd is towards inertia and stagnation; there is nothing creative in it.

The agreeable feelings which the good, well-meaning, even-handed man inspires in us (as opposed to the discomfort and apprehension which a great, new man occasions in us) are *our* personal feelings of security and equality; in this way the gregarious animal glories in its own nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgement born of complacency disguises itself in fine words – and thus we have 'morality'.

Observe, however, the *hatred of the herd* for the truthful –

286

Do not mistake yourself! If you hear within you the moral imperative as altruism understands it, then you belong to the *herd*. If you have the opposite feeling, if you fear that disinterested and selfless actions would be your undoing, then you do *not* belong to the herd.

287

My philosophy aims at the establishment of hierarchy, not at that of an individualistic morality. The herd mentality should prevail within the herd – but not extend beyond it; the herd leaders' actions require a fundamentally different assessment, as do those of the independent ones, or the 'beasts of prey', etc.

3. General Remarks on Morality

288

The contrary movement: religion; morality as an attempt to produce human pride. The theory of 'free will' is anti-religious. It is intended to give man the right to think of himself as the cause of his elevated states and actions; it is a form of the growing *sense of pride*.

Man feels his power, his 'happiness', as they say; there must be an act of 'will' preceding these states, otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is the attempt to postulate an act of volition, past or present, as the necessary antecedent to every elevated and strong feeling of happiness; if the intention to perform certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, a sense of power may be interpreted as its effect. This is merely *how things appear to the mind's eye*, which falsely assumes that nothing is attributable to us unless we have consciously intended it. The entire doctrine of responsibility depends upon the naïve psychological theory which holds that only the will is a cause, and that one must be aware of having willed to be able to think of one's *self* as a cause. Man is entitled to respect only if he is virtuous.

Then comes the contrary movement, that of the moral philosophers, who still labour under the prejudice that a man is responsible only for what he has intended. Man's worth measured in terms of his *moral worth*; consequently, his morality must be a *causa prima*;[82] consequently, there must be a principle in man, a 'free will', as *causa prima*. The ulterior motive is that if man's will is not a *causa prima*, then he is not responsible for his actions – consequently, he is not subject to the jurisdiction of morality, virtue or vice would be automatic and mechanical . . .

In summa, if man is to have any self-respect, he must be able to be evil.

289

The will to power as morality: pretence as the result of the morality of 'free will'. Man takes a further step in the *development of the feeling of power itself* when he comes to believe that he has also caused – and consequently, he immediately concludes, has *willed* – his elevated states (his perfection) himself . . . In critique of this, it may be said that it is precisely in so far as an action is unconscious and no longer intentional that it achieves perfection; consciousness is the expression of an imperfect and often pathological intermediate condition. *Personal perfection as a result of willing, as conscious control*, as dialectical reasoning, is a caricature, a kind of self-contradiction . . . The degree of conscious control involved renders perfection *impossible* . . . A form of *pretence* . . .

290

The *moral hypothesis*, intended as a *justification of God*, which is very well presented in the *Commentary on Epictetus* by Simplicius,[83] says that evil must be voluntary (if only to render the voluntary nature of *goodness* believable) but, on the other hand, all evil and suffering has a saving purpose.

On this view, guilt does *not* extend back to the ultimate ground of existence, and punishment is an educational benefit; consequently, it is the act of a *good* God.

Moral value judgements take absolute precedence over every other kind of value judgement; there is no doubt that

God could not be evil and could do no harm, i.e. perfection is conceived to be a merely *moral* perfection.

291

Morality. The assumption that the value of an action should depend upon what preceded it in *consciousness* – how wrong that is! And to think that morality, even criminality, has been measured accordingly . . . It has been held that its provenance must be known; and naïve psychologists in the past said . . .

The value of an action must be measured by its consequences, say the utilitarians; to measure it according to its provenance, according to the intention which lies behind it, implies an impossibility, namely, how we are to *know* what this intention is?

But how much do we really know about its consequences either? Five steps ahead, perhaps. Who can say what an action may inspire, provoke or incite? As a stimulant? Or perhaps as a spark igniting an explosive? Utilitarians are naïve . . . And finally, they would have to *know what* is useful in the first place; here too, they can only see five steps ahead . . . They have no conception of the broader economy which cannot dispense with evil. We know neither the provenance nor the consequences of any action; has an action, then, any value at all?

There remains the action itself to consider; its epiphenomena in consciousness, the affirmation or negation which follow its performance; does the value of an action lie in these subjective epiphenomena? Certainly an action is accompanied by a sense of worth, a sense of constraint or a sense of impotence, e.g. freedom or ease. In other words, could the value of an action be reduced to a matter of physiology, that is to say, whether it is the expression of a perfect life or an arrested one? The biological value of an action? Is it permissible to gauge its value by the epiphenomena, by pleasure and pain, the play of emotions, the feeling of discharge, explosion, freedom? . . . It may be that their *biological* value is expressed in this manner. That would mean gauging the value of music by the pleasure or displeasure it gives us . . . that it gives to its *composer* . . .

Thus, if it is possible to extract the value of an action neither in the light of its provenance, nor its consequences, nor even

its epiphenomena, then its value must be x, the unknown . . . Therefore, an action has no value as such. *In summa*, in the words of the hymn, 'Crawl, fly, creep in God's ways.'[84]

292

On the denaturalization of morality. The *separation* of an action from the man who performs it; the direction of hatred or contempt against 'sin'; the belief that there are intrinsically good or bad actions.

The restoration of 'nature': in itself, an action is utterly devoid of value; all that matters is who performed it. To commit the self-same 'crime' is, in one case, to exercise the highest prerogative, and in another, to incur a stigma. Actually, it is the selfishness with which judgement is pronounced that determines the interpretation; those who judge view an action in relation to their own benefit and harm – or else they view its author in relation to his similarity to, or difference from, themselves.

293

Value. The notion 'objectionable act' presents difficulties; nothing that exists can be inherently objectionable. Nothing that ever happens can be inherently objectionable; *we must not wish anything away*; for each thing is so connected to everything else that to exclude one thing would mean to exclude everything. An objectionable act: that means an altogether objectionable world . . . And furthermore, in an objectionable world, objecting itself would be objectionable . . . And so the consequence of a mode of thinking which objects to everything would be a mode of living which affirms everything . . . If the world of becoming is a great cycle, then each thing in it is equally valuable, eternal and necessary . . . In all correlations of affirming and negating, of embracing and rejecting, love and hate express the point of view, the interests, of a particular type of life, and nothing more; in itself, everything that is says *yes*.

294

Critique of subjective feelings of value. The *conscience.* Formerly people argued: conscience objects to this action,

therefore this action is objectionable. But, as a matter of fact, conscience objects to an action because that action has long been objected to; the voice of conscience does not create values, it merely speaks after the fact. At one time, what caused people to object to certain actions was *not* their conscience but their understanding of (or their prejudices about) its consequences . . . The approbation of conscience, the agreeable sense of being 'at peace with oneself', is of the same order as the pleasure an artist takes in his work – it proves nothing . . . Complacency is no more the measure of a thing's value than its absence is an argument against it. We are far too ignorant to be able to measure the value of our actions; in addition, we lack the ability to be objective about them. Even when we object to an action, we do so not as judges but as partisans . . . The noble ardours which accompany an action prove nothing as to its value: an artist may, with the highest pathos imaginable, bring a wretched piece of work into the world. Rather, we should say that these ardours are tempting: they draw our attention away from critique, caution and suspicion, so that we misdirect our efforts and do something *foolish* . . . they make us foolish —

295

We are the heirs of the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two millennia; therein lies our longest exercise, our mastery perhaps, our subtlety in any event. We have coupled our natural inclinations with the evil conscience.

A converse experiment would be possible: to couple the *unnatural* inclinations, by which I mean the tendencies towards the unworldly, the absurd, the irrational, the abnormal, in short, the previous ideals – all of which [are] world-slandering ideals – with the bad conscience.[85]

296
Misrepresentation in Psychology

The great crimes in psychology:

(1) That all *suffering and misfortune* has been misrepresented as being the result of injustice, of guilt (thus depriving sorrows of their innocence).

(2) That all *intensely pleasurable sensations* (exuberance, lust, triumph, pride, audacity, knowledge, self-assurance and happiness as such) were branded as sinful, as temptations, as suspicious.

(3) That *feelings of weakness*, of the most inward cowardice, the lack of confidence in oneself, have been given holy names, and have been taught as extremely desirable.

(4) That all *greatness* in men has been interpreted as self-denial, or as self-sacrifice on behalf of something else, on behalf of others; that even the knowledge-seekers and artists have been duped into believing that *depersonalization* is the cause of the highest knowledge and the greatest abilities.

(5) That *love* should have been misrepresented as devotion (and altruism), whereas it is actually a form of self-aggrandizement, or a form of munificence born of a superabundant personality. Only the *most whole* people can love; the disinterested ones, the 'objective' ones, are the bad lovers (just ask the females!). This is also true of the love of God or 'love of country': one must rest secure in oneself.

Egoism means becoming *yourself*; altruism, becoming *someone else*.[86]

(6) Life as punishment, happiness as temptation; the passions as diabolical; faith in oneself as godless.

NB. *The whole of psychology is a psychology* of *preventive measures*, a sort of *immurement* out of fear: on the one hand, the great majority (those who have come off badly or indifferently) try in this way to defend themselves against the strong (and *destroy* them in the course of their development . . .); on the other, all the impulses by which they themselves best thrive, they hallow and hold in honour to the exclusion of all else. Cf. the Jewish priesthood.

297

The *vestiges* of the *debasement of nature* through *moral transcendence*:

The value of *self-denial*, the cult of altruism.

The belief in *retribution* in the play of consequences.

The belief in the 'good', in the 'genius' even, as if the one like the other were a consequence of *self-denial.*

The persistence of the ecclesiastical sanction of bourgeois life.

The entirely deliberate misunderstanding of history (as if the past were some sort of educational factory for manufacturing a moral mankind) or pessimism at the sight of history (the latter is as much a consequence of the debasement of nature as the former is, as the *pseudo-justification* of history, the *refusal* to see what the pessimist *sees*) . . .

298

'Morality for its own sake!' This is an important step in the denaturalization of morality: morality itself seems to be the ultimate value. In this phase it permeates religion, e.g. in Judaism. And there is also a phase in which it *differentiates itself from* religion, and in which no god is 'moral' enough for it; it then prefers the impersonal ideal . . . This is how things stand at present.

'*Art for art's sake*' – this is an equally dangerous principle, for a false opposition thereby insinuates itself into things – it amounts to a defamation of reality ('idealizing' *it into ugliness*). When an ideal is severed from the real, the real is debased, impoverished and defamed. 'Beauty for its own sake', 'truth for its own sake', 'goodness for its own sake' – these are three ways of casting the evil eye on the real.

Art, knowledge and morality are *means*; instead of recognizing in them the object of improving life, they have been aligned with an *opposition to life*, with '*God*' – as revelations of a higher world, as it were, which here and there peeps through them . . .

'Beautiful and ugly', 'true and false', 'good and evil' – these *distinctions* and *antagonisms* betray conditions of existence and improvement, not only for man but for all robust and enduring complexes which differentiate themselves from their antagonists. The state of *war* thus created is essential thereto, as a means of *separation*, which *reinforces* the isolation . . .

299

Moralistic naturalism is the tracing-back of seemingly independent and supernatural moral values to their 'nature': i.e. to *natural immorality*, to natural 'utility', etc.

I would describe the tendency of these observations as *moralistic naturalism*: my task is to translate the moral values which have become seemingly independent and *non-natural* back into their nature – i.e. into their natural '*immorality*'.

NB. Compare Jewish '*holiness*' and its natural basis; the *moral law* made *sovereign*, separated from its *nature* (to the point of being *contrary* to nature) is similar.

Steps in the '*denaturalization of morality*' (its so-called '*idealization*'):

As a way to individual happiness;
As the result of knowledge;
As the categorical imperative, separated from [its nature];
As a way to salvation;
As a negation of the will to live;
The progressive *hostility of morality to life.*

300

The suppressed and expunged moral *heresy*. The notions of paganism, master-morality, *virtù*.

301

My problem: what sort of harm has mankind yet suffered from its moral conduct, as well as from its moral standards? Intellectual harm, etc.

302

Human values should be nicely ensconced in the only place where they have any right to be: standing on the corner with all the other loiterers. Many species of animals have already become extinct; were man also to become extinct, nothing would be wanting to make the world complete. One must be philosopher enough to admire even *this* nothingness. (*Nil admirari.*)[87]

303

Man is a minor, transitional animal species, which – fortunately – has had its day. Anyway, life on earth is but a moment, an incident, an exception without consequence, something which is irrelevant to the general character of the earth; the earth itself, like every planet, is a hiatus between nothingness and nothingness, an event without plan, reason, will or self-awareness, the worst kind of necessity: *blind* necessity . . . Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent 'vanity' says to us, 'All this must be wrong *because* it is outrageous . . . Might not all of this be an illusion? And, to speak with Kant, [might not] man despite all this [be something transcendent?]'

4. How to Make Virtue Prevail

304

Preface.[88] This *tractatus politicus* is not for everyone's ears; it concerns the *politics* of virtue, its ways and means to *power*. Indeed, who would want to prevent virtue from trying to prevail? *How* virtue does this, however, is incredible. And *that* is why this *tractatus* is not for everyone's ears. We have intended it for the use of those who are eager to learn, *not* how to *become* virtuous, but rather, how to *make other people* be virtuous, how to make virtue prevail. I will even prove that for one to pursue the former – the supremacy of virtue – one must *eschew* the latter, as a matter of principle; one must give up all hope of becoming virtuous oneself. This is a great sacrifice, but such a goal is perhaps worth the sacrifice. And yet greater sacrifices! . . . And some of the great moralists have risked as much. For they already recognized the truth and anticipated the doctrine which is to be taught for the first time in this treatise: that the *supremacy of virtue is attainable only by employing the same means* by which any supremacy is ever attained, at least not *by way of* virtue itself . . .

This treatise, as I have said above, deals with the politics in virtue: it postulates an ideal for such politics, and describes

it in its perfected form, were such a thing possible on this earth. Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the perfected form of politics is, namely, Machiavellianism. But a Machiavellianism which is *pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans toute son âpreté*,[89] is superhuman, divine, transcendent; man has never attained it and never will; at most he has approached it. Even in this more limited kind of politics – in the politics of virtue – the ideal never seems to have been attained. Plato himself only approached it. If we know where to look, we can discover, even in the most unembarrassed and deliberate of *moralists* (for 'moralist' is what we call such statesmen and founders in the realm of morality), traces of the fact that even they paid tribute to human frailty. For in their moments of weariness at least, *they all aspired to virtue* themselves, the primary and principal error of any moralist, that is, the kind of man who is obliged to be an *immoralist* in *practice*. That he *must not appear* to be one is another matter. Or rather, it is *not* another matter: consistent self-denial of this kind (expressed in moral terms, dissimulation) is part and parcel of the moralist's canon and its private doctrine of duties; without it he will never arrive at *his* kind of perfection. Freedom from morality, *even from truthfulness*, for the sake of that goal, outweighs any sacrifice: the supremacy of morality at any cost – *that* is the canon. Of course, moralists should adopt the *posture of virtue*, as well as the posture of truthfulness; their error begins when they *yield* to virtue, when they lose control of virtue, when they themselves become *moral*, become *truthful*. A great moralist needs to be, among other things, a great actor; but he thereby runs the risk of his dissimulation unconsciously becoming second nature to him, and that is at odds with his ideal, which is to keep his *esse* and his *operari*[90] divinely separated; everything he does must be done *sub specie boni*[91] – a high, distant and exacting ideal! A *divine* ideal! And, as a matter of fact, it could be said that the moralist thus imitates no less a model than God Himself: God, the greatest immoralist in practice that there is, but who nevertheless is able to remain true to His *nature* as the *good* God . . .

305

One does not establish the reign of virtue by acting virtuously: to act virtuously is to abstain from power, to lose the will to power.[92]

306

The good; their uncompromising integrity. The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same 'immoral' means as any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.

307

He who knows how *fame* arises will be suspicious even of the fame enjoyed by virtue.

308

In summary, morality is just as 'immoral' as any other thing on earth; morality is in itself a form of immorality.

The great *liberation* which this insight brings: the opposition is removed from things, the uniformity of all events is *saved* . . .

309

There are those who go looking for what is immoral, and once they have judged that something is wrong, they think it necessary to alter or abolish it. Conversely, if I have the impression that something is moral, I can have no peace as long as I am not yet cognizant of the *immorality* it involves. Once I have found it, I recover my equanimity.

310

(a) *The ways to power*: introduce the new virtue under the name of an *old* one.

Excite 'interest' in it ('happiness' as its result and vice versa).

Cultivate the art of slandering anything that stands in its way.

Turn advantages and accidents to account, the better to glorify it.

Make fanatics of its followers by sacrifice and separation.

Great symbolism.

(b) *Attained* power.

(1) Virtue's means of coercion.

(2) Virtue's means of temptation.

(3) Virtue's etiquette (court).

311

By what means does a virtue come into power? By precisely the same means as a political party: through defamation, suspicion, undermining those virtues already in power which strive against it, rechristening them with new names, systematic persecution and ridicule: thence, by flagrant 'immorality'.

What has to happen for a *desire* to become a *virtue*? Rechristening; fundamental denial of its intentions; practice in self-deception; alliance with existing and recognized virtues; conspicuous hostility towards its opponents. If possible, it must buy the protection of sanctifying powers; it must intoxicate with, and inspire, the Tartuffery of idealism; it must win for itself a party, which *either* triumphs with it *or* perishes . . . it must become *unconscious* and *naïve* . . .

312

Cruelty has been refined into tragic compassion, so that we no longer *acknowledge* it as such. Likewise with sexual love in the form of *amour-passion*; slavish disposition as Christian obedience; wretchedness as humility; disease of the *nervus sympathicus*,[93] e.g. as pessimism, as Pascalism, as Carlylism, etc.

313

We should entertain doubts about a man were we to hear that he required *reasons* for remaining respectable; it is certain that we would avoid any dealings with him. In certain cases, the little word 'because' is compromising; sometimes a man *refutes* himself with but a single 'because'. Should we hear, moreover, that such an aspirant to virtue has need of *bad* reasons for remaining respectable, that is as yet no reason to increase our respect for him. But he goes further; he comes to us and tells us outright: 'You are undermining my morality with your

unbelief, Mr Unbeliever; as long as you refuse to believe in my *bad reasons*, that is to say, in God, in punishment in the hereafter and in free will, you hinder my virtue . . . The moral is that we must do away with the unbelievers, for they hinder the *moral education of the masses*.'

314

When it comes to our most sacred convictions, to what is constant in our highest values, it is brawn, not brain, that judges.

315

Morality in the value judgements of races and classes. In view of the fact that emotions and fundamental impulses in every race and class express something of their conditions of existence (or at least, of the conditions under which they have prevailed for the greatest amount of time), to demand that they be 'virtuous' is to demand that they modify their character, change their spots and blot out their past. It is to demand that they no longer differentiate themselves from others. It is to demand that they assimilate themselves to others in their needs and requirements, or, to put it more clearly, *that they perish* . . .

The determination to have *one* morality for everyone thus proves to be the *tyranny* of a particular kind of man to whom that morality is tailored to fit over other kinds; it is their annihilation or regimentation for the benefit of the prevailing type (whether it be to render them harmless, or to exploit them).

The 'abolition of slavery', supposedly a tribute to 'human dignity', is in truth the *annihilation* of a fundamentally different *species* (the undermining of its values and its happiness).

The strengths of the members of an *opposing* race or class are interpreted as what is *wickedest* and worst about them, for they may use these strengths to harm us (their 'virtues' are slandered and rechristened).

It constitutes an *objection* against a man or a people when they *harm us*; but from their point of view *we* are a welcome sight, because we are something by which they may benefit themselves.

The insistence on everything being 'humanized' (which quite naïvely believes itself to be in possession of the formula for what 'human' is) is a piece of Tartuffery under the auspices of which a particular kind of man seeks to gain ascendancy; or, more precisely, a particular instinct, the *gregarious instinct*.

'Human equality': observe what lies *hidden* beneath the tendency to *equate* ever more human beings qua human beings.

The 'interestedness' in common morality. (*The trick* is to make the grand passions of ambition and avarice into protectors of virtue.)

To what extent all kinds of *businessmen* and speculators, all creditors and debtors, find it *necessary* to insist upon the same character traits and the same conception of value: *international trade* and *exchange* of all kinds enforce, and, as it were, *buy*, virtue.

Likewise the *state* and any kind of ambition in officers and soldiers; likewise science, so that it may work with confidence and an economy of force. Likewise the *priesthood*.

Common morality is therefore enforced in these classes because it is advantageous; and, in order for it to triumph, war and violence are waged against immorality – but by what 'right'? None whatsoever; but in accordance with the instinct for self-preservation. Yet these same classes avail themselves of *immorality* when it serves their purpose.

316

The hypocritical appearance with which all *civil institutions* are glossed over, as though they were *creatures of morality* . . . e.g. marriage; work; vocation; country; family; social order; law. But because they are, all things considered, established to protect the *mediocre* from exceptional men and exceptional needs, we should not be surprised to find them covered with lies.

317

We really ought to defend virtue from those who preach it: they are its worst enemies. For they preach virtue as an ideal *for all*; they take away the attractions of virtue – that it is rare,

inimitable, exceptional and extraordinary – they take away its *aristocratic charm*. We ought to make a stand against the obstinate idealists who eagerly tap the pots and take great satisfaction in hearing them ring hollow. What naïveté! To *demand* great and rare things, and then to be filled with indignation and contempt for man upon discovering their absence! It is obvious, e.g., that a *marriage* is worth no more than those who enter into it, i.e. that it will be in large measure something wretched and indecent; no clergyman or magistrate can make it otherwise.

Virtue has all the instincts of the ordinary man against it: it is unprofitable and unwise; it isolates, it is related to passion and not amenable to reason; it ruins a man's character, intellect and sensibilities – always as judged by the standards of mediocre men; it provokes hostility towards the prevailing order, and towards the *falsehoods* which lie hidden in every order, institution or set of circumstances – it is the *worst of vices*, if we judge it by its pernicious influence upon *others*.

What I acknowledge as virtuous: (1) not requiring acknowledgement of one's virtues; (2) not universally expecting other people to be virtuous, but quite otherwise; (3) *not suffering* from the absence of virtue, but on the contrary remaining silent and aloof, considering the distance between virtue and its absence as the reason why there is something honourable about virtue in the first place; (4) not resorting to propaganda on behalf of virtue . . . (5) not allowing anyone to stand in judgement over one's virtues, because one always pursues virtue *for its own sake*; (6) always doing precisely what is otherwise *forbidden*: for virtue, as I understand it, is the real *vetitum*[94] whenever the herd legislates; (7) in short, virtue as the men of the Renaissance understood it, *virtù*; moraline-free virtue . . .

318

Above all, my virtuous gentlemen, you take no precedence over us; we would like you to have a little *humility*: it is wretched self-interest and prudence which commend your virtue to you.

And had you more strength and courage, you would not have dragged yourselves down to the level of virtuous nonentities. You make of yourselves what you can: in part, what you must, what your circumstances compel you to become; in part, what gives you pleasure; and in part, what seems useful to you. But if you act in accordance with your inclinations, or what necessity demands of you, or what is useful to you, then you should *neither praise yourselves nor allow yourselves to be praised!* . . . It is a *thoroughly petty* kind of man who is merely *virtuous*; make no mistake about that! Considerable men were never such virtuous asses: their innermost instinct, the instinct dictated by the amount of power they had, did not find its satisfaction thereby; whereas your minimum amount of power permits nothing to seem wiser to you than virtue. But you have the advantage of *numbers*; and in so far as you *tyrannize* us with them, we will wage war against *you* . . .

319

A *virtuous man* is therefore from the very beginning an *inferior species* because he is not really a 'person', but rather receives his value from living in accordance with a scheme which has been established once and for all. He has no value *a parte*:[95] he is comparable, he has his equals, he *shall* not be an individual . . .

Reassessing the qualities of the *good* man for a moment, why *do* we find them so refreshing? Because we have no need to war against them, because they impose no suspicion, caution, composure or austerity on us: our idleness, benevolence and blitheness are all given *free rein*. It is this, our *sense of wellbeing*, that *we project outwards* and ascribe to the good man as his *quality*, as something *valuable*.

320

Sometimes virtue is merely a respectable form of stupidity; who would wish it ill on that account? And this kind of virtue continues to this very day, a kind of stout simplicity possible not only among peasants but in all classes of society, and which can only be met with respect and affection.

These virtuous people still believe that everything is in good hands, that is, in 'God's hands'; and if this simplicity maintains this proposition with the same modest assurance with which it would assert that two times two is four, then the rest of us will be careful not to contradict them. Why disturb *this* piece of pure foolishness? Why cast a shadow upon it with our concerns about mankind, its peoples, its aims, its future? And we could not if we wanted to. They cast the reflection of their own respectable stupidity and goodness *upon* things (the ancient God, *deus myops*,[96] lives among them still!); we others gaze otherwise upon things, beholding in them our enigmatic nature, our contradictions, our deeper, more painful, more suspicious wisdom.

321

The man who finds virtue easy makes light of it too. Taking virtue seriously is not graceful: as soon as he attains it, he vaults over it – thereby contriving out of it a little devilry for himself, and honouring his God as none other than the buffoon of God.[97]

Meanwhile, notice how intelligent all our bad impulses and inclinations have become! How scientific curiosity afflicts them! All so many ways of angling for knowledge!

322

The task was to associate vice with something so decidedly unpleasant that finally one flees from the vice, to get away from what is associated with it. This is the well-known case of *Tannhäuser*. Having lost all patience with Wagnerian music, Tannhäuser can no longer bear to stay, not even with the Lady Venus: all at once virtue acquires a certain charm; the price of a Thuringian virgin goes up; and worst of all, he takes a liking to the tune by Wolfram von Eschenbach . . .

323

The patronage of virtue: greed, ambition, laziness, simplemindedness, fear; all these things have an interest in the cause of virtue: that is why it persists.

324

No one believes in *virtue* any more, it has lost its attraction. What it needs is someone who knows how to place it on the market again as an extraordinary form of adventure and extravagance. Virtue costs its believers too much effort and narrow-mindedness not to go against their consciences nowadays. Of course, for those with neither conscience nor scruples, that may be much of its renewed charm, for it is now what it has never been before, a *vice*.

325

Virtue remains the most expensive vice, which is as it *should* be.

326

Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as we allow them to prevail as externally imposed authorities and laws which we have not engendered ourselves, as would be proper. Our virtues should be our most personal defences and necessities, precisely as the conditions of *our* existence and growth which we recognize and acknowledge, indifferent to whether others thrive with us under the same or different conditions. This law, that *objective*, impersonally conceived virtue is dangerous, also applies to humility: for through humility many of the choicest spirits perish.

The morality of humility is the worst kind of coddling for such souls – souls for whom the only sensible course is that they be trained as soon as possible to *endure hardship*.

327

The scope of morality should be gradually limited and reduced, and the fact brought to light that it is not virtue but instinct which operates here. These instincts have long been concealed by the hypocritical way in which we speak of them, but for once we should learn to call them by their proper names and give them the honour which is their due. The increasingly authoritative voice of our 'honesty' should shame us into unlearning that other shame which we feel on account of our natural instincts, the shame which makes us not only disown

them, but deny their very existence. The extent to which we can rid ourselves of virtue is a measure of our strength; we could conceive of an elevated state in which the notion 'virtue' would be perceived in such a way as to echo *virtù*, Renaissance virtue, moraline-free virtue – but for the time being, we are quite far from this ideal.

The reduction in the scope of morality is a sign of our progress towards it. Wherever man has not yet been able to think in *causal* terms, he has thought in *moral* terms instead.

328

What, ultimately, have I achieved? Let us not conceal from ourselves this wonderful result: I have imparted a new *charm* to virtue – as something *forbidden*. It has our most acute honesty against it, it is taken '*cum grano salis*'[98] of scientific conscientiousness; it smacks of the outmoded and the antiquated, so that it finally begins to attract the refined and excite their curiosity – in short, it has the effect of a vice. Only after we have realized that everything is lies and appearance, will we again permit ourselves this most beautiful falsehood, the falsehood of virtue. There is no longer any tribunal which might hold that it is forbidden to us: only by demonstrating that virtue is *a form of immorality* do we again provide it with a *justification* – it is classified with all other things, and is on an equal footing with them; it shares their basic meaning, and participates in the basic immorality of all existence, as a form of luxury of the first order, the most superior, most expensive and most uncommon form of vice. We have removed its scowl and cowl, we have rescued it from the importunity of the many, we have taken away its stupid inflexibility, its blank expression, its stiff wig and its hieratic musculature.

329

Have I harmed virtue? . . . As little as anarchists harm princes: it is only after these latter have been shot at that they again sit securely on their thrones . . . For thus it ever was and ever shall be: one cannot better serve a thing than by giving chase and setting the dogs on it . . . This I have done.

5. The Moral Ideal

(a) Towards a Critique of Ideals

330

Towards *a critique of ideals*: this should begin by doing away with the word '*ideal*': what is needed is a critique of the *aspirations*.

331

Very few of us are clearly aware of the fact that when we adopt the standpoint of *aspiration*, when we say 'it should be thus', or even 'it should have been thus', we commit ourselves to a condemnation of the whole course of events. For nothing in it is entirely isolated: the least thing has a bearing on the whole; the whole structure of the future arises out of your petty wrongs; when the least thing is met with critique, the whole is condemned. Now supposing that the moral norm is never fully complied with (as Kant himself thought),[99] but instead remains suspended over reality like some sort of beyond without ever descending into it; then morality would implicitly contain a judgement concerning the whole, but which nevertheless raises the question: *by what right?* How does the part come to pass judgement upon the whole? And were this tendency by which reality is morally judged and found wanting, in fact, an ineradicable instinct (as some have claimed), then might it not be one of the ineradicable stupidities, not to say presumptions, of our *species*? But in saying this, we are hoist by our own petard; for the standpoint of regarding things as intrinsically desirable or undesirable, of playing the judge without the least authority, is as much in keeping with the character of the course of events as any injustice or imperfection is – it is our very idea of 'perfection' which is never called to account. Every impulse which seeks gratification thereby expresses its dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs. How so? Perhaps the whole is composed of dissatisfied parts, all of which have their own notions of what or what not to aspire to? Is the 'course events take' perhaps the 'way out of here!

the way out of reality!', eternal dissatisfaction as such? Is aspiration perhaps the driving force itself? Is aspiration – *deus*?

It seems to me important that we rid ourselves of the notion that there is a totality, a unity, some kind of force, something unconditioned; otherwise we would have no choice but to regard it as some sort of final arbiter and call it God. We must shatter the totality and lose our respect for it; let us take back what we have given to the unknown whole, let it again be what is closest to us; let us take back what is ours. Whereas Kant e.g. said, 'Two things remain eternally worthy of admiration',[100] today we should prefer to say 'digestion is more deserving of respect'. The notion of totality always gives rise to the old problems, 'how is evil possible?' etc. Therefore *there is no totality, there is no* great *sensorium*[101] or *inventarium* or store-house of force *therein*.

332

'A man as he should be': that sounds to us as preposterous as 'a tree as it should be'.

333

Ethics: or the 'philosophy of aspiration'. 'Things *should be* otherwise', things *should be* changed; the feeling of dissatisfaction would thus be the germ of ethics.

One could escape this, first, by giving preference to the times when one does *not* have the feeling; second, by grasping that it is presumptuous and puerile; for to desire that *something* be otherwise is to desire that *everything* be otherwise – it involves an overriding critique of the whole – it is to that extent . . . *But life itself is such a desire!*

To determine *what* is, and *how* it is, seems to be something unspeakably superior and more serious than any 'it should be thus', because the latter, as an instance of human critique and presumption, seems doomed to ridicule from the outset. It expresses the need for the world to be arranged in such a way as to be conducive to our wellbeing, and the determination to do as much as possible in this regard. On the other hand, it is only this desire 'it should be thus' which has called forth that

other desire, the desire for what *is*: namely, the knowledge of what is, which is already a consequence of the questions: How? Is [it] possible? Exactly why is it thus? Our astonishment at the discrepancy between our desires and the course of the world has led to our getting to know the course of the world. But perhaps it is otherwise; perhaps the thought 'it should be thus' expresses our wish to overcome the world . . .

334

Morality as décadence. Today, when to us every declaration to the effect that 'man *should be* such-and-such' is said with a shade of irony, when we adhere to the opinion that, despite everything, one can only *become* what one *is* (despite everything, which means: despite upbringing, education, *milieu*, chance and accident), we have learned in matters of morality in a curious way to *reverse* the relation of cause and effect – there is perhaps nothing which more thoroughly distinguishes us from those who in past ages believed in morality. We no longer say, e.g., 'Vice is the cause even of a man's physiological decay'; still less do we say, 'Virtue is conducive to a man's prosperity; virtue brings happiness and long life.' Our opinion is rather that vice and virtue are not causes but only consequences. A man becomes a decent fellow because he is a decent fellow; that is, because he was born with the ability to profit by his good instincts and prosperous circumstances . . . If a man enters the world a pauper, born of parents who only squandered everything and saved nothing, he will be 'incorrigible', that is to say, ripe for prison or the madhouse . . . Today we know that we can no longer separate moral from physiological degeneration: the former is merely a symptom-complex of the latter; [one] is necessarily bad just as one is necessarily ill . . . Bad: the word here expresses a certain *impotence*, which is physiologically associated with the degenerate type: e.g. weakness of will, an unsteady and even divided 'personality', inability to resist the tendency to respond to any stimulus and to master oneself, and susceptibility to any kind of suggestion by a foreign will.[102] Vice is not a cause; vice is a consequence . . . Vice is a somewhat arbitrary conceptual demarcation for summarizing

certain consequences of physiological degeneration. We would be justified in asserting a general proposition such as that which Christianity teaches, namely that 'man is bad', only if we were justified in taking the degenerate type for the normal type of man. But this may be an exaggeration. To be sure, this proposition is correct precisely where Christianity prospers and prevails; that fact alone proves that the soil is morbid, an area of degeneration.

335

NB. We cannot sufficiently admire the way man fends for himself, endures hardships, turns circumstances to his own advantage and crushes his adversaries; on the other hand, when we see the object of his *aspirations*, we cannot help but think that he is the most ridiculous of animals . . . It is as if man needed to give his strong and manly virtues a rest in a place where his cowardice, laziness, weakness, mawkishness and submissiveness can romp and play: just look at man's *aspirations*, at his 'ideals'. Man, when he *aspires*, rests that part of himself that is of lasting value, his capacity for action, by wandering off into empty, absurd, worthless and childish fantasies. The intellectual poverty and lack of inventiveness in such an otherwise inventive and knowledgeable animal is simply appalling. The 'ideal' is, so to speak, the additional penalty man pays for the enormous outlay he requires in meeting all his actual and immediate expenses. Where reality leaves off, dreaming, fatigue and weakness begin, and that is precisely what an 'ideal' is: a form of dreaming, fatigue or weakness . . . When they are overcome by this condition, the strongest and most impotent natures both respond in the same way: they *make an apotheosis of* the *cessation* of work, of strain, of struggle (e.g. the struggle for knowledge and the *effort* it requires), of opposition, of the passions, of '*reality*' in short . . . Innocence is what they call an ideal state of stupefaction; beatitude is what they call the ideal state of laziness; love the ideal state of the gregarious animal which has no more enemies. And thus everything that debases and degrades man is raised to an *ideal*.[103]

336

A desire *magnifies* the object of one's desire; and by not being fulfilled, the desire grows – the *greatest ideas* are those which have been created by the most vehement and most prolonged desires. We regard things as *increasingly valuable*, the more our desire for them grows: if 'moral values' have become the *supreme values*, this tells us that the *moral ideal* has been the *farthest from fulfilment*. In this respect, it was deemed something which *transcended all suffering*, a way to achieve *beatitude*. Mankind has been embracing a *cloud* with ever-increasing ardour, and finally called its impotence and despair 'God' . . .

337

Naïveté with respect to all ultimate '*aspirations*' when the 'why?' of man remains unknown.

338

In what way does *morality* engage in *counterfeiting*? It professes to *know* something, namely what good and evil are. In other words, it demands the reason for man's existence; it demands to be acquainted with his purpose and destiny. But that is tantamount to demanding that man *have* a purpose and destiny.

339

(1)

There is a rather arbitrary and vague idea, still in its infancy, that mankind has some overall task to perform, and that it is continuously moving towards some goal as a whole. Perhaps we shall be rid of this idea again before it becomes a fixation . . . For there is no mankind as a whole: mankind is a multitude of processes of growth, inextricably intertwined with processes of decay – it does not have its own youth, followed by maturity and then old age. That is, its strata are jumbled together and superimposed upon one another – and in a few thousand years there may be even more youthful types of men than are in evidence today. *Décadence*, on the other hand, can be found

in all periods of human history; there is refuse and detritus everywhere; the elimination of products of waste and decay is itself a vital process.

(2)

Under the sway of Christian prejudice, *this question was never raised*; the meaning of life lay in the salvation of the individual soul; whether mankind would endure for a long or a short time was not even considered. The best Christians wished that history come to an end as soon as possible; as to what the individual needed to do, *there was no doubt whatsoever* . . . The task set for each individual was thought to be no different in the present than it would be in the future; the value, significance and scope of values were absolute, unconditional, eternal, divine . . . Whatever deviated from this eternal archetype was sinful, diabolical, doomed.

With regard to values, the emphasis for each soul lay on that soul itself: salvation or damnation! The salvation of the *immortal* soul! The most extreme form of *self-absorption*[104] . . . And for each soul there was only one kind of perfection, only one ideal, only one path to salvation . . . The most extreme form of *egalitarianism*, associated with a magnification of one's own importance to the point of absurdity . . . Nothing but absurdly self-important souls, terribly anxious about themselves . . .

(3)

No one believes in this ridiculous pomposity any more; we have sifted our wisdom through the sieve of contempt. Nevertheless, the *habit of focusing* on how closely man approaches an *ideal man* in order to ascertain his value remains unbroken; in essence, people adhere to both the *self-absorbed perspective* and the *egalitarianism* in light of that ideal. In brief, their notion of the ideal man *leads them to believe that they already know* what the *ultimate aspiration* should be . . .

But this belief is only the consequence of people having been exceedingly *pampered* by the Christian ideal, as can be immediately ascertained by a careful examination of the 'ideal type' itself. *First*, they think it goes without saying that approaching a single 'type' is desirable; *second*, that it goes without saying

which type that is; *third*, that any deviation from this type represents a decline, an obstacle, a loss of human strength and power . . . Neither our Socialists nor the esteemed utilitarians have gone beyond dreaming of conditions in which this *perfect man* will be in the overwhelming majority. With that, a *goal* in the *development* of mankind appears on the horizon; in any event, belief in *progress towards the ideal* represents the only form in which a *goal* of human history is now conceived. *In summa*, the coming of the '*Kingdom of God*' has been transferred into the future, here on earth and given human form – but at bottom, the faith in the *old* ideal has been retained . . .

340

NB. The more concealed forms of the worship of Christian, moral ideals. The *effeminate* and *cowardly term 'Nature'* applied by the nature enthusiasts (who are devoid of any sense of the cruel, implacable and cynical elements in even the 'most beautiful' aspects of nature) is a sort of attempt to *glean* from nature Christian morality's notion of what is 'humane' – as is Rousseau's notion of nature, which takes for granted that 'Nature' means freedom, goodness, innocence, fairness, justice – in short, an *idyll* . . . which is ultimately nothing more than the *worship of Christian morality* . . .

Collect passages which illustrate what poets truly admired, e.g. in high mountains, etc. – what Goethe wanted from them – why he admired Spinoza. Complete *ignorance* of this form of *worship* presupposes . . .

The effeminate and cowardly term 'man' à la Comte and as in Stuart Mill, perhaps even as an object of worship . . . This is but the worship of Christian morality in all but name . . . free-thinking, e.g. Guyau.

The effeminate and cowardly term 'art' as sympathy for all sufferers and unfortunates (even in *history* e.g. Thierry's): again it is the worship of the Christian moral ideal.

And as for the whole *Socialist ideal*: it is nothing but a foolish misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal.

341

The origin of the ideal. Examination of the soil from which it springs.

(a) From those 'aesthetic' states in which the world *is seen as* fuller, rounder and *more perfect*: therein lies the *pagan* ideal, in which self-affirmation is prevalent from the buffo[105] onwards. The highest type is the *classical* ideal, as an expression of the fact that *all* the primary instincts are well constituted. Therein lies the *grand style* as the highest style, the expression of the 'will to power' itself. (The most formidable instinct *dares to acknowledge itself*.) One gives away.

(b) From the states in which the world *is seen as* emptier, paler, thinner; when 'spiritualization' and freedom from sensuality hold the highest rank, and when all that is savage, forthrightly animal-like and spontaneous is avoided as much as possible; the qualities of being 'wise', 'angelic' (priestly = virginal = ignorant) are the physiological characteristics of such 'idealists' . . . therein lies the *anaemic* ideal. Under certain circumstances this may be the ideal of such men as *represent* paganism (thus Goethe sees in Spinoza his 'saint'). One deducts, one chooses.

(c) From those states in which we perceive the world to be so ridiculous, odious, impoverished and deceptive that we do not even hope or expect to find the ideal in it; the idealization of the unnatural, the counterfactual, the illogical; the state of those who judge thus (the 'impoverishment' of the world as a consequence of suffering: *one takes, one no longer gives*): the unnatural ideal. One denies, one destroys.

(The *Christian ideal* is a *transitional* form between the second and the third, sometimes inclining towards the former, and sometime towards the latter.)

The three ideals: (a) either a *strengthening* (pagan), (b) or a *thinning*[106] (anaemic), (c) or a *denial* (unnatural) of life.

The feeling of 'deification'; in the greatest abundance, in the most fastidious choice, in the destruction of and contempt for life.

342

(1)

The *Stoical* type, or: the perfect lummox. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability, a tranquillity which takes the form of an uncompromising and persistent resolve – a deep calm, the unassailability of a mountain, a military suspicion – firm principles; the unity of *willing* and *knowing*; self-respect. The hermit type.

The *consistent* type understands that he should not hate anything, not even evil, that he should not resist evil, that he should not wage war, not even against himself; that he does not merely accept the suffering which such a practice brings in its train; that he cultivates only *positive* feelings; that he takes the side of the enemy in word and deed; that through a superfetation[107] of irenic, benevolent, conciliatory, cooperative and affectionate states, he leaves less fertile ground for the other states . . . and that all of this requires constant *practice*.

What does he attain in this way? The Buddhist type, or the perfect cow.

This standpoint is only possible when there is no moral fanaticism, i.e. when evil is not hated for its own sake, but only because it paves the way to conditions which cause suffering (uneasiness, work, care, entanglement, dependence).

This is the *Buddhistic* standpoint; in Buddhism there is no hatred of sin, because the very notion 'sin' is entirely absent.

(2)

The *inconsistent* type. He wages war against evil – he believes that war waged *for the sake of goodness* has no moral consequences, and in no way affects character as war usually does (and on account of which he detests war as *evil*). In fact, such a war against evil corrupts much more thoroughly than any sort of hostility between persons; and ordinarily, it is his own 'person' which is thrust into the position of adversary, at least in his imagination (the Devil, evil spirits, etc.). His hostile bearing towards everything in him which is bad or which has a bad origin, his intention to subject himself to his own constant observation and surveillance, leads in the end to a

nervous and distressed constitution; at which point 'miracles', rewards, ecstasies and otherworldly solutions become eminently *desirable* . . .

The Christian type, or the perfect *hypocrite*.

343

An ideal which seeks to prevail or to assert itself props itself up with: (a) a *suppositious* origin, (b) an alleged relationship with existing powerful ideals, (c) the thrill of mystery, as though it spoke with an indisputable authority, (d) the slander of its enemies' ideals, (e) a deceitful doctrine about the *advantages* it brings, e.g. happiness, serenity, tranquillity or even the assistance of a powerful God, etc.

On the psychology of the idealists: Carlyle, Schiller, Michelet.

If the whole of the defensive and protective measures which an ideal depends upon for survival are discovered, is it thereby *refuted*? It has employed the means by which every living thing lives and grows – they are one and all 'immoral'.

My insight is that all the forces and impulses by virtue of which there is life and growth at all are *banned by morality*: morality is the life-denying instinct. We must destroy morality if we are to liberate life.

344

Not to know himself: that is the prudence of the idealist. The idealist is a being who has reason to remain in the dark about himself, and who is prudent enough to remain in the dark about that reason as well.

345

The tendency of moral development. Everyone wishes that no doctrine or estimation were brought to bear on things except one in which he himself comes off well. Consequently, the fundamental tendency of the weak and mediocre has always been to make the strong weak, to drag them down to their own level; their primary instrument was the *moral judgement*. The comportment of the strong towards the weak is stigmatized; the elevated states of the stronger get a bad name.

One of the most exquisite interludes in the struggle between the many and the few, the ordinary and the extraordinary, the weak and the strong, was when the rare, refined and more fastidious men presented themselves as the weak, and spurned cruder instruments of power –

346

(1) The supposedly pure instinct for knowledge which all philosophers have is dictated by their moral 'truths' – it is only apparently independent.

(2) The 'moral truths', 'something *should* be done', are merely the forms in which we are conscious of a flagging impulse which says, 'something *is* done, by us'. The 'ideal' should enliven and strengthen an impulse; it coaxes man into obedience, into being nothing but an automaton.

347

Morality as a source of temptation. 'Nature is good; for a wise and good God is its cause. So who bears the responsibility for "human corruption"? The tyrants and tempters of men, the ruling classes – which is why they must be destroyed.'[108]

Such is *Rousseau*'s reasoning (cf. Pascal's reasoning, which ends in original sin). Compare *Luther*'s similar reasoning. In both cases, they sought a pretext for introducing an insatiable desire for revenge as a *moral and religious duty.* They sought to *sanctify* hatred of the ruling class . . . (the 'sinfulness of Israel', the basis of the priest's position of power).

Compare *Paul*'s similar reasoning. These reactions always occur in God's name, in the name of justice, of humanity, etc. With *Christ*, the rejoicings of the people seem to be the cause of his execution; it was an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even with the *anti-Semites* it is always the same trick: smite the opponent with moral condemnations, and reserve to oneself the right to mete out *retributive justice.*

348

Consequence of fighting: the fighter tries to transform his foe into his *opposite* – in his imagination, of course.

He tries to have sufficient faith in himself that he may have the courage to fight the 'good fight' (as if he himself were this *good fight*); as if it were reason, taste and virtue themselves which his foes were attacking . . .

The faith which he has need of, as his strongest means of attack and defence, is *faith in himself*, but which he mistakes for faith in God.

He never envisages the advantages and the utility of victory, but only victory for its own sake, which he envisages as 'God's victory' –

Every little community (or even individual) engaged in fighting tries to persuade itself that '*good taste, good judgement and virtue are ours alone*' . . . Fighting obliges them to cultivate such an *exaggerated self-esteem* . . .

349

To propagandize is rather rude, but clever, clever! In any event, whatever kind of *bizarre ideal* we may adopt (e.g. as a 'Christian', a 'free-thinker', an 'immoralist' or a German citizen),[109] we should not demand that it be the *ideal*; for then it would be deprived of its character as a privilege or prerogative. We should distinguish ourselves from others, *not* equate ourselves with them.

How is it that, all this notwithstanding, most idealists propagandize for their ideal without further ado, as if they would have no right to the ideal if it is not acknowledged by *all*? As do, e.g., all those brave little females who give themselves leave to study Latin and mathematics. What compels them to do this? I fear it is the gregarious instinct, or, put plainly, cowardice in the face of the herd: they fight for the 'emancipation of woman' because the cleverest way to privately separate themselves from the general condition of women is by disguising their self-assertion as a *generous activity*, by marching under the banner of 'altruism' . . .

The *cleverness* of the idealists consists in their being missionaries and representatives of an ideal, and in this way 'transfiguring' themselves in the eyes of those who believe in disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real heroism consists,

however, *not* in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, devotion and disinterestedness, but in *not fighting at all* . . . 'That is the way *I* am; that is what *I* want – and *you* can go to the Devil!'

350

Every ideal presupposes *love* and *hate*, *admiration* and *contempt*. Either positive feelings are the *primum mobile*, or negative feelings are. *Hatred* and *contempt*, e.g., are the *primum mobile* in all the ideals inspired by resentment.

(b) Critique of the 'Good Man', the Saint, etc.

351

The 'good man'. Or, the hemiplegia[110] *of virtue.* For every strong and natural kind of man, love and hate, gratitude and revenge, kindness and anger, affirmation and negation, all go together. The price he pays for being good is knowing how to be evil; he is evil, because otherwise he would not know how to be good. Whence comes this disease, this ideological unnaturalness, which rejects this duality and instead teaches the superiority of one-sidedness? Whence comes this *hemiplegia* of virtue, this invention of the good man? The expectation is that man emasculate himself in those instincts which enable him to be an enemy, to do harm, to be angry, to demand revenge . . . This unnaturalness corresponds to that dualistic conception whereby there are merely good or merely evil beings (God, spirit, man); the positive forces, intentions and states are all united in the former, and the negative in the latter. Such a way of judging things believes itself to be 'idealistic'; it has no doubt that its conception of the 'good man' is the highest aspiration. Taken to its limit, it imagines a state in which all evil is annulled, and only good beings remain. It does not even begin to consider the possibility that the relation between good and evil is one of mutual dependence. On the contrary, it holds that the latter should disappear and only the former remain, that the one has a right to exist while the other *should not exist at all* . . . What desire does this really express?

In all eras, and particularly in the Christian era, people have gone to great lengths to reduce man to this *one-sidedness*, to '*the good*'; even today there is no lack of people among those who have been softened and spoiled by the Church, for whom this intention coincides with 'humanization' as such, with the 'will of God' or with the 'salvation of the soul'. Such people regard it as an essential requirement that man do no evil, that under no circumstances is he to do harm or *intend* harm. The way to do that is to curtail all prospect of hostility, to suspend all the instincts of *ressentiment*, leaving only 'peace of mind' behind as a chronic condition.

This way of thinking, which fosters a certain type of man, starts from that ridiculous assumption that good and evil are real, and mutually exclusive (*not* complementary notions of value, as in truth they are). It advises us to take the side of the good, and requires us to renounce and resist evil altogether, *and in so doing actually denies life*, for life contains in all its instincts both affirmation and negation. Not that it grasps this: on the contrary, this way of thinking dreams of returning to the wholeness, unity and strength of life; it thinks it will be in a state of salvation when it finally puts an end to its own inner anarchy due to conflict between the two opposing impulses *vis-à-vis* value. Perhaps there has never been a more dangerous ideology, or a greater mischief *in psychologicis*, than this determination to be 'good'; with it, the most disgusting type has been reared, that of the *dependent* man, the hypocrite; with it, we are taught that only as a hypocrite is one on the straight and narrow path to the Godhead, that only a hypocrite's way of life is a divine way of life.

And even here, life is still in the right; life which knows not how to separate affirmation from negation; of what use is it if we maintain that war is evil, do no harm and harbour no ill intentions, doing so with all our might? We still wage war! We cannot do otherwise! The good man who has renounced evil, afflicted as he is with the *hemiplegia* of virtue (however desirable it may seem to him), by no means ceases to wage war, have enemies or oppose in word and deed. The Christian, for example, hates 'sin' . . . and what

to him is not 'sin'! It is precisely through this belief in the moral opposition between good and evil that the world has grown tremendously hateful, and eternally conflict-ridden. The 'good man' sees himself surrounded by evil and under the constant onslaught of evil; he looks more closely, and descries evil even in his every thought and inclination.[111] And so he concludes, quite logically, that nature is evil, man is corrupt and goodness is grace (that is to say, humanly impossible). *In summa, he denies life*, he grasps that the good, when regarded as the supreme value, requires him to *condemn* life . . . With that, he really ought to consider his ideology of goodness refuted. But one does not refute a sickness. And so he conceives of *another* life! . . .

352

The notion of power, whether it be that of a god or that of a man, always includes both the ability to *benefit* and to *harm*. So it is with the Arabs; so it is with the Hebrews. So it is with all strong and sensible races. It is a fatal step to *dualistically separate* the one from the other . . . for in so doing, morality becomes the poisoner of life.[112]

353

Towards a critique of the good man. Righteousness, dignity, a sense of duty, justice, humanity, honesty, uprightness, a good conscience – when we utter these sweet-sounding words, do we say yes to and speak well of these qualities for their own sake? Or are these qualities and conditions in themselves indifferent, and only receive value when regarded from some point of view? Does their value lie in them, or in the benefits and advantages derived (or expected to be derived) from them?

Of course, I am not thinking here of altruism, of the fact that our judgements differ depending upon whether these benefits accrue to *ego* or *alter*; the question is: do the *consequences* of these qualities confer value on them, regardless of whether it be for those who possess them or for others (the environment, society, 'humanity'); or do they have value in and of themselves? . . . To put the question another way: is it *utility* which

bids us to condemn, combat and reject their opposites (unreliability, dishonesty, capriciousness, self-doubt, inhumanity)? Is it the essence of such qualities or only their consequences which are being condemned? To put it another way: would it have been *desirable* if men with the latter qualities had never existed? *At least that is what people believe* – but here lies the error, the shortsightedness, the parochial character of their *narrow egoism*.

To express it another way, would it be desirable to create conditions in which the entire advantage is on the side of the righteous, so that all those with opposing natures and instincts would become discouraged and gradually die out?

This is ultimately a question of taste and of *aesthetics*; would it be desirable if only the most 'respectable', i.e. most boring, species of man remained? The orthodox, the virtuous, the respectable, the decorous, the upright, the 'lummoxes'?

If we imagine the absence of the immense profusion of 'others', the righteous too would have no right to exist, as they are no longer necessary; and for the first time we come to grasp how crude utilitarian considerations have brought honour to such an *insufferable virtue*.

The converse might be more desirable: to create conditions in which the 'righteous man' would be reduced to the humble position of 'useful instrument', as the 'ideal gregarious animal', or at best as a shepherd; in short, conditions in which he no longer occupied the upper rank, conditions which demand *other qualities*.

354

Morality as décadence; the 'good man' as tyrant. Mankind has made the same mistake over and over again: out of what were originally means to life, it has made a standard by which life itself is judged; instead of judging things by what leads to the greatest enhancement of life itself, taking full account of the causes of growth and stagnation, mankind has used the means of a particular form of life to exclude all the others, in short, to criticize and to cull; i.e. man has ultimately become enamoured of the means for their own sake, and *forgets* that they

are mere means; so that now he becomes conscious of them as ends, as standards by which his ends are judged; . . . i.e., *a particular species of man* treats the conditions of its existence as mandatory conditions, as 'truth', 'goodness', 'perfection': it *tyrannizes* . . . ; it is a *sort of faith*, a sort of instinct, when a kind of man fails to realize that, while its own kind may depend upon such conditions, they are not absolute conditions which must be fulfilled by others as well; at the very least, a kind of man (a people, a race) seems to be at the end of its rope when it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights and no longer wants to be master.

355

'The good people are all weak; they are good because they are not strong enough to be bad' said the Latooka chief Commoro to Baker.[113]

'Calamity does not strike feeble hearts,' says a Russian proverb.[114]

356

Humble, diligent, benevolent and temperate, filled with peace and friendliness: is that what you would have men be? Is that what you think *good* men are? But all you achieve thereby is the Chinese of the future, the 'sheep of Christ', the perfect Socialist . . .

357

The *metamorphoses of slavery*; its disguise under the cloak of religion, its transfiguration by morality.[115]

358

The men of *faith*, the 'believers' of any sort, are necessarily dependent men, that is, men who do not regard *themselves* as ends in themselves, who are entirely unable to determine ends on their own initiative, but instead must allow themselves to be used as means . . . They instinctively give the highest honour to

a morality of *self-denial*; everything persuades them to it, their prudence, their experience, their vanity. And *faith* too is just a form of self-denial.

*

Atavism: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for once.

*

Diligence, humility, benevolence, temperance are just so many *impediments* to a *sovereign disposition*, a great *ingenuity*, an heroic purpose, a noble self-determination.

*

A man should not desire for himself something of which he is incapable. He should ask himself: do I want to *go on ahead*? Or do I want to *go my own way*? In the first case, he is at best a shepherd, i.e. a necessity for the herd. In the second case, he must be *able* to do something else – to go his own way; he must be *able* to go a different way and to a different destination. In both cases, he must be able to do something; in both cases, he may want to do the one, but must not want to do the other.[116]

359

One must add up all that has been treasured as a result of the *highest moral ideality*; almost all *other values* have crystallized around the ideal.

This demonstrates that it has been *the most sought-after for the longest time* – and that it has not yet been attained; otherwise it would have *disappointed* us (or, it would not have been rated so highly) . . .[117]

*

The *saint* as the *most powerful species* of man – it is *this* idea which has raised the value of moral perfection so high. One cannot help but think that the whole of our knowledge is an attempt to prove that the *most moral* man is the *most powerful and most divine*. The subduing of the senses, of the passions – everything inspired *terror* . . . the unnatural seemed to be *supernatural*, *otherworldly* . . .

360

Francis of Assisi: beloved, popular, poet, fights against spiritual *aristocracy* [and] hierarchy, in favour of the meekest.

*

Popular ideals, e.g. Francis of Assisi: denial of spiritual hierarchy, all equal before God.

*

The popular ideals, the good man, the selfless, the holy, the wise, the righteous. O Marcus Aurelius![118]

361

I have declared war on the anaemic 'Christian ideal' (along with what is closely related to it), not with the intention of destroying it, but merely to put an end to its *tyranny* and make a place for new ideals, for *more robust* ideals . . . The *continued existence* of the Christian ideal is one of the most desirable of things in the world: even for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their place by its side, or, perhaps, above it – they must have opponents, *strong* opponents, in order to grow *strong* themselves. That is why we immoralists need *morality to be powerful*: our instinct of self-preservation does not want our *opponents* to lose their strength – only to be *master of it.*

(c) On the Defamation of the So-Called Evil Qualities

362

The problem of egoism! The Christian gloominess in La Rochefoucauld, who managed to extract egoism from everything, and so believed that he had *reduced* the value of things and virtues! *Pace* La Rochefoucauld, I first sought to demonstrate that there *can* be nothing besides egoism – that in men in whom the ego is frail and slight, the power to love greatly is also frail – that the most loving people are loving because, above all else, their egos are strong – that love is an expression of egoism, etc. In all seriousness, the erroneous value judgement (1) appeals to the self-interest of those who are benefited and aided, the herd; (2) implicitly regards the basis of life itself with pessimism and suspicion; (3) would like to reject the most

splendid and well-constituted men – out of fear; (4) wants to help the defeated assert their rights against the victorious; (5) brings in its train universal dishonesty, and especially among the worthiest of men.

363

Man is an indifferent egoist; even the shrewdest would rather persist in their habits than pursue their advantage.

364

Egoism! But no one has asked what *kind* of ego! Rather, everybody instinctively regards all egos as the same. This is the result of the slave theory, of *suffrage universel* and of 'equality'.

365

The motives of a superior man's actions are indescribably *complex*; any word such as 'compassion' conveys *nothing* of this. The most important thing is the feeling, 'who am I? Who is the other in relation to me?' Value judgements are constantly being applied.

366

That the history of all the phenomena of morality admits of simplification to the extent that Schopenhauer believed – that is to say, that compassion is to be rediscovered at the root of every moral inclination thus far – this degree of absurdity and naïveté is only possible for a thinker who lacks all feeling for history, and who has managed in the most remarkable way to escape even that hard schooling in history which the Germans from Herder to Hegel had undergone.

367

My sort of 'compassion'. This is a feeling for which no words suffice: I feel it whenever I see precious ability squandered, for example, at the sight of Luther: what strength and yet what absurd country bumpkin problems! (And this at a time when in France, the brave and blithe scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible!) Or when I see someone fail to fulfil his

early promise, owing to some stupid accident. Or worse, when brooding over man's destiny, I view with trepidation and scorn current European politics, which, at all events, is weaving the fabric of *everybody's* future. Oh what 'man' might yet become, if only – ! This is 'compassion' of a sort, despite the fact that I have no 'companion' for whom to feel it.

368

Compassion is a waste of feeling, a parasite which is destructive to moral health; 'there cannot possibly be a duty to increase the ills in the world'.[119] If you do good merely out of compassion, you do good for yourself and not your neighbour. Compassion is not based on maxims, but on affections; it is pathological; the suffering of another infects us, compassion is an infection.[120]

369

There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and does not exceed them – consequently, the 'permissible', the 'morally indifferent' egoism of which you speak, does not exist at all.

We continually promote the interests of our egos at the 'expense of others'; life always lives at the expense of others. He who has not grasped this fact has not yet made the first step towards being honest with himself.

370

The 'subject' is really only a work of fiction; the ego of which they speak when they blame egoism – there isn't one.

371

The 'ego' (which is *not* the same as the centralized administration of our being!) is really only a conceptual synthesis – therefore there are no 'egoistic' actions.

372

The good. Since an impulse is unintelligent, it cannot consider its 'utility' for the whole. Every impulse, while active, expends energy and sacrifices other impulses; at length it is checked,

otherwise it would squander everything. Thus: that which is 'unegoistic', self-sacrificing and imprudent is unexceptional – it is common to all impulses – they do not consider the welfare of the whole ego (*because they do not think!*), they act 'contrary to our interests', against the ego, and often *for* the ego – and are equally innocent in both!

373

The origin of moral values. Egoism has just as much value as the physiological value of him who possesses it.

Each individual represents the whole course of evolution (and not only, as morality [conceives] it, something which begins at birth). If he represents mankind's ascending course, his value is, in fact, extraordinary; and extreme care should be taken in preserving and fostering his growth. (It is the concern for the promising future the well-constituted individual represents which gives him such an extraordinary right to egoism.) If he represents its *descending* course, towards decay and chronic illness, then he is of little value; simple fairness requires that the well-constituted be deprived of room, vigour and sunshine as little as possible. In this case, society has a duty to *suppress egoism* (and its sometimes ridiculous, pathological and inflammatory manifestations), whether it be that of individuals or of whole strata of the population which are decaying and atrophied. A doctrine and religion of 'love', of the *suppression* of the self-affirmation, of patience, forbearance and helpfulness, of reciprocity in word and deed, may be of supreme value within such strata, even in the eyes of the rulers, for it suppresses feelings of rivalry, *ressentiment* and envy, feelings which are all too natural in the unfortunate – it apotheosizes the condition of being enslaved, subjugated, impoverished, infirm and downtrodden for them, under the ideal of humility and of obedience. This is why, in every age, the ruling classes of all races, as well as the ruling individuals, have upheld the worship of selflessness, the gospel of the 'meek' and 'the God on the cross'.

The preponderance of an altruistic mode of assessment is the result of an instinctive sense of being ill-constituted. The value judgement here essentially says, 'I am not worth much': to put

it more plainly, a merely physiological value judgement born of a sense of impotence, an absence of any great and positive sense of power (in the muscles, nerves and motor cortex). This judgement is translated, in the particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the preponderance of religious or moral judgements is always a sign of low culture); it seeks to establish itself in spheres where the notion 'value' is at all familiar. The interpretation by which the 'Christian sinner' thinks he understands himself is an attempt to *justify* his lack of power and self-confidence; he would rather consider himself guilty than suffer in vain; it is itself a symptom of decay to need interpretations of this kind at all. In other cases, the unfortunate seek the reason for their suffering, not in their 'guilt' (as the Christian does) but in society; the Socialist, the anarchist or the nihilist, by experiencing his existence as something *for which someone should be blamed*, is thereby still the close relative of the Christian, for the Christian also believes that he can more easily bear his own wretchedness and inadequacy once he has found someone he can hold *responsible* for it. The instinct for revenge and *ressentiment* in both cases appears here as a means of enduring it, as an instinct of self-preservation, as does the preference shown for *altruistic* theory and practice. *The hatred of egoism*, whether it be one's own, as with the Christians, or another's, as with the Socialists, comes about first, as a value judgement under the predominant influence of revenge, and second, as a prudent means of self-preservation on the part of the suffering, by intensifying their feelings of reciprocity and solidarity. Finally, as already indicated, even that discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is still a self-preservative instinct on the part of the unfortunate. In short: the worship of altruism is a specific form of egoism, which occurs regularly under certain physiological conditions.

When the Socialist, with a fine indignation, demands 'justice', 'right', 'equal rights', this only shows that, under the impress of his inadequate culture, he is unable to grasp why he suffers; on the other hand, he takes pleasure in it; were he feeling any better, he would be careful not to shout so; then

he would take his pleasure elsewhere. The same is true of the Christian: he curses, condemns and vilifies 'the world' – nor does he exempt himself. But that is no reason to take his shouting seriously. In both cases we are still among the sick; it does them good to shout, and it affords them some relief to vilify.

374

Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to *caricatures*, to reduce them to skin and bones, so to speak – at least in its own *imagination*. Our notion of, e.g., the '*criminal*', is just such a caricature. In the aristocratic Roman order of values, the *Jew* was reduced to a caricature. Among artists, the 'bourgeoisie' becomes a caricature; among pious people, the godless; among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists, the moralist *becomes* [a caricature]; for example, for me Plato becomes one.

375

All the impulses and abilities which are *praised by* morality have proven themselves to me to be essentially *identical* to those which it has vilified and deprecated, e.g. justice as the will to power, the will to truth as an instrument in the service of the will to power.

376

Internalization in man (as a pathology). *Internalization* occurs, [owing to] the fact that the establishment of peace and of society denies powerful impulses outward expression; to prevent them from doing harm, they turn inwards, in league with the imagination. The tendency towards hostility, cruelty, revenge and violence turns back, 'stands down'; in the desire for knowledge there is greed and conquest; in the artist, the withdrawn powers of dissimulation and falsehood emerge; the impulses are transformed into demons against which we struggle, etc.

377

The problem of truth; the *need for faith* is the greatest *stumbling-block* to truthfulness; the will to truth; unconscious falseness.

Falseness. Every *sovereign instinct* has the other instincts for its instruments, courtiers and flatterers; it never allows itself to be called by its *ugly* name; and it tolerates *no* praise for *them* unless it involves *indirect* praise for itself. Around every sovereign instinct, any praise or blame whatever crystallizes into an established order and etiquette. That is *one* of the causes of falseness.

Each instinct which strives for mastery yet finds itself under a yoke needs all the pretty names and *acknowledged* values for itself, to prop up its self-esteem and fortify itself; *for the most part* it sallies forth under the name of the very 'master' against which it struggles, and from which it wants to free itself (e.g. under the auspices of Christian values, carnal lust or lust for power). That is the *other* cause of falseness.

In both cases, this falseness reigns with *perfect naïveté*; that these instincts are not what they purport to be never enters anyone's mind. It is a sign of an instinct *divided against itself* when man sees the underlying impulse and its 'expression' ('the mask') as *separate* things – it is a sign of self-contradiction, and makes victory much less likely. Absolute *innocence* in bearing, speech and emotion, a 'good conscience' in falseness and the assurance with which one seizes upon the most grandiose and splendid rhetoric and poses – all these things are necessary for victory.

However, in the case of *extreme lucidity*, victory requires the *genius* of the *actor* and tremendous discipline. Hence priests, the most adroit and *conscious* of hypocrites; then princes, in whom rank and lineage cultivate a certain theatricality; third, men of society and diplomats; fourth, women.

The basic idea here is that falseness seems so deep, so pervasive, and *desire* so opposed to honest self-knowledge and plain-speaking that one is *very likely right* in *suspecting* that *truth*, *the will to truth*, is actually something quite different and only a *disguise*.

378

'Thou shalt not lie':[121] we demand truthfulness. But praise for factual correctness (the refusal to countenance lies) has always been greatest precisely among liars; they also recognized the factual *in*correctness of the notion that 'truthfulness' is ever

truly popular. Too much or too little are constantly being said; the requirement that people *bare their souls* with every word they speak is a piece of naïveté.

We speak our minds, are 'truthful', *only under certain conditions*: namely, provided we will be *understood (inter pares)*,[122] and understood sympathetically *(again, inter pares)*. We conceal ourselves from the *stranger*; and he who wants to achieve something says what he wants people to think about him, but *not* what he thinks. (The saying 'the powerful always lie'.)

379

The great *nihilistic* counterfeiting which has been concealed by a cunning misuse of moral values.

(a) Love as a mode of becoming impersonal; likewise compassion.
(b) Only the *impersonal intellect* ('the philosopher') can recognize the *truth*, 'the true being and essence of things'.
(c) The genius and the *great man* are great because they do not pursue their own interests: a man's *value grows* in proportion to the extent of his self-denial. Schopenhauer II pp. 440 ff.[123]
(d) Art as the work of the '*pure will-less subject*'; misunderstanding of 'objectivity'.
(e) *Happiness* as the purpose of life; *virtue* as a means to that end.

The pessimistic condemnation of life by Schopenhauer is a *moral* one. The standards of the herd are carried over into the metaphysical domain.

The 'individual' is meaningless; consequently he is given an origin in the 'thing-in-itself' (and his existence is given a meaning – as an aberration); parents are only an 'occasional cause'.[124] The fact that science does not grasp the individual has taken its toll; the individual is *the whole of life so far in a single line*, not the result of it.

380

(1) *Misrepresentation of history* as matter of principle, so that it provides *evidence* for the moral judgement.

(a) The decline of a people attributed to corruption.
(b) The rise of a people attributed to virtue.
(c) The pinnacle of a people ('its culture') regarded as the consequence of its moral elevation.

(2) Misrepresentation of the *great men*, the *great creators and* the *great periods*, again, as a matter of principle.
(a) The desire to make *faith* the distinguishing characteristic of greatness; whereas it is unscrupulousness, scepticism, allowing oneself to have the ability to renounce a faith, 'immorality', which belong to greatness (Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe – the most important thing about them, their independence, their 'free will', is always suppressed).

381

[*The great lies in history.*] As if the *corruption of the Church* had been the *cause* of the Reformation; this was only the pretext and self-deception of the demagogues – there were urgent demands present whose brutality very much needed to be cloaked in spiritual considerations.

382

Schopenhauer interpreted high intellectuality as an *emancipation* from the will; he did not *want* to see the typical *immorality* of genius, the liberation from moral prejudices which the unfettering of a great intellect involves; he artificially fastened upon the only thing which he cherished, the moral worth of 'self-denial', even as a *condition* of the most intellectual activity, of 'objective' perception. 'Truth', even in art, emerges after the withdrawal of the *will* . . .

Throughout all the forms of preoccupation with morality *I* discern something *fundamentally different and judge accordingly*; *I know nothing* of such a ridiculous separation of 'genius' from the world of the will, of morality from immorality. The moral man is a lower *species* than the immoral, a weaker one; indeed – he is a type modelled after the requirements of morality and *not* a type of his own; a copy, but

invariably a good copy – the measure of his worth lies in something *external* to him. I judge a man by the *amount of power* and *abundance of will* he represents, *not* by its weakening and extinction; I consider a philosophy which *teaches* the denial of will to be a teaching both harmful and defamatory . . .

I judge the *power* of a *will* by how much opposition, pain and torture it endures and knows how to turn to advantage; far be it from me therefore to add to the charges against existence its evil and painful character; rather [I] hold out the hope that it may one day be more evil and painful than it has ever been . . .

The *summit* of intellectual attainment which Schopenhauer could imagine was to come to the realization that everything is meaningless, in short, *to realize* what the good man already instinctively *acts* upon . . . he denied that there could be *higher* intellectual attainments – he regarded his insight as a *non plus ultra* . . . Here intellectuality is ranked much lower than goodness; its highest value (as *art*, e.g.) would be to recommend to us, and prepare us for, moral conversion: here, *moral values* hold absolute sway . . .

Besides Schopenhauer I want to characterize *Kant* (*Goethe*'s position on radical evil): un-Hellenic, absolutely anti-historical (his position on the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic. Even with him, *saintliness* lurked in the background . . .

I require a critique of the *saint* . . .

Hegel's value 'passion'.

In Mr Spencer's grocer's philosophy, an ideal is entirely absent, except that of the average man.

The instinctive principle of all philosophers, historians and psychologists is that *everything valuable* in man, art, history, science, religion and technology must be shown to be *morally valuable*, *morally determined*, in aim, means and result. Everything is understood in terms of this highest value, e.g. Rousseau's question concerning civilization, 'is man bettered by it?' – a funny question, for the reverse is obviously the case, and that is precisely what speaks *in favour of* civilization.

383

For the chapter 'religion as décadence'; religious morality. Emotion, great desire; the passions for power, love, revenge and possessions – the moralists wish to eradicate, to uproot and to 'purify' the soul of them. The reasoning here is that these desires often do great mischief – consequently, they are evil and reprehensible. Man must get rid of them; otherwise he cannot be a *good* man . . . This is the same reasoning as that of the saying, 'If a member offend thee, pluck it out.' Unfortunately in this particular case, in which that dangerous 'country bumpkin' the founder of Christianity recommended the practice to his disciples in case of sexual excitability, it is not only the loss of a member that hence ensues, but the *emasculation* of a man's character . . . and the same is true of the moralists' madness, which requires not the taming of the passions, but their extirpation. Their conclusion is always that only the emasculated man is a good man. Our passions, which so often endanger and overwhelm us, are the rushing rapids of our souls; and instead of damming these great sources of energy, taking their power into service and using it *economically*, this short-sighted and pernicious way of thinking – the moral way of thinking – wants to make them run *dry*.

384

Conquering the passions? Not if 'conquering' them means the same thing as weakening and destroying them. *Rather, they must be taken into service*, which may include tyrannizing them a good long while (not only as individuals, but as communities, races, etc.). Eventually, and with increasing confidence, we give them back their freedom, for now they love us like good servants and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.

385

Moral intolerance is an expression of a man's *weakness*: he is afraid of his own 'immorality', he must *deny* his strongest impulses, because he does not yet know how to use them . . . Thus the most fertile corners of the earth remain for the longest

time uncultivated – the strength which would be required to master them is lacking . . .

386

NB. There are quite naïve peoples and individuals who think that continuous *fair weather* is something to be desired; even in this day and age, they think that in *rebus moralibus*, the 'good man' alone is something to be desired – and even that the course of human development should be such that when all is said and done, only *he* will remain (and that we *must* be directed to that end alone). To think in this way is *wasteful* in the highest degree and, as already suggested, the height of naïveté. That is a *convenience* which 'the good man' affords – he inspires no fear, he puts us at ease, we find everything about him eminently acceptable . . .

*

The same sort of man who wishes for nothing but 'fair weather' also wishes for nothing but 'good men' and, in any case, good qualities – at least the ever-growing reign of the good. But if we view things from a higher vantage-point, we desire exactly the opposite, the ever-greater *reign of evil*, man's increasing emancipation from the narrow and timid strictures of morality, the growth of the power to take the greatest forces of nature, [the] passions, into service[125] . . .

387

The whole idea of the hierarchy of *passions*: as if the right and proper thing were to be guided by *reason*, while the passions are abnormal, dangerous, half-animal; and moreover, as if they were aimed at nothing other than *pleasure* . . . Passion is profaned (1) as if it were only the more unseemly way to act and not necessarily and always the *mobile*, (2) in as much as it envisages that which is of no great value, an enjoyment . . . The misunderstanding about passion and *reason*, as if the latter were a being-in-itself, and not instead an ensemble of relations between various passions and appetites; and as if every passion did not have within it some degree of reason . . .

388

For the *main chapter*: how was it that, under the impress of an ascetic *morality of self-denial*, it was precisely the feelings of love, kindness, compassion, even of justice, of magnanimity, of heroism, which were inevitably *misunderstood*?

It is a *personality rich* in inner wealth, an overflowing abundance and munificence, an instinctive sense of well-being and self-affirmation which makes possible great love and great sacrifices: these passions spring from a strong and divine sense of self just as surely as do the wish to be master, encroachment and an inward assurance of being entitled to everything. What common opinion regards as *opposite* dispositions are in fact *one and the same*; and if a man is not himself strong and brave, then he has nothing to give, and can neither stretch forth his hand nor be refuge and staff for anyone . . .

How is it that these instincts came to be *reinterpreted* in such a way that what conflicted with a man's self was felt to be valuable? That surrendering his self to another's self was felt to be valuable?

Oh the psychological wretchedness and chicanery which has dominated everything in the Church and the philosophy that has been tainted by its influence!

If man is sinful through and through, then all he can do is to hate himself. In essence, he may treat his fellow man no differently than he treats himself; philanthropy requires a justification – which lies in the fact that *God has commanded it*. It follows that, apparently, all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) are in themselves impermissible, and that it is only after their *renunciation* that they are again restored on the grounds of one's obedience to God . . . Pascal, the admirable *logician* of Christianity, went as far as that! Bear in mind his relationship to his sister, p. 162;[126] 'to make oneself *not* love' seemed Christian to him.

389

[*The good.*] Consider how dearly we pay for a moral canon (an 'ideal') such as this. Its enemies are – well, the egoists.

The melancholic yet incisive self-critique in Europe (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld); the enervation, discouragement and self-devouring introspection of the ungregarious.

The constant emphasis on mediocre qualities as the most valuable ones (on humility in the rank and file, on having the character of an instrument).

Bad conscience interfering with everything autocratic or individualistic; hence the suffering of the more strongly constituted and the *gloominess* of their world.

Gregariousness, the herd's awareness of itself, being carried over into philosophy and religion; likewise its trepidation, its . . . not to mention the psychological impossibility of a purely selfless action.

390

We Hyperboreans.[127] My conclusion is that the *real* man represents a much higher value than the ideal man previously 'aspired to'; that every such 'aspiration' has been a ridiculous and dangerous extravagance, by which a particular kind of man might lay down as law for everyone what are merely his own idiosyncratic conditions of survival and success; that whenever an 'aspiration' of such an origin has prevailed, it has *reduced* man's value, his strength and his prospects; that man's paltriness and narrowness of intellect most reveals itself, even in this day and age, in his *aspirations*; that man's ability to determine values has been too little developed to do justice to *man's actual values*, and not merely to the ones considered 'desirable'; that, until now, the ideal has been a truly slanderous influence on opinion about man and the world, a blight on reality and a great *temptation to embrace nothingness* . . .

(d) Critique of the Words 'Betterment', 'Perfection', 'Elevation'

391

The standard *by which* the value of moral judgements is to be determined; critique of the words 'betterment', 'perfection', 'elevation'.

The fundamental fact that has been *overlooked*: the contradiction between 'becoming more moral' and the elevation and the strengthening of the human type.

Homo natura. The 'will to power'.

392

Compared with *physiological* values, moral values may be regarded as *illusory*.

393

We are always in need of more reflection on the most general things; e.g. the ultimate 'aspirations' for mankind have never been regarded as a problem by philosophers. They all naïvely suppose that the 'betterment' of mankind is desirable, as if through some sort of intuition we could skip over the question of exactly *why* it is that we need 'bettering'. To what extent is it *desirable* for man to be *more virtuous*, or *wiser*, or *happier*? Given that we do not already know the 'why?' of our existence at all, any such intention makes no sense; and if we want to have one of them, who knows? Perhaps we may not have the other? . . . Is an increase of virtuousness at the same time compatible with an increase of wisdom and insight? *Dubito*, and I shall have plenty of opportunities to demonstrate the contrary. Is it not true that hitherto, aiming at virtuousness has actually been in the strictest sense incompatible with being happy? Are not the required means quite the converse, that is, sorrow, privation and self-injury? And if our aim were the *greatest insight*, to that end must we not spurn an increase in happiness, and choose instead the way of danger, adventure, distrust and temptation? . . .

But if it is *happiness* you seek, then perhaps you should join the ranks of the 'poor in spirit'.

394

'*Betterment*'; *morality as décadence*. The general and continuous deception in the domain of so-called moral betterment. We do not think that a man can become someone he is not, unless he has it within him to become that person already, i.e.

unless he possesses a multiplicity of personalities, at least in rudimentary form (as is often the case). In this case, he merely succeeds in bringing a different role to the fore, while his 'former self' recedes into the background . . . The man's aspect is altered, but *not* his nature . . . Even that may not always be sufficient to break a habit, or provide the best reason for doing so. He whose *fatum* it is to be a criminal, and whose ability lies in that direction, never forgets how to be one, but is always picking up new things along the way; and long abstinence even acts as a *tonicum* for his talent . . . The fact that someone refrains from performing a certain action is a mere *fatum brutum*, and admits of a wide variety of interpretations. For society, of course, the only interest is that a man should no longer perform certain actions; and to that end it removes him from those circumstances in which he is *able* to perform them, which in any event is wiser than attempting the impossible, namely attempting to change the destiny of his being such-and-such.

The Church – and in this it has done nothing but inherit and supplant the philosophy of antiquity – proceeding under a different standard and wanting the 'salvation' of a 'soul', believes in the power of atonement through punishment, and in the power of absolution through forgiveness, both of which are delusions of religious prejudice – for punishment does not atone, and forgiveness does not absolve; what is done cannot be undone. Just because someone has forgotten something does not mean that he has succeeded in eliminating it . . . Actions have consequences, both internal and external, regardless of whether they, by being punished, have been 'atoned for', 'forgiven' and 'absolved'; regardless of whether the Church has in the meantime made a saint of whoever performed it. The Church believes in things which do not exist, in 'souls'; it believes in 'works' which do not exist, in divine works; it believes in states which do not exist, in sin, redemption and the salvation of the soul; everywhere it remains on the surface with signs, gestures, words and emblems to which it gives an arbitrary interpretation; it has a carefully premeditated method of psychological counterfeiting.

395

'Illness makes people better':[128] this famous assertion, which we come across throughout the centuries, both as words of wisdom and popular twaddle, must give one pause. Conceding for the moment its validity, we might ask ourselves whether there is perhaps a causal connection between morality and illness anyway? The 'betterment of mankind' regarded as a whole, for example, the undeniable fact that Europeans have become more mellow, more humane, more good-natured in the last thousand years – might it not be the result of a long-hidden, long-mysterious suffering,[129] failure, deprivation and atrophy? Has 'illness' made Europeans 'better'? Or, put differently: is not our morality – our modern tender-hearted European morality, which may be likened to that of the Chinese – an expression of physiological *decline*? . . . It cannot be denied that every period in history during which the human type has displayed a particular splendour and power immediately assumed an impetuous, reckless and volatile character, in consequence of which humanity suffered; and perhaps in those cases *in which it seems otherwise*, all that was lacking was the courage or subtlety to explore the psychological depths, to discover that even there, the general proposition remains true: 'the healthier, the stronger, the richer, the more fruitful and enterprising a man may feel, the more "immoral" [he] will be as well'. A disconcerting thought! It is best not to dwell upon it! However, if we linger upon it for a while, how bewildering the future now seems! What would be more dearly bought than this very thing for which we are striving with all our might – the humanizing, the 'bettering', the 'civilizing' of mankind? Nothing would have proved more costly than virtue, because in the end the whole world would become a hospital, and those who say, 'everybody must be everybody else's nurse' would have had the last word. Admittedly, we would have come by that much-coveted 'peace on earth'! And yet with so little 'rejoicing in one another'![130] With so little beauty, exuberance, daring and danger! With so few 'works' for whose sake life on earth is still worth living! And alas! with absolutely no more 'deeds'! All the *great* works and deeds which are still standing and have not been swept

away by time and tide – were they not in the deepest sense of the word immoral? . . .

396

How virtue comes to power. The priests (and those semi-priests, the philosophers) have always attested to the truth of any doctrine whose *educational* effect they deemed beneficial – which 'bettered' people. In this respect they resemble faith-healers or popular miracle-workers who, because they have tried a poison as a remedy, deny that it is a poison. 'You shall know them (our "truths" that is) by their fruits.'[131] This has been the reasoning of priests to this very day. They have wasted their ingenuity in a disastrous effort to give priority to the 'demonstration of power' (or the demonstration 'by the fruits') over all other forms of evidence, and even to regard it as dispositive. 'What makes us good must itself be good; and what is good cannot lie' – for them, this is the inexorable conclusion; 'what bears good fruit consequently must be true; there is no other criterion of truth' . . . But if 'bettering' is considered an argument, *worsening* must be considered a refutation. The error is demonstrated to be an error by examining the lives of those who represent it; a peccadillo or a vice serves as a refutation . . . This most indecent kind of opposition, in which the opponent is hounded to death, has likewise never died out. When priests are psychologists, they have never found anything more interesting than sniffing out the secrets of their opponents. This is the only lens through which they view the world, and this is how they demonstrate the truth of Christianity: by looking for dirt in everything 'worldly', first and foremost, in the best of us, in the 'geniuses'; recall how Goethe was always attacked in Germany (Klopstock and Herder take precedence in setting a 'good example' in this respect – what is bred in the bone will come out in the flesh).

397

A man must be very immoral in order to *create morality* by his own actions. The moralist's instruments are the most terrible instruments that have ever been wielded; he who lacks

the courage for immorality in his own actions is not fit to be a moralist.

Morality is a menagerie; it assumes that an iron cage may be more useful than freedom, even for those captured; it also assumes that there are animal-tamers who do not shrink from using terrible instruments, and who know how to wield the branding iron. This appalling species which struggles with the wild animal calls itself the 'priesthood'.

Man, imprisoned in an iron cage of errors, has become a caricature of himself: sick, lean, malicious towards himself, filled with loathing for the impulses of life, filled with distrust of all that is beautiful and happy in life, a walking misery. How shall we ever succeed in *justifying* this phenomenon, this artificial, arbitrary and *in retrospect* misbegotten man – the sinner – which the priests have brought forth from their soil?

*

In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two *zoological* notions in its place: the *taming* of wild animals, and the *breeding of a particular type*. The priests always pretend that they wish to '*better*' people . . . But we who view things differently have to laugh when an animal-tamer speaks of his 'bettered' animals. In most cases, animal-taming only succeeds in harming the animal; similarly, the moralized man is not a bettered man; he is, rather, a weakened, less harmful man, a thoroughly emasculated and mutilated man.[132]

398

What I wish to make abundantly clear is:

(a) That there is nothing worse than confusing *taming* with *weakening*, as is always done . . . Taming, as I understand it, is a means by which mankind accumulates tremendous energies, so that descendants can carry on the work of their ancestors – not only externally, but internally, organically growing out of them into creatures *stronger* than they were . . .

(b) That there is an extraordinary danger in thinking that mankind as a *whole* would grow stronger, when individuals are becoming lethargic, equal, average . . . Mankind

is an abstraction; the goal of *taming*, even in the individual case, is always only the *strong* man (the man who is untamed is weak, wasteful and inconstant) . . .

6. Concluding Remarks Towards a Critique of Morality

399

My contention is that our honesty, our determination to not deceive *ourselves*, must be legitimated: 'Why *not*?' – Before what tribunal? – The determination not to allow one's self to be deceived is of a different origin, a defence against being subjugated, exploited, an essential instinct for life.

These are the things *I* demand of you – however harsh they may sound to you – that you subject moral judgements themselves to critique. That you should call a halt to the moral impulse which in this case demands submission and *not* critique, with the question: why submission? That your demand for a 'why?', for a critique of morality, should be regarded simply as your *current* form of morality itself, as the most sublime kind of honesty, which does you and the age in which you live honour.

400

The three *allegations*: the ignoble is higher (the protest of the 'common man'); the anti-natural is higher (the protest of those who have come off badly); the average is higher (the protest of the herd, of the 'mediocre').

Thus a *will to power* expresses itself in the *history of morality*, through which: now the enslaved and oppressed, now the ill-constituted and inherently miserable, now the mediocre, attempt to gain acceptance for the value judgements most favourable to them.

In this respect, the phenomenon of morality considered from a biological standpoint is of the greatest concern. Morality has thus far been developed at the *expense* of: the rulers and their specific instincts; the well-constituted and *beautiful* natures; the independent and privileged classes in any sense.

Morality is thus a *reaction against nature's efforts to produce a higher type*. Its effects are: distrust of life in general (in so far as its tendencies are perceived to be 'immoral'); a sense of futility, in so far as the highest values are perceived to be opposed to the highest instincts – which is incongruous; degeneration and self-destruction of the 'naturally superior' because it is precisely in them that the conflict becomes *conscious*.

401

First book.

Which values were hitherto in the ascendant.

(1) Morality has been regarded as the supreme value in all phases of philosophy (even among the Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a 'world of truth' must exist.

(2) *What* really determines the highest value? What really defines morality? The instinct of *décadence*; it is the exhausted and the disinherited who *take their revenge* in this way and make themselves *the masters* . . . The historical evidence for this is that philosophers have always been *décadents*, always in the service of nihilistic religions.

(3) The instinct of *décadence* appears as the will to power. The presentation of its methodology; its methods are utterly immoral.

General insight: the highest values hitherto are a special case of the will to power; morality itself is a special case of *immorality*.

Second book.

Why the opposing values were always defeated.

(1) How was this actually *possible*? Question: why were life and well-constituted physiology defeated everywhere? Why was there no *affirmative* philosophy, no *affirmative* religion? The historical indications of such movements: pagan religion. Dionysus versus the 'Crucified'. The Renaissance. *Art*.

(2) The strong and the weak; the healthy and the sick; the exception and the rule. There is no doubt as to *who* is

stronger. *General idea of history*: is man therefore an *exception* in the history of life? An objection to *Darwinism*. The methods by which the weak maintain their ascendancy have become instinctive ('humanity'); these methods are now 'institutions' . . .

(3) The evidence of this domination by the weak in our political instincts, in our social value judgements, in our arts, in our *science*. We have seen two 'wills to power' in conflict; *a special case*: *we have a principle* by which the one who was hitherto defeated is in the right, and the one who was hitherto victorious is in the wrong; we recognize the 'world of truth' to be a 'world of lies' and *morality as a form of immorality*. We do *not* say 'the stronger is in the wrong' . . .

Third Book.
What is the cause of all values and the diversity of values.

(1) The nihilistic values are in the ascendant.
(2) The contrary movement is always defeated – and immediately degenerates . . .
(3) The contrary movement is known only in partial and degenerate forms.

The purification and restoration of its type. More precise expression of the system: psychology, history, art, politics.

Purification of the hitherto inferior values.

We have grasped what has hitherto determined the highest value and *why* it has mastered the contrary assessment. It was *stronger* . . . We now purify the *contrary assessment* of infection and half-measures, of the *degeneration* with which we are familiar. Theory of its *denaturalization* and *restoration of nature: moraline-free.*

Epistemology, will to truth; theory of psychology; origin of religion; origin of art; theory of forms of domination; theory of life; life and nature.

History of the *contrary movements*: the Renaissance, the Revolution, the emancipation of science.

The corrupt and mixed condition of the values corresponds to the physiological condition of contemporary man: theory of *modernity*.

The *instincts of declining life* have become master over the *instincts of ascending life* . . . The *will to embrace nothingness* has become master over the *will to live* . . .

Is this *true*? Might there not be a greater guarantee of life and of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre? Might this not be only a means in the overall movement to life, a slackening of *tempo*, a defence against something even worse?

Suppose the strong were masters in all things, even in value judgements; what consequence should we expect in light of their attitude towards illness, suffering and sacrifice? Self-contempt on the part of the weak; they would seek their own demise, their own annihilation . . . And would this be *desirable*? Would we really prefer a world where the after-effects of the weak, their subtlety, their consideration, their intellectuality, their *pliancy*, were lacking?[133] . . .

402

Morality is a useful error, or rather, a necessary and expedient lie, according to the greatest and most impartial of its supporters.[134]

403

We may admit the truth to ourselves to such an extent that we rise far enough to have no further need of the *compulsory school of error*.

When we judge existence morally, *it disgusts us*.

We should not invent imaginary people, as we do when we say, e.g., 'Nature is cruel'. It is a *relief* just to realize *that there is no such being which is the locus of responsibility!*

The development of mankind:

(a) To gain power over nature and *to that end* over itself. Morality was necessary *in order for* man to be successful in his struggle with nature and the 'wild animal'.

(b) Once the power over nature *is* attained, he can use this power in order freely to develop *himself* further: the will to power as self-elevation and fortification.

404

Morality is the *illusion of a species* which impels the individual to sacrifice himself for the sake of the future; it apparently even confers an infinite value on him, and the resulting *self-awareness*, while enabling him to tyrannize and suppress other aspects of his nature, also renders it difficult for him to be pleased with himself.

We are most profoundly grateful for what morality has done so far; but *now it is only a form of oppression* which may yet prove disastrous! In the form of honesty, *morality itself obliges* us to deny morality.

405

Conclusion. To what extent this self-destruction of morality is still a part of its own vigour. We Europeans have within us the blood of those who died for their faith; we have taken morality to be something dire and serious, and there is nothing which we have not at one time or another sacrificed to it. On the other hand, our intellectual subtlety has been attained essentially through the vivisection of our consciences. We do not yet know the 'whereto?', the destination towards which we are driven, now that we have uprooted ourselves from our old soil. But this soil itself has cultivated in us the vigour which now also impels us into the distance, into adventure, forcing [us] out into the infinite, untried, undiscovered – no choice remains to us, we must be conquerors, now that there is no place we call home, no place we wish to 'preserve'. No, my friends, you know better! The hidden Yes in you is stronger than all those Nos and Maybes of which your era is sick and avid; and if you must set sail, you emigrants, then you must perforce have *faith* in your course[135] . . .

Part 3. Critique of Philosophy

1. General Considerations

406

Let us rid ourselves of a few superstitions about philosophers which have hitherto been commonplace.

407

Philosophers, 3 by instinctive determinations of value in which *earlier* cultural conditions are reflected (the more dangerous ones), are prejudiced *against*: (1) appearance, (2) change, (3) pain, (4) death, (5) the bodily, the senses, (6) fate, bondage and (7) the aimless.

In other words, whatever is human, still more what is animal, still more what is material.

They believe in: absolute knowledge, knowledge for its own sake, virtue and happiness as necessarily related, the intelligibility of men's actions, e.g. pleasure and pain, good and evil, as well as other false dichotomies due to the seductions of language.

408

What have philosophers *lacked*? (a) A sense of history, (b) a knowledge of physiology, (c) a future aim. The ability to criticize without irony or moral condemnation.

409

Philosophers (1) have had from the first a remarkable talent for *contradictio in adjecto*.

(2) They have trusted concepts as unreservedly as they have distrusted the senses: it never seems to have occurred to them

that concepts and words are our inheritance from the past, when thought processes were rather murky and undemanding.

NB. Finally it dawns on philosophers: they must no longer let concepts merely be given to them, nor merely refine and clarify them, but must first *make*, *create*, characterize and argue for them. On the whole, people rely on their concepts, as if they were a wonderful *endowment* from some kind of wonderland; but in the final analysis, they are the legacy of our remote ancestors, who were as thoroughly dull as they were utterly unassuming. This *piety* towards *that which we find within us* is perhaps related *to the moral elements* in *knowledge*. What is needed at this time is absolute scepticism towards all received notions, such as one philosopher *may well* have possessed already – Plato: naturally, he *taught the contrary* . . .

410
For the Preface

Deeply suspicious of the dogmas of epistemology; loving to look out of first this, then that window; careful not to settle down anywhere, thinking it harmful to do so; and last but not least, finding it improbable that an instrument would be *able* to criticize its own suitability for its tasks – I noticed that no epistemological scepticism or dogmatism has ever arisen without some ulterior motive, and that epistemological issues are a purely secondary consideration, as soon as one considers *what* it is which *compels* people to a position with respect to them: even the desire for certainty, unless it [is] the desire [expressed by the words] 'I desire first and foremost to live' . . . My fundamental insight is that Kant as well as Hegel or Schopenhauer – the sceptic-epochistic[136] as well as the historicizing or pessimistic attitudes – are of *moral* origin. I have seen no one venture to attempt *a critique of moral sentiments*; and I soon turned my back upon the meagre attempts to arrive at an historical account of the origin of these sentiments (by English and German Darwinians). What accounts for Spinoza's position, his denial and rejection of moral value judgements? (It was *one* consequence of a theodicy, was it not?)

411

Morality as the supreme form of debasement. Our world is either the work and expression (the *modus*) of God, in which case it must be supremely perfect (Leibniz's conclusion . . .) – and there was never any doubt as to what constituted perfection – in which case the ills and evils in it can only be apparent (Spinoza's notions of good and evil are more radical); or they must be derived from God's supreme purpose (perhaps as a result of God's special favour in allowing us to choose between good and evil: the privilege of not being an automaton, of possessing a 'freedom', which comes with the danger of making a mistake, of making the wrong choice . . . e.g. in Simplicius, in his commentary on Epictetus).

Or our world is imperfect, evil and guilt are real, determined and absolutely inherent in its essence; in which case it cannot be the *world of truth*; in which case knowledge is only a way to its denial, in which case the world is an aberration which may be recognized as such. This is Schopenhauer's opinion, on Kantian premises. Naïve! That would merely be another *miraculum*! Pascal was still more desperate: he grasped that even knowledge must be corrupt and counterfeit – that *revelation* is needed, even to understand that the world is worthy of nothing but denial . . .

412

The Metaphysicians. The naïve ones: Lamennais, Michelet, Victor Hugo. After being accustomed to unconditional authorities, eventually a profound need for them arises – a need so strong that, even in an age of critique such as Kant's, it proved to be superior to the need for critique, and in a certain sense was able [to] make the whole work of critical understanding submit to it and turn it to its own advantage. It proved its superiority once more in the following generation, which was inevitably driven by its instinctive historicism towards the view that all authority is relative; as it was also driven towards the Hegelian philosophy of development, a system of thought which, by rechristening philosophy history, even rendered itself subservient, and represented history as the progressive

self-revelation and self-surpassing of moral ideas. Since Plato, philosophy has been under the sway of morality; even with his predecessors, moral interpretations play a decisive part (for Anaximander, the perishing of all things is a punishment for their emancipation from pure being; for Heraclitus, the regularity of phenomena serves as a testimony to the moral and legal character of the whole of becoming).

413

The course of philosophy thus far has been hindered most by ulterior moral motives.

414

'Fine sentiments' have always been taken for arguments, the 'heaving bosom' for the bellows of the Godhead, convictions as the 'criterion of truth', and the desires of the heart as the clues to wisdom. False words and false coinage pervade the whole history of philosophy. Setting aside the few honourable sceptics, an instinct for intellectual integrity is nowhere to be found. Most recently, even Kant in all innocence sought to make this intellectual corruption scientific under the rubric of 'practical reason'; he expressly invented a kind of reason for those cases in which one does not trouble oneself with reason, namely, when the desires of the heart, that is, when morality or 'duty' speaks.

415

Hegel: his popular side, the doctrine of war and of great men. The victor is always in the right; he represents the progress of mankind.

The attempt to demonstrate the reign of morality from history.

Kant: inaccessible to us, invisible, real, a realm of moral values.

Hegel: a demonstrable development, the manifestation of the moral realm.

We will no longer allow ourselves to be imposed upon in this manner, neither by Kant nor by Hegel: we do not *believe* in morality the way that they did, and consequently do not

have to establish any philosophical systems *in order to* justify morality. For us, the charm of critique and historicism does not consist in *this* – well, in what then does it consist?

416

The significance of German philosophy (Hegel): the construction of a *pantheism* in which evil, error and suffering would *not* be perceived as arguments against the Godhead. *This grandiose initiative* has been abused by the powers that be (the state, etc.) as if it tended to confirm the reasonableness of the current rulers. Schopenhauer, by contrast, conveys the impression of being the stubborn man of morality who, in order to justify his moral judgement, ultimately becomes a *denier of the world* – who ultimately becomes a 'mystic'.

I myself have sought an aesthetic justification of the ugliness in this world: how is the ugliness of the world possible? I took the desire for beauty, for the persistence of *similar* forms, as a temporary expedient and remedy; what seemed to me fundamental, however, was the eternally creative impulse as the *eternally destructive impulse* associated with pain. Ugliness is the form things take when viewed under the aspect of the intention to put a meaning, a *new* meaning, on what has become meaningless: is it not the accumulated vigour which compels the creator to feel that what has existed so far is untenable, ill-constituted, unworthy and ugly?

417

My first solution: *Dionysian wisdom.* Dionysian: temporary identification with the principle of life (the ecstasy of the martyr included). Joy at the annihilation of the noblest, and at the sight of him going step by step towards his doom. Joy at the *approaching prospect* of what will triumph over *the present, however good it may be.*

*

My innovations

The further development of pessimism, intellectual pessimism. Critique of morality dissolves our last remaining comfort.

Recognition of the signs of *degeneration*, enshrouded in delusion; the culture isolates unjustly, thus strongly. (1) My struggle against degeneration and increasing personal weakness. I sought a new centre. (2) The impossibility of this endeavour recognized! (3) *Whereupon* I went along the path of dissolution – and on the way *found new* sources of strength for individuals. We *must* be destroyers! I perceived that the state of dissolution, in which *individuals* may perfect themselves *as never before* – is an image and *instance* of *life in general.*

Against the paralysing sense of general dissolution and imperfection, I set the eternal recurrence![137]

418

We seek the picture of the world in that philosophy in which we feel most free, i.e. in which our strongest impulse feels unrestrained in its activity. So will it be with me!

419

German philosophy as a whole – Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, to mention only the greatest – is the most thoroughgoing form of *Romanticism* and nostalgia that has thus far been met with; it is a yearning for the best that ever was. The Germans no longer feel at home anywhere; they ultimately yearn for the place where they can feel somewhat at home, because it is the only place in which anyone would want to be at home: the Greek world! But the bridges to that world are precisely the ones which are all broken down – *except*, of course, the rainbow of notions! And these lead everywhere, to all the homes and 'homelands' that ever existed for Greek souls! Certainly one must be very fine, light and insubstantial to cross these bridges! But what delight is already to be found in this quest for what is intellectual, spiritual and almost ghostly! How far removed it is from the 'hustle and bustle', from the mechanistic clumsiness of the natural sciences, from the vulgar din of 'modern ideas'! One wants to get *back* to the Greeks by way of the Church Fathers, from North to South, from formulae to Forms; the gateway out of antiquity,

Christianity, is still a source of joy as a gateway to antiquity, as a goodly portion of the ancient world itself, as a glistening mosaic of ancient notions and ancient value judgements. The arabesques, flourishes and rococo of Scholastic abstractions – these are far better, finer and more delicate than the vulgar concreteness of Northern Europe. Interest in them is a protest on the part of a loftier intellectuality against the peasant wars and mob insurrections which have dominated the intellectual taste of Northern Europe, and which had as its leader the great 'guileless' Luther. In this respect German philosophy is a part of the Counter-Reformation, of the Renaissance even, or at least an aspiration to a Renaissance, the aspiration to *continue* the Renaissance's rediscovery of antiquity, and its excavation of ancient philosophy, and above all of pre-Socratic philosophy – for of all Greek temples, this one is buried deepest! Perhaps, in a few centuries, people will come to the conclusion that all German philosophy derives its dignity from having regained the lost ground of antiquity, and that therefore all claims to 'originality' must appear both petty and ridiculous when compared with Germany's higher claim, which is to have renewed the broken ties that had once bound us to the Greeks, the highest type of men ever to have arisen. Today we are once more approaching all the fundamental forms of cosmogony conceived by the Greek mind, the thought of Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus and Anaxagoras – day by day we are growing *more Hellenic*, at first, as is natural, only in mind, in our notions and value judgements, like Hellenizing spectres, as it were; but eventually, it is to be hoped, in *body* too! Here lies (and has always lain) my hope for the German character!

420

I have no interest in exhortations to philosophy: it is necessary, and perhaps even desirable, that the philosopher should be a *rare* plant. Nothing is more repugnant to me than the sententious praise of philosophy in Seneca, or worse, in Cicero. Philosophy has little to do with virtue. Allow me to say that even the man of science and scholarship is fundamentally

different from the philosopher. What I want is that the proper notion of the philosopher should not entirely vanish from Germany. There are so many here already who are neither the one nor the other, and who would conceal their defects under such a distinguished title.

421

I must *establish* the *most exacting ideal* of a *philosopher*. Scholarship alone won't do! The scholar is the gregarious animal in the realm of knowledge who conducts research because he is ordered to and shown how.

422

The conventional wisdom about philosophers confuses them with scholars and scientists, as if values were already inherent in things themselves and we need only ascertain what they are. Consider the extent to which their researches are pursued under *received* values (their hatred of appearances, of the body, etc.). Compare Schopenhauer concerning morality (his scorn for the utilitarian). Ultimately the confusion has gone so far that Darwinism is regarded as philosophy; now it is the scholars and scientists who hold sway.

Even Frenchmen such as Taine pursue research, or fancy they do, free from bias or prejudice. This prostration before 'facts' has become a kind of cult. As a matter of fact, they *annihilate* existing value judgements.

The *explanation* of this misunderstanding is as follows. A man who is able to command appears but rarely, and is apt to misinterpret himself. It is far *preferable* to disclaim acting on one's own authority and to attribute it to one's *circumstances*. The esteem in which the critic was held in Germany belongs to the history of awakening *manhood*, Lessing, etc. (what Napoleon said about Goethe).[138] As a matter of fact, German Romanticism moved in the opposite direction, which is relevant to the *reputation* of German philosophy; it was as if with German philosophy the danger of scepticism had been averted, and *faith* could be *demonstrated*. Both tendencies culminate in Hegel: in essence, what he did was to combine and

universalize German critique and Romanticism into a kind of dialectical fatalism, supposedly in honour of the intellect, but, in fact, with the philosopher submitting *to* reality. Once the critic *prepared the way*; but not any more!

With Schopenhauer, the task of the philosopher dawns, albeit still under the auspices of eudaemonism, and that task is the determination of the value, the ideal (ridicule for [Eduard von] Hartmann aside) of pessimism.

423

Theory and practice. This is a fateful distinction, as if there were a separate *impulse towards knowledge* that would charge blindly at the truth without regard to questions of benefit or harm; and then, apart from this impulse, the whole world of *practical* interests.

On the contrary, I try to identify the instincts which have been at work in all these *pure* theoreticians – how they all, under the spell cast by their instincts, fatalistically charged at what was *for them* the 'truth', for them and *only* for them. The struggle of the systems, together with that of epistemological scruples, is a struggle of quite definite instincts (forms of vitality, of decline, of classes, of races, etc.).

The so-called *impulse towards knowledge* is attributable to *an impulse to appropriate and subjugate*; the senses, memory and the instincts, etc. have developed in consequence of this impulse. An impulse towards the quickest possible reduction of the phenomena, towards economy, towards the accumulation of the acquired treasure of knowledge (i.e. the world appropriated and made manageable) . . .

Morality is therefore such a curious science, because it is to the highest degree practical: the purely epistemic position, scientific integrity, is immediately abandoned as soon as morality demands answers to its questions. Morality says: I *need* some answers, reasons, arguments; scruples may come afterwards, if at all.

'How should one act?' Now, bearing in mind that what we have to do with here is a superbly developed type which has 'acted' for countless thousands of years, and in which

everything has become instinctive, purposive, automatic and fated, the *urgency* of this moral question seems rather amusing.

'How should one act?' Morality has always involved a misunderstanding; the truth of the matter is that a species which was destined to act in a such-and-such a way sought to justify itself by *seeking to dictate* its own norm as universally applicable. Asking the question: how should one act? is not a cause, but an *effect*. Morality ensues; the ideal is the end result . . .

On the other hand, the appearance of moral scruples (in other words, *becoming conscious of the values* by which one is guided) betrays a certain *morbidness*; strong ages do not encourage reflection on one's rights, on principles of action, on relations between instinct and reason, and strong peoples do not indulge in it. *Becoming conscious* is a sign that real morality, i.e. instinctive certainty of action, is going to the Devil . . . The appearance of moralists is a sign of damage, impoverishment and disorganization, as is the case whenever a *new world of consciousness* is created. Those who are *deeply instinctive* are reluctant to rationalize duties; included among them are the Pyrrhonic opponents of dialectics and of the possibility of knowledge in general . . . A virtue is *refuted* with an 'in order to' . . .

Thesis: the appearance of moralists belongs to a time when morality is coming to an end.

Thesis: the moralist *dissolves* the unity and strength of the moral instincts, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.

Thesis: the moralist is really guided not by his moral instincts, but by the *instincts of décadence*, translated into moral formulas. He perceives the growing uncertainty of the instincts as *corruption*: whereas in fact . . .

Thesis: the *instincts of décadence*, expressing themselves through the moralists, want to get the better of the instinctive morality of stronger races and ages; such instincts include:

(1) The instincts of the weak and the unfortunate;

(2) The instincts of the exceptional, of the solitary, of the disengaged, of the *abortus* among both superior and inferior men;

(3) The instincts of those who habitually suffer, of those who need a noble interpretation of their condition, and therefore need to know as little as possible about physiology. *Morality as décadence.*

424

One should make no pretensions to scientific rigour when it is not yet time to be scientific; but he who is engaged in actual research must also lay aside all vanity and make no pretence to a method whose time has not yet come. Nor should he 'falsify' matters by forcing thoughts which he arrived at differently into an artificial arrangement of deductions and dialectics. (Kant, in his 'moral philosophy', falsified his own psychological tendencies in just this manner; Herbert Spencer's *Ethics* is a more recent example.) He should neither suppress nor pervert the *evidence* by which he arrived at his conclusions. The most profound and inexhaustible books will probably always have something of the aphoristic and abrupt character of Pascal's *Pensées*. The *driving forces* behind the work, the underlying value judgements, are hidden; what emerges is their effect.

I resist the Tartuffery of scientific rigour:

(1) in *presentation*, if it does not correspond to the *genesis* of the thoughts,

(2) in claims to *methods* which, at a given time in the history of science, may not even be possible,

(3) in claims to *objectivity*, to cold indifference, where, as with all value judgements, we reveal ourselves and our inner experiences with every word. There are ludicrous forms of vanity, e.g. Sainte-Beuve's, who all his life was annoyed to think that he had on occasion shown genuine warmth or passion for something either 'pro' or 'con', and he would have liked to have repudiated that altogether.

425

'Objectivity' in the philosopher: moral indifferentism towards oneself, disregard for both good and bad consequences; no hesitation in using dangerous methods; the perception that perversity and complexity of character afford one certain

opportunities, and taking advantage of them. My profound indifference towards myself: I have no wish to derive any profit from my discoveries, and I do not avoid any loss which they may incur. Included among them is what might be called *corruption* of character, the prospect of which is beside the point; I wield my character like an instrument, but I give no thought to how I might better understand or change it; the personal *calcul* of virtue has never once entered my mind. It seems to me that the gates of knowledge are closed to a philosopher as soon as he takes a personal interest in his own case – or, still more, in the 'salvation' of his soul! . . . He must not take his own morality too seriously, and he must not cease to assert a modest right to its opposite . . . A kind of *moral inheritance* may be presupposed here; he suspects that he can squander and throw away much of it without particularly impoverishing himself. He is never tempted to admire 'beautiful souls', for he always knows himself to be their superior. He encounters the monsters of virtue with silent scorn; *déniaiser la vertu*[139] – that is his secret pleasure. He revolves on his own axis, he has no wish to be 'better' or at all 'different' from what he is. He is too interested not to cast the tentacles and nets of every morality at things.

426
Philosophy as décadence.

On the psychology of the psychologists. Psychologists, as they are possible only from the nineteenth century [onwards], are no longer loiterers, who see but three or four steps in front of them, and are almost satisfied to burrow into themselves. We psychologists of the future are not very well disposed towards introspection; we almost take it to be a sign of degeneration when an instrument seeks 'to know itself'; we are instruments of knowledge and would like to possess all the simplicity and precision of an instrument – consequently we may not analyse or 'know' ourselves. The primary characteristic of an instinct for self-preservation in a great psychologist is that he never investigates himself, having no eyes for, interest in, or curiosity about himself . . . The great egoism of our dominating will wants us to shut our eyes to ourselves as much as possible, to

seem 'impersonal', '*désintéressé*', 'objective' . . . But oh, how much we are the opposite of that, and solely because we are psychologists to an unusual degree!

The psychologist.

(1) We are no Pascals; we are not particularly interested in the 'salvation of the soul', in our own happiness, in our *own virtue*.

(2) We have neither time nor curiosity enough to be so self-centred. More deeply considered, the case is still different: we distrust all navel-gazers, on the grounds that introspection is a *degenerate* form of the psychological genius, something which raises questions about the soundness of his instincts as a psychologist; just as surely as a painter's eye is degenerate if what lies behind it is the *determination* to see for the sake of seeing.

2. Critique of Greek Philosophy

427

Towards a critique of Greek philosophy. The appearance of the Greek philosophers since the time of Socrates is a symptom of *décadence*; the anti-Hellenic instincts come into the ascendant.

The 'Sophist' is still entirely Hellenic (as are Anaxagoras, Democritus and the great Ionians), but only as a transitional form: the *polis* loses its faith in its cultural uniqueness, in its right to dominate every other *polis* . . . Cultures, i.e. 'the gods', are exchanged, and thus the belief in the sole prerogative of the *deus autochthonus* is lost. Good and evil of differing origins are mixed together; the distinction between good and evil becomes *confounded* . . . This is the 'Sophist' . . .

The 'philosopher', by contrast, is the *reaction*; he wants to return to the *old* virtues. He sees the reasons [for decline] in the decline of institutions – he wants to restore the old institutions; he sees the decline as a decline of authority – he searches for new authorities (travels abroad, foreign literatures, exotic religions . . .); he wants to establish the *ideal polis*, long after the

notion '*polis*' has become obsolete (in something like the way the Jews clung together as a 'people' after they had fallen into slavery). Philosophers are intrigued by all tyrants; they want to restore virtue by '*force majeure*'.

Gradually everything *genuinely Hellenic* is held responsible for the *decline* (and Plato is just as ungrateful to Homer, tragedy, rhetoric or Pericles, as the prophets were to David and Saul). *The decline of Greece is understood as an objection to the foundations of Hellenic culture; this was the fundamental error of the philosophers. Conclusion*: the Greek world perishes. The *cause*: Homer, mythology, ancient morality, etc.

The *anti*-Hellenic development of the philosophers' value judgement is due to the influence of the Egyptian ('life after death' as a court . . .); the Semitic (the 'dignity of the sage', the '*sheikh*'); the Pythagorean, the subterranean cults, silence, the afterlife as an instrument of torture; *mathematics*; religious value judgements, a kind of trafficking with the cosmic All; the priestly, ascetic and transcendent; *dialectics* – there is a disgusting and pedantic quibbling about concepts already in Plato, is there not? The decline of good taste in intellectual matters: people no longer perceive the ugly and rattling character of every bald argument.

Both of the extreme developments associated with *décadence* go hand in hand:

(a) the luxuriant, charmingly wicked *décadence* of flamboyant aestheticism,

(b) and the gloomy *décadence* of religious and moral pathos, with its Stoical indifference, its Platonic slander of the sensuous, all of which prepares the soil for Christianity.

428

Science and philosophy. To what extent have psychologists been corrupted by a preoccupation with morality? Not one of the ancient philosophers had the courage to advance a theory of the 'unfree will' (that is, a theory that negates morality); not one had the courage to define what is typical of pleasure, of every kind of pleasure ('happiness'), as the feeling of power; for to take pleasure in power was considered immoral; not one

had the courage to regard virtue as a *result of immorality* (as a result of power-seeking) in the service of a species (or of a race, or of a *polis*) (for power-seeking was considered immoral, for that would have been to recognize what the truth [is] . . . that virtue is only [a] form of immorality).

In the whole course of morality's development, truth is nowhere to be found; all the conceptual elements involved are fictions; all the psychological posits are forgeries; all the forms of logic introduced into this kingdom of lies are sophisms. What distinguishes moral philosophers themselves is their complete lack of intellectual scruple and self-discipline; they regard 'fine sentiments' as arguments; their 'heaving bosoms' seem to them the bellows of the Godhead . . .

Moral philosophy is the *scabreuse* part in the history of the intellect. The chief and most noteworthy example: in the name and under the auspices of morality, philosophy perpetrated an outrageous piece of mischief, in fact, a piece of *décadence* in every respect . . .

Philosophy as décadence. One cannot insist strongly enough on the fact that the great Greek philosophers represented the *décadence of Greek excellence in all its forms*, and made it *contagious* . . . This 'virtue' made wholly abstract was the greatest temptation to make oneself abstract, i.e. to become *detached.*

The moment is quite curious: the Sophists had touched upon the first *critique of morality*, the first *insight* into morality; they compared moral judgements with each other, noting their plurality and their dependence on local conditions; they gave us to understand that any morality admits of dialectical justification – that it makes no difference; that is, they surmised that every justification of morality must be of necessity *sophistical* – a proposition which was subsequently confirmed in the most striking manner by the ancient philosophers from Plato onwards (up to Kant); they postulated that there is no such thing as 'an intrinsic morality', an 'intrinsic goodness' as a primary truth, and that it was a swindle to talk of 'truth' in this area.

Where was *intellectual integrity* to be found in those days? The Greek culture of the Sophists sprang from all the Greek

instincts; it is part of the culture of the Periclean Age, just as surely as Plato is *not*; it has its predecessor in Heraclitus, Democritus and the scientific types of ancient philosophy; it finds expression e.g. in the high culture of Thucydides – and it ultimately proved to be correct; all progress in epistemological and moral knowledge has *restored* the position of the Sophists . . . Our modern way of thinking is, to a great extent, Heraclitean, Democritean and Protagorean . . .

. . . suffice it to say that it [is] *Protagorean*, because Protagoras combined within himself the qualities of both Heraclitus and Democritus; Plato was a *great Cagliostro*; bear in mind how Epicurus judged him; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend, judged him – is Plato's integrity unimpeachable? . . . At the very least, we know that the doctrines he wished to have *taught* were in fact doctrines he regarded as not even conditionally true, namely the separate existence and immortality of the 'soul'.

429

The struggle for science; *the Sophists*. The Sophists are nothing more than realists; they put into words the ends universally pursued, the practices universally followed, and raise them to the rank of values – they have the courage common to all powerful intellects, the courage to *face the truth* about their own immorality . . .

Are we to suppose that these little Greek city-states, which would have gladly devoured each other out of rage and jealousy, were guided by principles of philanthropy and righteousness? Are we to reproach Thucydides for the words he puts into the mouths of the Athenian ambassadors in their negotiation with the Melians over their destruction or surrender?[140]

Only the most accomplished Tartuffes would have found it possible to speak of virtue under the terrific strain of that situation – or else *those living apart from the world*: hermits, and other emigrants or exiles from the realities of life . . . all of them people who denied the world, that they themselves might live.

The Sophists were Greeks; when Socrates and Plato joined the party of virtue and justice, they were *Jews* or I know not what. *Grote*[141] pursued the wrong tactics in his defence of the

Sophists; he wished to extol them as men of honour and moral exemplars – but their honour consisted in not perpetrating any swindles with big words and virtues . . .

430

Philosophy as décadence. The most important reason for all moral education has always been to achieve the *certainty of an instinct*, so that one need not be aware of the goodness of one's intentions or means per se prior to action. A man should learn to act in just the same way that a soldier drills. In fact, this unconsciousness is a part of every kind of perfection; even the mathematician makes his calculations unconsciously . . .

So what did it mean when Socrates *reacted* by preaching dialectics as the way to virtue, and by expressing derision when people were unable to justify morality logically? But part of its *merit* consists in this very inability, for without it *it is worthless.* The *shame* aroused was a necessary concomitant to perfection! . . .

When *demonstrability* is made a precondition of personal prowess in virtue, what this meant was precisely *the dissolution of the unity and strength of the Greek instincts.* They were themselves forms of dissolution, all these great 'virtuosos' and windbags . . .

In praxi, it meant that moral judgements had been deprived of their conditional character, that they had been uprooted from the Greek cultural and political soil from which they sprang and in which they had any meaning, and subsequently, under the guise of *rarefaction*, *denaturalized.* The major concepts of 'goodness' and 'justice' had become detached from their preconditions, and as *liberated* 'Ideas' became objects of dialectic. A truth was sought behind them; they were regarded as beings or as signs of beings; a world was *invented* in which they might reside, and from which they came.

In summa, the mischief had already reached a climax in Plato . . . And then it even became necessary [to] invent the *abstractly perfect man*, who is good, just, wise and a dialectician – in short, the *scarecrow* of the ancient philosopher; a plant detached from any soil; a mankind devoid of any

particular regulative instincts; a virtuousness which 'demonstrates' itself with reasons. The perfectly *ridiculous* 'individual' considered in abstraction from everything else! *Unnaturalness of the highest order* . . .

In short, the denaturalization of moral values resulted in the creation of a degenerate *type of man* – '*the* good man', '*the* happy man', '*the* wise man'. Socrates represents a moment of the *most profound perversity* in the history of mankind.

431

Philosophy as decadence; *Socrates*. This turn of taste in favour of dialectics is a great question mark. What really happened? Socrates, the commoner who brought it about, triumphed with dialectics over a nobler taste, the taste of *the nobility* – it was the mob which triumphed with it. Prior to Socrates, dialectical styles of rhetoric were shunned in good society, they were thought to be compromising; the youth were warned against them. Why the exhibition of reasons? Why, in fact, resort to demonstration at all? Against others the nobility could exercise authority. They commanded: that was sufficient. Among themselves, *inter pares*, there was tradition, which is *also* a form of authority; and last but not least, they 'understood' one another. They had no place for dialectics. Besides, such a public display of one's arguments was regarded with suspicion. Nothing honourable has its reasons so readily available. There is something unbecoming about enumerating them. That which can be demonstrated is of little worth . . . That dialectics excites distrust and carries little conviction, by the way, is something that orators of all parties know instinctively. Nothing is easier to erase than the effect of a dialectician. Dialectics can only be a form of *self-defence*. One must be under attack; one must have to *enforce* one's rights: otherwise one makes no use of them. That is why the Jews were dialecticians, as was Reynard the Fox,[142] as was Socrates. The dialectician has a merciless instrument readily available, with which he is *able* to tyrannize. He compromises as he conquers. He leaves it to his victims to prove that they are not idiots. He infuriates them and renders them helpless, all the while

himself remaining the cold, triumphant voice of reason – he *stupefies* his opponents. With dialectical irony, the mob takes its revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed finds expression in the cold knife-thrusts of the syllogism . . .

*

In Plato, as a man of easily excitable sensuality and enthusiasm, the spell cast by concepts was so great that he involuntarily revered and idolized concepts as ideal Forms. *Dialectical intoxication*, as the consciousness of exercising self-control by means of it – as an instrument of a power-seeking will.[143]

432

The problem of Socrates. The two opposites: the *tragic* attitude and the *Socratic* attitude, as measured by the law of life.

To what extent is the *Socratic* attitude a phenomenon of *décadence*? To what extent do robust health and strength show themselves in the man of science, in his dialectics, his efficiency, his rigour, his whole *habitus*? (It is the health of the *plebeian*, whose malice and *esprit frondeur*, whose cunning, whose *canaille au fond* are held in check by *cleverness*; the health of a man who is, in a word, 'ugly'.)

He becomes ugly through self-mockery, dialectical aridity, *cleverness* serving as a *tyrant* against 'the tyrant' (against instinct). Everything in Socrates is exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature; he is a buffo with the instincts of a Voltaire. He discovers a new kind of *agon*; he is the first fencing-master of Athenian high society; he represents nothing but *supreme cleverness*; he calls it 'virtue' (he sensed that it was his *last resort*; he was not free to be *clever*, cleverness was *de rigueur*); he maintains self-control in order to enter the fray with reasons and *not* with emotions (Spinoza's *cunning* consisted in the unravelling of the errors of emotion); he discovers that everybody in whom he provokes emotion falls into his trap, that emotion proceeds illogically; he engages in self-mockery in order to injure the roots of his *rancorous feelings.*

I wish to understand the partial and idiosyncratic circumstances from which Socrates' problematic equation of reason, virtue and happiness derives. Despite the absurdity

of identifying them, Socrates *enthralled* antiquity with this doctrine: ancient philosophy could not break free . . .

Socrates displays an absolute lack of objective interests; a hatred of science; the hypersensitivity involved in feeling oneself to be a *problem*. His acoustic hallucinations constitute a morbid element. The intellect's resistance to occupying itself with morality is strongest when it is rich and independent. So how is it that Socrates, of all people, is a *moral monomaniac*? In an emergency, every 'practical' philosophy immediately steps into the foreground. Morality and religion becoming chief interests is the sign of a crisis.

433

Problem of Socrates. Cleverness, clarity, rigorousness and logicality as weapons against *wild impulses*. The latter must be dangerous and threaten destruction. Otherwise there is no sense in cultivating *cleverness* to the point of tyranny. The goal is *to make a tyrant* out of cleverness; but for *that* to be necessary, these impulses must have already become tyrants. This is the problem, and at that time it was a very pressing one. Thus reason came to be equated with virtue and happiness.

Solution: the Greek philosophers stand upon the same foundation as Socrates does, the same inner experiences – five steps from excess, from anarchy, from debauchery, all of them men of *décadence*. They perceive him to be a physician. *Solution*: the wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a *symptom of décadence*. Likewise the superfetation of logic and clear reasoning. Both are abnormalities, both go hand in hand. Logic expresses a will to power, to self-control, to 'happiness'.

Critique: *décadence* betrays itself in this preoccupation with 'happiness' (i.e. with the 'salvation of the soul'; i.e. in feeling that *one's circumstances are dangerous*). Its fanatical interest in 'happiness' shows the pathological condition of the physiological substrate; it is a vital interest. The *alternative* which they all faced was: *be reasonable or perish*. The moralism of the Greek philosophers shows that they felt that they were in *danger* . . .

434

Philosophy as décadence; *why everything was reduced to a charade.* Primitive psychology only took account of the *conscious* factors in men (as causes); it regarded 'consciousness' as an attribute of the soul, and sought a will behind every action (i.e. an intention); it had only needed to answer: *what does a man want*, first and foremost? Answer: happiness (he was not permitted to answer 'power', because that would have been *immoral*) – consequently in every human action there is an intention of attaining happiness through it. Second, when a man does not in fact attain happiness, why is that? Because of errors with respect to the means. *What is the unerring means of attaining happiness?* Answer: virtue. Why virtue? Because it [is] in the highest degree rational, and because rationality makes it impossible to err with regard to the means; as *reason*, virtue is the way to happiness . . . Dialectics is the abiding vocation of virtue, because it excludes any clouding of the intellect, any emotion.

Actually, man does *not* want 'happiness' . . . Pleasure is a feeling of power: if we exclude the emotions, we also exclude those states which afford the greatest feeling of power and consequently of pleasure. The highest degree of rationality is a cool, clear state, which is far from affording us that feeling of happiness which accompanies every kind of *intoxication* . . .

The ancient philosophers combated everything intoxicating, everything which impairs cool and impartial judgement . . . They were consistent with their false assumption that consciousness was the *superior*, the *supreme* state, the prerequisite of perfection; *whereas the opposite is true* . . .

Any kind of action is imperfect in so far as it is willed or conscious. The ancient philosophers were the *greatest bunglers in practice*, because they condemned themselves to *bungling* in theory . . . In practice everything was reduced to a charade; and anyone who saw through it, e.g. Pyrrho, judged that in goodness and righteousness 'little people' were far superior to philosophers.

All the more profound men of antiquity abhorred the *philosophers of virtue*; they were regarded as nothing but

squabblers and actors. (This was the judgement about *Plato* by *Epicurus*, by *Pyrrho*.)

The upshot is that in practical life, in patience, goodness and instinctive mutual encouragement, the little people are superior to them. This is something like the judgement Dostoevsky (and Tolstoy) made on behalf of his *muzhiks*:[144] they are more philosophical in practice, they are more stout-hearted in dealing with the exigencies of life . . .

435

Philosophy as décadence; *towards a critique of the philosophers*. Philosophers and moralists deceive themselves in thinking that they escape from *décadence* by fighting *against* it. This is beyond their capacity; and however little they may acknowledge the fact, it subsequently becomes clear that they are among the most powerful promoters of *décadence*.

The philosophers of Greece [are a case in point], e.g. Plato, [who was a] man of the 'good' – but he detached the instincts of the *polis* from the contest, from military prowess, from art and beauty, from the mysteries and from faith in tradition and in ancestors . . .

He seduced *les nobles*; he himself was seduced by the commoner Socrates . . . He rejected all the prerequisites of the 'noble Greek' of the old school; he made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with tyrants, influenced subsequent politics and provides an example of the most complete instinctual detachment from the old. He is profound and passionate in everything *anti*-Hellenic.

One after the other, these great philosophers represent the *typical* forms of *décadence*: preoccupation with moral and religious considerations, anarchism, nihilism, cynicism, hedonism and conservatism, ἀδιάφορα,[145] becoming obdurate.

To ask the question of 'happiness', of 'virtue' and of the 'salvation of the soul' is an expression of *physiological processes at cross-purposes* in these men, and is symptomatic of decline; do their instincts lack all *emphasis* and *direction*? Why does no one deny the freedom of the will? They are all preoccupied with their 'salvation of the soul' – what is the truth to them?

436

The extent to which dialectics and the faith in reason still rest upon moral prejudices. According to Plato, as the former inhabitants of an intelligible world of goodness, we are still in possession of a legacy from that time; and divine dialectics, which has its origin in that realm of goodness, leads us to everything good (thus, it must lead us to what is 'prior', so to speak).[146] Similarly, Descartes, whose fundamental way of thinking was coloured by Christian morality and theology (including a belief in a *benevolent* deity as the creator of all things), had the notion that the truthfulness of God *guarantees* for us the judgements of the senses. Without this religious sanction and guarantee of our senses and rationality, how would we be entitled to believe that anything exists! The idea that thought is the measure of reality – that what cannot be conceived, cannot *be* – is a rather inelegant *non plus ultra* of moralistic trustfulness (i.e. trust in an essential principle at the foundation of things which compels them to tell us the truth); it is an inherently foolish assertion which experience contradicts at every turn. We are utterly incapable of conceiving of things just as they *are* . . .

437

Philosophy as *décadence*; wise weariness; Pyrrho, the Buddhist; comparison with Epicurus.

Pyrrho sought to live meekly among the meek, without pride; to live in the ordinary way; to honour and believe what all believe. He guarded against science and intellect, against everything that *puffs one up* . . . He lived modestly, with unutterable patience, light-heartedness and mildness, in a state of ἀπάθεια,[147] or, better still, πραΰτης.[148] A Buddhist for Greece, he grew up as a latecomer amid the tumult of the schools; he was weary, and thus in protest against the assiduousness of the dialectician and in doubt as to the importance of anything. He had seen *Alexander*; he had seen the *Indian penitents*. To such latecomers and sophisticates, everything meek, poor, idiotic even, proves seductive. It anaesthetizes; it relaxes (as it did Pascal). On the other hand, in the midst of the crowd and

mixing with everybody, such men feel a little warmth. They have need of *warmth*, these weary ones . . . Pyrrho sought to overcome opposition; to eliminate competition; to abandon any desire for distinction; to deny the *Greek* instincts. He lived with his sister, who was a midwife. He disguised wisdom so that it was no longer a source of distinction; he cloaked it in poverty and rags; he performed the most menial of tasks, such as going to market to sell suckling pigs . . . He exemplified the virtues of sweet-temperedness, clarity and indifference, but no virtues which call for gestures. He sought to be everybody's equal, even in virtue, and thereby achieved the ultimate self-conquest, the ultimate indifference.

Pyrrho, and Epicurus after him, were two forms of Greek *décadence*, related by their hatred of dialectics and all the *histrionic* virtues. At that time, these two taken together were what was meant by the word 'philosophy'; they intentionally [held in] low [esteem] that which they loved; they chose common and even despised names for it, exemplifying a state in which one is neither sick nor healthy, neither alive, nor dead . . . Epicurus was more naïve, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho was more travelled, more spent, more nihilistic . . . His life was a protest against the great *doctrine identifying happiness, virtue and knowledge*, for he knew that the right way to live is not found through science: wisdom does not make one 'wise' . . . He who follows the right way to live does not seek happiness, he disregards his own happiness . . .

The authentic *philosophers of Greece* are those who came before Socrates: with Socrates something changes. They are all noble personages who set themselves apart from people and custom, who are travelled, who are serious to the point of melancholy, whose gaze is steady, who are no strangers to statecraft and diplomacy. They anticipate all the great conceptions of things held by later thinkers; they themselves embodied these conceptions, they made systems out of themselves. Nothing gives us a loftier conception of the Greek intellect than this sudden proliferation of types, this accidental completeness in the array of great possibilities. I see only one original figure in those who came afterwards: a latecomer but necessarily the

last . . . the nihilist *Pyrrho* . . . He was instinctively *opposed* to the influences which in the meantime [had come] into the ascendant: the Socratics, Plato. Pyrrho draws upon Democritus via Protagoras . . . The artist's optimism of Heraclitus . . .

438

The struggle against the 'old faith', as Epicurus undertook it, was, strictly speaking, a struggle against a *pre-existing* Christianity – the struggle against an ancient world which was already growing dark, already moralized, already soured by a sense of guilt, already elderly and infirm. It was not antiquity's 'moral corruption', but precisely its *moralization* which enabled Christianity to become its master. Moral fanaticism (in short, Plato) destroyed paganism by inverting its values and poisoning its innocence. We should finally come to understand that what was destroyed was *superior* to that which became its master! Christianity sprang from physiological corruption, and could only take root in rotten soil.

439

Science and philosophy; *science as training or as instinct*. I see a *decline of the instincts* in Greek philosophers; otherwise they could not have erred to such an extent as to regard the *conscious* state as the *more valuable* state. The *intensity of consciousness* is *inversely* proportional to the facility and rapidity of cerebral transmission. Among them the *preconceived opinion* about instinct reigned, which is always the sign of *weakened* instincts.

As a matter of fact, if we wish to find *life lived to perfection*, we must seek it where it is least conscious (where i.e. its logic, its reasons, its means and ends, its *utility* least present themselves). We must return to the facts of *bon sens*, the facts of the *bon homme* and of 'little people' of all sorts, to the *integrity and wisdom* which are *stockpiled* for generations by people who are never conscious of their principles, and who are even somewhat wary of principles. The demand for a *virtue which reasons* is unreasonable . . . A philosopher is compromised by such a demand.

440

When morality (and therefore acuteness, foresight, courage and fairness) has been as it were stockpiled by repeated exercise over a number of generations, this accumulation of virtue radiates strength even in that sphere where integrity is most rare: the *intellectual* sphere.

Every form of becoming conscious is an expression of uneasiness in the organism; something new must be attempted, but nothing is quite suitable; there is effort, tension, irritation – and precisely this is what *constitutes* becoming conscious . . . Genius lies in instinct; goodness as well. Our actions achieve perfection only in so far as they are performed instinctively. Even from the moral point of view, all thinking which takes place consciously is a mere attempt, usually in the service of immorality. Scientific integrity is as good as suspended when a thinker begins to reason; even the wisest are weighed in the balance and found wanting when they speak of morality . . .

It is demonstrable that all thinking which takes place consciously displays a much lower degree of morality than it would were it guided by instinct.

441

[*Science versus philosophy.*] The struggle against Socrates, Plato and all the Socratic schools proceeds from the instinctive sense that man is not *bettered* when he is told that virtuous conduct is demonstrably correct and requires reasons . . . Finally, there is the *mesquine* fact that it was the competitive instinct in all these natural-born dialecticians which compelled them to glorify their *personal ability as the supreme quality* and to represent everything else that is good as flowing from it. The *anti-scientific* spirit of this whole 'philosophy': *it seeks justification.*

442

The struggle of philosophers against science. This is extraordinary. From the very beginning, Greek philosophy struggled against science with epistemological or sceptical arguments as means; and to what end? Always for the sake of *morality* . . .

Physicists and physicians were hated. Socrates, Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics, Epicurus and Pyrrho constituted a general onslaught upon knowledge in favour of *morality* . . . Dialectic was hated as well . . . One problem remained, in that they offered arguments which bordered on sophistry in order to rid themselves of science. On the other hand, the physicists were subjugated to such an extent that they incorporated into their foundations the schema of truth, of true being, e.g. the atom, the four elements (*juxtaposition* of a being, in order to explain plurality and change). One was taught contempt for any interest in *objectivity*, there was a return to practical interests, and to the personal utility of all knowledge . . .

The struggle against science was directed against:

(1) its pathos (objectivity);
(2) its means (i.e. against its utility);
(3) its results (as childish).

It was the same struggle which would be taken up again later on behalf of the *Church*, in the name of piety; it inherited all the knowledge and ingenuity of antiquity for the struggle. Epistemology played the same role here as in Kant, as in the philosophers of India. One does not wish to be troubled by science; one wishes to retain the ability to go one's own 'way'.

What are they defending themselves against anyway? Against being bound, against being subject to law, against being constrained to agree – I believe this is what is called *freedom* . . .

This is an expression of *décadence*: the instinct of solidarity is so degenerate that solidarity itself is perceived as *tyranny*; they want no authority over them, no solidarity with others, no falling in with the rank and file to adopt its infinitely slow pace. They hate the gradualness, the *tempo*, of science; they hate men of science for their patience, their stamina, their personal indifference.

443

Morality is fundamentally *hostile* to science: certainly Socrates was – and this is because science regards as important things which have nothing to do with 'good' and 'evil'; thus the sense of 'good' and 'evil' *loses its importance*. Morality demands that

we serve it with our whole heart and with all our might; to give stars or vegetation such serious attention is regarded as an extravagance that we can *ill afford*. That is why in Greece, once Socrates introduced the disease of moralizing into science, scientific rigour fell into a rapid decline; the sensibility of a Democritus, a Hippocrates or a Thucydides was a height not to be reached twice.

444

The problem of the philosopher and of the man of science. The *ascending type* possesses a calm strength. He reacts with relative indifference; it is difficult to provoke a reaction from him at all. He possesses *all* the great emotions, and they all aid each other in a marvellous way . . .

The influences of age include depressive habits (sedentary life *à la* Kant), overwork, insufficient nutrition of the brain and excessive reading.

More essentially, one might ask whether it is not already perhaps a symptom of *décadence* when thinking tends towards such *generalities*? *Objectivity may be regarded as the disintegration of the will* (as the *ability* to remain so *remote* from things . . .). This presupposes a great indifference with regard to the strong impulses: a kind of isolation from, exceptional attitude towards, and resistance to the normal impulses.

Typical features include disengagement from one's *homeland*, movement away from it in ever-widening circles, a growing exoticism, the silencing of the old imperatives – the persistent question 'whither?' ('happiness') is a sign of *liberation* from the forms of organization, a sign of rupture.

The problem is whether the *man of science* is more of a symptom of *décadence* than the philosopher. The man of science is not *entirely* disengaged; only a *part* of him is absolutely dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge, and trained to occupy his niche, his particular standpoint; he is in need of *all* the virtues of a strong race and robust health, to wit, great rigour, manliness and cleverness. Here we might speak of a division of labour and training, a division which is very useful to the whole and which is possible only where there is a

high degree of culture. The man of science is more a symptom of the great diversity of culture than of its exhaustion. The *décadent* scholar is a *bad* scholar, whereas the *décadent* philosopher has been at least hitherto considered the typical philosopher.

445

Nothing is rarer among philosophers than *intellectual integrity*; they may say the opposite, and may even believe it themselves, but their entire vocation presupposes that only certain truths are permissible; they know what they *have* to prove; one could almost say that their agreement on these 'truths' is how they know that they *are* philosophers. There are, e.g., moral truths. But belief in morality does not constitute proof of morality; there are cases – and the philosopher is a case in point – where such a belief is simply *immoral*.

446

What about the philosopher is atavistic? That he teaches that *his* qualities are the indispensable and only means to the 'highest good' (e.g. dialectic, as Plato taught); that he ranks every kind of man by ascending *gradatim* with *his* type as the highest one; philosophers despise what is generally considered valuable, thereby creating an enormous disparity between the supreme *spiritual* values and the *worldly* ones; the philosopher insists that he *knows* what is true, what God is, what the goal should be and what the way to it is . . . in this respect, the typical philosopher is an absolute dogmatist – and if he finds scepticism to be *necessary*, it is in order to permit himself to speak dogmatically about *his more important points*.

447

When the philosopher is pitted against his *rivals*, e.g. science: he becomes a sceptic; he reserves to himself a *form of knowledge* which he denies to men of science; he allies himself with the priest so as [not] to arouse the suspicion of atheism and materialism; he considers an attack upon himself as an attack on morality, virtue, religion and order – he knows how to

discredit his opponents by accusing them of 'leading astray' and 'undermining authority' – he allies himself with those in power.

When the philosopher is in conflict with other philosophers, he tries to force them into the role of anarchists, infidels and subversives.

In summa: to the extent that he *fights*, he fights just like a priest, like a member of a priesthood.

3. Truth and Error of Philosophers

448

Philosophy is defined by Kant as '*The science of the limits of reason*'![149]

449

Philosophy is the art of discovering truth, according to Aristotle.[150] *By contrast*, the Epicureans, who availed themselves of Aristotle's sensualistic theory of knowledge, were quite ironical about, and dismissive of, the search for truth; for them, philosophy was 'the art of *living*'.

450

The three great pieces of naïveté:

Knowledge – as a means to happiness (as if . . .); as a means to virtue (as if . . .); as a means to the 'denial of life', in so far as it is a means to disappointment (as if . . .).

451

As if there were a 'truth' which could be approached somehow –

452

Just because something is believed . . . Error and ignorance are disastrous. The claim that the *truth has been found*, and that there is an end to ignorance and error, is one of the greatest temptations there is. If it is believed, it paralyses the determination to examine, to investigate, to be cautious and to experiment; it may even be regarded as sacrilege to entertain

doubt as to its truth . . . 'Truth' is therefore more disastrous than error and ignorance, because it stifles the energies with which we strive for enlightenment and knowledge. The tendency to *idleness* now sides with 'truth' ('thinking is hardship and misery!'), likewise a sense of order and regularity, the joy of possession, the pride of wisdom – in a word, vanity; it is easier to obey than *to examine* . . . It is more flattering to think 'I possess the truth', than to be surrounded by darkness . . . but above all, it fills the mind with calm and confidence, making life easier – and in so far as it *allays suspicion*, it even 'betters' the character . . . 'The peace of the soul', 'the quiet conscience', are all inventions which are possible only on the assumption that *the truth has been found*. 'You shall know them by their fruits' . . . 'The truth' is truth, *because* it makes men *better* . . . The process continues: all goodness and all success is attributed to 'truth'. This is the demonstration of power: the happiness, contentment and prosperity of a community and of an individual are now understood as the result of the *belief in morality* . . . Conversely, *ill*-success is ascribed to a *lack* of faith.

453

Man's *good* will is just as much a cause of error as his *bad*; in thousands of cases he distorts reality himself, he falsifies it, so as not to suffer from his good will, e.g. by regarding God as the shaper of human destiny, or by interpreting his little fate as if everything were devised and sent for the salvation of his soul. This want of 'philology', which a more discerning intellect would have to regard as unscrupulous and fraudulent, is ordinarily inspired by the *good will* . . . Good will, 'noble sentiments' and 'exalted states' are just as fraudulent and deceptive in the means they employ as the emotions which morality has repudiated and declared egoistic, such as love, hatred and vindictiveness.

It is mankind's errors which have proved most costly, and for the most part it has been the errors due to 'good will' which have done the most damage. The illusion which makes people happy is more pernicious than the illusion which has immediately fatal consequences, for the latter sharpens the mind,

renders it suspicious and purges it of error – while the former lulls it to sleep . . . Physiologically speaking, fine sentiments and 'sublime passions' should be classified as narcotics, for their abuse has precisely the same effect as the abuse of any other opiate: *nervous exhaustion* . . .

454

Error is the most expensive luxury that man can allow himself; and when the error is a physiological error as well, things become extremely dangerous. For what, therefore, has mankind so far been obliged to pay most dearly, to atone most grievously? For its 'truths'; for these were all mistakes *in physiologicis* . . .

455

For the chapter on the will to truth. Psychological *confusions*: the *desire to believe* has been confounded with the 'will to truth' (e.g. Carlyle). But the *desire to disbelieve* has likewise been confounded with the 'will to truth' (a need to shake off a belief for a hundred reasons, to be proven right against any number of 'believers'). What was it that *inspired the Sceptics*? Their *hatred* of the dogmatists – or a need for rest, a kind of fatigue, as with Pyrrho. The *advantages* which were expected from truth were the advantages of belief in it – for, in itself, truth could be quite painful, harmful and disastrous. Dogmatic 'truths' were attacked only to the extent that victory over them promised advantages . . . e.g. freedom from the ruling powers. The methods employed to establish the truth were *not* motivated by a desire for truth but by a *desire for power*, a *desire to be superior. How* is truth *proved*? By the sense of elevated power ('certitude', 'faith'), by utility, by indispensability – *in short, by advantages*, that is, assumptions as to how the truth is *supposed* to be constituted in order to be acknowledged by us. But that is a *prejudice*, a sign that something is not *true* at all . . . What is the meaning of the 'will to truth' in the Goncourts? In the *Naturalists*? We need a critique of 'objectivity'. *Why* should we know? Why not prefer to be deceived? . . . What was always desired was belief – and *not* the truth . . . Belief is created by

means *utterly opposed* to the methods employed in rigorous investigation – and is even incompatible with them –

456

For us, a certain degree of faith is sufficient to constitute an objection to what is believed; more, it raises questions as to the mental health of the believer; 'unshakeable convictions' almost always belong in the madhouse.

457

The will to truth; *martyrs.* In order to attack anything which is based on reverence an assailant needs to be possessed of a certain daring, reckless, even shameless disposition . . . Now, if we consider that for thousands of years mankind has sanctified as truths nothing but errors, and that it has branded any critique of them as a sign of an evil disposition, then we must reluctantly concede that a great deal of *immorality* was necessary to provide the impetus for the attack, that is to say, the impetus for *reason* . . . We should forgive these immoralists for having always posed as the 'martyrs of truth'; the truth of the matter [is] that they did not reject these errors out of some impetus towards the truth, but out of a desire for disintegration, a sacrilegious scepticism and a love of adventure. In other cases it was personal rancour which impelled them towards a domain of problems; they attacked certain problems in order to vindicate themselves against certain people. But above all, it was revenge which proved scientifically useful – the revenge of the oppressed, who had been forced aside and even oppressed by the *prevailing* truths . . .

Truth, that is to say, the scientific method, was seized upon and furthered by those who suspected that it could be an instrument of war – a weapon of *destruction* . . . In order to make their opposition respectable, they moreover needed a device similar to the devices of those whom they were attacking; they therefore adhered to the notion 'truth' as unconditionally as their opponents did; they became fanatics, or at least adopted a posture of fanaticism, because no other posture was taken seriously. What remained to be done was

accomplished by persecution, passion and the insecurity of the persecuted – hatred grew, and in turn took away the very thing which remaining on the solid ground of science presupposes. Ultimately all of them wanted to be right in the same ridiculous way as their opponents . . . The words 'conviction', 'faith', the pride of martyrdom – all these things are most unfavourable to the acquisition of knowledge. The opponents of these so-called truths finally accepted again the entirely subjective manner of deciding upon the truth, namely by adopting postures, by making sacrifices and heroic resolutions – i.e. they *prolonged* the *reign* of the anti-scientific method. As martyrs they compromised their own act of martyrdom.

458
Theory and practice.
Critique of the value of morality.

A dangerous distinction between 'theoretical' and 'practical' can be found, e.g. in Kant, but also in the ancient philosophers; they act as if pure intellect presented them with the problems of knowledge and metaphysics; they act as if practice should be judged by its own measure of value, whatever answer theory may give. Against the first, I pit my *psychology of philosophers*; their most detached calculations and 'intellectuality' remain but the faintest impression of a physiological fact; voluntariness is absolutely lacking in them, everything is instinct, everything is set in a certain direction from the outset . . . Against the second I wonder whether we know any method of acting well, other than always thinking well; the latter is an action, the former presupposes thought. Do we have a capacity to judge the value of a way of life any differently than we would judge the value of a theory through induction or comparison? . . . The naïve think that in judging a way of life we are better off, that here at least we know what 'goodness' is – and the philosophers concur. We conclude that some sort of *faith* is present here, and nothing more . . . Even the ancient Sceptics said, 'We must act; *therefore* a code of conduct is necessary.' They thought that the urgency with which they were pressed for a decision was an argument for thinking something *true*! . . . Their more consistent brothers

the Buddhists said that one must *not* act, and then devised a code of conduct by which one detached oneself from action . . . To adapt oneself, to live as the '*common man*' lives, to think right and proper what he thinks proper: this is to *submit to the gregarious instinct*. We must carry our courage and severity so far as to find such submission *disgraceful*. We must not live by a double standard! . . . We must not separate theory and practice!

459

We now know that nothing of what we formerly believed is true, that what was formerly denied us on the grounds that it was unholy, forbidden, contemptible and disastrous – today all these flowers bloom along the lovely paths of truth. None of the old morality concerns us any longer; morality is not a notion still worthy of respect. We consider it obsolete; we are no longer green and naïve enough to allow ourselves to be lied to in this way . . . Or, to put it more mildly, we are too virtuous for it . . . And if truth in the old sense was only 'truth' because the old morality affirmed it, and was allowed to affirm it, then it follows that we no longer have any of the former truths left either . . . Morality is by no means our *criterion* of truth; once we have demonstrated that an assertion is dependent upon morality or inspired by noble sentiments we consider it *refuted*.

460

Science and philosophy. Those who believe in and worship all these values do not wish to acknowledge their empirical and conditional character. All of the philosophers have believed in these values, and one form their worship took was the endeavour to make them into *a priori truths*. The falsifying character of *worship* . . . Worship is the supreme test of intellectual *integrity*; and yet in the whole history of philosophy there *is* no intellectual integrity, but rather the 'love of the good' . . . There is an absolute *lack of method* for taking the measure of these values; *second*, there is a reluctance to examine these values or to regard them as in any way conditional. In the case of moral values, all *anti-scientific* instincts came together in order

to *exclude* science . . . which explains why morality represents an incredible scandal in the history of the sciences . . .

4. Concluding Remarks towards a Critique of Philosophy

461

Philosophy as décadence; why are philosophers slanderers? The malicious and blind hostility of philosophers towards the *senses* is absurd. The senses are *not* what deceive us! Consider the nose[151] – so far as I know, no philosopher has spoken with due reverence for what is for the time being the most delicate physical instrument there is; it can still detect vibrations where even the spectroscope is powerless. How much of the *mob* and of the *bourgeoisie* there is in all this hatred! The people always regard it as an *objection* to an abused principle if they feel the bad consequences of its abuse; every movement in rebellion against some principle, be it in the area of politics, or of the economy, has always argued thus, with the ulterior motive of representing an *abusus* as inherent in, and necessary to, the principle.

It is a *sorrowful* tale; man seeks a principle by virtue of which he can despise man – he invents a world in order to slander and besmirch this world; every time he does this, he grasps at straws, at nothingness in fact, and construes this nothingness as 'God', as 'truth', and in any case as that which brings judgement and condemnation upon *this* existence . . .

If we require proof of how deeply and thoroughly the truly *barbarous* needs of man seek satisfaction, even when he has been tamed and 'civilized', then we should look at the 'leitmotifs' of the whole development of philosophy. This represents a sort of revenge on reality, an insidious process of destroying the values by which men live, a *dissatisfied* soul which experiences being tamed as torture, and takes pleasure in a pathological unravelling of all the ties by which it is bound.

The history of philosophy is that of a *secret rage* against life's presuppositions, against life's sense of what is valuable, against

being life's advocates and champions. Philosophers have never hesitated to affirm the existence of another world, provided that it was contrary to this world, and that it furnished them with a means of speaking ill of this world. Philosophy has hitherto been the great *school for slander*; and it has imposed upon us so much that even today our science, which offers itself as the advocate of life, has essentially *accepted* its slanderous position and treats *this* world as illusory, and this chain of causes as merely phenomenal. *What* is the actual source of this hatred? . . .

I fear that it is the perennial *Circe of philosophers*, morality, which plays them this trick of having always to be slanderers . . . They believed in moral 'truths', they found in them the supreme values – what alternative did they have, but to deny existence the more they understood it? . . . for this existence is *immoral* . . . And this life rests upon immoral presuppositions; and all morality *denies* life.

Let us do away with the world of truth; and to that end, we must first do away with the hitherto supreme value: morality . . .

It is sufficient to demonstrate that morality itself is *immoral*, in the sense in which immorality has been condemned up to now. If we break the tyranny of the former values in this fashion, if we do away with the 'world of truth', a *new order of values* must follow of its own accord.

NB. NB. The world of illusion and the world of *fabrication* is the antithesis. The latter has hitherto been called the 'world of truth', the 'truth', 'God'. *This* is what we have to abolish.

(1) The logic of my conception:

(a) *Morality is the supreme value* (it is mistress of *all* the phases of philosophy, even of the Sceptics); the *result* is that this world is no good, it is not the 'world of truth'.

(b) *What is it* which here determines the supreme value? *What*, in fact, is morality? It is the instinct of *décadence*; it is the means whereby those who are exhausted and the disinherited *avenge themselves*. *The historical* proof of this lies in the fact that philosophers have always been *décadents* . . . in the service of nihilistic religions.

(c) It is the instinct of *décadence* which appears as the will to power. The proof of this lies in the absolute *immorality* of the *means* employed by morality throughout its entire history.

(2) We have recognized in the whole movement only a *special case of the will to power.*

462
For the plan

In the place of *moral values*, nothing but *naturalistic* values. Naturalization of morality.

In the place of 'sociology', a *theory of forms of domination.*

In the place of 'epistemology', a *perspectivist theory of the emotions* (including a hierarchy of emotions).

The emotions *transfigured*: their *superior accuracy*, their '*intellectuality*'.

In the place of metaphysics and religion, the *theory of eternal recurrence* (as a means of cultivation and selection).

*

In the place of 'society', the *culture-complex*, as *my* preferred interest (as a whole, as it were, or with regard to its parts).[152]

463

Schopenhauer prepared the way for me, to the extent that I deepened pessimism, and by the invention of its perfect opposite first fully acquainted myself with the sentiment.

As did the ideal artists, that new blood from the Napoleonic movement.

As did the superior *Europeans*, harbingers of *great politics.*

As did the study of the Greeks and their origins. In *Birth of Tragedy* I hinted at the relationship between 'suffering' and 'art'. The *Germans* and the *spirit.*

464

I have named those who have unwittingly worked and prepared the way for me. But where should I turn if I am to have any hope of finding my kind of philosophers themselves, or at least someone who shares *my sense that such new philosophers*

are wanting? Those in whom a *noble* attitude prevails, who believe in slavery and many degrees of servitude as the prerequisite for every higher culture; those in whom a *creative* attitude prevails, who do not regard the enjoyment of tranquillity, the 'Sabbath of Sabbaths', as the world's aim, and who, unlike others, prize peace because of the opportunities it affords for new wars; those who would prescribe laws for the future and who, for the sake of that future, are hard even on themselves and tyrannical towards everything in the present; those who are impetuous and 'immoral', who want the good and the evil qualities in man developed in equal measure and to the greatest extent, because they have the confidence to accord each its proper place – the place where they depend on each other? For a man who goes in search of such philosophers nowadays, what prospect is there that he will find what he seeks? Is it not probable that, even with the best lantern of Diogenes, he will wander about night and day, searching for them in vain? In our age, people have the *opposite* instincts: what they want above all is comfort; second, they want what is public and that great theatrical noise, that great rumbling, as befits their fairground tastes; third, they want everyone to grovel in abject submission before the greatest of all lies – the lie known as 'the equality of men' – and honour only the egalitarian virtues, the *levelling* virtues. But for the emergence of the philosopher as I understand him, this takes us from the very beginning in exactly the opposite direction, even if it is believed in all innocence to be conducive to it. In fact, nowadays all the world bemoans how bad it *used to be* for philosophers caught between the stake, a guilty conscience and the pretensions to wisdom by the Church Fathers: but the truth is that precisely these circumstances were ever so much more *favourable* to the development of a powerful, comprehensive, cunning and audacious intellect than the conditions prevailing today. Today a different kind of intellect, namely the intellect of the demagogue and the actor, and perhaps the beaver-like and ant-like intellect of the scholar, find favourable conditions for their development. But things are even worse for the better artists; for are they not almost all perishing from a want of internal discipline? They are no longer

tyrannized from without by the absolute standards of a church or court; and thus they no longer learn to develop the 'tyrant within', the *will*. And what applies to artists also applies, in a higher and portentous sense, to philosophers. Where, then, *are* free-thinkers to be found today? Show me a free-thinker today! Well! We should keep our voices down. Solitude today is full of secrets, more than ever. In fact, in the meantime I have learned that the free-thinker must be a hermit.

465

I understand something very definite by 'free-thinking': it requires that one [be] a hundred times [superior] to philosophers and other disciples of 'the truth' in severity towards one's self, in integrity, in courage and in one's absolute will to say no even when it is dangerous to say no – I regard the philosophers that have appeared so far as *contemptible libertines* hiding under that woman's cloak 'truth'.[153]

BOOK III

PRINCIPLE OF A NEW DETERMINATION OF VALUES

Part 1. The Will to Power as Knowledge

1. Method of Enquiry

466

What distinguishes our nineteenth century is not the triumph of science, but the triumph of scientific method over science.

467

The history of scientific methods is regarded by A. Comte as being almost philosophy itself.

468

The great *methodologists*: Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, A. Comte.

469

The most valuable insights are always discovered last; but the most valuable insights are the *methods*.

All the methods, all the presuppositions on which contemporary science rests, were treated with the most profound contempt for thousands of years: anyone who made use of them was excluded from the society of *respectable* people – held to be an '*enemy of God*', a 'reviler of the highest ideal', something of a 'monomaniac'.

We had the whole *pathos* of mankind against us – their notion of what 'truth' is supposed to be, of what the service to truth is supposed to be, led them to look upon our objectivity, our method, our calm, cautious and distrustful manner, with

utter *disdain* . . . Fundamentally, that which has most hindered mankind was an aesthetic prejudice: men believed in the picturesque effect of truth, they demanded that the knowledge-seeker make a strong impression on their imaginations.

From the above, it would almost seem as if an *opposite* had been achieved, a *leap* had been made: in truth, that schooling which the hyperboles of morality afforded gradually prepared the way for that *milder form of pathos* which itself became incarnate as scientific character . . .

Conscientiousness in matters of detail, the self-control of the religious man, was a preparatory school for the scientific character: above all, the disposition to take *problems* seriously, irrespective of personal considerations[1] . . .

2. The Epistemological Starting Point

470

A deep aversion to settling once and for all on any comprehensive view of the world; the allure of the opposite ways of thinking; the refusal to be deprived of the stimulus of its enigmatic character.

471

The assumption that things are at bottom so morally constituted that human reason is justified[3] is an assumption born of trustfulness and a bourgeois sensibility, the after-effect of faith in divine truthfulness – God regarded as the creator of all things. Concepts are thought to be an inheritance from an otherworldly pre-existence. An instrument cannot *criticize* its own suitability: the intellect cannot determine its own limitations, nor can it determine whether it is well-constituted or ill-constituted.

472

I am opposed to the notion of the so-called 'facts of consciousness'. Observation here is a thousand times more difficult, and error is perhaps a condition of observation anyway.

473

The intellect cannot criticize itself, precisely because it cannot be compared with different kinds of intellects, and because its ability to acquire knowledge would be manifested only in the face of 'true reality'; i.e. in order to criticize the intellect, we should have to be superior beings who possessed 'absolute knowledge'. This already presupposes that, apart from all perspectival kinds of observation and sensory and intellectual appropriation, there *is something*, an 'in-itself' – but the psychological derivation of the belief in *things* forbids our speaking of 'things in themselves'.

474

That a kind of adequate relation obtains between subject and object, that the object is something which when *seen from inside* would be a subject is a well-intentioned invention which, I think, has had its day. The measure of that of which we [are] at all conscious is so entirely dependent upon broad considerations of utility for consciousness, that it is difficult to see how this oblique perspective of consciousness would permit us to assert anything with regard to 'subject' and 'object' which was in contact with reality!

475

Critique of modern philosophy: erroneous starting point, as if there were such things as 'facts of consciousness' – and no phenomenalism in introspection.

476

Note well the extent to which 'consciousness' – the idea, the intention, the feeling presented (*and which alone is familiar to us*) – is quite superficial! Our *inner* world is also an 'appearance'!

477

On psychology and epistemology. I adhere to the principle that even the *inner* world is phenomenal; *everything of which we are conscious* is first thoroughly arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted – the *actual* process of inner 'perception', the

relation of the causal connection between thoughts, feelings, desires, like that between subject and object, [is] completely hidden from us, and may be purely imaginary. This '*inner* world of illusion' is treated with precisely the same forms and procedures as the 'outer' world. We never encounter 'facts'; pleasure and pain are subsequent and derivative intellectual phenomena . . .

'Causality' eludes us; to assume the existence of a direct causal connection between thoughts, as logic does, is the result of the most casual and superficial observation. *Between* two thoughts, *every possible emotion* plays its game; but the movements are so rapid that we *fail to recognize* them, we *deny* their existence . . . 'Thinking' as the epistemologists understand it does not occur at all; it is an entirely arbitrary fiction, obtained by selecting one element from the process and by eliminating all the rest, an artificial arrangement introduced for the purpose of rendering inner processes intelligible . . .

The 'intellect', *something which thinks*; perhaps even, 'the pure and absolute intellect' – this conception is a further consequence of false introspection, influenced by the belief in 'thinking'; *first* an act, 'thinking', is imagined which does not occur at all; and, *second*, a subject-substrate is imagined in which every act of thinking has its origin, and in which nothing else occurs; e.g. *both action and agent are invented.*

478

We must not seek phenomenalism in the wrong place; nothing is more phenomenal, or, to be more precise, nothing is more deceptive, than this inner world, which we observe with the renowned faculty of the 'inner sense'. We have believed in the causal efficacy of the will to so great an extent that, in accordance with our personal experience, we have introduced a cause (i.e. intention) into events. We believe that the thoughts in succession within us are linked by some sort of causal nexus; the logician in particular, who actually speaks of cases which never happen in reality, has grown accustomed to the prejudice that thoughts cause thoughts. He calls this – thinking . . .

We believe – and even our physiologists believe it still – that pleasure and pain are the cause of reactions, that the whole

point of pleasure and pain is to give rise to reactions. For thousands of years, we have regarded the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain as motives for every action. On reflection, however, we have to admit that everything would have proceeded in accordance with precisely the same nexus of cause and effect had these states 'pleasure and pain' been absent, and that we are simply mistaken in asserting that they actually cause anything; they are epiphenomena whose function is not to cause a reaction, but something else entirely; within the reactions which have been initiated, they are already effects of other, prior causes.

In summa: each event which becomes conscious is a terminal phenomenon, a conclusion – it causes nothing; every successive phenomenon in consciousness is completely atomistic. And yet we have tried to understand the world with the opposite conception as if nothing were effective or real, save thinking, feeling, willing . . .

479

The phenomenalism of the 'inner world'. A *chronological inversion* takes place, so that the cause enters consciousness later than the effect. We have learned that pain is projected to a part of the body without being situated there; we have learned that the sensations which we naïvely supposed were conditioned by the outer world are, rather, conditioned by the inner world; that every real action of the outer world always occurs outside our consciousness . . . The fragment of the outer world of which we are conscious is the belated offspring of the effect which is exercised on us from the outside, subsequently projected as the 'cause' . . .

In the phenomenalism of the 'inner world', we reverse the chronology of cause and effect. The fundamental fact of 'inner experience' is that the cause is imagined after the effect has taken place . . . The same is true of the sequence of thoughts . . . we seek a cause for a thought before we are even conscious of it; the cause then enters consciousness before the thought itself, and then the thought follows . . . All our dreams are an attempt to interpret the totality of our sensations in terms

of their possible causes, in such a way that a condition only becomes conscious when the invented causal chain has entered consciousness. The whole of 'inner experience' rests on the fact that we seek a cause for an excitation of our nerve centres, and imagine that we have found one; it is only then that the cause enters *consciousness*; this cause is in no way sufficient to count as the real cause – it is a groping on the basis of previous 'inner experiences', i.e. of memory.

The memory, however, also preserves the habits of the old interpretation, i.e. their erroneous causalities . . . so that the 'inner experience' has to bear within it still the consequences of all the prior causal fictions. Our 'outer world', as we project it from moment to moment, is transposed and inextricably bound up with the old error of cause; we interpret it with the schematism of 'the thing'. Very little of the pain in a particular case merely represents the circumstances of that case, but rather a long experience of the consequences of certain injuries, including the errors in the assessments of these consequences.

'Inner experience' enters consciousness only after it has found a language which the individual *understands* . . . i.e. a translation of a condition into conditions with which he is *familiar* – 'to understand' simply and naïvely means: something new can be expressed in the language of something old and familiar. E.g. 'I feel poorly' – such a judgement presupposes a *later development, a considerable degree of neutrality on the part of the observer*; the naïve man always says: such-and-such makes me feel poorly – the fact that he feels poorly only becomes clear to him when he sees a reason for feeling poorly . . . This is what I call a *lack of philology*; the ability to read a text as a text, without intermingling an interpretation, is the latest development of 'inner experience' – and perhaps one which is barely possible . . .

480

Towards a merely empirical epistemology. There is neither 'intellect', nor reason, nor thought, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth; they are all useless fictions. It is not

a matter of 'subject and object', but of a particular species of animal which thrives only by virtue of a certain relative *accuracy*, especially by virtue of the *regularity* of its perceptions (so that it can capitalize on its experience) . . . Knowledge operates as an *instrument* of power. It is therefore obvious that it grows with each increase of power . . . The notion 'knowledge' here, as with that of 'goodness' or 'beauty', must be taken in a strictly and narrowly anthropocentric and biological sense.

In order for a given species to preserve itself – to grow in power – it must capture in its conception of reality enough of what is uniform and predictable that a scheme of its behaviour can be constructed on that basis. *The utility of preservation*, and not some abstract theoretical need to be undeceived, stands as the reason for the development of the sensory organs . . . they develop so that their mode of observation is sufficient to preserve us. In other words, the *extent* of the desire for knowledge depends upon the extent to which the *will to power* grows in the species; a species grasps so much of reality *in order to master it*, *in order to take it into service.*

3. The Belief in the 'Ego'. The Subject.

481

Against positivism, which goes no further than the phenomenon and says, 'there are only facts', I would say: no, facts are precisely what there are not, only interpretations. We can establish no fact 'in itself'; perhaps it is nonsense to desire such a thing. 'Everything is subjective', you may say, but that is already an interpretation; the 'subject' is not something given, but an embellishment, an interpolation. Is it necessary to postulate the existence of an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even that would be a piece of fiction, a hypothesis.

In so far as the word 'knowledge' has any meaning at all, the world is knowable. It may however be interpreted differently; it has no meaning hidden behind it, but rather innumerable meanings which can be assigned to it. Hence 'perspectivism'.

It is our needs *which interpret the world*: our impulses with their sympathies and antipathies. Every impulse is an ambition of sorts, each has its own perspective which it would like to impose upon all of the other impulses as their standard.

482

We provide a word where our ignorance begins, where we can see no further, e.g. the word 'I', the word 'do', the word 'suffer'; these are perhaps horizons of our knowledge, but they are not 'truths'.

483

. in 'thinking', the ego is presupposed; but previously we believed, as ordinary people do, that there was something immediately certain in 'I think', and that this 'I' was the given *cause* of thinking, after the analogy on which we understood all other causal relationships. However familiar and indispensable this fiction may now be – *that alone* proves nothing against its fictitiousness: a belief can be a condition of life and *still* be *false*.

484

'There is thinking: therefore there is something which thinks': that is all Descartes' *argumentatio* amounts to. This is tantamount to saying that our faith in the idea of substance should be regarded as an '*a priori* truth'; to say that if there is thought, then there must be 'something which thinks', is, however, simply an expression of a grammatical habit which requires an agent for an action. In short, Descartes was already making a logico-metaphysical assumption here – and *not just discovering an axiom* . . . Following his path does not lead to absolute certainty, but rather to the fact of a very strong faith.

If we reduce the proposition to 'there is thinking, therefore there are thoughts', then we have a mere tautology, and precisely what was at issue, the '*reality* of thought', is not even touched upon – to wit, in this form the 'appearance' of thought cannot be denied. But what Descartes *wanted* was for thought to have reality not only *apparently*, but *intrinsically*.

485

The notion of *substance* is a consequence of the notion of *subject*, not vice versa! If we abandon the soul, 'the subject', then the presupposition for a 'substance' is altogether absent. We get *degrees of being*, but we lose the being *itself*.

Critique of 'reality': what leads us to believe in the idea that there can be 'more or less reality', in the idea that being admits of degrees?

The degree to which we *feel alive* and *powerful* (the logic and coherence of what is experienced) provides us with the standard by which we judge the degree of 'being', of 'reality', of non-illusoriness.

The subject: this terminology expresses our belief in a *unity* underlying all the various aspects of whatever gives us the greatest sense of reality; we understand this belief to be the *effect* of one cause – and we are so determined to adhere to this belief that, in order to preserve it, we imagine that there are such things as 'truth', 'reality', 'substantiality'.

We accept the fiction of the 'subject', as if many *identical* states in us were the effect of one substate; but it is *we* who created the 'identity' of these states in the first place; the *identifying* and *arranging* of them is the *fact*, *not* their identity (this, rather, is to be *denied*).

486

We would have to *know* what being *is*, in order to *decide* whether this or that is real (e.g. 'the facts of consciousness'); likewise what *certainty* is, what *knowledge* is and the like. Since we do *not* know this, a critique of the faculty of knowledge is pointless: how should an instrument be able to criticize itself, if the only means of criticism available to it is *itself*? It cannot even define itself!

487

Is it not inevitable for philosophy to bring to light the presuppositions on which *reasoning* rests, to wit, our *belief in the ego* as a substance, as the only thing whose reality serves as a model for our ascription of reality to everything else? The

oldest 'realism' comes to light at the moment when we recognize that the whole religious history of mankind is the history of the superstitious belief in souls. *Here we reach a limit*: our thinking itself involves that belief (with its distinctions of substance and accident, action, agent, etc.); to abandon it means no longer being able to think. But however necessary a belief may be for the preservation of a creature, this has nothing to do with its truth, as may be seen, e.g., from the fact that we *must* believe in time, space and motion without feeling ourselves compelled [to regard] them as absolute.

488

The psychological origin of our faith in reason. The ideas 'reality', 'being', are derived from our sense of being a 'subject'.

The 'subject' is an interpretation of ourselves according to which the ego is considered a substance, the cause of all action, an *agent*.

The logico-metaphysical assumptions, the belief in substance, accident, attribute, etc., derive their persuasiveness from our habit of regarding all our actions as the consequence of our willing them – so that the ego, as substance, is not assimilated to the multiplicity of changes. *But there is no such thing as will.*

We have no categories which would enable us to distinguish a 'world in itself' from a world as phenomena. All our categories of reason have their origin in the senses: we read them off the empirical world. As for 'the soul', 'the ego' – [the] history of this notion shows that even here, the oldest distinction ('breath', 'life') [is at work].

If there is nothing material, then there can be nothing immaterial. The concept no longer *contains* anything . . .

There are no subject-'atoms'. The sphere of a subject is constantly *increasing* or *decreasing*, the centre of the system constantly *shifting*; in the event that it can no longer organize the appropriated mass, it divides into two. On the other hand, it may reshape a weaker subject into one of its own functionaries without destroying it, and to a certain degree form with it a new unity. This is not a 'substance', but rather something which in itself strives to enhance its strength; and which

seeks to 'preserve' itself only incidentally (it strives to *surpass* itself . . .).

489

Everything that enters consciousness as a 'unity' is already immensely complicated: we never have anything more than a *semblance of a unity*.

The *body* is the more extensive, clearer and more comprehensible phenomenon; it should be given priority for methodological reasons, without coming to any conclusion as to its ultimate significance.

490

The assumption of a *single subject* may not be necessary; might we not just as well assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose conflict and interplay underlie our thought and even our consciousness? A kind of *aristocracy* of 'cells' in which the authority resides? Of *pares*, it goes without saying, accustomed to sharing power and knowing how to command.

My hypotheses:

The subject as *multiplicity*.

Pain as intellectual and dependent upon the judgement 'harmful': projected.

The effect always 'unconscious': the inferred and imagined 'cause' is projected *after* the fact.

Pleasure is a kind of pain.

The sole *force* in existence is the same kind as that of will, a commanding of other subjects that change in response.

The ever-fading, ever-fleeting character of the subject, 'mortal soul'.

Number as perspective form.

491

The belief in the *body* is more fundamental than the belief in the soul; the latter arose from the aporias of the unscientific observation of the body (something which leaves it. The belief in the *truth of dreams*).

492

Why take the *body* and physiology as the starting point? Because in this way we get the right idea of the nature of our unity as subjects, namely as rulers at the head of a community, and therefore not as 'souls' or 'vital forces'. By the same token, we get the right idea of their dependence on the ruled, the conditions of the hierarchy and the division of labour which makes individuals and the whole possible. Similarly, we see how the 'subject' is not eternal, but that these living unities continually arise and pass away. We see that struggle also finds expression in obeying and commanding, and that shifting boundaries of power are a part of life. The comparative *ignorance* in which the ruler is kept about particular tasks being carried out and even disturbances occurring in the community, is one of the conditions of ruling at all. In short, we come to appreciate even not knowing, seeing things in broad outlines, simplification, falsification and perspective. However, the most important thing to understand is that the lord and his vassals are of the *same kind*, all of them feeling, willing, thinking – and that wherever we see or suspect movement in a body, we also are sure to add a subjective, invisible life associated with it. Movement is a kind of visual symbolism; it indicates that something has been felt, willed, thought. All intellectual self-examination and self-absorption poses a threat to the subject because it might be helpful and important to its operation that it misinterpret itself. That is why we interrogate the body and set aside the testimony of introspective faculties; if I may, let us see if the subordinates cannot communicate with us themselves.

4. Biology of the Instinct for Knowledge. Perspectivism.

493

'Truth' is the kind of error without which a particular kind of creature could not live. The value for *life* is ultimately decisive.

494

It is improbable that our 'knowledge' goes much further than what is absolutely necessary for the preservation of life. Morphology teaches us that an animal's senses, nerves and brain develop in proportion to the difficulty it has in feeding itself.

495

If the morality of 'thou shalt not lie' is rejected, the sense of truth will have to establish its credentials in another forum, as a means for the preservation of man, *as a power-seeking will*, just as our love of beauty is also this *formative will*. Both senses stand side by side – the sense of reality is the means of obtaining the power to shape things to our liking. The pleasure in fashioning and refashioning – a primeval pleasure! And we can only *comprehend* a world which we ourselves have *made*.

496

What is this *multifariousness* of knowledge? Merely something feeling *its* relation (or the species' relation) to a multiplicity of things – but how does that amount to 'knowledge' of them? For the species to know and to recognize is itself already among the conditions of its existence; but it would be hasty to conclude that there could be no other kind of intellect than that which preserves us; perhaps it is only an *accident*, and in no way necessary, that these conditions of existence are the *actual* ones.

Our intellectual apparatus is not particularly *suited* to acquiring 'knowledge'.

497

NB. I regard the best-believed *a priori* 'truths' as – *provisional assumptions* (e.g. belief in the law of causation, which is incorporated by thorough practice and habituation, so that *not* to believe in it would destroy the race). But are they therefore truths? What a conclusion! As if the truth were proved by the fact that man remains in existence!

498

The extent to which even our intellect is a product of the conditions of existence – we would not have it if we could live without it, nor would we have it in this *form*, if we could live otherwise.

499

'Thinking' in a primitive (pre-organic) state is a matter of *enforcing a configuration*, as in crystals. In *our* thinking, what is *essential* is the classification of new material into old schemata (= Procrustes' bed), the *assimilation* of the unfamiliar.

500

Perceptions are projected on the 'outer' world: 'inner' and 'outer' – does the *body* command here?

The same assimilating and organizing power which holds sway in the idioplasma also holds sway in the incorporation of the outer world; our perceptions are already the *result* of this *assimilating* and *equating* of *all* that has transpired within us; they do not follow immediately after the 'impression'.

501

Every thought, judgement or perception, regarded as kinds of *comparison*, presupposes a process of '*equating*', and the even earlier process of '*assimilating*'. The process of assimilation is the same as the amoeba's incorporation of the matter it appropriates.

Memory must be recent, in so far as the assimilating impulse appears to have been *harnessed* here; differences are preserved. Memory is a process of classification and encapsulation, an activity – but by whom?

502

We need to reconsider our views about memory, for here lies the main temptation to assume the existence of a 'soul' which timelessly reproduces and recognizes, etc. An experience lives on 'in memory'. I cannot help when it 'comes', as sudden memories, like momentary thoughts, are independent of my

will. Something happens of which I become conscious; now something similar comes to mind – who summoned it? Who evoked it?

503

The whole apparatus of cognition is one of abstraction and simplification – it is not a means whose end is *conceptual knowledge* of things, but their *appropriation*; for that matter, 'ends' and 'means' are as far from the nature of this apparatus as 'concepts' are. With 'ends' and 'means' we appropriate a process (an instrumental process is *invented* which is subsumable!); with concepts we appropriate the 'things' which constitute it.

504

Principle of life. Consciousness begins quite superficially, as we coordinate 'impressions' and become conscious of them – initially it is farthest from the biological centre of the individual; but it is a process which deepens and internalizes itself, continually approaching that centre.

505

The perceptions of which we are cognizant are the sum of just those perceptions, the *consciousness* of which was found necessary and desirable, both by us and the whole organic process which preceded us; and therefore they do not include every possible perception (e.g. they do not include the electrical). That means that we have *senses* only for a range of perceptions – those with which we must be concerned in order to preserve ourselves. *Consciousness extends only so far as it is useful.* There can be no doubt that all our sense perceptions are thoroughly permeated by *value judgements* (useful, harmful – and consequently, pleasant or painful). Every particular colour simultaneously expresses to us a value. That said, this is something we seldom recognize, or recognize only after protracted and exclusive exposure to a colour (e.g. convicts in jail or lunatics). Hence insects react in different ways to different colours; some, they like, e.g. ants.[2]

506

First, images – to explain how images arise in the mind. Then *words*, applied to images. Finally, concepts, possible only when there are words – the consolidation of several images under something which is not visible but audible (a word). The little bit of emotion which accompanies the 'word' – this weak emotion is the common factor, the basis of a concept. The fundamental fact is that weak sensations are all regarded as equivalent, *as identical*. Hence the confusion of two closely associated sensations when the sensations are *registered* – but *who* does the registering? *Believing* is the very first thing in every sense impression, a kind of affirmation comes *first* in intellectual activity! Being 'taken for true' is there from the outset! Our task, then, is to explain how being 'taken for true' *arises*! What kind of sensation lies *behind* it?

507

The *value judgement*, 'I believe that such-and-such is so' is the *essence* of what we call '*truth*'.

In the *value judgement*, the *conditions* of *preservation* and *growth* find expression.

All our *senses and faculties* involved in the acquisition of *knowledge* have developed only in relation to the conditions of preservation and growth.

The *trust* we place in reason and its categories, in dialectics, and thus the value judgement we make about logic, only proves that experience has taught us their *usefulness* for life, not their 'truth'.

It is a presupposition of all living things and their survival that there must be a great deal of *faith* if there is to be any judging at all, that doubt with respect to all the essential values be *lacking*. Therefore it is necessary to *assume* that something is true, *not* that it *be* true.

'The *world of truth* and the world of illusion' – I traced this contrast back to *value relations*. We have projected *our* conditions of preservation as *predicates of being* in general.

In light of the fact that we have to be stable in our beliefs in order to thrive, we have made it the case that the world

of 'truth' is not one of mutability and becoming, but one of *being*.

5. The Origin of Reason and Logic

508

The origin of *logic* out of an original chaos of ideas.

Those ideas which were compatible with one another remained, the greatest number perished – and are perishing.

509

The soil of desires from which logic sprang: the gregarious instinct in the background, with the assumption of equivalent cases presupposing 'equivalent persons'. *For purposes of mutual understanding and establishing supremacy.*

510

On the origin of logic. The fundamental inclination to *equate* things and to see *them as equivalent* is modified and held in check by considerations of benefit and harm, by considerations of *success*. It adjusts itself so that it can be satisfied to a lesser degree without at the same time denying life and endangering the organism. This process corresponds entirely with that external and mechanical process (of which it is symbol) by which protoplasm constantly assimilates what it appropriates, and arranges it according to its own forms and series.

511

Equivalence and similarity.

(1) The more imprecise organ sees many apparent equivalencies.

(2) The intellect *wants* things to be equivalent, i.e. to classify one sense impression with other, similar ones of a prior series, just as inorganic matter is *assimilated*.

Towards an understanding of *logic*: *the will to equivalence is the will to power* – the *belief* that something is such-and-such,

the essence of a *judgement*, is the consequence of a desire that things *should* be equivalent as much as possible.

512

Logic is subject to the following condition: *suppose that there are identical cases*. In fact, for there to be logical thought and inference, the fulfilment of *this* condition *must* be invented first. That is, the demand for *logical truth* can only take place after a fundamental *falsification* of all events has been effected. From which it follows that an instinct prevails here which is capable of employing two means: first, falsification, and second, the implementation of a point of view. In short, logic does *not* spring from a demand for truth.

513

The inventive force which devised the categories worked in the service of needs, namely the needs for security and ready intelligibility, by virtue of signs and sounds, by virtue of means of abbreviation – 'substance', 'subject', 'object', 'being', 'becoming' – are not matters of metaphysical truth. It was the powerful who made the names of things into law; and, among the powerful, it was the greatest artists of abstraction who created the categories.

514

A moral code, a way of life tested by long experience and trial which has *proved* itself, at length comes to seem mandatory, *authoritative* . . . And as a result a whole group of related values and conditions enter into it; it becomes venerable, unassailable, holy, true; it is a part of this development that their origin is *forgotten* . . . This is a sign that the moral code has become master . . .

Exactly the same thing might have happened with the *categories of reason*; after much groping and fumbling, they might have proved themselves by their relative utility . . . There came a point when they were gathered together, and brought to our attention as a whole, when they were *commanded*, i.e. when they acquired the force of a *command* . . . From that time on, they were considered *a priori*, beyond experience, irrefutable. And yet they may be nothing more than the expression of what

serves the purposes of a particular race or species, their utility alone constituting their 'truth'.

515

The will to power as knowledge. The object is not 'to know', but to schematize, to impose as much regularity and form upon chaos as our practical needs require.

In the formation of reason, logic and the categories, it was need which was decisive; not the need 'to know', but to subsume, to schematize, for purposes of understanding and calculation . . . The development of 'reason' is nothing but a process of arrangement and invention which generates similarity and equality, the same process which every sense impression undergoes. No pre-existing 'idea' is at work here, but rather utilitarian considerations which dictate that things are predictable and manageable for us only when we see them rendered approximate and equal . . . *Finality* in reason is an effect, not a cause; with any other type of reason, the rudiments of which appear constantly, life goes awry – things become too confusing – too incommensurable –

The categories are 'truths' only in the sense that they are conditions of living, just as Euclidean space is a conditional 'truth'.[3] (And between ourselves, since no one would maintain that the existence of man in particular is necessary, reason, as well as Euclidean space, must be regarded as but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animal, and one among many others . . .)

The subjective requirement that we not contradict ourselves is a biological one; the utilitarian instinct to infer as we do is inherent in us, we almost *are* this instinct . . . But what naïveté it is to conclude from this that we are thereby in possession of the 'intrinsic truth' . . . The requirement that we not contradict ourselves proves to be an incapacity, not a 'truth'.

516

Any attempt to affirm and deny the same thing is a failure: that is a subjective empirical principle which is not the expression of a 'necessity' *but only of an incapacity.*

If, according to Aristotle, the *principle of contradiction* is the securest of all principles, if it is the ultimate root of all demonstration, if the principle of all other axioms lies within it; then we should consider all the more carefully what assertions it already essentially *presupposes*. Was Aristotle claiming something with it concerning reality and being, as if he already knew the same thing from somewhere else, that is to say, as if contradictory predicates *could* not be ascribed to it; or does the principle mean that contradictory predicates *should* not be ascribed to it? In that case, logic would be an imperative, *not* to know the truth, but to establish and arrange a world *which we are obliged to call true*.

In short, it is an open question whether the axioms of logic are adequate to reality, or are standards and means by which we first *create* reality, or the concept 'reality', for ourselves . . . However, in order to be able to affirm the former, as previously remarked, we must already have a knowledge of being, which is emphatically not the case. The principle therefore is no *criterion of truth*, but rather an *imperative* as to *what shall be deemed true*.

Suppose that there were no such thing as self-identical *A*s, as is presupposed by every principle of logic (and of mathematics), and that *A* were already an *illusion*, then logic would have a merely illusory world as its presupposition. In point of fact, we believe in this principle under the impress of a boundless empiricism which repeatedly *confirms* it, or so it would appear. The 'thing' – that is the real substratum of *A*; *our belief in things* is the presupposition of all belief in logic. The *A* in logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the 'thing' . . . By failing to comprehend this and making logic into a criterion of *true being*, we are well on our way to hypostatizing notions like substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc., as if they were real, i.e. to conceiving of a metaphysical world, i.e. a 'world of truth' (*but this is only the world of illusion all over again . . .*).

The most primitive acts of thought, affirmation and negation, belief and disbelief, in so far as they presuppose not only a general habit of believing or disbelieving, but a justification for doing so, are already subject to the influence of a faith in *the possibility of knowledge*, a faith in *our judgements' capacity*

for truth – in short, logic has no doubt of its ability to state something intrinsically true (namely, that nothing can have contradictory predicates).

Here vulgar empiricist prejudice reigns supreme, to wit, that perceptual experiences teach us *truths* about things – that I cannot say of one and the same thing that it is both *hard* and *soft* at the same time (the instinctive proof, 'I cannot have two contradictory sensations at the same time' – *which is quite vulgar and false*). The prohibition on conceptual contradiction is based on a faith that we are *able* to form concepts, a faith that concepts not only indicate but also *capture* the essence of a thing . . . But in point of fact, *logic* (like geometry and arithmetic) only pertains to *invented truths which we have created.* Logic is the attempt *to comprehend the real world according to an ontological scheme we have postulated, or, to put it more accurately, to render the world expressible and calculable*[4] . . .

517

To be able to think and to reason, it is necessary to *assume that there are beings*: logic deals only with formulae for what remains the same. That is why this assumption has no probative value with regard to reality: 'beings' are part of our perspective. The 'ego' as being (not affected by becoming and development).

The *invented world* of subject, substance, 'reason', etc. is *necessary* – there is a power in us to order, simplify, falsify and make artificial distinctions. 'Truth' – the desire to be master over the multiplicity of sensations – to *group* phenomena into definite categories. In this way we proceed from the belief in an 'intrinsic nature' of things (we accept the *reality* of the phenomena).

The character of this transitory world is *inexpressible*, is 'false', is 'self-contradictory'. *Knowledge* and *becoming* are mutually exclusive. *Consequently*, 'knowledge' must be something else: it must be preceded by a desire to make the world knowable, something which is itself a kind of becoming must create the *illusion of beings.*

518

If our 'ego' is the sole *being* after which we fashion or understand all of being – very good! Then we may well question

whether this is not an *illusion* of perspective – the apparent unity in which everything is bounded in a kind of horizon. If we take the body for our guide, we find that it displays a tremendous internal *diversity*; it is a legitimate method to use the more accessible, *richer* phenomenon as a guide to understanding the poorer. Finally, if we suppose that all is becoming, then *knowledge is only possible on the basis of a prior belief in being.*

519

If there is 'only one being, the ego', and all other 'beings' are made after its image – if ultimately the belief in the 'ego' stands or falls with the belief in logic, i.e. with the metaphysical truth of the rational category: if, on the other hand, the ego is shown to be something *transitory*, then . . .

520

Continuous transition forbids us to speak of 'individuals', etc.; the 'number' of beings is itself in flux. We would not speak of time, and would know nothing of motion, if we did not think that we can more or less see 'things at rest', in addition to 'things in motion', any more than we would speak of cause and effect. And without the erroneous conception of 'empty space' we would never have arrived at the notion of space at all. The principle of identity has for its background the 'observation' that there are identical things. But a world of becoming could not, strictly speaking, be 'understood', would not be 'known': only to the extent that the 'understanding' and 'knowing' intellect encounters a rough and ready-made world, built out of mere appearances but stable to the extent that this kind of sham has preserved life – only to this extent is there anything like 'knowledge', i.e. the checking of the earlier and more recent errors against each other.

521

Concerning 'logical illusion'. The concepts 'individual' and 'species' are both false and merely illusory. '*Species*' expresses merely the fact that a number of similar creatures appear at

the same time, and that the *tempo* of their further growth and transformation has been almost imperceptible for a long time; so that the minute steps in development and growth that actually occur are scarcely noticeable at all (a phase of evolution in which the process of evolving is not apparent, so that a state of equilibrium seems to have been reached, while also leading to the error of supposing that a goal has been reached – and that evolution had a goal . . .).

The *form* seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable; but the form is merely something of our own invention; and however often 'the same form is attained', it does not signify that it *is* the *same* form – on the contrary, *something new always appears* – and it is we alone who, comparing this new thing with the old and finding them alike, consider them the same 'form'. As if a *type* had to be reached and you might say was implicitly intended by the formative processes.

Form, *species*, *law*, *idea*, *purpose* – all these concepts suffer from the same defect, namely that of bestowing a false realism on a piece of fiction: as if events were in any way obedient to them – an artificial distinction is here made between that which acts and the *object* of this action (but *both* of these things are only presupposed by us out of obedience to our metaphysico-logical dogma: they are not 'facts').

We should not interpret this *compulsion* to imagine concepts, species, forms, purposes and laws – '*a world of identical cases*' – as if we were able to determine anything about the *world of truth*, but as a compulsion to arrange for ourselves a world in which we can *exist* – we thereby create a world which is predictable, simplified, comprehensible, etc. for us. This very same compulsion is expressed in the *functions of the senses*, which support the understanding – through simplification, exaggeration, emphasis and invention, processes upon which all 'recognition', all ability to make oneself understood, rests. Our *needs* have made our senses so specific in operation that the 'same apparent world' always returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of *reality*.

Our subjective compulsion to believe in logic indicates merely that long before we became conscious of logic itself, we

did nothing but *introduce its postulates into events*; now we find them in events – we can no longer help it – and now we would like to believe that this compulsion is a guarantee of 'truth'. It was we who created 'the thing', the 'self-same thing', the subject, the predicate, the action, the object, the substance and the form, after we had carried the process of *assimilating*, *approximating* and *simplifying* as far as possible.

The world *seems* logical to us, because *we* have already *made* it logical.

522

Ultimate solution. We believe in reason; this is, however, the philosophy of pallid *concepts*, language is built according to the most naïve prejudices.

Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to *think only* in the form of language – we also believe in the 'eternal truth' of 'reason' (e.g. subject, predicate, etc.).

We cannot even think if we refuse to do so subject to linguistic constraints; the most we can do is to doubt whether the boundary here really is a boundary. *Rational thought is an interpretation according to a scheme which we cannot discard.*

6. Consciousness

523

Nothing is more erroneous than the opinion that mental and physical phenomena are two faces, two manifestations, of the same substance.[5] This explains nothing; the concept 'substance' is utterly useless as an explanation. Consciousness plays an altogether secondary role: it is almost inert and superfluous, and is perhaps destined to disappear in order to make room for perfect automatism.

When we observe inner phenomena, we resemble the deaf and dumb who, through the art of lip-reading, guess at the words they cannot hear.

We infer from the presentations of the inner sense apparent and other phenomena (what is called the nerve-current) which we would perceive if our means of observation were adequate.

This inner world [is one] for which no sensitive organs are available to us, so that we experience a *thousandfold complexity* nonetheless as a unity, so that we invent a causality where the underlying basis of motion and change remains invisible to us. The succession of thoughts, of feelings, is only the manifestation of this basis in consciousness; it is completely implausible to think that this sequence has anything to do with a causal nexus: consciousness never provides us with an example of cause and effect.

524

The part played by 'consciousness'. It is essential not to misunderstand the part played by 'consciousness'; it is our *relationship to the outer world which developed it.* By contrast, *'administrative' activity,* whether with respect to the supervision or the guidance of the interplay of bodily functions, does *not* enter into consciousness, any more than the intellect's *stockpiling* of information does; doubtless there is a supreme authority for these purposes, some sort of steering committee in which the various *principal desires* make their voices heard and influence felt. 'Pleasure, pain' – these are but a suggestion of what occurs in this sphere . . . likewise for *volitions*, likewise for *ideas*.

In summa: that which becomes conscious is subject to causal relations which are entirely concealed from us; the succession of thoughts, feelings and ideas in consciousness says nothing as to whether the sequence is a causal one, although it gives every *appearance* of being so. And it is on this *appearance* that *we have based our whole conception of intellect, reason, logic,* etc. (none of which exist: they are invented syntheses and unities) . . . and then *projected* them again *into* things, *behind* things! Usually we regard *consciousness* itself as the general sensorium and supreme authority; whereas it is only a *means of communication*; it was developed by our commerce with the world, and with a view to the interests of such commerce . . . 'commerce' being understood here as the various influences of the outer world and the resulting necessary responses on our part, as well as our effects *on it*. It is *not* what controls us, but an *organ* of what controls us –

525

My principle, condensed into a formula that smacks of antiquity, Christianity, Scholasticism and other musty things, is this: in the concept, 'God is spirit', God as perfection is merely *imagined* . . .

526

Wherever a certain unity in a grouping has been observed, the cause of this coordination has always been assumed to be *the mind*, an assumption for which there is no foundation. Why should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of this fact? Or why must the representation of a complex fact precede it?

We must be careful not to explain the fact that something serves a purpose by invoking the mind as a cause; there is no reason to ascribe the characteristic of organizing and systematizing to the mind alone.

The domain of the nervous system is much more extensive than that of consciousness; consciousness is ancillary. In the overall process of adaptation and systematization, it plays no role.

527

Physiologists, like philosophers, believe that *consciousness* increases in *value* in proportion as it *gains* in lucidity: the most lucid consciousness and the most logical and dispassionate thought are of the *first* order. However – according to what standard is this value determined? The most superficial, most *simplistic* thinking is, in regard to *spontaneity of action*, the most useful (because it leaves few motives) – it could therefore, etc.

NB. *Precision of action* is at odds with *provident* and cautious forethought: the latter is preceded by the *deeper* instinct.

528

The chief error of psychologists: they regard the more indistinct idea as inferior in *nature* to the clear; but that which keeps itself remote from our consciousness and which is thus *obscure*, *may* on that very account be quite clear in itself. *The fact that a thing becomes obscure is a question of the perspective of consciousness.*

The 'thing which is obscure' is a result of the perspective of consciousness, and *need* not be something inherently 'obscure'.

529
Science versus philosophy

The huge mistakes:

(1) The absurd *overestimation of consciousness*, which made a unity out of it, made a being, 'an intellect', 'a soul', something that feels, thinks and wills;
(2) The intellect regarded as a *cause*, especially where purpose, system and coordination appear;
(3) Consciousness regarded as the highest attainable form, as the supreme kind of being, as 'God';
(4) The will introduced wherever there is an effect;
(5) The 'world of truth' regarded as the intelligible world, accessible by means of the facts of consciousness;
(6) *Absolute knowledge* regarded as a capacity of consciousness, wherever there is knowledge at all.

Consequences:

Every step forwards consists in becoming progressively more conscious; every step backwards consists in becoming unconscious. We approach reality, approach 'true being', through dialectics; we *get further away* from it through instincts, senses . . . To reduce man to his intellect would mean to make him into a god, for intellect, will, goodness are all one. Everything good must have its origin in the intellect, must be a fact of consciousness. Every step towards *improvement* can only be a step forwards in becoming *conscious*. Becoming unconscious is regarded as an enslavement to the *passions* and *senses* . . . as a form of *animalization* . . .

7. Judgement. True – False.

530

Kant's theological prejudice, his unconscious dogmatism, his moral outlook, ruled, guided and directed him.

The πρῶτον ψεῦδος:[6] how is the fact of knowledge possible? Is knowledge a fact at all?

What is knowledge? If we do not *know* what knowledge is, we cannot possibly reply to the question of whether there is such a thing as knowledge. Very good! But if I do not already 'know' *whether* there is, or can be, such a thing as knowledge, I cannot reasonably ask the question: what is knowledge? Kant *believed* in the fact of knowledge; what he wanted is something naïve: *knowledge of knowledge!*

'*Knowledge is judgement!*' But judgement is a *belief* that something is such-and-such! And *not* knowledge!

'All knowledge consists in synthetic judgements' – a necessary and universally valid connecting of diverse representations – which have the character of universality (the fact is so in all cases, and not otherwise), which have the character of necessity (the contrary of the assertion can never occur).

The *legitimacy* of a belief in knowledge is always taken for granted; as is also the legitimacy of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here *moral ontology* is the *dominant* prejudice.

The conclusions, therefore, are:

(1) There are assertions which we hold to be universally valid and necessary;
(2) This character of necessity and universal validity cannot spring from experience;
(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no experience at all, *but upon something else* and must be derived from another source of knowledge!

Kant concludes:

(1) That there are some assertions which are valid only under certain conditions.
(2) One such condition is that it does not spring from experience, it springs from pure reason.

Thus his question is, *whence do we derive our reasons for believing* in the truth of such assertions? No, whence has he his judgements! But the *origin of a belief*, of a strong conviction, is a psychological question; and a *very* narrow range of experience frequently brings about such a belief!

He *already presupposes* that there are not only '*data a posteriori*' but also *data a priori*, that is to say, 'prior to experience'. Necessity and universality can never be given by experience; is it therefore quite clear that they arise in us without experience at all?

There are no isolated judgements!

An isolated judgement is never 'true', never knowledge; only *in connection with*, and *in relation to*, many other judgements is there any guarantee.

Now what is it that distinguishes true from false belief?

What is knowledge? He 'knows' it, how extraordinary!

Necessity and universality cannot be given by experience. They are therefore independent of experience, *prior to* all experience! The insight which we possess *a priori*, and thus independently of all experience, *from reason alone*, is '*pure* knowledge'.

The principles of logic, the principle of identity and of contradiction, are examples of pure knowledge, because they precede all experience. Yet surely these principles are not examples of knowledge! But merely *regulative articles of faith!*

In order to establish the *a priori* character (the pure rationality) of mathematical judgements, space must *be conceived as a form of pure reason.*

Hume had declared: there were no synthetic *a priori* judgements. Kant says: there are! The mathematical ones! And if there are such judgements, there may also be such things as metaphysics and a knowledge of things by means of pure reason! *Quaeritur.*

Mathematics is possible under conditions under which metaphysics is *never* possible.

All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics.

A judgement is synthetic, i.e. it connects diverse representations.

It is *a priori*, i.e. this connection is universal and necessary, and is never arrived at by sense perception, but by pure reason.

If there are such things as synthetic judgements *a priori*, then reason must be able to connect: connection is a form. Reason must *possess a formative faculty.*

Space and time treated as *conditions of experience.*

531

Judging is our most ancient faith, our most ingrained habit of holding true or untrue, an act of assertion or denial, a certainty that something is thus and not otherwise, a belief that here we 'know' – *what* comes to be believed true in all judgement?

What are *predicates*? We did *not* regard changes in ourselves merely as such, but as 'things in themselves' which are foreign to us, and which we only 'perceive'; and we did *not* class them as events, but as beings, as 'attributes' – and in addition we invented a being to which they attach themselves, *i.e.* we took the *effect* for the *cause*, and the *latter* we took as a *being*. But even in this plain statement, the concept 'effect' is arbitrary; for in regard to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced we ourselves are *not* the causes, we still argue that they must be effects; which is in accordance with the belief that 'every change must have its author'. But this belief in itself is already a piece of mythology, for it *separates* the action *from* the cause. When I say 'the lightning flashes', I count the flash once as an action and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a being is fancifully attached to an event which is not identical to it, but rather which is *stable*, which *exists* and which does *not 'come into being'. To regard the event as effective* and to make the *effect into a being*: this is the *double* error, or the *interpretation* of which we are guilty. Thus, e.g. 'the lightning flashes' – 'flashing' is a state in us; but instead of taking it as an effect on us, we say 'something is flashing' as an 'in itself' and seek an author for it, the 'lightning'.

532

Judgement is the belief: 'such-and-such is so'. Thus implicit in judgements is the avowal that an 'identical case' is to be met with, which presupposes comparison with the help of memory. It is *not* the faculty of judgement that creates the impression of an identical case. Rather, it thinks that it perceives one, operating under the assumption that there are absolutely identical cases. What, then, is that function which must be much *older* and must have been active much earlier, which identifies and assimilates intrinsically different cases? What is that second

function which, on the basis of the first one, etc. 'Whatever excites the same sensations must be the same thing'; but what is it that makes sensations the same, that 'accepts' them as the same? Unless sensations were subjected to a kind of assimilation first, there could be no judgements. Memory is possible only with a constant emphasis on what has already been experienced and is already familiar. *Before* something can be judged, *this process of assimilation must have already occurred*; thus, even here, an intellectual activity is exhibited which does not enter consciousness in the way that pain due to an injury does. It is probable that such internal events correspond to all the organic functions; this would explain assimilation, rejection, growth, etc.

The essential thing is to start with the body and to use it as a guide. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and may be more clearly observed. Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind.

'A thing may be ever so strongly believed; but that is no criterion of truth.' But what is truth? Perhaps it is a kind of belief which has become a vital necessity? Then, of course, strength would be a criterion, e.g. in regard to causality.

533

Logical certainty, transparency, is considered the criterion of truth ('*omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte percipitur*', Descartes):[7] by this means the mechanical hypothesis of the world becomes desirable and credible.

But this is a gross confusion; like *simplex sigillum veri*.[8] How can we know that the real nature of things stands in *this* relation to our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? That the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of strength and reliability is *preferred, prized and thus* called *true*? The intellect establishes its *least constrained* and *strongest faculty and ability* as the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what is *true* . . .

'True': from the standpoint of feeling – that which excites the strongest feeling ('ego'); from the standpoint of thought – that which gives thought the greatest sensation of strength;

from the standpoint of touch, sight and hearing: that which offers the greatest resistance.

Thus the *highest degree to which this resistance is offered awakens* belief in the 'truth', i.e. the *reality*, of the object. The sensations of strength, struggle and resistance convince the subject that there is something *there* which has resisted.

534

The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the sense of power.[9]

535

'Truth', according to my way of thinking, does not necessarily mean the opposite of error, but in the most elementary cases merely the position various errors occupy towards each other. For instance, some of them are older and deeper than the others, and are perhaps even ineradicable, such that an organic being of our kind cannot live without them. Others less essential to life do not tyrannize us in this way; on the contrary, compared to such 'tyrants', these errors can be removed and 'rebutted'. A presumption that is unrebuttable – why therefore should be it be *true*? Logicians who take *their* limitations to be the limitations of things might think it scandalous, but I long ago declared war against their optimism.

536

Everything simple is purely imaginary, is not 'true'. However, that which is real, that which is true, is neither a unity nor reducible to a unity.

537

What is truth? It is *inertia*, that hypothesis which proves satisfactory, involves the smallest expenditure of intellectual effort, etc.

538

For: *the will to truth*

1st proposition. The *easier* way of thinking always prevails over the harder – as dogma: *simplex sigillum veri. Dico*:

to suppose that *clarity* is any indication of truth is utter childishness . . .

2nd proposition. The doctrine of *being*, of things and of all those fixed unities is a *hundred times easier* than the *doctrine* of *becoming*, of *development* . . .

3rd proposition. Logic was meant to *facilitate thought and its expression*, not to embody the truth . . . Later on it acquired the *force* of truth . . .

539

Parmenides said: 'One cannot conceive of the non-existent'; we are at the other extreme, and say, 'That of which one can conceive is certainly fictional.' Thought has no grip on reality, but only on . . .

540

The tempter. There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes; and therefore there are many kinds of 'truths', and therefore there is no truth.

541

Sign over the entrance to a modern madhouse.

'The necessities of thought are moral necessities.'
Herbert Spencer.
'The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition
is the inconceivableness of its negative.'
Herbert Spencer.[10]

542

If the character of existence should itself prove false, if existence had a 'bad character' – and precisely that would indeed be possible – what would all of our truths amount to then? One falsehood more?[11]

543

In a world which is essentially false, truthfulness would be an *unnatural tendency*; it could only make sense as a means of raising *falsehood* to a special *higher power.* So that a world of

truth and being could be invented, the truthful man had to first be created (including the fact that such a man believe himself to be 'truthful'). Simple, transparent, self-consistent, substantial, inalterable, without convolutions, legerdemain, facade or decorum: a man of that kind conceives a world of being as '*God*' in his own image. In order for truthfulness to be possible, the whole sphere of man must be very tidy, small and respectable; in every sense, the *advantage* must lie with the truthful. Lies, tricks and disguises must excite astonishment . . .

There is a hatred of lying and its affectation out of *pride*, out of an irritable sense of honour; but there is also such a hatred out of cowardice, because lying is forbidden. For *another* kind of man, all preaching of 'thou shalt not lie' is powerless against the instinct which needs to lie incessantly: witness the *New Testament*.

544

The capacity for '*deception*' increases as we ascend the *hierarchy* of organic beings. In the inorganic world it seems to be entirely absent. *Art* begins in the organic world; even plants are mistresses of the craft. The greatest men, such as Caesar and Napoleon (see Stendhal's remark concerning him), as well as the higher races (the Italians), the Greeks (Odysseus) reveal this; cunning is *essential* to the elevation of man . . . The problem of the actor. My Dionysian ideal . . . The perspective of all the organic functions, of all the strongest vital instincts; the power which *insists upon* error in all life; error as the prerequisite of thought itself. Before 'thought' is possible, 'poetizing' must first have done its work; the *proper formation* of identical cases, of the *appearance* of identity, is more primeval than the *recognition* of *identity*.

8. Against Causalism

545

I believe in absolute space as the substratum of force: such force sets its bounds and determines its shape. Time, eternal. But neither space nor time exists in itself: 'changes' are mere

appearances (or sensory processes for ourselves); the ever-so-regular recurrence of these changes *establishes nothing* but the fact that this is what has always happened. It is easy to misinterpret and extrapolate from the feeling that *post hoc* is *propter hoc*; it is quite understandable. But appearances cannot be 'causes'!

546

The interpretation of a phenomenon, *either* as action or passion – every action is a passion – amounts to this: in every change, an alteration presupposes the existence of an agent and something *upon which* 'change' is imposed.

547

Psychological history of the concept 'subject'. The body, the thing, the 'whole' which is construed by the eye, awakens the thought of distinguishing between an action and an agent; what ultimately remains, after the notion that the agent is the cause of the action has been repeatedly refined, is the 'subject'.

548

We have a bad habit of regarding a mere mnemonic sign or abbreviated formula for a thing as its essence, ultimately as its *cause*, e.g. when we say of lightning that 'it flashes'. Or even the little word 'I'. *Regarding an aspect of vision, the fact that it only occurs from a certain point of view, as a thing which causes vision itself* – that was the sleight of hand involved in the invention of the 'subject', of the 'ego'!

549

'Subject', 'object', 'attribute' – these distinctions have been *made*, and are now imposed as schemata on all apparent facts. The fundamentally false observation is that I believe it is *I* who does something, who bears something, who '*has*' something, who '*has*' a quality. This 'doing' 'bearing' 'having' . . .

550

We imagine ourselves as cause, as agent.

In every judgement lies the firm faith in subject and predicate, or cause and effect; and even this latter belief (in the form of an assumption that every effect is the result of activity, and that all activity presupposes an agent) is only an isolated example of the first; so that what remains as belief, as the most fundamental belief, is: there are such things as subjects.

I notice something, and try to discover the *reason* behind it; originally this was: I look for an *intention* behind it and, above all, I look for one who has intentions, for a subject, an agent – formerly intentions were seen in *all* events, all events were actions. This is our oldest habit. And what of animals? As living organisms, are they not also compelled to interpret things as analogous to *themselves*? The question: why? is always a question concerning the *causa finalis* and the general 'purpose' of things. Of a 'sense of the *causa efficiens*' we have nothing; in this respect *Hume* is quite right, habit (but *not* only that of the individual!) allows us to expect that a certain process, frequently observed, will follow upon another, nothing more! That which gives us such an extraordinarily firm faith in causality is *not* the common habit of associating processes, but our *inability* to *interpret* an event in any way other than as the result of *intention*. It is the *belief* in living and thinking things, as the only *effective things* – it is the belief in will, in intention – that all events are actions, that all actions presuppose an agent, it is the belief in the 'subject'. Is not this belief in the notion of subject and predicate a great stupidity?

Question: is intention the cause of an event? Or is that also illusion? Is it not *the* event itself?

551

The will to power in essence; a critique of the concept 'cause'. As a *starting point*, I need the 'will to power' as the source of motion. Consequently, motion may not be conditioned from the outside – it may not be *caused* . . . I need centres of incipient motion from which the will emanates . . . We have absolutely no experience of a *cause*; on closer examination, the whole concept is derived psychologically from the subjective conviction

that we are the cause, that is to say, that the arm moves itself . . . *But that is an error.*

We distinguish ourselves, the agents, from the action, and we make use of this scheme everywhere – we seek an agent behind every event . . . What have we done? We have *mistaken* a sense of strength, tension, resistance, a muscular sensation which is already the beginning of the action, for a cause; or we have understood the intention to do such-and-such as a cause because the action follows in its train – cause, i.e. . . . 'Causes' never occur at all; those instances in which we seem to be presented with a cause, and from which we have projected it outwards in order to understand the event, prove to be self-deception.

Our 'understanding of an event' consisted in our inventing a subject which was responsible for the fact that something happened, and the manner in which it happened. We have combined in the notion 'cause' our sense of agency, our 'sense of freedom', our sense of responsibility and our intention of acting: *causa efficiens* and *finalis* are fundamentally the same.

We thought that an effect was explained when a state was shown in which it was already inherent. Actually, we invent all causes using our own actions as a template; the latter are familiar to us . . . On the other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing how it will 'act'. The thing, the subject, the will, the intention, are all inherent in the notion 'cause'. We seek things which will explain why something has changed. Even the 'atom' is such an imaginary 'thing' and the 'primitive subject' . . .

At last we grasp that things, and consequently atoms as well, effect nothing; because they do not exist . . . and that the concept of causality is utterly useless. A causal relation does not follow from a necessary sequence of states (for that would be to make their causal efficacy spring from 1 to 2, to 3, to 4, to 5).

The interpretation of events in terms of causality is an *illusion* . . . A tree is but a word [for a false unity]; a tree is not the cause [of its fruit] – a 'thing' is a sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept, an image . . .

There is neither cause nor effect. They may be indispensable to us for linguistic purposes, but that does not matter. If I conceive of a muscle in isolation from its 'effects', I have negated it *qua* muscle . . .

In summa: an event neither causes nor is caused by anything. *Causa* is a capacity to effect something which has been fictitiously added to events . . . There is *no* sense of causality, as Kant believed. We are surprised, we are uneasy, we want something familiar to cling to . . . As soon as we are shown something old in something new, we are put at ease. The supposed instinct of causality is nothing more than the fear of the unusual and the attempt to discover something familiar in it. It is a search, not for causes but for the familiar. Man is immediately put at ease when he [traces] something new [to something old]; he makes no real effort to understand how the matchsticks caused the fire.

In point of fact, science has emptied the notion of causality of all content, and has retained it for use as a formula of comparison, in which it is a matter of indifference which side is the cause and which the effect. What is asserted is the fact that in two complexes or states of affairs (constellations of forces) the amount of force remains the same.

The *predictability of an event* does not lie in the fact that a rule was followed, or a necessity obeyed, or in a law of causality which we have projected into every event: it lies in the *recurrence of identical cases.*

552

To combat determinism. From the fact that something happens regularly, and that its occurrence may be relied upon, it does not follow that it happens *necessarily.* The fact that a quantity of force determines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular case does not make it an 'unfree will'. 'Mechanical necessity' is not an established fact: it was we who first read it into events. *We* interpreted the possibility of *formulating* events as a result of a necessity that governs them. But just because I do a particular thing, it does not follow that I am bound to do it. *Compulsion* cannot be demonstrated in things;

all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same event is not another event. Owing to the very fact that we introduced subjects, '*agents*', into things, the notion arose that all events are the consequence of a *compulsory* force exercised over the subject – but exercised by whom? Once more by an 'agent'. Cause and effect – the concept is a dangerous one, so long as people believe in *something* that *causes*, and something that is *caused*.

(a) Necessity is not a fact, but an interpretation.

(b) When it is understood that the 'subject' is nothing that *acts*, but only a fiction, from this all sorts of things follow.

With only the subject as model we invented *things* and read them into the confusion of sensations. If we cease to believe in the *acting* subject, the belief in *acting* things, in reciprocal action, in a causal relationship between those phenomena which we call things, also collapses.

In this case, of course, the world of *active atoms* also disappears; for this world is always assumed to exist on the grounds that subjects are necessary. Ultimately, of course, the '*thing-in-itself*' also disappears; for this is in essence the conception of a 'subject-in-itself'. But we have seen that the subject is invented. The antithesis 'thing-in-itself' and '*appearance*' is untenable; but in this way the concept 'appearance' also disappears.

(c) If we abandon the notion of the active *subject*, we also abandon the *object* acted upon. Duration, identity with itself, being, are inherent neither in what is called subject, nor in what is called object: they are complexes of events, and in regard to other complexes are apparently enduring – they are distinguishable, e.g., by the different *tempo* with which they happen (rest versus motion, bound versus free: these are all opposites which do not exist in themselves but are merely expressions of *differences of degree*, from a certain limited perspective, though they seem to be opposites).

There are no such things as opposites: we have the notion of opposition only by way of logic – and from which it is applied erroneously to things.

(d) If we abandon the concepts 'subject' and 'object', then we must also abandon the concept '*substance*' – and of course

its various modifications too, e.g. 'matter', 'mind' and other hypothetical beings, 'eternity and the immutability of matter', etc. We are then rid of *materiality*.

The moral standpoint: *the world is false*. But in as much as morality itself is a part of this world, morality too is false.

The will to truth is a matter of *making* things determinate, of *making* things true and lasting, a total elimination of that *false* character, a reinterpretation of it into *being*.

Thus, 'truth' is not something which exists and which has to be found and discovered – it is something which *has to be created* and which gives its name to a *process* or, better still, to the will to subdue, which in itself has no purpose; to introduce truth is a *processus in infinitum*, an *active determining*, *not* a process of becoming conscious of something [that] would be 'in itself' fixed and determined. It is merely a word for the 'will to power'.

Life rests on a belief in something lasting and regularly recurring; the more powerful life is, the broader must be the world we can divine, upon which we, as it were, *confer* the character of *being*. This process of making the world logical, rational, systematic, furthers life.

Man projects his instinct of truth, his 'aim', to a certain extent beyond himself, in the form of a metaphysical world of *being*, a 'thing-in-itself', an already existing world.

His needs as creator invent the world in which he works in advance, anticipating it: this anticipation ('this belief' in truth) is his mainstay.

All events, motion, becoming, regarded as the establishment of relations of degree and force, as a *struggle* . . .

The 'welfare of the individual' is just as fanciful as the 'welfare of the species': the former is *not* sacrificed to the latter; seen from afar, the species is just as fluid as the individual. The '*preservation* of the species' is only a result of the *growth* of the species, i.e. of the *superseding of the species* on the way to a stronger kind.

As soon as we *imagine* that someone is responsible for the fact that we are such-and-such, etc. (God, nature), and that we ascribe our existence, our happiness, to their *intention*, the

innocence of becoming is corrupted. We then have someone who wishes to attain something with us and through us.

That the appearance of '*purposes*' ('*purposes which far surpass the art of man*') is merely the result of that *will to power* taking place in all events

That *becoming stronger* implies an orderliness, which resembles a purposeful design.

That the apparent *ends* are not intended but, as soon as a superior power prevails over an inferior power, and the latter becomes a function of the former, *hierarchy*, that is, organization, is bound to give the impression of a deliberate arrangement of means and ends.

Against apparent '*necessity*' – this is only an *expression* of the fact that a power can never be other than what it is.

Against apparent '*purpose*' – the latter is only an expression of the order among the spheres of power and their interplay.

9. Thing-in-itself and Appearance

553

The sore spot in Kantian criticism has gradually become visible even to the more undiscriminating eyes: Kant is not entitled to his distinction between 'appearance' and 'thing-in-itself' – he himself has precluded anyone henceforth from making this hoary distinction, in so far as he rejected the inference from the appearance to the cause of the appearance as illegitimate, in accordance with his account of causality and its purely intra-phenomenal validity – an account which, on the other hand, already anticipates this distinction, as if the 'thing-in-itself' were not only accessible, but *given*.

554

On 'causalism'. It is obvious that *neither* things-in-themselves *nor* appearances can be related to each other as cause and effect; consequently, in a philosophy which believes in things-in-themselves and appearances, the concept 'cause and effect' does *not apply*. Kant's mistakes . . . In fact, psychologically

speaking, the concept 'cause and effect' is derived from a manner of thought which believes it sees, only and always, the action of will upon will – which believes only in living things, and at bottom only in 'souls' (*not* in things). Within the mechanistic world-view (which is logic and its application to space and time), that concept is reduced to mathematical formulae – with which, and this cannot be emphasized too much, nothing is ever understood, but rather designated, *distorted.*

555

Against the scientific prejudice. The most incredible fairy tale ever told is our account of knowledge. We would like to know how *things-in-themselves* are constituted; but behold, there are no things-in-themselves! But even supposing there were a thing-in-itself, something completely unconditioned by other things, then for that very reason it *could not be known!* Something unconditioned cannot be known; otherwise it would *not* be unconditioned!

What we call knowing always involves 'placing oneself in a conditional relation to something' – whereas the 'knowledge-seeker' wants the object of knowledge to be of no concern to him, for it to be of no concern to anyone; this involves a contradiction, in the first place, because the desire for knowledge is incompatible with the demand that the object of knowledge be of no concern to him (then why know anything!); and second, because something which is of no concern to anyone *is* nothing whatsoever, and therefore cannot be known. Knowing means 'to place oneself in relation to something': to feel conditioned by something, and between ourselves . . . It is therefore invariably a matter of *determining, describing and being made aware of conditions* (and *not* a matter of *disclosing* the inherent nature of beings, entities or 'things-in-themselves').

556

A 'thing-in-itself' is just as absurd as a 'sense-in-itself', 'a meaning-in-itself'. There is no such thing as a 'fact-in-itself', *for a meaning must always be introduced before there could be a 'fact'.*

To answer the question, 'what is that?' involves something else *imposing a meaning* on it from its own standpoint. What is regarded as the '*essence*', the '*quiddity*', depends upon the point of view from which it is regarded, and already presupposes more than one. Fundamentally the question is, 'what is that to *me*?' (to us, to everything that lives, etc.).

A thing would be described when all beings had asked, 'what is that?' and been answered. Suppose one single being, with its own relations and points of view towards all things, absent; and the thing is not yet 'defined'.

In short, the essence of a thing is really only an *opinion* about the 'thing'. Or rather: '*it means*' is the real '*this is*', the only '*this is*'.

Do not ask, '*who* interprets, then?', for the interpreting has its own existence (not as a 'being', but as a *process*, as a *becoming*), as a form of the will to power, as a passion.

The origin of 'things' is wholly the work of that which imagines, thinks, wills, invents: the concept 'thing' itself as well as all its properties. Even 'the subject' is such a creation, a 'thing' like all the rest: a simplification to indicate the *force* as such, that which imposes, invents and thinks, as distinct from all the particular acts of imposing, inventing and thinking themselves. Thus a *capacity*, as distinct from anything particular, is indicated: fundamentally, the act and all anticipated acts (including the probability of similar acts) are bundled together.

557

The properties of a thing are its effects upon other 'things': if one imagines other 'things' to be non-existent, a thing has no properties, i.e. *there is nothing without other things*, i.e. there is no 'thing-in-itself'.

558

The 'thing-in-itself' is absurd. If I abstract all the relations, all the 'properties', all the 'activities' of a thing, the thing itself does *not* remain; for thinghood was only *invented* by us to meet certain logical needs, for the purposes of definition and

comprehension (to hold together that multitude of relations, qualities and activities).[12]

559

'Things which have an intrinsic constitution' – a dogmatic idea which we must completely abjure.

560

It is *perfectly idle to suppose* that things have a *nature in themselves*, quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity: it would presuppose that *interpretation* and *being subjective* are not essential, that a thing divorced from all its relations can still be a thing. On the other hand, might not the apparent *objective* character of things be merely the result of a *difference of degree* within the subjective? That something which changes slowly strikes us as being 'objective', lasting, existing, 'in-itself'? That the objective view is only a false way of conceiving things and a high degree of difference *within* the subjective?

561

All unity is such *only* in the form of *organization and collective action*, just as a human community is a unity, that is to say, the *reverse* of atomistic *anarchy*; thus it is a *form of domination*, which *signifies* a unity, but *is* not a unity.

*

What if all unity were only unity as organization? But the 'thing' in which we believe was *invented* only as a medium for the various properties. If the thing 'acts', this means we regard *all the other* properties which are momentarily latent but otherwise still available as the cause of the fact that a single property now emerges: i.e. *we take the sum of its properties, x,* as *the cause of the property x*: which is obviously *quite* absurd and idiotic!

562

'At some time in the development of thought, a point must have been reached when it was realized that what are called the properties of a thing were merely the affections of the sentient

subject; and thus the properties ceased to belong to the thing. The "thing-in-itself" remained. The distinction between the things-in-themselves and the thing-for-us was based upon that earlier, naïve view which ascribed energy to a thing; but analysis revealed that even force was ascribed to it only by our imagination, as was substance.'[13] 'The thing affects a subject?' The root of the notion of substance is in language, not in what exists outside us! The thing-in-itself is no problem at all!

'The being itself will have to be conceived in terms of sensation which no longer inheres in something devoid of sensation.'

'Motion adds no new *content* to sensation. A being is inherently incapable of motion. Therefore it is a *form* of being.'

NB. The *explanation* of an event may be sought first, in the mental representation that *precedes* it (the intention to bring it about), and second, in the mental representation that *follows* it (the mathematico-physical explanation).

The two should not be confounded. Thus the physical explanation, which is itself the depiction of the world in sensation and thought, cannot account for the origin of sensation and thought; rather, physics must construe the sensible world *as strictly devoid of feeling or purposes* – right up to the highest man. And the teleological is but a *history of intentions*, and thus is *never* physical!

563

In other words, our method of acquiring 'knowledge' is limited to a process of establishing quantities, but we can by no means help feeling the differences of quantity as differences of quality. *Quality* is merely a relative truth for us; it is not an 'in-itself'.

Our senses function within a certain average range, i.e. we perceive size large and small in relation to our physical needs. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold we should perish; i.e. we perceive even *proportions* as *qualities* in regard to our physical needs.

564

Could not every *quantity* merely indicate the presence of some *quality*? Greater power comes with different experiences, feelings

and desires, an entirely different perspective; growth itself is an expression of a desire *to be more*; the desire for a greater quantum arises from a certain *quale*; in a purely quantitative world, everything would be dead, rigid and still. The reduction of all qualities to quantities is nonsense: clearly they always go together, the one serving as an analogy for the other.

565

Qualities are our insurmountable barriers; we cannot possibly help feeling mere differences of quantity as something fundamentally different from quantity, that is, as qualities, which we can no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But if the word 'knowledge' means anything, it pertains to the realm of calculating, weighing and measuring, that is, to quantity – whereas, conversely, all our value-feelings (which is what even our sensations are) pertain strictly to the realm of qualities, that is, to those 'truths' which belong to us alone and to our point of view, and which absolutely cannot constitute 'knowledge'. It is obvious that every one of us, different creatures, must feel different qualities, and must therefore live in a different world from the rest. Qualities are an idiosyncrasy peculiar to human nature; the demand that these, our human interpretations and values, should be general and perhaps constitutive values, is one of the inherent follies of human pride, which is still most firmly seated in religion. On the other hand, need I add that quantities 'in themselves' are not to be met with in the world of experience, which is merely qualitative? And that consequently logic and applied logic (such as mathematics) are among the artifices of the ordering, subduing, simplifying, abbreviating power called life? And thus something practical and useful, that is to say, conducive to the preservation of life, but for that very reason not in the slightest degree 'true'?

566

The 'world of truth', in whatever form it has thus far been conceived – was always the world of illusion *all over again*.

567

'Illusoriness' = specific activity of action and reaction. The world of illusion is a world viewed under the aspect of values, arranged and selected according to values; i.e. in this case, according to the utilitarian standpoint with regard to the preservation and the increase of power in a certain species of animal.

It is this *perspectival aspect*, then, which furnishes the character of 'illusoriness'. As if a world still remains, when the perspectival aspect has been subtracted! Thus *relativity* would have been subtracted, which . . .

Each centre of force has its own *perspective* on all the *rest* of them, i.e. its own entirely distinctive *evaluations*, its own kind of action, its own kind of resistance. The 'world of illusion' is thus reduced to a specific kind of action towards the world, emanating from a centre.

But there is no other kind of action; and 'world' is only a word for the totality of these actions. *Reality* consists precisely in the particular action and reaction of each individual against the whole . . .

We have not the slightest *justification* for speaking of *illusion* in this way . . .

Specific kinds of reactions are the only kind of reaction; we have no idea how many kinds there are, or what their nature may be.

But there is no 'other', no 'real', no essential being – for that would mean a world without action and reaction . . .

The contrast between the world of illusion and the world of truth reduces to the contrast between 'world' and 'nothing'.

568

Will to power as knowledge. A critique of the notion 'the world of truth and the world of illusion'. Of these two, the first is a mere fiction, made up of nothing but figments of our imagination. 'Illusoriness' itself is an aspect of reality; it is a form taken by the being of reality, i.e. in a world in which there is no being, a certain predictable world of *identical*

cases must first be created through the power of *illusion*, a *tempo* in which observation and comparison are possible, etc. 'Illusoriness' is an arranged and simplified world in which our *practical* instincts have operated; it is perfectly true for *us*, that is to say, we *live* and can live in it; this is the *proof* of its truth as far as we are concerned . . . The world apart from the fact of our living in it, the world which we have *not* reduced to our being, our logic, our psychological prejudices, does *not* exist as a world 'in-itself'; it is essentially a world of relations; it is conceivable that it presents a *different aspect* from every vantage-point; the being of the world is essentially different at each point; the world presses at every point, and every point resists it – and these summations of pressure and resistance are, in every instance, completely at odds with one another. The *amount of power* at every point determines the amount of power possessed by any particular being, that is, the form its action or resistance takes, and the control or coercion to which it is subject. Our particular case is interesting enough – we have created a conception of things in order to be able to live in the world, in order to perceive just enough of it to *withstand* it.

569

The nature of our psychological perspective is determined by the fact that:

(1) *Communication* is necessary, and for communication to be possible something must be consistent, simplified, admitting of precision (above all, in the *identical* cases . . .). In order that it may be communicable, it must be felt as something *arranged*, as '*recognizable*'. The material of the senses, arranged by the understanding, reduced to broad outlines, are assimilated to each other and classed with related matters. Thus the vagueness and the chaos of the impressions of the senses are, as it were, *made logical.*

(2) The 'phenomenal' world is the arranged world which *we perceive to be real.* Its 'reality' lies in the constant recurrence of similar, familiar and related things, in their *now*

logical character and in the belief that here we can count and reckon.

(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world is *not* 'the world of truth', but the amorphous world consisting of the chaos of sensations which cannot be reduced to a formula – that is to say, *another kind* of phenomenal world, a world which is 'unknowable' for us.

(4) To the question, 'how are "things-in-themselves" constituted, entirely independent of our sense-receptivity and of the activity of our understanding?', we reply by asking, 'how do we know *that there are such things*?' 'Thinghood' was first devised by us; it is one of our own inventions. The question is whether there are not a good many more ways of creating such a world of illusion – and whether this creating, making logical, arranging and falsifying is not the surest *reality* there is: in short, whether that which interprets experience in terms of 'things' is not the only reality; and whether the 'effect of the external world upon us' is not merely the result of such subjects exercising their wills . . .

The notion that one thing is a 'cause' and the other an 'effect' is merely a misinterpretation of a *war* between such subjects and a relative *victory* of the former over the latter.

The other 'beings' act upon us; our *arranged* world of illusion is the result of an *overpowering* of their activities, a sort of *defensive* measure.

Only the subject is demonstrable: the hypothesis might be advanced that there are only subjects – that 'object' is only a form of action of subject on subject . . . a *modus of the subject.*

10. Metaphysical Need

570

If one is a philosopher as philosophers have always been, one cannot observe what comes to be or passes away – only what *is*. But as there is no such thing as 'what is', all that remained for philosophers as their 'world' was imaginary.

571

To assert the *existence* of things of which we know nothing at all, precisely to take advantage of our inability to know them, was Kant's naïveté, and was due to his deference to the needs of morals and metaphysics in particular . . .

572

The value of truth and error

An artist cannot bear reality, he turns away from it, his sincere opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that dim impression of it which one derives from colour, form, sound and thought, believing that the more rarefied, diffuse and vaporous things or men become, *the more valuable they become: the less real they are, the greater their worth*. This is Platonism; and it boldly reverses yet another thing – for Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value, saying: the more 'idea' there is, the more being. He turned the concept 'reality' round and said: 'What you believe to be real is an error, and the nearer we come to the "idea" [the nearer] we are to "truth".' Is this understood? It *was the greatest of all rebaptisms*; and because Christianity adopted it, we fail to see how striking it is. Essentially, Plato, like the artist he was, *preferred appearance* to being; and thus falsehood and fiction to truth, the unreal to the real – so convinced was he of the value of the appearance that he attributed to it 'being', 'causality', 'goodness', truth and everything else we value.

The notion of value itself was regarded as a cause: first insight.

The ideal was considered to have all the attributes which conferred honour: second insight.

573

The idea of the 'world of truth' or of 'God' as absolutely nonsensuous, intellectual and benign is a necessary *expedient* proportionate to the extent to which opposing instincts are still dominant . . . It is precisely the tendency to anthropomorphize gods which shows a moderate and harmonious disposition. The Greeks of the most vigorous period, who had no fear of

themselves but rather had faith in themselves, approximated their gods in all of their emotions . . .

The spiritualization of the idea of God is thus very far from signifying *progress*; one is quite strikingly aware of this in encountering Goethe – *in reading him*, it impresses itself upon us that the vaporization of God into virtue and spirit represents a more *primitive* stage . . .

574

What makes metaphysics such nonsense is the derivation of the conditioned from the unconditioned. It is in the nature of thinking that it silently adds and appends the unconditioned to the conditioned; it silently adds and appends the 'ego' to the multiplicity of its processes; it measures the world by nothing but its own prescribed dimensions: by its fundamental fictions, such as 'the unconditioned', 'means and ends', things, 'substances', by logical laws, by figures and forms.

There would be nothing that could be called knowledge, if thought did not first *reconstruct* the world as self-identical 'things'.

Only through thought is *untruth possible.*

The origin of thought, like that of *sensations*, *cannot be derived*; but that is *far* from proving that it is primordial or self-sufficient! It simply shows that we cannot get *behind it*, because thought and sensation are all we *have.*

575

To 'identify' something is to *retrace one's footsteps*: in its nature it is a *regressus in infinitum.* We halt (in the face of an alleged *causa prima* or unconditioned, etc.) out of *laziness*, weariness . . .

However well one may understand the conditions under which something *arises*, it does not *follow* that the thing itself is yet understood – thus whisper the historians.

576

On the psychology of metaphysics. The influence of *fear*. That which has been most *feared*, the cause of the most *intense suffering* (ambition, lust, etc.), has aroused the greatest antagonism

in men, and been eliminated from the world of 'truth'. Thus they have progressively *blotted out* the *emotions* – fastening upon the idea that God is the opposite of evil, i.e. that reality lies in the *negation of the desires and the emotions* (that is, in *nothingness*). Similarly, they despised anything which was *irrational*, arbitrary or accidental (as the cause of incalculable physical suffering). *Consequently* they denied that this element was present in existence as it is in itself, which they conceived in terms of its absolute 'rationality' and 'purposiveness'. Similarly, they feared *change* and *transience*, which is the expression of a stricken soul, full of distrust and bad experiences (as in the case of Spinoza; the opposite kind of man would consider the fact of change a *challenge*). For the kind of creature who is so brimming with vitality that he can *play* with it, *emotion, irrationality and change* are precisely what he would call good in a *eudaemonistic* sense, together with their consequences: danger, opposition, destruction, etc.

577

Against the *value* of that which never changes (v. *Spinoza's* naïveté, *Descartes'* likewise); rather, the value of the most ephemeral, the seductive flash of gold on the belly of the serpent *vita* –

578

Moral values in epistemology itself

The trust in reason – why not distrust?

The 'world of truth' is supposed to be the good world – why?

Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle are considered immoral; a world is wanted in which all this is *absent*.

The transcendent world contrived, *so that* a place remains for 'moral freedom' (as in Kant).

Dialectics regarded as the way to virtue (in Plato and Socrates; clearly because sophistry was held to be the way to immorality).

Time and space are ideal; consequently there is 'unity' in the essence of things, consequently no 'sin', no evil, no imperfection – a *justification* of God.

Epicurus *denied* the possibility of knowledge, so that moral (or hedonistic) values would retain their pre-eminence. So did Augustine; and later Pascal ('corrupted reason'), in support of Christian values.

Descartes' contempt for everything changeable; likewise Spinoza's.

579
Concerning the psychology of metaphysics

This world is illusory – *consequently* there must be a world of truth.

This world is conditioned – *consequently* there must be an unconditioned world.

This world is contradictory – *consequently* there must be a world free from contradiction.

This world is becoming – *consequently* there must be somewhere a world of being.

Utterly groundless inferences (blind faith in reason: if A *exists*, then its opposite B must also *exist*).

Suffering inspires these inferences; *they are wishes that such a world should exist*; hatred of a world which inflicts suffering likewise expresses itself in imagining another world, a valuable one; the *resentment* of the metaphysician against reality is creative here.

The *second* series of questions: *why* suffer? And from this an inference is drawn concerning the relation of the world of truth to our illusory, mutable, suffering and contradictory world.

(1) Suffering as the consequence of error; how is error possible?

(2) Suffering as the consequence of guilt; how is guilt possible?

(These are experiences drawn entirely from the sphere of nature or society, universalized and projected into the 'in-itself'.)

But if the conditioned world is due to the unconditioned, then the *freedom to err and sin* must be so as well; and again the question arises: to what end? . . . The world of illusion, of becoming, of contradiction, of suffering, is therefore *willed*; *to what end?*

The error inherent in these inferences: two contradictory concepts are formed – and *because* one of them corresponds to a reality, the other 'must' also correspond to a reality. 'Where *else* could its counterpart have come from?' *Reason* is thus a source of revelation concerning being-in-itself.

But the *origin* of the above oppositions *need not* be a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to show, on the contrary, that the *real genesis of the concepts* lies in practical needs, utilitarian needs, hence the *strong faith* they command (he who does not reason in this way perishes; but this 'proves' nothing).

Metaphysicians' *preoccupation with suffering is quite naïve. 'Eternal beatitude'* is *psychological nonsense.* Brave and creative men never take pleasure and pain to be the last word in determining what is worthy – they are incidental states; one must *want* them both, if one would *achieve* something. There is something sick and tired in metaphysicians and the religious in the way questions of pleasure and pain always seem to be in the foreground for them. Even with morality, the *only* reason it has such *importance* for them is because it is essential to the abolition of suffering.

The same holds good of the preoccupation with *appearance and error* – the cause of suffering, a superstition that happiness and truth are connected (confusion: happiness lies in 'certainty', in 'faith').

580

To what extent are the various *epistemological positions* (materialism, empiricism, idealism) based on value judgements; the source of the highest feelings of pleasure ('feelings of value') may also be decisive for the problem of *reality.*

The measure of positive knowledge is a matter of little or no importance, as witness the development of India.

The Buddhistic *negation* of reality in general (appearance = suffering) is perfectly consistent: indemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of categories, not only for a 'world-in-itself' but a *recognition of the erroneous procedures* by means of which the whole notion has been reached. 'Absolute reality',

'being-in-itself' are contradictions. In a world of *becoming*, 'reality' is merely a *simplification* for practical purposes, or a *deception* resulting from the dullness of the senses, of a variation in the *tempo* of becoming.

Being nihilistic and logically denying the world is a consequence of the fact that we must oppose non-being with being, and that the concept 'becoming' is denied ('*something* becomes') when being [is affirmed] . . .

581
Being and becoming

'*Reason*' has developed on an empirical basis, on the *prejudices of the senses*, i.e. with believing in the judgements of the senses.

'Being' is the generalization of the concept '*life*' (to breathe), 'to be animate', 'to will, to act upon', 'to become'.

The opposite is 'to be inanimate', '*not* to become', '*not* to will'. Thus 'being' is *not* opposed to 'non-being', to 'appearance', nor is it opposed to death (for only that which can live can also be dead).

The 'soul', the 'ego' were presumed to be *original facts*, and were introduced wherever there is *becoming*.

582

'Being' – we have no conception of it other than that of '*living*'. How then can anything dead 'be'?

583

(1)

I am astonished to find that science today has resigned itself to relying upon appearances and confining itself to a world of illusion; a world of truth – well, whatever it may be, surely we have no faculty of knowledge for it.

Here one might well ask: what faculty of knowledge enables us to establish this opposition between illusion and truth in the first place? . . .

The fact that a world which is accessible to our faculties is also understood to be dependent upon them, the fact that we [understand] such a world to be subjectively conditioned, does

not mean that an objective world [is] at all *possible*. What prevents us from thinking that subjectivity is essential to reality?

The idea that there is a way things are 'intrinsically' is actually an absurd conception; an 'intrinsic constitution' is nonsense; our notion of a 'being' or 'thing' is always only a relational one. The trouble is that, owing to the old opposition between 'illusion' and 'truth', the correlative value judgement was propagated, to wit, that illusion is of lesser value, and truth is ostensibly of absolute value. The world of illusion is not considered a 'valuable' world; illusion is supposed to be something opposed to valuableness of the highest order. Only a world of 'truth' can be intrinsically valuable . . .

First, one claims it exists. Second, one has a very definite *idea of its value*.

Prejudice of prejudices! It is intrinsically possible that the true constitution of things is so inimical and opposed to the requirements of life that illusion is necessary just to be able to live . . . This is indeed the case in so many situations, e.g. in marriage.

Our empirical world would then be conditioned by the instincts of self-preservation, even with respect to the limits of knowledge; we would consider true, good and valuable that which is conducive to the preservation of the species . . .

(a) We have no categories by which we might distinguish between a world of truth and a world of illusion. (It could be that a world of illusion is all there is, but that *ours* was not the only one.)

(b) Assuming that there is a world of *truth*, it could be *of lesser value* to us; in light of its value to us as a means of preservation, the amount of illusion is probably of greater importance. Unless illusion per se were grounds for dismissal?

(c) That a correlation exists between the *degrees of value* and the *degrees of reality* (so that the highest values also possess the highest degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate based on the assumption that we *know* the hierarchy of values, namely that this hierarchy is a *moral* one . . . Only on this assumption is *truth* necessary to the definition of

everything which is of the greatest importance; 'illusion' would constitute an objection to a value in general.

(2)

It is of cardinal importance that this notion should be dispelled. There are few things which so belittle and discredit the world which we are as the world of truth; it was our hitherto most dangerous attempt to assassinate life. Let us declare war against everything the inventing of a world of truth presupposes. Included among these presuppositions is the notion that moral values are the supreme values. The supremacy of moral judgement would be refuted, if it could be demonstrated that it was the result of an immoral preference, that it was a special case of real immorality; it would thereby reduce itself to a semblance, and as a semblance it would forfeit all right to condemn illusion.

(3)

'The will to truth' would then have to be subjected to a psychological examination; it is no moral force, but rather a form of the will to power. This would be demonstrated by the fact that it employs every *immoral* means; above all, those of metaphysics. *This method of investigation* attains its object only when all *moral prejudices* have been overcome; it represents a victory over morality. NB. Today we are faced with the prospect of putting the assumption that moral values are the supreme values to the test.

584

The origin of the '*world of truth*': Chapter 1. The aberration of philosophy rests on the fact that, instead of seeing in logic and the categories of reason a means of arranging the world to utilitarian ends (therefore, 'in essence', a means of usefully *falsifying* it), they were taken to contain the criterion of truth and *reality*. The 'criterion of truth' was in fact merely the *biological utility of such a system of essential falsification*; and, since a species of animal knows of nothing more important than its own preservation, we may speak here of a kind of 'truth'.

The naïveté consisted only in taking this anthropocentric idiosyncrasy for the *measure of things*, for the authority to pass judgement over what is 'real' and what is 'unreal': in short, in making something conditional absolute. And behold, all of a sudden the world was broken into two halves, a world of truth and one of 'illusion'; and it was precisely the world that reason had invented, a world in which man might reside and establish himself, which came to be discredited. Instead of using the forms as a means of handling the world, of making it manageable and predictable, the mad ingenuity of the philosophers discovered that these categories provided the notion of a world which does not correspond to the world in which we live . . . The means were misunderstood as standards of value, and even as implying a condemnation of their original purpose . . . which was to deceive oneself in a useful way; the means were formulas and signs whose invention assisted us in reducing a bewildering multiplicity to an expedient, convenient scheme.

But alas! Now a *moral category* came into play; no creature wishes to deceive itself, no creature may deceive another; thus there is only a will to truth. What is 'truth'?

The principle of contradiction provided the scheme; the world of truth to which we seek the way cannot be in contradiction with itself, cannot change, cannot evolve, can have neither beginning nor end.

That is the greatest error ever committed, the most disastrous error on earth: believing that in the forms of reason, we had in our possession a criterion of reality, whereas we had them in order to gain mastery over reality, in order to *misunderstand* it in a shrewd way . . .

And behold, the world became false precisely because of the qualities *which constitute its reality*: change, becoming, multiplicity, opposition, strife, war.

At which point the whole disaster was upon us:

(1) How do we get rid of the false, the merely illusory world? (Although it was the real one, and the only one there is.)

(2) How do we come to acquire a character as much as possible the opposite of that possessed by the world of illusion? (The notion of the perfect creature as the

opposite of every real creature; or, more clearly, as a *contradiction to life itself* . . .)

(3) The whole tendency here was towards values which *slander life*;

(4) Thus ideal dogmatism came to be confounded with knowledge as such; so that the *opposing party* also began to recoil in horror from *science* . . . Thus the way to science was *doubly* barred: first, by belief in the world of truth; and then by opponents of this belief.

Natural science and physiology were (1) condemned for the objects they investigated, and (2) deprived of the problems they sought to solve . . .

In the real world, where utterly everything is intertwined and conditioned, to condemn or to think away anything means to condemn and think away everything.

The words 'this should not be', 'this should not have been', are a *farçe* . . . Bear in mind the consequence of seeking to abolish everything which is in some sense *harmful* or *destructive* – it would ruin the very source of life. Physiology knows *better*!

Morality as *décadence*. Science.

We see how *morality*:

(a) *poisons* the whole conception of the world;

(b) cuts off access to *science*;

(c) dissolves and undermines all real instincts (in that it teaches us to experience their roots as immoral).

We see before us a terrible instrument of *décadence* at work, which maintains itself with holy names and gestures.

585

Great, searching *self-examination*: not by individuals, but by mankind as a whole. *Let us reflect and remember; let us go into the highways and byways.*

(a)

Man seeks 'the truth': a world that does not contradict itself, that does not deceive, that does not change, a world of *truth* – a world without suffering. Contradiction, deception, change – these are the causes of suffering! That there is a world as it should be, he does not doubt; he would gladly

seek the way to it. (Indian critique: even the 'ego' is apparent and *un*real.)

Whence does man derive the conception of *reality*?

Why make change, deception, contradiction a source of *suffering*? Why not happiness instead? . . .

Regarding the contempt and hatred of all that perishes, changes and transforms: whence comes this assessment of the permanent?

Obviously, the will to truth is merely the longing for a *permanent world*.

The senses deceive, reason corrects the errors; *therefore*, it was concluded, reason is the path to the permanent; the *purest* ideas, those most remote from the senses, must be nearest to the 'world of truth'. It is from the senses that most misfortunes come – the senses beguile, deceive and destroy.

Only being can promise *happiness*: change and happiness exclude each other. Accordingly, the highest hope is to become one with being. That is the *formula* for the way to highest happiness.

In summa, the world as it *ought* to be, exists; the world in which we live is an error – this, our world, should *not* exist.

The belief in being proves [to be] only a consequence of the real *primum mobile*: the disbelief, distrust and disdain of all becoming.

What sort of men reflect *in this way*? Unproductive, *miserable*, world-weary men. Were we to conceive of the opposite sort of man, he would not require a belief in being: more still, he would despise it as dead, dull and indifferent . . .

The belief that the world which ought to be, *is*, really exists, is a belief proper to the unproductive, *who do not wish to create a world* as it should be. They take it for granted, thinking they need only seek the means of attaining it. 'The will to truth' *is the impotence of the will to create.*

To recognize that something *is* such and such; to act so that something *becomes* such and such: antagonism in the degree of strength in men of different natures.

The fiction of a world which answers our desires; psychological artifices and interpretations in order to associate all that we honour and regard as pleasant with this *world of truth*.

'The will to truth' at this stage is essentially the *art of interpretation*; which, if nothing else, still involves the ability to interpret.

The same order of men, one degree *poorer* and *no longer possessed of the ability* to interpret and to create fictions, become *nihilists*. A nihilist is a man who judges that the world as it is ought *not* to exist, and that the world as it ought to be does not exist. According to this, existence (action, suffering, willing and feeling) has no meaning: the pathos of 'futility' is the nihilist's pathos – and as pathos it is moreover an *inconsistency* on the part of the nihilist.

He who is unable to introduce his will into things, the man without either will or strength, at least invests them with some *meaning*: i.e. the belief that there ought to be a will in the things acting and intending already.

The measure of a man's *will-power* is how far he can dispense with the *meaning* in things, how much he can bear a world without meaning; because *he himself organizes a small portion of it*.

The *philosophically objective view* of things may thus be a sign of poverty in will and strength. For strength organizes what is nearest and next; the 'knowledge-seeker', whose only desire is to *ascertain* what exists, can determine nothing *as it ought to be*.

The *artists* are an intermediate type: they at least determine a likeness of things as they ought to be – they are productive in as much as they actually *alter* and transform; not like the knowledge-seekers, who leave everything as it is.

The philosophers' affinity with the pessimistic religions: the same species of man (they attribute the *highest degree of reality* to the *things which are most highly valued*).

The philosophers' affinity with moral men and their standards of value. (The *moral* interpretation of the world as its *meaning* = after decline of the religious meaning.)

Overcoming the philosophers by *annihilating* the world of being: intermediate period of nihilism: before there is sufficient strength present to turn the values round, and to make the world of becoming, and of appearance, the *only* world to be countenanced and deified.

(b)

Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a symptom of increasing *strength* or of increasing *weakness*.

This is partly owing to the fact that the strength to *create*, to *will* has grown to such an extent that comprehensive interpretation, the giving of *meaning* to things ('present tasks', state, etc.), is no longer required.

And partly owing to the fact that even the creative force necessary to create *meaning* declines, and disappointment becomes the prevailing condition. The inability to *believe* in a 'meaning' becomes 'unbelief'.

What is the significance of *science* in regard to both possibilities?

(1) It is a sign of strength and self-control, it shows an *ability* to dispense with healing, comforting worlds of illusion.

(2) It undermines, dissects, disappoints, weakens.

(c)

The need to hold on to something believed to be true: the psychological reduction of *the belief in truth*, all previous feelings of value aside, is fear, laziness.

At the same time, *unbelief*. Reduction. In what way does it acquire a *new* value, if there is no world of truth at all (in this way the value-feelings previously *squandered* on the world of being become free again).

586

The *world of truth and the world of illusion. Draft of the first chapter.*

(a)

The temptations which this notion presents are of three kinds. An *unknown* world – we are adventurous and inquisitive, we are weary of the familiar (the danger of the notion lies in its insinuation that 'this' world is *known* to us) . . . *another* world, where things are different; something in us reconsiders, and our tacit acquiescence, our silence thereby loses its value – perhaps all will be well, and we have not hoped in vain . . . yes, a world where things are different, and – who knows? – we

ourselves are different . . . The oddest trick ever played upon us, the strangest attack ever made, is the notion of the *world of truth*; the word 'truth' has become overlaid with so many things that we involuntarily make a gift of all this to the 'world of truth'; the *world of truth* must also be a *truthful* one, one that would not deceive us or make fools of us; to believe in it is almost to be obliged to believe in it (out of common decency, as is the case among trustworthy individuals).

The notion of the 'unknown world' insinuates to us that *this* world is already known to us (and is thus already tedious to us); the notion of the 'other world' insinuates that this world *could be otherwise* – it transcends what is necessary and factual (it is profitless for a man to *yield* to it, to *accommodate* himself to it); the notion of the 'world of truth' insinuates that this world is untruthful, deceitful, dishonest, spurious and insignificant – and *consequently* also not a world which has our best interests at heart (it is inadvisable to accommodate oneself to it; it would be *better* to resist it).

Thus we withdraw from this world in three different ways: with our *curiosity* – as if the more interesting part lay elsewhere; with our *reluctance to yield* – as if it was not necessary to do so, as if this world were not in the highest degree necessary; with our determination not to be misled – as if this world did not deserve our sympathy and respect, as if it had dealt unfairly and dishonestly with us . . .

In summa: we are in rebellion in a threefold way; we have made 'x', the unknown quantity, into a critique of the 'known world'.

(b)

The first step towards reasonableness is to understand the extent to which we have been *seduced*, to wit, it might be exactly the *opposite*:

(1) The *unknown* world could be constructed in such a way as to make us well disposed towards 'this' world – for it may be a more foolish and more petty form of existence.

(2) The *other* world, far from taking account of our wishes which had not been carried out, might be among the mass of things which *this* world makes possible for us; to become acquainted with it would be a means of satisfaction.

(3) The world of truth: but who says that the world of illusion must be of less value than the world of truth? Do our instincts not contradict this judgement? Is man not forever creating an invented world, because he wishes to have a better world than reality?

Above all, how did we arrive at the conclusion that *our world* is *not* the world of truth? . . . For it might be that the other world is the 'illusory' one (as a matter of fact, the Greeks, for example, imagined *a realm of shadows*, an *illusory existence* alongside *true* existence). And finally, what justification do we have for postulating *degrees of reality*, so to speak? That is something quite different from an unknown world; that is already the *desire to know something about the unknown.*

NB. It is all well and good to speak of the 'other', the unknown world – but to speak of the '*world of truth*' means '*knowing something about it*', which is quite the contrary to the assumption of an '*x*'-world . . .

In summa, the world '*x*' could be more tedious, more inhuman and more unworthy in every sense than this world.

If it were asserted that there were several '*x*' worlds, i.e. every possible kind of world besides our own, that would be another matter. But that has *never been asserted* . . .

The world of 'truth'

= the truthful world, which does not lie to us, which is honest;
= the right, which is all that matters;
= the genuine, as opposed to something forged and counterfeit.

(c)

The problem is, why does the representation of the *other world* always work to the disadvantage of this world? Why does it always have the effect of criticizing this world? What does this indicate?

A people who are proud of themselves, whose life is ascending, think that to be *different* is always to be inferior, to be

worthless; they regard the foreign, unknown world as their enemy, as their opposite; they feel no curiosity about what is foreign, and completely reject it . . . Such a people would never admit that another people were the 'true people' . . .

The very fact that such a distinction is possible, that this world is taken for an 'illusion', and the *other* for the 'truth', is symptomatic.

The *point of origin* for the idea of 'another world'.

The philosopher who invents a rational world where *reason* and *logical* functions are adequate: hither comes the idea of the world of 'truth'.

The religious man who [invents] a 'divine world': hither comes the idea of the 'denaturalized, unnatural' world.

The moral man who invents a 'free world': hither comes the idea of the 'good, perfect, just and holy' world.

The common factor in the three points of origin is error in *psychology*, confusion in physiology.

In what terms is the 'other world' as it actually appears in history sketched? In terms of the stigma of philosophical, religious and moral prejudices.

The 'other world', as is evident from these facts, is *synonymous with not being*, not living, not *wishing* to live . . .

General insight: it was an instinctive sense of weariness with life, and not an instinctive sense of vitality, which created the other world.

The implication is that philosophy, religion and morality are symptoms of *décadence*.

11. Biological Value of Knowledge

587

It might seem as if I had evaded the question of certainty. The reverse is true; but in the course of trying to determine its criterion, I examined the very weights previously used to make these measurements – and thereby showed that the question of certainty is in itself a *dependent* question, a question of *secondary* importance.

588

The question of values is *more fundamental* than the question of certainty: the latter becomes serious only after the question of values has been answered.

Being and appearance, regarded psychologically, yield no 'being-in-itself', no criterion for 'reality', but only for degrees of appearance, measured according to the strength of the *interest* taken in appearance.

*

There is no struggle for existence between ideas and perceptions, only a struggle for supremacy – the vanquished idea is *not* annihilated, but rather *driven to the background* or *subordinated. There is no such thing as annihilation in intellectual spheres*[14] . . .

589

'Ends' and 'means', 'cause and effect', 'subject and object' ('action and passion'), 'thing-in-itself' and 'appearance', all as interpretations (*not* as facts) in the sense of a will to power. To what extent are they perhaps *necessary* (for preservation) as interpretations?

590

Our values are *read into* things.

Is there then any *meaning* in things in themselves??

Of necessity, is not every meaning but a relative meaning, a relative perspective?

All meaning is will to power (all relative meanings may be resolved into it).

591

The insistence upon 'hard facts' – epistemology, how much pessimism there is in it!

592

The antagonism between the 'world of truth', as pessimism depicts it, and a world where one can live – for this the rights of *truth* must be tested. To understand the nature of this

antagonism, the meaning of all these 'ideal impulses' must be measured by the standard of *life*: a *life* that is sickly, desperate and clinging to heavenly things struggles with one that is healthier, richer, fresher, more foolish and more false. Thus it is not 'truth' struggling with life, but one kind of life struggling with another. But the former wants to be the *higher* kind! Here we must prove that some hierarchy is necessary – that the first problem is the *hierarchy among kinds of life.*

593

The belief 'thus and thus it is' to become the intention '*thus and* [*thus*] *shall it be*'.

12. Science

594

Science – previously it has been a way to eliminate the utter confusion in which we find ourselves, through hypotheses which 'explain' everything – that is to say, it has been the result of the intellect's aversion to chaos. This same aversion takes hold of me in contemplation of *myself*: I should like to visualize my inner world by means of a *schema*, and thus escape intellectual confusion. Morality was just such a *simplification*: it regarded man as *known*, as *familiar*. Now we have annihilated morality – and once again we find ourselves *completely obscure*! I know that I know nothing of *myself*. *Physics* has proved to be a great *comfort* to us: science (as the way to *knowledge*) becomes attractive once morality has been set aside – and *because here alone* do we find consistency, we must *build* our lives upon it, if we are to have any. This is a sort of *practical consideration* concerning our *needs* as knowledge-seekers.

595

Our presuppositions: no God, no goals, finite force. Let us *beware* of devising and prescribing modes of thought necessary for baser men!!

596

There is no need for a 'moral education' of the human race: what is necessary rather is a compulsory school of error, because 'truth' disgusts, and spoils life, provided a man has not already been sent on his irrevocable *way* and bears the consequences of his honest *insight* with tragic pride.

597

The prerequisite to *scientific work*: belief in its cohesion and continuity, so that the individual may work in any part, however small, confident that *his labour is not in vain*.

There is one *great paralysing thought: he labours in vain, he struggles in vain.*

The periods of accumulation, when force and instruments of power are found and preserved for future use: *science* as a *way-station*, where the more ordinary, more multifarious and complicated sorts find their most natural discharge and gratification: *all those who do well to avoid action.*

598

A philosopher finds relaxation in other ways and in other things: he finds relaxation, e.g., in nihilism. The belief that there is no such thing as truth, the belief of the nihilist, is a great relief for one who, as a warrior of knowledge, struggles incessantly with nothing but ugly truths. For the truth is ugly.

599

The 'meaninglessness of everything': this belief is the result of an insight into the falsity of previous interpretations, a generalization born of despondency and weakness – not a *necessary* belief.

Man's arrogance – when he sees no meaning, he *denies* that there is one!

600

The world admits of endlessly many interpretations, each of them a sign of growth or decline.

Previous attempts to overcome the *moral* God (pantheism, Hegel, etc.).

Inertia is in need of unity (monism); multiplicity of interpretations a sign of strength. We should *not wish to deny* the world its disquieting and enigmatic character!

601

Against the desire for reconciliation and peaceableness. Included therein is every attempt at monism.

602

This world seen in perspective, this world as it presents itself to the eyes, ears and touch, is quite false, no doubt, compared to how it would present itself to a much keener sensory apparatus. But its intelligibility, its comprehensibility, its practicability, its beauty, all come to an *end* if we *sharpen* our senses, just as beauty ends upon careful consideration of the processes of history; the *teleological* order is but an illusion. Suffice it to say that the more approximate and superficial our grasp of it, the more *precious*, the more determinate, the more beautiful, the more meaningful the world *seems*. The deeper we go into it, the more it falls in our estimation – *meaninglessness draws near!* We have created the world that has value! Knowing this, we also recognize that the reverence for truth is only the *result* of an illusion – and that we should have greater appreciation for the force that forms, simplifies, shapes and invents – what God was.

'All is false! All is permitted!'[15]

Only by a certain short-sightedness, a determination to simplify, is anything 'beautiful' or 'precious': in themselves, things are *I know not what*.

603

Neither pessimists nor optimists. Schopenhauer's great insight – that destroying an illusion does not result in a truth, but in just *another piece of ignorance*, an extension of our 'empty space', an increase in our inner 'desolation'.

604

Interpretation (introduction of meaning), *not* explanation. There are no facts, everything is fluid, ineffable, elusive; the

most enduring things are still our opinions. In most cases a new interpretation is laid over an old interpretation which has grown incomprehensible, and which now remains only a sign.[16]

605

To distinguish between 'true' and *'untrue'*, to *ascertain* facts in general, is fundamentally different from *inventive conjecture*, from the forming, shaping, subduing and *ordaining* which lies in the nature of *philosophy. To give a meaning to things* – this work remains *to be done*, provided *no meaning is already imputed to them.* Thus it is with sounds, and with the fate of nations: they admit of the most varied interpretations and of being applied to *the most varied purposes.* The still higher level is *to set a goal* and to mould facts accordingly, that is, the *interpretation of the act*, and not merely the *poetic adaptation* of concepts.

606

Man ultimately finds no more in things than he himself has introduced into them: this rediscovery is called science, and the introducing – art, religion, love, pride. While this may be child's play, people continue to do both, it being a part of a good disposition to do so – it falls to some people to rediscover, while it falls to others – *we* others! – to introduce!

607

The two sides of *science*:

In regard to the individual;

In regard to the culture-complex ('levels').

Conflicting assessments according to which side is considered.

608

The development of science resolves the 'familiar' more and more into the unfamiliar; its *aim*, however, is the reverse, and it instinctively proceeds to trace the unfamiliar back to the familiar.

In summa, science prepares the way for a *sovereign ignorance*, for a feeling that there is no such thing as 'knowledge', and that it was presumptuous ever to dream of such a thing; more, that we have not the slightest reason even to consider knowledge a *possibility* – that 'knowledge' itself is a contradictory notion. We *translate* primeval mythology and human vanity into hard fact: we can no more *allow* a thing-in-itself as a concept than we can allow 'knowledge-in-itself'. The seductive influence of 'number and logic', of 'laws'.

'*Wisdom*' is an attempt to *cope* with perspectival judgements (i.e. with the 'will to power'), a principle of a disintegrating and life-threatening nature, a symptom as with the Indians, etc., a *weakening* of the power of appropriation.

609

It is not enough to recognize the ignorance in which man and beast live; you must realize that they are, and you yourself must be, determined to be ignorant. You need to understand that without this kind of ignorance life itself would be impossible, that only under this condition can a living thing survive and thrive: a great solid globe of ignorance must surround you.

610

Science – the transformation of nature into concepts for the purpose of mastering nature – that falls under the rubric 'means'.

But the purpose and will of mankind must *grow* in the same way, the intention with respect to the whole.

611

What is strongest, what is constantly exercised in all stages of life, is *thought*. It is present in every perception and even in what is apparently passive! Obviously this makes it the *most powerful* and *exacting* of forces, and in time tyrannizes over all the rest. Ultimately it becomes 'passion itself'.

612

The right to great *passion* must be reclaimed for the knowledge-seekers, after depersonalization and the cult of 'objectivity'

have created a false hierarchy in this sphere also. Error reached its zenith when Schopenhauer taught that *freedom from the passions* and the will is the only way to 'truth', to knowledge; the will-less intellect could not help seeing the true and actual nature of things.

The same error is found *in arte*: as if everything were *beautiful* as soon as it is beheld without willing.

613
Deliverance from morality

Organic-moral (battle of [conflicting] emotions and the dominion of one emotion over the intellect).

Revenge, injustice, punishment.

614

To 'humanize' the world, i.e. to feel our increasing mastery over it –

615

For a superior kind of being, knowledge will also take on new forms which are not yet necessary.

616

The idea that the *worth of the world* lies in our interpretations (and that maybe somewhere other interpretations are possible apart from the merely human); that the previous interpretations involve judgements made from a certain point of view, by virtue of which we sustain life, that is, the will to power and the growth of power; that each *elevation of men* implies the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that strengthening and extending one's power opens up new perspectives and inspires faith in new horizons – this theme runs through all my writings. The world that *concerns us* is false, i.e. is not a fact but an invention and extrapolation from too few observations. It is 'in flux', a process, an ever-shifting body of errors that never approaches the truth, for – there is no 'truth'.

617

To *impress* upon becoming the character of being – this is the highest expression of the *will to power*.

The senses and the intellect, by a *double falsification*, obtain for us a world of things that exist, abide, are equivalent, etc.

That *everything recurs* is the *nearest approach a world of becoming makes to a world of being – and with that, we reach the height of contemplation.*

The dissatisfaction and condemnation that the world of becoming arouses stems from the value attributed to unchanging beings, once a world of them has been invented.

Subsequently they metamorphose into body, God, ideas, natural laws, formulae, etc.

But it is 'the being' that is the appearance; what is valuable is quite the reverse: it is the appearance that *confers value*.

Knowledge as such in a world of becoming is impossible; in what sense then *is* knowledge possible? Only as a self-misunderstanding, as a will to power, a will to deception.

To become means to invent, to desire, to deny oneself, to overcome oneself: it means to be not a subject but an activity, an activity of positing, a creative activity. It does not involve 'causes and effects'.

Art springs from the desire to overcome transience, it 'immortalizes', but short-sightedly, from a point of view: it repeats in miniature the tenor of the whole.

What *all life* shows must be regarded as shorthand for the whole tendency; hence the new definition of the concept 'life' as will to power.

There is no such thing as 'cause and effect', but instead a struggle between the opposing processes, often leading to one absorbing another; the number of these processes is indeterminate.

The old ideals are useless for interpreting all that occurs, once their animal origin and utility are recognized; moreover, they are all hostile to life.

Mechanistic theory is also useless – it gives the impression that all is *meaningless*.

All of mankind's previous *idealism* is about to turn into *nihilism* – into a belief in absolute *worthlessness*, that is, *meaninglessness* . . .

The annihilation of ideals, the new desert, requires new arts to withstand it, *amphibians* that we are.

Prerequisites: bravery, patience, no going 'back', but no ardent desire to advance either.

NB. Zarathustra constantly parodies all previous values, out of abundance.

Part 2. The Will to Power in Nature

1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World

618

Of all the interpretations of the world that have been tried so far, the mechanical one today seems conspicuously triumphant. Obviously it has a good conscience on its side, and no one in the sciences has any faith in progress or hope for success, unless it is achieved with the aid of mechanical procedures. Everyone is familiar with these procedures: as far as possible, put 'reason' and 'purpose' out of play; show that in the fullness of time, anything can become anything; smile and gloat a little when, once again, the 'apparent intention' behind the destiny of a plant or an egg yolk is traced to pressure and impact – in short, pay unreserved homage to the principle of greatest stupidity,[17] if I may be permitted a facetious expression in so serious a matter. Meanwhile, a presentiment, an anxiety can be detected even among the best minds of the movement, as if the theory had a hole in it, which sooner or later will prove to be its last: I mean the sort of hole which finally sinks it. They cannot 'explain' pressure and impact themselves, they cannot dispense with *actio in distans* – they have lost faith in their own ability to explain, and admit with a scowl that they can really only describe; and that the dynamic world interpretation, with its denial of 'empty space' and granular atoms, will soon hold sway over physicists; at this point, of course, they [will have to attribute] to the *dynamis* an inner quality –

619

The victorious notion 'force' by which our physicists have removed God from the world still needs to be completed: an inner world must be ascribed to it which I describe as a 'will to power', i.e. as an insatiable desire to demonstrate one's power; or to apply and exercise it, as a creative impulse, etc. Physicists find the principle of 'action at a distance' indispensable; they find the force of attraction and repulsion no less so. It can't be helped: one must regard all motion, all 'phenomena', all 'laws' as symptoms of an internal event, and do so by taking man as an analogy. It is possible to derive all the instincts of an animal from the will to power and likewise all the functions of organic life from this one source.

620

Has the existence of force ever been established? No, only effects, translated into a completely foreign language. Regularity of succession has so spoilt us that we *no longer wonder at the wondrous process.*

621

A force which we cannot imagine is an empty word, and has no standing in *science* (like the so-called purely mechanical forces of attraction and repulsion): they are intended to make the world intelligible, nothing more!

622

Compression and impact are something inexpressibly recent, derivative and thus not primordial. They presuppose something which *coheres* and *can* cause compression and impact! But how does it cohere?

623

Philosophy. There is nothing immutable in chemistry; this is only an illusion, a mere scholastic prejudice. To my esteemed colleagues in physics, I say: we *introduced* the notion of immutability, taking it from metaphysics as usual. It is quite naïve to assert merely on the basis of observation that diamond,

graphite and carbon are identical, for no better reason than that no loss of matter can be detected by weight! Admittedly, they have *something* in common; but this does not alter the fact that the transformation, the molecular work which we can neither see nor weigh, produces from the initial material something *different* – with specifically different properties.

624

Against the physical atom. In order to understand the world, we must be able to quantify it; in order to be able to quantify it, we must have constant causes; but since we find no such constant causes in reality, we *invent* some – the atoms. This is the origin of atomism.

The ability to quantify the world and express everything in formulae – is that really 'understanding'? What would be understood in a piece of music if what were quantifiable and expressible in formulae in it were reckoned? Then the 'constant causes', things, substances, something 'unconditional'; all *invented* – and what has been achieved?

625

The mechanical conception of *motion* is already a translation of the original process into another language, a translation into *visual and tactile terms.*

The conception of the 'atom', with its distinction between the 'seat of a driving force and the force itself', rests upon a *linguistic distinction derived from our logical and psychological world.* We may not be at liberty to change our means of expression; but it should be possible to understand the extent to which they are mere semiotics. It is preposterous to demand an *adequate mode of expression*; it lies in the very nature of a language, of a means of expression, to express mere relations . . . The concept 'truth' is *absurd.* The whole domain of 'true' and 'false' refers to the relations between beings, not to what they are 'in themselves' . . . *Nonsense*: there is no such thing as a 'being-in-itself' (relations are what constitute beings in the first place), any more than there can be 'knowledge-in-itself'.

626

'Nor can the sensation of force arise from motion. Sensation in general cannot arise from motion.'

'The only evidence in support of sensation arising from motion is a seeming experience: sensation being generated in something material (the brain) through transmitted motion (the stimuli). But if the sensation has to be generated, wouldn't this show that sensation in the matter does *not* yet exist at all? So that its emergence would *have* to be regarded as the *creative act* of the supervening motion? It is only an hypothesis that matter is devoid of sensation! Not something of which we have experience! Sensation, therefore, is a *property* of matter; matter is capable of sensation.'

'Do we find that certain material things have *no* sensations? No, we have only failed to discover any. It is impossible to derive sensation from matter incapable of sensation.'[18] Oh the haste!

627

The notions 'attraction' and 'repulsion' in the purely mechanical senses are complete fictions: mere words. We cannot imagine an attraction without . . . an *intention*. The desire to seize a thing, or to defend ourselves from its influence and repel it – that 'we understand', that would be an interpretation we might need.

In short: the psychological necessity of a belief in causality lies in our *inability to imagine an event without an intention*; of course this says nothing about truth or untruth (the justification of such a belief). The belief in *causae* stands or falls with the belief in τέλη[19] (against Spinoza and his causalism).

628

It is an illusion to suppose that something *is known* when we have a mathematical formula for an event: it is only *designated*, *described*, nothing more!

629

If I reduce a regular event to a *formula*, I facilitate the designation of the whole phenomenon, abbreviate it, etc. This

establishes no 'law', but rather raises the question of why something is repeated here: it is a supposition that the formula represents a complex of initially unknown forces and their discharge; it is quite mythical to suppose in such cases that forces obey laws, so that in consequence of their obedience the same thing always happens.

630

I am careful not to speak of chemical '*laws*': that smacks of morality. It is more a matter of absolutely determining the relations of power: the stronger becomes master of the weaker, to the extent that the latter fails to retain some degree of independence – here there is no mercy, no quarter, still less any respect for 'laws'!

631

The unalterable sequence of certain appearances does not prove any 'law', but a relation of power between two or more forces. To say, 'but it is precisely this relation that remains the same!' says nothing more than, 'one and the same force cannot also be another force'. It is not a matter of things *coming one after another* – but rather of things *going into each other*, a process in which the individual successive moments are *not* determined as cause and effect . . .

The separation of 'deeds' from 'doers', of what happens from [what] makes it happen, the process from something that is not a process but permanent, substance, thing, body, soul, etc. – the attempt to comprehend what happens as a sort of displacement and a change of position on the part of a 'being', of something abiding: this ancient mythology established the belief in 'cause and effect', once it had assumed a fixed form in the linguistic-grammatical functions.

632

The 'regularity' of a sequence is only a figurative expression, *just as if* a rule were followed here; but this is not a fact. And the same is true of 'conformity to law'. We find a formula to express an ever-recurring kind of episode; but with that we

have *discovered no 'law'*, much less a force which causes a recurrence of episodes. The fact that something *always* happens thus and [so] is interpreted as if a being always acted that way in obedience to a law or to a lawgiver; whereas but for the 'law' it would be free to do otherwise. But precisely this inability to do otherwise might come from the being itself, *not* because of law but because it was so constituted. It only means: something cannot be what it is and also another thing, cannot sometimes do one thing and sometimes another, is neither free nor unfree, but merely such-and-such. *The fault lies in the poetic infusion of subjectivity.*

633

It is wrong to say of two successive states that one is the cause and the other the effect. The first state brings about nothing, the second is brought about by nothing. It is a struggle between two elements unequal in power; a rearrangement of forces is attained, based on the relative strength of each. The second state is something fundamentally different from the first (it is *not* its 'effect'); the essential thing is that the factors engaged in the struggle emerge from it with different quantities of power.

634

Will to Power – Philosophy – Quantities of Power

A critique of mechanism. Let us eliminate the two popular notions of 'necessity' and 'law'; the first introduces a false constraint, the second a false freedom into the world. 'Things' do not act regularly, they follow no *rule*: there are no things (that is our fiction); just as little do they act under the constraint of some sort of necessity. There is no obedience here; just because *something is as it is*, this strong, this weak, does not mean that it is the result of obedience, or of a rule, or of a constraint . . .

The degree of resistance and the degree of superiority – that is what is at issue in all events. If *we*, for ordinary purposes of prediction, know how to express this in formulations of 'laws', so much the better for us! But that does not mean that we have introduced any 'morality' into the world, just because we invented [the idea] that it was obedient.

There are no laws: at every moment, every power produces all the consequences of which it is capable. The very fact that there is no *mezzo termine*[20] is what gives things their predictability.

A quantity of power is indicated by the effect which it produces and [that] which it resists. These power-centres exhibit no state of indifference, although such a state is conceivable in itself. What they do exhibit is essentially a desire to violate and to defend themselves from violations. This is not self-preservation; every atom exercises its influence over the whole of being – if we abstract from it this radiation of power-seeking, we abstract from it its very existence. That is why I call it a quantity of '*will to power*', a formula which expresses the character which we cannot abstract from the mechanical order without abstracting that very order from the world altogether.

The translation of the world of action into a *visible* world – a world for the eye – is the concept 'motion'. Here it is always implicitly understood that *something* has been moved, whether it be the fiction of an atom as a little lump of matter, or even the more abstract conception of it, the dynamic atom, something is always imagined which acts – i.e. we have not yet abandoned the habit into which we are misled by our senses and our language. The distinction between subject and object, between agents and their acts, between acts and their effects: let us not forget that that is merely semiotics and indicates nothing real. Mechanics as a doctrine of *motion* is already a translation of events into man's language of the senses.

635

We have need of unities in order to make predictions; but it cannot be assumed that there are such unities. We borrowed the notion of unity from our notion 'ego', our oldest article of faith. If we did not regard ourselves as unities, we would never have formed the notion 'thing'. Now, rather late in the day, we are thoroughly convinced that our conception of the 'ego' guarantees nothing with regard to real unity. Thus, if we are to sustain the mechanical interpretation of the world as a matter of theory, it is always with the proviso that we do so in so

far as we employ two fictions: the concept of motion (derived from the language of our senses) and the concept of the atom = unit (derived from our mental 'experience'); it presupposes a *sensory prejudice* and *psychological prejudice.*

The *mechanistic world* is thus imagined as the senses of vision and touch alone could envisage such a world (as in 'motion'), so as to be predictable; to that end unities are invented, so that *causal* unities can be invented, i.e. 'things' (atoms) whose effects remain constant (which involves the transfer of the false notion of subject to the concept of the atom).

The concept of number, the concept of thing (the concept of subject), the concept of activity (separation of cause and effect), motion (sight and touch). The notion that all effects are *motion*; where there is motion, *something* is moved. All these things are phenomenal: the introduction of the concept of number, of the concept of subject, of the concept of motion; our eye and our *psychology* are still involved.

If we eliminate these additions, nothing remains but dynamic quantities of energy, in tension with all other dynamic quantities of energy, whose essence consists in their relation to all other quantities, in their 'effect' on them – the will to power, which is not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos*, is the most elementary fact, from which a becoming, an effecting, emerge in the first place . . .

Mechanics formulates means of expression for sequelae, and it does so semiotically, in sensory and psychological terms; but it does not so much as touch the question of the nature of causal force.

636

Philosophy. The physicists believe in a 'world of truth' in their own way; an unalterable, generally applicable, deterministic system of atoms in motion, so that for them the 'world of illusion' reduces to that aspect of being which is universal, universally necessary and accessible to every creature after its kind (accessible and yet also arranged and made 'subjective'). But that is where they have gone astray: the existence of the atom which they postulate is inferred by following the logic

of consciousness' perspective – and is therefore itself a subjective fiction. This picture of the world which they draw is essentially the same as the subjective picture of the world; the only difference is that it is constructed with imagined senses extrapolated, to be sure, from our own *actual* senses . . . And in the end, they inadvertently left something out of the constellation: precisely the necessary perspective through which every centre of force – and not only man – constructs the entire rest of the world, i.e. takes its measure, grapples with it and refashions it as far as it is able . . . They have neglected to include in 'true being' the force which *establishes* the perspective in the first place . . . To put it in scholastic terms, they have neglected to include subjectivity. They suppose that it somehow 'developed' subsequently, but even chemistry needs it; subjectivity is the *specificity* with which something determinately acts and reacts in such-and-such a way, depending upon circumstances.

Perspectivism is only a complex form of specificity. My idea is that every specific body strives for ascendancy over all of space, to extend its power (its will to power), and to defeat anything which resists its extension. But it continually encounters the same striving in other bodies, and in the end comes to terms with ('unites' with) those which are sufficiently related to it – thus they *conspire together for power.* And the process continues . . .

637

Even in the inorganic realm, an atom of force takes into consideration only what is in its immediate vicinity: in the distance, forces offset each other. This is the essence of what seeing in perspective is, and why a living organism is 'self-centred' through and through.

638

If the world had a certain amount of force at its disposal, clearly whenever power shifted from one point to another this would affect the whole system – thus, besides *successive* causality, there would also be *simultaneous and mutual* dependence.

639

The only possible way of making sense of the concept 'God' would be: God, *not* as the motive force, but God as a *maximum state*, an *epoch* . . . A point in the further development of the *will to power* by means of which subsequent development explains itself just as much as the prior development up to Him . . .

Viewed mechanically, the energy of the overall process remains constant; viewed economically, it rises to its zenith and falls back again in an eternal cycle; this 'will to power' expresses itself in the *interpretation*, in the *manner* in which the *force* is *consumed* – conversion of energy into life, and life in the highest potency, thus appears to be the goal. The same amount of energy at different stages of development means different things.

That which constitutes growth in life is the economy, ever more frugal, and ever more closely calculated, which always does more with less and less force . . . The ideal is the principle of least effort . . .

The one thing proven is that the world shows *no* tendency to a steady state. Consequently its highest state *must* be conceived as something other than a state of equilibrium . . .

The absolute necessity of the same events, in any given course of the world, to all eternity, *not* a determinism governing events, is merely the expression of the fact that the impossible is not possible . . . that a given force simply cannot be other than just this determinate force; that one force vents itself upon another which offers a certain amount of resistance, strictly in proportion to its strength. To speak of events as being necessary is *tautological.*

2. The Will to Power as Life

(a) The Organic Process

640

He imagines himself *present* at the beginning of organic life; but what has actually been seen and felt by this procedure?

What was quantified? What regularities were reflected in their motions? So, man would rather treat everything as if it were *visible and tangible*, hence as if it were in motion, and wants to discover *formulae* to *simplify* the enormous mass of data. *This reduces everything* to the level of the empiricist and the mathematician.

It is a question of an *inventarium of human experience*: as if man, or rather *human vision* and *comprehension*, were the ever-present witness to everything.

641

What we call 'life' is an assemblage of forces sharing a nutritive process. Essential to this nutritive process are all so-called sensations, ideas and thoughts, i.e. (1) a resistance to external forces, (2) an arrangement of internal forces according to forms and rhythms and (3) an estimation of what to absorb and what to excrete.

642

The connection between the inorganic and the organic must lie in the repulsive force exercised by every atom of force. Life might be defined as a stable form the *process* takes that determines the unevenly growing strengths of various combatants. To some extent resistance is present even in obedience; those who obey have by no means abandoned all initiative. By the same token, those who command must concede that they never entirely defeat their adversaries or absorb and dissipate their power. 'Obeying', like 'commanding', is a form of competition.

643

The will to power *interprets: the formation of an organ involves interpretation*; interpretation defines, it determines degrees, disparities of power. Mere disparities of power could not be felt as such: there must be something wanting to grow, that interprets according to its value every other thing that wants to grow. *In that respect* they are the same . . . In fact, *interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something. (The organic process requires continual interpretation.)*

644

Principle of life. Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, the juxtaposition of the developed organs and functions, with the disappearance of transitional forms – if that is *perfection*, then there is a will to power inherent in the organic process, by virtue of which *dominating, shaping and commanding forces* are always extending the sphere of their power, and continually simplifying things within that sphere: the demand *increasing*.

'Mind' is only a means and an instrument in the service of higher life, the elevation of life; and as for the good, as Plato (and after him, Christianity) understood it, it seems to me even a life-threatening, life-slandering, life-negating principle.

645

'Heredity', being something entirely unexplained, cannot be used to explain, but only to locate and put a label on a problem. The same holds true for 'adaptability'. As a matter of fact, a morphological study, even supposing it were complete, *explains* nothing, but merely *describes* a prodigious fact. How it is possible for an organ to be adapted to some end; *that* remains unexplained. The assumption of *causae finales* would explain these things just as little as *causae efficientes* does. The term '*causa*' is only a means of expression, a word, nothing more.

646

There are analogies, e.g. between our memory and another kind of memory that is evident in the inheritance and development of forms, between our human ingenuity and experimentation and nature's ingenuity in the application of means to new ends, etc. However, our so-called consciousness is not responsible for any of the processes essential to our preservation and growth; and no head would be clever enough to construct more than a machine – to which every organic process is far superior.

647

Against Darwinism. The utility of an organ does not explain its origin, on the contrary!

During most of the time a certain trait is forming, this trait does not help to preserve the individual organism, is of no use to it, and particularly not in its struggle with external circumstances and enemies

But after all, what is 'useful'? We must ask, 'useful *for what*?' E.g. what promotes the *longevity* of the individual organism might be inimical to its strength or grandeur; what preserves it might at the same time arrest its development. On the other hand, a *deficiency*, a state of *degeneration*, may be of the greatest utility in so far as it acts as a *stimulans* to other organs. In the same way, *distress* may be a condition of existence in so far as it reduces the individual organism to surviving and not wasting its resources.

The individual organism itself is the struggle of parts (for nutrition, space, etc.); its development involves the *prevalence*, the *predominance* of individual parts, and the *atrophy*, the 'becoming an organ', of others.

The extent of the influence of 'external circumstances' is ridiculously *overrated* by Darwin; essential to the life process is precisely this tremendous formative power to create from within, which merely *uses* and *exploits* 'external circumstances' . . .

The fact is that the *new* forms generated from within are *not* formed for any purpose, but that in the struggle between the parts, it will not be long before a new form bears a relationship to a partial utility, and then adapts itself ever more perfectly to that *use*.

If only that which had proved *permanently* useful were preserved, then the damaging, destroying, dissolving capability, the senseless, the accidental [would not be possible] in the first place.

648

Being useful for accelerating the *tempo* of a species' evolution is different from being 'useful' for the species to establish itself and remain stable.

649

'Useful' in Darwinian biology means what has proved advantageous in the struggle with others. But it seems to me a *sense*

of growth, a sense of *becoming stronger*, quite apart from any advantage to be gained from the struggle, is true *progress*: it is from this alone that the desire to struggle arises.

650

Physiologists should think twice before fastening upon the impulse to self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being; above all, a living thing wants to express its strength: 'self-preservation' is only one of the consequences of that. Let us beware of superfluous teleological principles! And among them is the entire notion of 'the impulse to self-preservation'.

651

The most fundamental and most primordial activity of a protoplasm is not to be ascribed to a desire for self-preservation, because it ingests more than preservation would require for no good reason; but more to the point, in so doing it does not even *succeed* in 'preserving itself', but rather, *disintegrates* . . . The impulse which holds sway here must account for precisely this *indifference* to self-preservation. To call this activity 'hunger' is to interpret it in terms of fundamentally dissimilar and more complicated organisms (hunger is a later, more specialized form of this impulse, an expression of the division of labour, in service of a higher impulse which holds sway over it).

652

Hunger can no more be regarded as the *primum mobile* than self-preservation: hunger understood as the result of malnutrition means hunger as the result of a *will to power which is no longer able to prevail*. Cell division is the result of too weak a unity. It is certainly not a matter of the restoration of what has been lost – it is only later when, owing to the division of labour, the will to power learns how to pursue entirely different forms of satisfaction that the organism is able to *reduce* the necessity of appropriation to mere hunger, to the necessity of restoring what has been lost.

653

The false '*altruism*' of biologists is laughable: the reproduction of the amoeba is like throwing out ballast, a pure advantage. It is the excretion of useless matter.

654

The division of a protoplasm into two takes place when it lacks the power to control what it has appropriated: procreation is due to impotence.

Thus when the males out of hunger seek the female and merge with it, procreation is the result of a kind of hunger.

655

We see the weaker one thronging towards the stronger from the need for nutrition; it wants to be sheltered by it, if possible to become *one* with it. The stronger, conversely, wards them off; it refuses to perish in this way; rather, in the course of growing, it divides into two or more.

The greater the impetus towards unity, the more that weakness is implied; the greater the impetus towards variety, differentiation, internal disintegration, the greater the strength.

In the organic as much as in the inorganic world, the forces of attraction and repulsion are what bind things together. The whole distinction between organic and inorganic is a prejudice.

It is *more accurate* to say that there is a will to power in every alliance, *defending itself against the stronger and preying upon the weaker*. NB. *Processes considered as 'beings'*.

656

The will to power can manifest itself only against *resistance*; it therefore seeks out that which resists it – this is the primordial tendency of the protoplasm when it sends out its pseudopodia and gropes about. The act of appropriation and assimilation is, above all, an expression of the desire to subdue, a process of forming and shaping and reshaping, until at last the subdued falls entirely under the power of its attacker, and in so doing augments it. If this process of incorporation does not succeed, then the structure is likely to fall apart; and then a

duality appears as the result of the will to power: in order to prevent the escape of that which has been captured, the will to power divides into two halves (under some circumstances without completely abandoning the connection between them).

The experience of 'hunger' is only a closer adaptation, once the fundamental impetus towards power has achieved a more intellectual form.

657

What is 'passive'? Resisting and reacting. Being *hindered* from reaching forwards; thus an act of resistance and reaction.

What is 'active'? Grasping at power.

'Nutrition' is only derivative, the original form is to want to encompass everything within oneself.

'Procreation' is only derivative: originally, where one will does not suffice to organize the whole appropriation, an *opposing will* comes into effect, which tries to break away and establish a new centre of organization, after a struggle with the original will.

Pleasure is a feeling of power (presupposing pain).

658

Towards a plan. *Introduction.*

(1) The organic functions are to be traced back to the fundamental will, the will to power – and shown to be ramifications of it.

(2) Thought, sensation, will or volition are present in all living organisms. What then is pleasure other than overcoming a painful impediment (or, better still, a rhythm of interruption and resistance), which arouses the feeling of power – and through that pleasure swells; thus pain is included in all pleasure. If the pleasure is to be very great, the pains preceding it must be quite prolonged, and the tension of the bow must be extreme.

(3) The will to power becomes specialized as the will to nutrition, property, *tools*, servants – as ruling and obeying: the body. The stronger will controls the weaker. There is no

other causality than the influence of will on will. There is as yet absolutely no mechanistic [explanation for this].

(4) Intellectual functions: the desire to arrange, assimilate, etc.

Appendix. The philosophers' great misconceptions.

(b) Man

659
With the body as our guide

Granting that 'the soul' was an attractive and mysterious notion which philosophers were rightly reluctant to abandon, it may be that what they have come to put in its place is even more attractive, even more mysterious. The human body, in which the ancient and recent past is alive and embodied, recapitulates the whole history of organic evolution; a great yet soundless torrent seems to rush through, over and beyond it. The body is a more astonishing notion than the old 'soul'.

There has always been more belief in the body, as that part of us which most certainly exists, in short, as ego, than in the intellect (or the 'soul', or 'the subject', to use the current academic terminology). It has never occurred to anyone to consider his stomach as an alien, that is, a divine, stomach. But to apprehend his ideas as 'inspired', his value judgements as 'whispers of the divine', his instincts as the work of daemons? This human tendency and predilection has always been very much in evidence. Even now, it is quite common for artists in particular to express a sort of astonishment and a respectful reluctance to form an opinion, when asked how they manage to throw the dice so well and where their creative ideas come from. When the question is put to them, they respond with all the innocence and embarrassment of a child, for they dare not say 'that came from me, it was my hand that threw the dice'. Conversely, even those philosophers and religious men who in their logic and piety found the most compelling reasons to regard things of the flesh as illusions (specifically as illusions overcome and abolished), could not help but recognize the stubborn fact that their own bodies still remained: the strangest testimony on this subject is to be found partly in Paul and partly in Vedanta philosophy.

But in the end, what significance does *strength of belief* have! Strongly held beliefs, for all that, might be quite foolish beliefs! There is food for thought.

And in the end, if belief in the body is only the result of an inference, suppose it were a false inference, as the idealists maintain: does not the fact that the intellect causes such false inferences raise a question about the credibility of the intellect itself? Suppose that multiplicity, space, time and motion (and whatever else might be a presupposition of the belief in corporeality) turn out to be errors, what suspicions will that arouse against the intellect which had led us to such presuppositions! Suffice it to say that, for the time being, belief in the body remains a stronger belief than belief in the intellect, and whoever undermines it, just as thoroughly undermines belief in the authority of the intellect.

660
On hierarchy. For Book I.

On the physiology of power. The aristocracy within the body, the majority of the dominant parts (the struggle of tissues?).

Slavery and the division of labour: the higher type is possible only through the reduction of inferior types to a subordinate function.

Pleasure and pain are not opposites. The sense of power.

Nutrition is only a consequence of an insatiable desire to appropriate, of the will to power.

Procreation is the disintegration which occurs when the dominant cells are powerless to organize what they have appropriated.

It is the *formative* force that wants to have a continual supply of new 'material' (to have still more 'force' at its disposal). Consider the masterpiece of construction represented by the emergence of an organism from an egg.

'The mechanistic view' makes use of nothing but quantities; but the nature of force is qualitative; mechanics can therefore only describe processes, not explain them.

Consider the notion 'purpose'. Our starting point should be the 'sagacity' of plants.

The notion 'perfection' involves not only greater *complexity*, but greater *power* (which requires something more than just greater masses).

Conclusion concerning the development of mankind: perfection consists in the production of the most powerful individuals, who turn the great multitude into instruments (albeit into the most intelligent and versatile instruments possible).

The artist as the formative process in miniature. The pedantry of the 'educator' in opposition. Punishment: the maintenance of a higher type. Isolation.

We have drawn the wrong lesson from history. *The fact that* something higher is flawed or subject to abuse (like aristocracy) is no refutation!

661

NB. How profound are the 'creative'?

Why [is] it that all *activity*, even that of a *sense organ*, is associated with pleasure? Was it because, before, there had been an inhibition or pressure? Or rather, is it because all action is a process of overcoming, mastering and *increasing the feeling of power*? The pleasure of thinking. Ultimately it is not only the feeling of power, but also the pleasure taken in the creating, and the *creation*; for all activity enters our consciousness as consciousness of a 'work'.

662

Creating – the act of *selecting*, and of *finishing* the thing selected. (In every voluntary act, *this* is what is *essential*.)

663

All that happens out of intention may be reduced to the *intention of increasing power.*

664

Psychology of error. When we act, and often even before we act, there is always an accompanying *sense of strength* at the thought of what is to be done (as at the sight of an obstacle or enemy to whom we think ourselves equal). We instinctively feel

that this is the cause of the action, that it is the 'force' behind it. Our belief in causality is the belief in strength and its influence; we transfer this experience to things, identifying force with this sense of strength. Force, however, never moves things, the felt force does not 'set the muscles in motion'. 'We have no experience, no idea of such a process.' 'We no more experience force as bringing about motion than we do the *necessity* of motion.' But force should compel! 'We only experience that one thing follows another – we do not experience that one thing follows another by compulsion or caprice.'[21] Our notion of causality arises only from trying to understand the sequence of processes in terms of compulsion. This gives us a certain 'understanding' of the process, i.e. we have humanized it, made it 'familiar': what is familiar is our habitual acquaintance with human compulsion *and the sense of strength we associate with it.*

665

I form the intention of extending my arm; on the assumption that I know as little about the physiology about the human body and of the mechanical laws of its movements as the man in the street, what could be more vague, pale and indeterminate than this intention when compared with what follows? And suppose that I were the most brilliant of the mechanists, and especially well versed in the mathematical formulae which are applicable to this case, I should be able to extend my arm not one whit better or worse. Our 'knowledge' and our 'action' in this case lie far removed from one another, as though in two different realms. On the other hand, how are we to understand the fact that Napoleon executes the plan for a campaign? Here, every part of the execution of the plan is *known*, because everything must be expressly ordered; but even here we must presuppose the existence of subordinates who interpret the general plan, adapting it to the particular needs of the moment, the forces available, etc.

666

Psychology of error. From time immemorial we have placed the value of an action, of a character, of a life, on the intention,

on the end for which it was done, acted or lived; this ancient idiosyncrasy of taste finally takes a dangerous turn – provided that the unintended and inadvertent character of all that occurs is brought to our attention more and more. This seems to set the stage for a general reduction in value, 'nothing has any meaning'. This melancholy proposition says: 'All meaning lies in intention, and if intention is entirely absent, then meaning is entirely absent as well.' In accordance with this assessment, one was compelled to shift the value of life to a 'life after death', or in the progressive development of ideas, or of mankind, or of the nation, or beyond man; but with that we arrive at a *progressus in infinitum*[22] of ends: it finally became necessary to find one's place in the 'world process' (perhaps with the thought that, from a dysdaemonistic perspective, it is a process which leads to nothingness).[23]

In this connection, the notion 'end' stands in need of a more rigorous criticism. It must be realized that an action is *never the result of an end*. Ends and means are interpretations by which certain points in an event are selected and emphasized at the expense of others, and indeed, at the expense of most of them. Every time something is purportedly done with an end in view, something fundamentally distinct and different is occurring. An action performed with an end in view may be likened to the alleged purpose of the heat which is radiated from the sun, the greater part of which is wasted, and only an inconsiderable part of which serves any 'purpose' or has any 'meaning'. To call something an 'end' (along with its 'means') is to provide an indescribably vague characterization, the kind of thing which may indeed be issued as an instruction, as a '*volition*', if we presuppose a system of trained and obedient instruments who will replace the vagueness of such a variable with clear and definite magnitudes. In other words, if we imagine a system of *abler* but narrower intellects who determine the ends and means, in order that we may give the role of 'cause of an action' to the only 'end' with which we are familiar, an idea to which we are not entitled – it would be to solve a problem by relegating its solution to a world inaccessible to our observation. Finally, what reason is there to think that 'an end' is not

an *epiphenomenon* of the series of changes the active forces undergo which produce the appropriate action? A pale emblem prefiguring in consciousness what will happen, serving to orient us to it, something which is itself a symptom of the event but is *not* its cause? But with that do we not criticize *volition itself*? Is it not an illusion to regard the conscious act of volition as a cause? Are not all conscious phenomena only terminal phenomena, the last links of a chain, but which in their succession within a plane of consciousness seem to be conditioned only by themselves? After all, this might be an illusion.

667

Science does *not* ask what prompts this volition of ours; rather, it *denies that we have volition at all*, and says that something else entirely occurs – in short, that the belief in will and intentions is an illusion. Science does not investigate the *motives* of an action, as if these had been present in our consciousness before the action; rather, science first analyses the action into a group of mechanical phenomena, and seeks the antecedent of this mechanical motion – but *not* in terms of feeling, sensation or thought. Sensation is precisely what *needs to be explained. Therefore* science can never accept such an explanation. The problem for science is simply this: to explain the world without using sensations as causes; for that would mean regarding the sensations themselves as the causes of sensations. The task of science is by no means accomplished.

Thus, either there is no such thing as the will at all – the hypothesis of science – or the will is free. The latter assumption represents the prevailing feeling, of which we cannot rid ourselves, even if the hypothesis in question were *proved*.

The popular belief in cause and effect rests on the presupposition that free will is the *cause of every effect*: only here do we have the impression of causality. From this also comes the feeling that every cause is *not* an effect, but always only a cause – if the will is the cause. 'Our voluntary actions are *not bound by necessity*' – that is *contained* in the notion '*will*'. What we feel is that the effect necessarily follows the cause. It is a mere *hypothesis* that in every instance our volition is forced.

668

'Willing' is *not* 'desiring', striving, yearning; it distinguishes itself from these by the *sense of command*. There is no such thing as '*willing*', but always only the *willing of something*; we must not disengage the aim from the state as the epistemologists do. 'Willing', as they understand it, is no more real than 'thinking'; it is a pure fiction. It is a part of willing that *something is commanded* (but that is not to say that the volition is 'executed'). That general state of *tension* by which a force seeks discharge is not 'willing'.

669

Pain and pleasure are the silliest *means* imaginable for the expression of judgements, which of course does not mean that the judgements which are made clear in this way must be silly. The omission of all reasoning and logic; the reduction of everything to a passionate desire for, or aversion to, some particular object, to its affirmation or negation; an abrupt curtailment of deliberation the benefits of which are undeniable: that is pain and pleasure. Its origin is in the central sphere of the intellect; its presupposition is an infinitely accelerated process of perception, organization, subsumption, examination, deduction; pleasure and pain are always terminal phenomena, not 'causes' . . . The decision as to what shall excite pain and pleasure depends upon the degree of power; the same thing which seems dangerous to a creature with a small amount of power, and which seems immediately to compel it to defend itself, may, for a creature more conscious of the abundance of its power, produce a voluptuous sensation and a sense of pleasure. All feelings of pleasure and pain already presuppose a *measurement of the total amount of benefit and harm*, and therefore a sphere in which the willing of an end (a state) and the choice of a means takes place. Pleasure and pain are never just irreducible 'facts'. The feelings of pleasure and pain are *reactions of the will* (*emotions*) in which the intellectual centre determines the value to the organism of certain changes which have occurred in the total amount of value it has, at the same time that it adopts counter-measures.

670

The belief in 'emotions'. Emotions are a fabrication of the intellect, an *invention of causes* which do not exist. All common bodily *sensations* that we do not understand are interpreted *intellectually*, i.e. we seek the *cause* of our feeling this way or that in persons, experiences, etc.; thus something harmful, dangerous or strange is *taken for* the cause of our agitation; in fact, it is *added to* it for the sake of *intelligibility.* Frequent increased blood-flow to the brain, attended by a sense of suffocation, is *interpreted* as *anger*: the people and things that provoke us to anger elicit this physiological condition. Subsequently, after long habituation, certain circumstances and sensations are so regularly correlated that the sight of the one revives the other, accompanied by vascular congestion, the excitement of seminal fluid, etc., so by association we then say that the 'emotion is excited'.

Judgements already enter into the sensations of 'pleasure' and 'pain'; the stimuli are distinguished by whether they are conducive to the feeling of power or not.

The belief in volition. To consider a thought the cause of a mechanical motion is to believe in miracles. The *consistency* of *science* demands that once we have rendered the world *intelligible* by means of thumbnail sketches, we should also render the emotions, the desires, the will, etc. *intelligible*, i.e. we should *deny* them and *regard* them *as errors of the intellect.*

671

Free will or no free will? There is *no such thing as will.*

Before an intention to act can be formed, the action must be prepared, and made possible mechanically. Put another way: *generally*, the idea of the '*purpose*' appears in the brain only after all is prepared for its accomplishment. The idea of the purpose is an 'internal' 'stimulus' – nothing more.

There is no 'will': the will is merely a simplified conception of the understanding, like 'matter'.

672

The most recent prior history of an action pertains to that action; but *further back* lies a prior history which explains matters *further afield*; the individual action is at the same time linked to a much more comprehensive, *later* fact. The *shorter* and *longer* processes are not separate.

673

The theory of *chance: the soul is selective and self-nourishing*, exceedingly clever and *endlessly* inventive (this *creative* force is usually overlooked! It is regarded as merely '*passive*'.)

The active and creative force within chance should be recognized.

Chance itself is *nothing more than the clash of creative impulses.*

674

That which is called a good action is a mere misunderstanding; such actions are not possible. 'Selfishness', like 'selflessness', is a popular fiction; similarly, the individual, the soul.

In the vast multiplicity of events within an organism, that part which becomes conscious is but a small corner of it, and the little bit which consists of 'virtue', 'selflessness' and similar fictions, is belied by the rest of the totality of events in a completely radical way. We would do well to study our organism in all its immorality . . .

The animal functions are invariably a million times more important than any fine sentiments and rarefied states of consciousness; the latter are superfluous unless they are obliged to serve as instruments of these animal functions. The whole of *conscious* life, the intellect along with the soul, along with the heart, along with goodness, along with virtue – for whose sake does it labour? Its purpose lies in the greatest possible perfection of the means (subsistence and improvement); it exists for the sake of the fundamental animal functions; above all, for the *improvement of life.*

That which is called 'body' and 'flesh' is of such unspeakably greater importance; the rest is a small accessory to it. To

continue to spin the thread of life *so that the cord becomes ever stronger* – that is the task. But now observe how the heart, the soul, virtue and intellect actually conspire to transform this fundamental task into its *opposite*, as if *they* were the aim . . . The degeneration of life is mainly due to consciousness and its remarkable aptitude for error, which is barely held in check by the instincts at all; this is the reason why consciousness *errs* the longest and the most fundamentally. To gauge whether existence has any value by consulting the pleasant or unpleasant feelings present in this consciousness: can any wilder, more extravagant vanity be conceived? Consciousness is only a means, and pleasant and unpleasant feelings are also only a means. By what standard, then, is *value* objectively measured? Solely by the amount of *power which one has amassed and organized*, in accordance with that which is occurring in all events, a desire for more . . .

675

The value of devaluing. We must restore to the notion of an action the notion of an *actor*, after having conceptually taken it away, and having thus deprived action of its reason for being. We must also restore to the notion of an action the notion of acting in some *particular* way, with some particular 'end', 'intention' or 'purpose' in view, after artificially taking it away and having thus deprived action of its reason for being.

It should be recognized that all 'purposes', 'ends' and 'meanings' are only modes of expression and metamorphoses of the one will which is inherent in all that occurs, the will to power; that to have purposes, ends, intentions, to *will* at all is in effect to intend to become stronger, to intend to grow and also to intend the *means of doing so*; that the most common and most base instinct in all acting and willing is for that very reason the one which has remained the most unknown and most hidden, because *in praxi* we always follow its bidding, for the simple reason that we *are* this bidding . . .

All value judgements are only narrower points of view *in service of this one will* and consequences of the same; the act of value judgement itself is nothing but this will to power. A

criticism of being on the basis of any one of these values is an incongruity and a misunderstanding; for even supposing that it initiates a process of destruction, that process is still *in the service of that will* . . .

We have passed judgement on being itself; but this act of passing judgement itself is still a part of being – and by saying no, we thus still do what we *are* . . . We must realize the absurdity of this attitude of judging existence, and then try to divine *what* has actually transpired here. It is symptomatic.

676
Concerning the Origin of our Value Judgements
In Praise of the Value Judgement

We can explain our bodies in terms of extension, and by so doing acquire exactly the same conception of them as we have of the solar system; the difference between organic and inorganic can no longer be discerned.

Once the causes of planetary motion were sought in the actions of conscious, purposeful beings: this is no longer necessary, and the belief that bodily movement and changes can be similarly explained has long since been abandoned. The great majority of movements have nothing to do with consciousness at all, *nor with sensation*. Sensations and thoughts are *extremely rare* and *slight* when compared with the innumerable events of each passing moment. On the other hand, even the smallest events show *purpose*, forethought, discrimination, organization, regeneration, etc. that exceeds our comprehension. In short, they display an activity we are apt to attribute to a superintending *intellect incalculably superior* to any known to us. We have learned to *think less of* consciousness: we cease to blame ourselves because, as conscious, purposeful beings, *we* are the least part of our actions. Of the numerous influences exerted during every moment, e.g. air, electricity, we feel next to nothing: there might be plenty of forces of which we are unaware constantly affecting us. Sensations like pleasure and pain are rather few and far between compared with the countless stimuli that cells or organs impart to other cells or organs.

This is the phase of the *humility of consciousness*. Finally, we see even the conscious self as only an instrument in the service of that superior, superintending intellect; and then we may ask whether all conscious *volition*, all *conscious intentions*, all *value judgements*, are not perhaps only *means* for the attainment of something essentially *different* from what within consciousness seems to be the case. We *mean*: if it were a question of our *pleasure* and *pain* – but pleasure and pain might be the means by which we *accomplish* something which lies outside our consciousness . . . The object is to show how *superficial* everything conscious really is; how an action and the picture we have of it *differ*, how *little* we know of what *precedes* an action; how fanciful our impressions of 'free will', of 'cause and effect' are; how thoughts are but pictures, and words are but the signs of thought; the inscrutability of every action; the superficiality of all praise and blame; how *figments of the imagination* are *essential* to our conscious lives, how in all our words we speak of nothing but these figments (even our emotions), and how *human relations* seem to rest on the composition and transmission of them while the *real* human relation (procreation) goes unrecognized. Has mankind been in any way *altered* by belief in these common human figments? Or is the whole body of intellectual and evaluative judgements *in itself* only an *expression* of unrecognized changes? *Are there* really such things as volition, intention, thought and value? Is the whole of conscious life perhaps no more than a *reflection of something else*? And even when a value judgement seems to *determine* a man's character, is what is really happening something quite different? In short: suppose it were possible to explain the purposiveness in the workings of nature without the assumption of an intelligence behind them; might not *our* intentions, volition, etc. be only *symbolic gestures* expressing something quite different – that is to say, something involuntary and unconscious? Something which, although bearing but the *faintest resemblance* to that natural purposiveness in the organic world, is not essentially different from it?

Briefly: perhaps the progress of the human mind is entirely a matter of the *body*; that a *superior physique is forming* which

is the *tangible and prospective history* of that progress. The organic is rising to still higher levels. Our thirst for natural knowledge is the body's means of self-perfection. Or rather: hundreds of thousands of experiments are being made to change the body's diet, habitat and way of life; consciousness and its value judgements, every kind of pleasure and pain, are *indications of these changes and experiments. In the end, it is not a question of man at all, for he shall be surpassed.*

677
Will to Truth. Interpretation.

To what extent are all interpretations of the world a symptom of a dominant impulse?

The *artistic* view of the world; to be a spectator of life. But we still lack an analysis of aesthetic intuition, its roots in cruelty, its sense of assurance, of the authority to pass judgement, lofty indifference, etc. We also require a critique of the artist himself, and of his psychology (that is, of the play impulse as a release of energy, of the delight in change, in leaving the stamp of one's personality, the absolute egoism of the artist, etc.). What impulses does he render sublime?

The *scientific and scholarly* view of the world; critique of the psychological need for science and scholarship. The desire to make everything comprehensible; the desire to make everything practical, useful, serviceable – to what extent is all of this anti-aesthetic? The sole value is that which may be quantified and calculated. The extent to which a mediocre kind of man wants to attain predominance. It would be terrible if even *history*, the domain of the superior man, of the man who passes judgement, were to be taken possession of in this way. What impulses he sublimates!

The *religious* view of the world; critique of the religious man. He is *not* necessarily the same as the moral man, but rather a man who ascends to heights of exaltation, who descends to depths of despair, and who interprets these states with gratitude or suspicion – without, however, attributing either of them (especially not the latter!) to a source within himself. He is essentially a man who feels himself to be 'unfree', and

who renders this condition, his instinctive tendency to submit, sublime.

The *moral* view of the world; the sense of social order is projected onto the universe; because immutability, the rule of law, categorization, equal status are so highly prized, they are sought even in the highest places, above everything or behind everything; similarly . . .

What they have in *common*: the dominant impulses also wish to be regarded as possessing *supreme authority to pass judgement with respect to values in general, even as being creative and ruling powers.* It goes without saying that these impulses are either hostile towards one another or subjugate one another (probably by forming a synthetic unity as well), or alternate in their supremacy. Their profound antagonism is so great that, where they all clamour for satisfaction, a man of profound *mediocrity* is to be expected.

678

Value of truth and error. The origin of our value judgements lies in our needs. Should the origin of our apparent 'knowledge' be sought in our *older value judgements*, which are so firmly incorporated that they have become second nature to us? Is it but a matter of *more recent* needs being pitted against the *product of the oldest needs*?

The world is understood, felt and interpreted as it is, so that organic life may be preserved by means of this interpretative point of view. A man is no mere individual, but rather the living organic totality in one particular line. The fact that *he* endures thereby proves that a species of interpretation (albeit one constantly under construction) has also endured; it proves that the system of interpretation has not changed. 'Adaptation.'

Our 'dissatisfaction', our 'ideal', etc. are perhaps the *consequence* of this incorporated bit of interpretation, of our perspectival aspect; perhaps the organic world will ultimately perish of it – in the same way that, in organisms, the division of labour, together with an atrophy and weakening of the parts, eventually brings with it the death of the whole. Organic life in its highest form is as subject to destruction as the individual is.

679

Individuation, judged from the standpoint of the theory of common descent, shows the constant decomposition of one into two, and the equally constant passing away of many individuals *for the sake of the few individuals* who continue the evolution; the overwhelming majority die off each time ('the body'). The fundamental phenomenon is that *innumerable individuals are sacrificed for the sake of a few*, in order to enable their existence. We must not deceive ourselves, it is the same with *peoples* and *races*: they form the 'body' for producing isolated, *valuable individuals*, who continue the great process.

680

I am opposed to the theory that the individual deliberately sacrifices his own interests for those of his *species* and its progeny; that is only an *illusion*. The enormous importance which the individual attaches to the *sexual instinct* is not a *consequence* of its importance to the species; for procreation is the actual *accomplishment* of the individual and thus it is his supreme interest, *the supreme expression of his power* (judged, of course, not in terms of his conscious desires, but in terms of the central tendency of the whole process).

681

Principle of life. The *fundamental errors* of previous biologists: it is *not* a matter of the species, but of *stronger, more effective individuals* (the many are mere means). Life is *not* adaptation of internal to external conditions, but the will to power, which, proceeding from these internal conditions, subjects more and more of the 'external' world to its control and incorporates it into itself. These biologists *perpetuate* moral value judgements (the intrinsically higher value of altruism, the hostility towards ambition, towards war, towards impracticality, towards hierarchy and caste).

682

In natural science, the moral disparagement of the *ego* goes hand in hand with the overestimation of the *species*. But the

species is just as illusory as the ego, for here a false distinction has been made. The ego is a hundred times more than a mere link in a chain; it is nothing less than the *chain* itself; and the species is a mere abstraction from the multiplicity of these chains and their partial similarity. The idea that the individual is *sacrificed* to the species, as is often asserted, is by no means the fact of the matter, but rather the very model of an erroneous interpretation.

683

The formula for the *superstitious belief in 'progress'*, by a famous physiologist of the cerebral activities: '*L'animal ne fait jamais de progrès comme espèce; l'homme seul fait de progrès comme espèce.*'[24] No . . .

684

Against Darwin. The *domestication of man*: what definitive value can it have? Or has domestication a definitive value at all? There are reasons for denying the latter.

The school of Darwin makes the utmost effort to persuade us to the contrary: it endeavours to show that the *influence of domestication* may be profound, even fundamental. For the time being, we adhere to the older opinion; so far, domestication has been shown to have nothing but a very superficial effect – or else degeneration. And everything which escapes human control and cultivation almost immediately reverts to its natural state. The type remains constant, one cannot '*dénaturer la nature*'.

The Darwinists rely upon the struggle for existence, the death of the weaker creatures and the survival of the most robust and most gifted; consequently they imagine a *continuous increase in the perfection of all creatures*. We, on the contrary, are quite assured that in the struggle for existence, chance serves the weak as well as the strong; that cunning often advantageously substitutes itself for strength; that the fruitfulness of a species bears a remarkable relation to the *likelihood of its destruction* . . .

They attribute to *natural selection* both gradual and limitless metamorphoses; they wish to believe that every advantageous trait is hereditary and is expressed more strongly with each successive generation (whereas heredity is in fact so capricious, that . . .); they observe the successful adaptations of certain creatures to very special conditions of life, and explain that they are obtained through the *influence of the milieux*.

Nowhere do we find examples of *unconscious selection* (not in the slightest). The most disparate individuals breed with one another; the extremes blend into one another and are lost in the throng. They all compete with each other to preserve the type; creatures whose external markings protect them from certain dangers do not lose them when they find themselves in circumstances where they may live without danger . . . When they live in places where their protective covering ceases to conceal them, they do not approximate themselves to their *milieu* in any way. The Darwinists have exaggerated the importance of *selection of the most beautiful* in nature in such a way that it goes far beyond the impulse towards beauty in our own race! In fact, the most beautiful creature couples with the disfavoured, and the largest ones with the smallest ones. We almost always observe males and females taking advantage [of] any chance encounter, with no fastidiousness at all. They think that modification through climate and diet is important – but it is a matter of absolute indifference.

There are no *intermediate forms* . . .

They trace different kinds back to one. But experience says that unions between different kinds will be condemned to sterility and a type will again become dominant. They assert that the evolution of creatures is cumulative, a principle for which there is no foundation. Each type has its *limits*, beyond which there is no evolution. Up to that point, there is absolute regularity. Primitive creatures are supposed to be the ancestors of those of the present day. But a look at the fauna and flora of the Tertiary period only allows us to conceive of an as yet unexplored environment, where there are types which do not exist

elsewhere, and are akin to each other, and even those which do exist elsewhere.

My conclusions

My general point of view. First proposition: man as a species is not progressing. Higher types are indeed produced, but they do not endure. The general level of the species is *not* raised.

Second proposition: man as a species does not represent progress in comparison with any other animal. Flora and fauna as a whole do not evolve from lower to higher . . . Rather, everything evolves simultaneously, with each species superimposed on the others, the whole in confusion and conflict. The most fruitful and complex forms – because the phrase 'higher type' means no more than this – perish more readily; and the lowest types possess an apparent immortality. The former are seldom attained, and maintain their superiority at great cost to themselves; the latter are embarrassingly prolific. Even with mankind, the higher types, evolution's strokes of good fortune, perish more readily under changing circumstances of prosperity and adversity. They are exposed to every kind of *décadence*; they are extreme, and for that reason alone, almost already *décadents* . . . The short duration of beauty, of genius, of Caesar, is *sui generis*; such things are not passed down to future generations. By contrast, a *type* is passed down, a type is nothing extreme, no 'stroke of good fortune' . . . This is not due to the 'malignancy' of nature, or a peculiar doom which befalls the higher type, but simply what it is to *be* a 'higher type'; the higher type involves an incomparably greater degree of complexity – a greater sum of coordinated elements; but for this reason disintegration becomes incomparably more probable. 'Genius' is the most sublime machine there is, and thus the most fragile.

Third proposition: the domestication ('the culture') of man does not go very deep. When it does, it immediately becomes degeneration (the Christian being typical in this respect). The 'wild' man (or, expressed in moral terms, the *evil* man) is a return to nature – and, in a certain sense, its restoration, its *recovery* from the effects of 'culture' . . .

685

The contrary movement: against Darwin. What surprises me most on making a general survey of the grand destinies of man, is that I invariably see the opposite of what today Darwin and his school sees or *wishes* to see: the progress of the species, and selection in favour of the stronger and fitter. Precisely the opposite of this is palpable: the elimination of the strokes of good fortune, the inutility of the more highly developed types, the inevitable preponderance of the average, and even of the *below*-average types. Unless we are shown some reason why man is an exception among creatures, I tend to assume that Darwin's school is entirely mistaken. That will to power in which I recognize the ultimate ground and character of all change provides us with the means to assess why selection is never in favour of the exceptions and of the strokes of good fortune; the strongest and most serendipitous individuals are at a disadvantage when they are opposed by the organized gregarious instincts and timidity of the weak, of the majority. My general view of the world of values shows that the select types, the strokes of good fortune, do *not* [have] the upper hand when it comes to the supreme values which are now imposed upon mankind, but rather the types of *décadence* – perhaps there is nothing more interesting in the world than this *unwelcome* spectacle . . .

Strange as it may sound, one always has to arm the strong against the weak, the serendipitous against the hapless, the wholesome against the corrupt and congenitally afflicted. If we drew our *morality* from reality, then it would read thus: the ordinary are more valuable than the extraordinary, and the forms of decadence more valuable than the ordinary; the desire for nothingness has the upper hand over the desire for life – and the general aim now is (to express it in Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian terms): better *not* to be than to be.

I am *outraged* by this way of drawing morality from reality, and therefore regard Christianity with a mortal loathing, because it created sublime phrases and gestures in order to cloak an execrable reality in the mantle of justice, virtue and godliness . . .

I see all philosophers, scientists and scholars on their knees before a reality which is the *opposite* of 'the struggle for existence', as Darwin and his school teach it – that is to say, for the most part it is those who are in the ascendant, those who persist, who are an embarrassment to life and its value. The error of Darwin's school became a problem to me, for how can one be so blind as to not see *this*? . . .

That species represent any progress is the most idle assertion in the world; for the time being, they represent a plateau. There is no evidence thus far that higher organisms have evolved from lower ones. I see that the lower types, owing to their numbers, their shrewdness and their cunning, now predominate – and I fail to see an instance in which an accidental variation was advantageous, at least not over a long stretch of time; why an accidental variation had become so well established would be yet another thing which calls for explanation.

I find the much remarked 'cruelty of nature' elsewhere, for she is cruel to her fortunate children; she shelters and protects and loves *les humbles* – just as . . .

In summa, the increase of a species' power may be ensured not so much by the preponderance of its strong, fortunate children as by the preponderance of its average and inferior ones . . . The latter possess great fertility and endurance; the former are increasingly subject to danger, swift destruction and rapid decline in numbers.

686

NB. Hitherto, man has been the man of the future in embryo, so to speak – *all* the forces for development in *that* direction can be found in him; and because these forces are prodigious, for the modern individual, *the more he determines the future*, the more he will *suffer*. This is the deepest view of *suffering*: the forces for development get in each other's way.

We must not be deceived by the isolation of the individual – in truth, some tendency deeper than these individuals continually runs through them. The individual may feel isolated, but *that* part of the process serves as the *most powerful spur* towards the most distant aims: it is his pursuit of *his own*

happiness that tempers these forces and gives them coherence so that they do [not] destroy each other.

687

An excess of intellectual strength directs itself towards new aims; *it is by no means limited to commanding and leading for the sake of the inferior world, or for the sake of preserving the organism*, the 'individual'. We are more than individuals: we are still the whole chain of events which led up to us, and inherit all of *its* future tasks.

3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Values

688

A unitary conception of psychology. We are accustomed to maintain that the embodiment of a vast abundance of forms is compatible with a single origin. The fact is that the will to power is the most elementary form of emotion, and that all other emotions are only the embodiments of it; that it is most enlightening to substitute power for unalloyed 'happiness' (after which every living organism is supposed to strive): 'there is striving for power, for more power'; pleasure is only a symptom of the feeling of attaining power, the consciousness of a difference – there is no striving for pleasure, rather, pleasure occurs when we attain that which we strive for; pleasure is an accompaniment, not a motivation . . . The fact is that all motive force is the will to power, and that there is no other force, either physical, dynamical or psychological . . .

In our science, where the concept of cause and effect is reduced to an equation, in which the ambition is to demonstrate that the same amount of force is found on each side, *the motive force is absent*; we observe only results, postulate that they are equal with respect to the force they contain, and neglect to enquire into the *cause* of a change . . .

It is a mere matter of experience that change *never ceases*; we have not the slightest assurance that one change must follow upon another. On the contrary, *any state which had been*

attained would seem obliged to maintain itself, unless it has the capacity to wish *not* [to] maintain itself . . . Spinoza's proposition concerning self-preservation[25] should actually put an end to change. But the proposition is false; the *contrary* is true. It is precisely a living organism in which it is most clearly shown that it does what it does *not* to preserve itself, but to become *something more* . . .

689

Critique of the notion 'causality'. Considered psychologically, the notion 'cause' is thus our sense of power in the act which is called willing – our notion 'effect' is the superstition that the sense of power is itself what moves things . . .

A state which accompanies an event and is already an effect of that event is projected as the 'sufficient reason' of the same; the tension in our sense of power, pleasure as the sense of power, of resistance overcome – are these things illusions?

If we translate the notion 'cause' back into the only familiar sphere from which we have taken it, we cannot envisage any *change* in which the will to power is not present. We do not know how to account for a change which is not an encroachment of one power on another.

Mechanics only shows us the consequences, and then only figuratively (motion is a figure of speech). Gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, because it is itself the reason why there are mechanical consequences in the first place.

We tend to regard the desire to accumulate strength as specific to the phenomenon of life – to nutrition, procreation, heredity – or as specific to society, the state, custom and authority. Should we not be permitted to assume that this will is also the motive cause in chemistry? And in the cosmic order?

Not only is there conservation of energy, but maximum economy in its consumption, so that the sole reality is the *desire to become stronger by every centre of force* – not self-preservation, but rather appropriation, the desire to become master, to become more, to become stronger.

Is the fact that science is possible the proof of any principle of causation? Of such principles as 'from like causes, like

effects', 'a permanent law of things' or 'an *invariable* order'? Because something is predictable, is it therefore necessary?

The fact that something happens thus and not otherwise implies quanta of force whose essence consists in wielding power over all other quanta of force, not that there is a 'principle', 'law' or 'order' involved. With regard to the belief in cause and effect, the main thing is always forgotten: the *event* itself. In postulating an agent which produces the action, we have merely hypothesized the action all over again.

Can we assume the existence of a striving after *power* without a sensation of pleasure and pain, i.e. without an increase or reduction in the sense of power? Is mechanism only a symbolic language for the factual world of fighting and conquering quanta of will concealed *within*? All of the presuppositions of mechanism, matter, atoms, pressure and impact, gravity are not facts in themselves, but interpretations arrived at with the help of *psychological* fictions.

Life, as the form of existence which is most familiar to us, is specifically 'the desire to accumulate strength'; all the processes of life hinge on this; no being merely seeks to preserve itself, rather, everything it seeks is to be aggregated and accumulated.

I take life as an isolated case, and extrapolate from there to the overall character of existence; life strives for the *maximum sense of power*; life is essentially a striving for more power; striving as such is nothing but a striving for power; this will remains the most fundamental fact, the innermost fact: mechanism is merely the semiotics of its consequences.

690

We cannot find the reason why there is any evolution at all by way of research into evolution itself; we should not try to understand evolution as 'coming into being', let alone as having come into being . . .

The will to power cannot have come into being.

691

How does the whole organic process comport itself *in opposition to* the rest of nature? That is where the *fundamental will* reveals itself.

692

A unitary conception of psychology. Is the 'will to power' a kind of 'will', or is it identical with the notion of the 'will'? Is it equivalent to desiring? Or commanding? Is it the 'will' which Schopenhauer believed to be the 'thing-in-itself'? My proposition is that the *will* of psychology so far has been an unjustified generalization, that *no such will as this exists*, that instead of apprehending that one *specific* kind of will unfolds itself into many different forms, Schopenhauer in particular *eliminated* the character of will, owing to the fact that he subtracted its content, its 'whither'; what he calls 'will' is but an empty word. It is even less a matter of a 'will to *live*', for life is just an *isolated example* of the will to power – it is quite arbitrary to assert that everything is striving to subscribe to this form of the will to power.

693

If the innermost essence of being is the will to power, if pleasure is solely a matter of increase in power, and pain is solely the feeling of not being able to resist and dominate; may we not then postulate pleasure and pain as cardinal facts? Is *will* possible without both of these oscillations between affirmation and negation? But *who* is it that feels pleasure? . . . But *who* is it that seeks power? . . . These are absurd questions, if the essence itself (and with it the feelings of pleasure and pain) is the power-seeking will. Nevertheless, it requires opposition and resistance, and therefore, relatively speaking, *unities which encroach on one another's spheres* . . . And they must be localized . . . in order for A to have an effect on B, A must first have a separate location from B.

694

The more resistance which a force seeks to overcome, the greater grows the amount of failure and disaster to which it is subject; and in so far as every force can discharge itself only on something which resists it, an *ingredient of displeasure* is an inevitable part of any action. But this displeasure whets the appetite for life; and strengthens the *will to power*!

695

Décadence in general. If *pleasure* and *pain* are related to the sense of power, life would have to represent an increase in power such that the difference, the sense of 'more' power, would enter consciousness . . . If a degree of power were maintained, pleasure could only be measured in terms of reductions in the degree of pain – *not* of pleasure . . . The desire for more is of the essence of pleasure: it is the experience of power increasing, of the difference in power entering consciousness.

With decadence, past a certain point a difference in the *opposite* direction is felt, and the decrease in power enters consciousness; the recollection of moments of strength in times gone by depresses the present sensations of pleasure – and this comparison now *weakens* our sense of pleasure.

696

It is *not* the satisfaction of the will[26] which causes pleasure; I particularly wish to combat this most superficial of theories, and the preposterous psychological misrepresentation it involves of the things which are closest to us . . .

Rather, the cause of pleasure is the fact that the will presses onwards and prevails against all that stands in its way. It is precisely to the dissatisfaction of the will that the feeling of pleasure is attributable, for, without limits and obstacles, the will is never satisfied.

To be 'happy' is the ideal of the gregarious.

697

The normal *dissatisfaction* of our drives, e.g. of hunger, of sex, of movement, is by no means intrinsically depressing; it serves rather to entice us into a sense of vitality, and like all the rhythms of irritating stimuli, it *invigorates* (whatever the pessimists may say to the contrary). This dissatisfaction, rather than spoiling life for us, serves as the great *stimulus* to it.

We might even describe pleasure in general as a rhythm of irritating stimuli.

698

Kant says: I subscribe to these tenets of Count Verri's (1781 [*Discorso*] *sull' indole del piacere e del dolore*) with full conviction:

Il solo principio motore dell' uomo è il dolore. Il dolore precede ogni piacere.

Il piacere non è un essere positivo.[27]

699

Psychology of the will to power: pleasure, pain. Pain is something different from pleasure – by which I do *not* mean that it is the opposite of pleasure.

While the essence of pleasure has been aptly described as an *increased sense* of power (and thus as the sense of a difference which presupposes a comparison), the essence of pain is not so easily defined. The false oppositions which are the objects of popular belief, and which are *consequently* enshrined in language, always put dangerous fetters on the progress towards truth. There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is conditioned by a certain *rhythmic sequence* of irritating stimuli; in this way a very rapid increase in the sense of power and in the sense of pleasure is attained. This is the case, e.g. with titillation, also with sexual titillation in the act of *coitus*; here we see pain as an active ingredient of pleasure. It appears that a little obstruction has been overcome, immediately followed by another little obstruction, which in turn is overcome; this play of resistance and victory most strongly excites that whole sense of excessive and superfluous power which constitutes the very essence of pleasure.

The contrary case – bringing about an increase in the sense of pain by introducing a succession of little pleasurable stimuli – does not occur; pleasure and pain are simply not contraries.

Pain is an intellectual process in which a judgement is made – the judgement 'harmful', which contains the accumulated lessons of long experience. There is no such thing as pain in itself. It is *not* the injury which hurts, it is the experience of the dire consequences an injury may have for the entire organism, which speaks in the form of that profound agitation which we call pain. (With harmful influences which were unknown

to ancient mankind, e.g. the poisonous effects of new chemical compounds, the message of pain is absent, and we are lost . . .)

What is peculiar to pain is the prolonged agitation, the repercussions of a terrible *choc*[28] in the cerebral centres of the nervous system: we do *not* actually suffer from the cause of pain (some kind of violation, for example), but from the protracted disturbance of our equilibrium in consequence of each *choc*. Pain is a disorder of the cerebral nerve centres – pleasure is not a disorder at all . . .

The idea that pain is the cause of bodily movement has appearances and even philosophical prejudice in its favour, but in the case of sudden pains, if we observe more closely, we find that the bodily movement occurs appreciably earlier than the sensation of pain. I would be in a bad way when I stumbled if I had to wait until that fact had rung the bell of consciousness, and a hint of what was to be done had been telegraphed back to me. Rather, what I discern as clearly as possible is that first, my foot reacts in order to prevent the fall and then, after a measurable period of time, a kind of painful wave in my forehead is suddenly palpable. We do *not*, then, respond to pain with bodily movement. Pain is subsequently projected into the site of the injury – nevertheless, the essence of this localized pain remains the expression of something other than the local injury; its essence is to be a mere signal which the nerve centres receive, the intensity and tone of which is in accordance with the nature of the injury from which the signal comes. The fact that in consequence of this *choc*, the muscular strength of the organism is measurably reduced in no way indicates that the *essence* of pain is to be sought in the reduction of the sense of power . . .

Again, it is not in response to *pain* that we move; pain is no 'cause' of action. Pain *itself* is a kind of response; the bodily movement is another and an *earlier* process – each has its own distinct starting point.

700

The intellectual nature of *pain*: pain does not indicate what is immediately damaged, but what the damage has *cost* the individual as a whole.

Are there any sorts of pain which affect 'the species' but *not* the individual?

What do *active* and *passive* mean? Is it not gaining *ascendancy* and being *subjugated*, becoming subject and object?

701

'The sum of pain outweighs the sum of pleasure: hence the non-existence of the world would be better than its existence': such twaddle is what today calls itself pessimism. 'The world is something which, in all reason, ought not to be, because it causes the sentient subject more pain than pleasure.'

Pleasure and pain are purely incidental, and do not cause anything; they are secondary judgements derived from a primary governing value, judgements that something is 'useful' or 'harmful', expressed in the form of a feeling; pleasure and pain are therefore absolutely ephemeral and dependent. For with each such judgement, there are still a hundred different questions to ask regarding what ultimate ends are to be chosen.

I despise this *pessimism of sensitivity*; it is itself a sign of a profound impoverishment of life. I will never tolerate the fact that such a puny ape as [Eduard von] Hartmann speaks of his 'philosophical pessimism'.

702

The will to power as life. Man does *not* seek pleasure and does *not* avoid pain. The reader will surely recognize the famous prejudice I am here contradicting. Pleasure and pain are mere effects, mere epiphenomena – what every man wants, what the least part of a living organism wants, is an increase of power. In striving after this, both pleasure and pain ensue; of its own accord, the organism seeks things which resist it, needs something to oppose it . . . Pain as an obstacle to its will to power is therefore a normal condition, a normal ingredient of every organic event; man is not free to avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly in need of it: every triumph, every pleasurable sensation, every event presupposes resistance overcome.

Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive nutrition; the protoplasm extends its pseudopodia in search of something

which offers resistance – not out of hunger, but out of the will to power. As a result, it makes the attempt to overcome, appropriate and assimilate what resists it – what we call 'nutrition' is merely a subsequent phenomenon, a practical application of the original intention to become *stronger*.

*

Pain is so far from acting to *reduce our sense of power* that it usually serves to excite this very sensation – the obstacle is the *stimulant* of the will to power.

703

We tend to confound one kind of pain, exhaustion, with pain in general; for exhaustion does in fact represent a profound reduction and discouragement of the will to power, a measurable loss of strength. That is to say, pain may serve as an irritant leading to an intensification of power, and pain may follow a dissipation of power; in the first case it is a stimulant, in the second it is the consequence of excessive irritation . . . The inability to resist is peculiar to the latter form of pain; the provocation of that which resists is a part of the former . . . In the state of exhaustion, the only pleasure which remains is that of falling asleep; in the other case, pleasure lies in victory . . .

It has been a source of great confusion that psychologists have not adequately distinguished between these two *kinds of pleasure* (that of *falling asleep*, and that of *victory*). Those who are exhausted seek rest, relaxation, peace and tranquillity, the things which constitute *happiness* for nihilistic religions and philosophies; the rich and vigorous seek victory, defeated adversaries and a sense of power spreading over still wider areas than before. All normal functions of the organism have this need – and the whole organism until the age of puberty is just such a complex of systems, struggling for an increase in the sense of power.

704

How is it that the fundamental articles of faith in psychology are all the worst misrepresentations and forgeries? Take, e.g.,

'*man strives for happiness*' – what is true in it! In order to understand what life is, and what kind of striving and straining it involves, the formula must apply not only to animals, but to trees and plants as well. 'What do plants strive for?' – the very question presupposes a false unity which does not exist; for if we begin with the crude unity 'plant', we thereby conceal and deny the existence of an enormously complex growth, each element of which has initiatives all its own, or at least partially so. It is immediately apparent that the ultimate and smallest 'indivisible' constituents cannot be understood in terms of 'metaphysical indivisibility', as atoms; their sphere of power is constantly shifting; but when each of them is transformed in such a manner, can it really be said that it strives for its '*happiness*'? But all this propagation, incorporation and growth involves striving against resistance; movement is essentially connected to painful conditions; in any case, the impetus here must desire something else, for it to desire and constantly seek out pain in such a manner. To what end do the trees of the primeval forest struggle with each other? For 'happiness'? For *power* . . .

Man has mastered the forces of nature, as well as his own savagery and licentiousness: the passions have obeyed and learned to be useful. Man, in comparison with his pre-human ancestors, represents an enormous amount of *power – not* an increase in happiness. How can we assert that he has *striven* after happiness? . . .

705

As I say this[29] I see above me, shining among the stars, *a disastrous train of errors*, errors previously regarded as mankind's greatest inspiration: 'all happiness is the product of virtue, all virtue is the product of free will!' and which has, among other things, a long life and many descendants in consequence (*Cornarism*).[30]

Let us reverse the evaluations which say that all excellence is a consequence of *being* virtuous, and that all freedom is a consequence of excellence. By contrast, freedom is being understood here as freedom and facility in self-direction. Every artist

will understand me . . . It is a matter of having a fortuitous organization.

706

Values. 'The value of life': but life is an isolated case; we must justify all of existence, and *not* only life – the justifying principle is one through which life is to be *explained* . . . Life itself is no means to something: it is the *expression* of the growth of power in all its forms.

707

Necessity of an objective determination of value. The *conscious* world of sensations, intentions and value judgements is but a small sample of the enormous number of collaborative and antagonistic processes which comprise the whole life of each organism. There is no justification whatsoever for regarding this bit of consciousness as the end, the reason, for the whole phenomenon of life; it is obvious that becoming conscious is only an additional means employed by life in the course of its development and the extension of its power. That is why it is a piece of naïveté to regard pleasure, or intellectuality, or morality, or any other detail in the sphere of consciousness, as the supreme value, and perhaps even to justify 'the world' with it. This is my *fundamental objection* to all philosophical-moral cosmodicies and theodicies, to all the *reasons* and *supreme values* offered by philosophy and theology hitherto. *One kind of means has been misunderstood as an end; conversely, life and its increase in power were* reduced to *a mere means.*

If we wished to postulate an adequate end of life, it might not coincide with any category of conscious life; rather, such an end must *explain* conscious life as *a means to that end* . . . The 'denial of life' as the aim of life, the aim of development, existence as a huge mistake: such an *insane interpretation* is only the unfortunate offspring of measuring life with reference to states of *consciousness* (pleasure and pain, good and evil). Here the means are deemed an objection to the end; the 'unholy', preposterous and, above all, *disagreeable* means – how can the

end be something worthwhile when it requires such means! But the error lies in the fact that we assume from the beginning the very end which *excludes* such means, instead of *seeking* the end which explains the *necessity* of such means; i.e. we took the desirability of certain means (namely, the agreeable, rational and virtuous ones) and made it into a *norm*, and only then did we determine which *comprehensive end* is *desirable* . . .

The *fundamental error* lies in the fact that we always regard self-consciousness as the standard, as the supremely valuable condition in life, instead of as an instrument and a mere detail: in short, the erroneous point of view of the *a parte ad totum*.[31] That is why all philosophers are instinctively eager to imagine a comprehensive consciousness, a conscious living and willing which accompanies all that occurs, a 'spirit', a 'God'. But they need to be told that it is *in just this way* that *existence* would become a *monster*; that a 'God' and a general *sensorium* would without question be something on whose account existence would have to be *condemned* . . . The very fact that we *eliminated* the comprehensive consciousness which determines ends and means comes as a *great relief*, after which we no longer *have* to be pessimists. The greatest *reproach we ever* cast upon existence was our belief in the *existence of God* . . .

708

If the world process really did have some end state, it should have been attained. The only fundamental fact, however, is that the world has no such state, and every philosophy or scientific hypothesis (e.g. mechanism) in which such an end state is deemed necessary, is *refuted* by this fact alone . . .

I seek a conception of the world which does justice to this fact; becoming ought to be explained without recourse to such teleological tendencies; becoming must appear justified at every moment (*or it must defy all evaluation*, which comes to the same thing); the present must on no account be justified by a possible future, nor the past for the sake of the present. 'Necessity' does not take the form of an overarching, comprehensive governing power or prime mover; still less is it the necessary condition of some valuable result. For this purpose

it is necessary to deny the existence of a comprehensive consciousness of becoming, a 'God', so that events may not be brought under the purview of a being who knows us, and suffers with us, but *intends* nothing: 'God' is useless if He intends nothing; and if He does intend something, a *sum total of suffering* and *irrationality* is thereby presupposed which would diminish the whole value of 'becoming'; happily, just such a comprehensive power is *lacking* (a suffering but all-knowing God, a 'general *sensorium*' and 'universal spirit' – that would be the *greatest objection to being*).

Strictly speaking, *the very idea of being is altogether inadmissible* – because otherwise becoming would lose all value, and would almost appear to be meaningless and superfluous.

Consequently, we must turn our attention to how the illusion of being is possible (or even inevitable); and, relatedly, how all value judgements which rest upon the hypothesis that there is such a thing as being are devalued when that illusion is dispelled – whereby it becomes apparent that this *hypothesis about being* (the better world, the world of truth, the world 'beyond', 'the thing-in-itself') is the source of all the *slander to which the world is subjected.*

(1) Becoming has *no end state*; it does not lead to any sort of 'being'.

(2) Becoming is *not an illusory state*; perhaps the world of *being* is an illusion.

(3) Becoming has the same value at every moment; the sum of its value always remains the same; in other words, it has no specific value; for we lack anything whereby it might be measured and with respect to which the term 'value' has any meaning. *The whole value of the world is not susceptible to devaluation*; consequently, philosophical pessimism is ludicrous.

709

[*Values.*] Let us not make our 'aspirations' into the basis for judgements about *being*! Let us not place the mature stage of our development (e.g. 'spirit') *behind* that development a second time as its 'intrinsic nature'.

710

Our knowledge has become scientific to the extent that it is able to quantify and measure . . . We should try to determine whether a scientific order of values might not be constructed simply on the basis of a *quantitative scale for measuring strength* . . . All other '*values*' are prejudices, pieces of naïveté and misunderstandings . . . They are all *reducible* to that *quantitative scale for measuring strength*. Moving *upwards* on this scale indicates an *increase in value*; moving *downwards* on this scale indicates a *decrease in value*.

Here appearances and prejudices are against us.

711

I maintain that in the '*process as a whole*', *the work of mankind does not come into consideration*, because a comprehensive process (regarded as a system) simply does not exist; that there is no 'whole', and that no *debasement of human existence or human ends is possible with respect to something which does not exist*; that necessity, causality and teleology are useful *illusions*; that the elevation of consciousness is *not* the end, but rather an increase in power, of which the usefulness of consciousness is but a part, with pleasure being of no more importance in this regard than pain; that we ought not to take the *means* for the highest standard of value (and that we therefore ought not to take states of consciousness like pleasure and pain for such a standard, if becoming conscious is itself but a means); that the world is in nowise an organism, but a chaos; that the development of the 'intellect' is a means whereby an organized whole attains a relative permanence; and that what strikes us as 'desirable' has no significance in relation to the overall character of being.

712

We might say that what we call 'God' is a culminating moment, and existence an eternal process of deification and its opposite. *However, such a moment would not constitute a zenith of value*, but rather a zenith of power.

Mechanism and *materialism* should be completely ruled out; the two together are only a form of expression employed by inferior men, and the least intelligent form of emotion ('of the will to power') at that. It is their desire to make the world appear utterly *stupid*, itself a consequence of their will to power, which makes them portray its elements as completely independent of each other; *beauty is a sign that the victorious have become accustomed to and pampered by their circumstances*; ugliness is the expression of many defeats (within the organism itself). None of this is hereditary! The chain as a *whole* is growing –

The decline from the zenith of this process (the supreme intellectualization of power for the most slavish of reasons) may be represented as a *result* of this supreme power turning *against itself* and having nothing left to organize, using its power *to disorganize* . . .

(a) The ever-greater *surrender* of societies, and their subjugation by stronger men of smaller numbers.
(b) The ever-greater surrender of these privileged and stronger men, and the subsequent emergence of democracy, with the elements dissolving into *anarchy* in the end.

713

Value . . . the highest amount of power that a man can assimilate – a man, *not mankind* . . . Mankind is much more a means than an end. It is a question of type; mankind is merely the experimental material, the vast superfluity of failures, a field of debris.

714

When a value is put into words, a flag is planted to mark the discovery of a *new source of felicity* – a new *feeling*.

715

A thing's 'value' is relative to complex, comparatively enduring forms of life within the world of becoming, that is, to their *conditions of preservation and improvement*.

There are no ultimate, permanent units, no atoms, no monads; here too, the notion 'being' must first be *introduced* by us (for practical, utilitarian reasons which are applicable only from certain points of view).

'The forms of domination': the sphere of domination is constantly increasing; or it is periodically waxing and waning; or it changes in response to favourable or unfavourable circumstances (e.g. with respect to nutrition).

A thing's 'value' is necessarily relative to the waxing or waning of these dominating centres ('pluralities' in any case; for 'units' are simply not present in the world of becoming, by its very nature).

A quantum of power, a process, in so far as nothing therein has the character of 'being' – in so far as . . .

Linguistic expression is inadequate to describe processes; the supposition of a cruder world of permanent entities, of 'things', etc. is a consequence of the *unavoidable necessity of self-preservation*. We may speak of atoms and monads in a relative sense; and this much is certain: the *world of the least-lasting is the longest-lasting world* . . . There is no such thing as the will; there are only provisional agreements of will, which are constantly gaining or losing their power.

Part 3. The Will to Power as Society and Individual

1. Society and State

716

Egoism. We take it as a fundamental principle that only individuals feel any *responsibility.* Collectives were invented to do that for which the individual lacks the courage. For this reason all communities and societies are a hundred times more *straightforward* and *instructive* about the nature of man than the individual, who is too weak to have the courage to act upon his own desires.

The whole of 'altruism' is the result of the *prudence of the private man*; societies are not 'altruistic' towards one another . . . The commandment to love thy neighbour has never been extended to include neighbouring *countries*. Rather, what Manu recommends here is still applicable . . . 'The king must always take for his enemies all the princes whose kingdoms border his own, and he has for friends and allies those who are the immediate neighbours of his enemies.'[32]

The 'remedy'. The study of society is invaluable, because man in the aggregate is *far more naïve* than man as a 'unit'. 'Society' has never regarded virtue as anything else than a means to strength, power and order. How guileless and self-assured are the words of Manu: 'Punishment governs all that exists; virtue would hardly be supported by its own forces; it is the fear of punishment that keeps all the classes within the limits assigned to them, and allows everyone to enjoy in peace what they have amassed.'[33]

717

The *state*, or organized *immorality*, acts *internally*, in the form of the police, the penal code, class, commerce and the family; and *externally*, in the form of the will to power, to war, to conquest and to revenge. How is it that it succeeds in doing a *great number* of things which an *individual* would never countenance? Through division of responsibility, of command and execution; through *interposing* the virtues of obedience, duty, patriotism and fealty; and the maintenance of pride, severity, strength, hate and revenge – in short, all the typical traits which are *incompatible* with the gregarious type . . .

718

None of you has the courage to whip a man, let alone to kill him; but the monstrous machinery of the state overwhelms the individual so that he *disavows* responsibility for what he does (through obedience, oath, etc.). All that a man *does* in the service of the state, all that he *learns* in preparation for it, is contrary to his nature. This is accomplished through *division of labour*, so that no one bears all the responsibility, neither those who make the law nor those who execute it, neither the disciplinarian nor those who have grown hard and severe under that discipline. The state is essentially *organized violence* . . .[34]

719

A *division of labour* exists within society as regards the *emotions*, such that individuals and classes produce *partial*, but more *useful*, kinds of psyches. Observe the extent to which some emotions have become almost *rudimentary* in each type of man within society (the better to cultivate more intensively some other emotion).

Several justifications of morality are possible:

The economic justification (the intent of utilizing, as far as possible, the energies of the individual, and preventing the waste of everything exceptional);

The aesthetic justification (the formation of established types, together with the delight in one's own);

The political justification (as an art of withstanding the heavy strain produced by men of differing degrees of power); and

The physiological justification (as an imaginary superior estimation of those who have come off badly or indifferently – the better to preserve the weak).

720

The most terrible and most fundamental desire in man, his impulse towards power – what they call the impulse towards 'freedom' – for the longest time was the impulse most in need of restraint. That is why ethical training and cultivation previously sought (albeit instinctively and unconsciously) to curb the appetite for power; ethical discourse disparages the tyrannical individual, while simultaneously glorying in the welfare of the community and in love of country. The emphasis is always on the herd's instinct for power [and giving it] free rein.

721

The *incapacity to attain power*, in its *hypocrisy* and *shrewdness*, manifests itself as:

Obedience (subordination, pride in duty, morality);

Submission, devotion, love (the idealization and deification of the commander as a kind of compensation, and indirect self-transfiguration);

Fatalism and resignation;

'Objectivity';

Self-tyranny (Stoicism, asceticism, 'depersonalization', 'sanctification'); (everywhere we see the expression of a necessity either of exercising some kind of power, or of creating for oneself the temporary *illusion* of a power – as *intoxication*);

Critique, pessimism, indignation, making a nuisance of oneself;

'Beautiful soul', 'virtue', 'self-sanctification', 'detachment', 'unworldliness', etc. (my insight into the incapacity to attain power disguising itself as *dédain*).

There are men who desire power for the sake of the *advantages* it procures with respect to happiness (e.g. political parties). Other men seek power, despite obvious *disadvantages*, and the *sacrifice* in happiness and wellbeing; they are the *ambitiosi*.[35] Yet other men seek power only to prevent it from falling into the hands of others on whom they do not wish to be dependent.

722

Critique of 'justice' and 'equality before the law': what are they supposed to *eliminate*? Tension, enmity, hatred. But it is a mistake to think that we thereby *increase 'happiness'*; the Corsicans enjoy more happiness than the Continentals.

723

Reciprocity, the expectation of reward, is one of the most insidious forms which the debasement of mankind takes. It goes hand in hand with that 'equality' which takes exception to all disparities as instances of immorality.[36]

724

NB. What is useful is entirely dependent upon the *intention*, the 'wherefore?', which in turn is entirely dependent upon the degree of *power*. For that reason, utilitarianism cannot be the foundation, and is only a doctrine of *consequences*, and is *not* absolutely *obligatory* for *all*.

725

At one time, the idea of the state as the result of a utilitarian calculus was just a *theory*: now, it is also the *practice*! The age of the kings is past, because their subjects are no longer worthy of them: they do not *want* to see their king as an embodiment of their ideal, but rather as an instrument for their benefit. That is the whole truth!

726

I am attempting to grasp the *absolute rationality* – of social judgement and value judgement, independent of the intentions

of those who form them, while at the same time disregarding any moral results; of the extent to which *psychological falseness* and opacity are required to *sanctify* the emotions essential to preservation and increase in power (i.e. to create a *good conscience* for them); of the extent to which *stupidity* is required so that common rules and values remain possible (including education, supervision of cultural elements, training); of the extent to which *inquisition*, *suspicion* and *intolerance* are required to deal with and suppress the exceptions, by treating them as criminals, in order to give them bad consciences, so that their exceptional nature sickens them.

727

Morality is essentially a *shield*, a means of defence, and thus a sign of immaturity in a man, p. 123,[37] (armoured, Stoical). The mature man is primarily armed with *weapons*: he is *aggressive*; he *attacks*. Implements of war are converted into implements of peace (from scales and carapaces, feathers and hair develop).

728

The notion 'egoism'. The very notion of life implies that a living thing must grow – that it must extend its power, and thus must incorporate alien forces into itself. Our minds befogged by morality, we speak of the individual's right to defend himself; we might just as well speak of his right to attack someone else; after all, *both* – and the latter more than the former – are necessities for every living thing – aggressive and defensive egoism are not matters of choice, let alone of 'free will', but rather the *inevitable concomitants* of life itself.

This is equally true whether we envisage an individual, a living body or an ambitious 'society'. The right to punish (or society's self-defence) has been arrived at only through a fundamental misuse of the term 'right'; a right is acquired by contract – but the right to resist and defend oneself does not rest upon such a basis. A nation might just as well describe its desire for conquest, its lust for power, whether by force of arms, or by trade, commerce and colonization, as a right – the right to grow, perhaps. A society which definitively and *instinctively*

rejects war and conquest is in decline; it is ripe for becoming a democracy, a nation of shopkeepers . . . In most cases, of course, assurances of peace are merely the means of lulling an adversary into a false sense of security.

729

The *maintenance of the military state* is the last remaining means of taking up and retaining the *great tradition*, with respect to the *higher type of man*, the *strong type*. And all *notions* which perpetuate animosity and difference in rank between the states, e.g. nationalism, protective tariffs, would appear to be sanctioned for that very reason . . .

The strong type is maintained as that which *sets the standard* . . .

730

For something to exist which lasts longer than an individual, for a *work* to outlive the individual who may have created it, all manner of restrictions and partiality must be imposed on individuals. But by what means? It is facilitated by love, devotion and gratitude towards the person who created the work; or the fact that our ancestors fought for it; or the fact that my descendants are secure only if the *work* is, which I must therefore seek to protect (e.g. service to the πόλις).[38] *Morality* is essentially the means, above and beyond the individual (or, rather, through the *enslavement* of the individual), of bringing about the permanence of something. It goes without saying that the view from below will find expression in a very different manner than the view from above.

How is a power-complex *preserved*? By the fact that many generations sacrifice themselves to it; i.e. . . .

731

The continuum. 'Marriage, property, language, tradition, descent, family, people and the state'; each of these things exhibits a lower or higher degree of continuity. Their economics consists in the extent to which the advantages of continuous labour, as well as of multiplication, *exceed* the *disadvantages*,

that is, the greater costs associated with replacing parts or making them durable. (However, the working parts which are reproduced frequently remain unemployed, thus incurring greater acquisition costs and not insignificant costs of maintenance.) The advantage consists in the disruptions avoided, and the losses arising from them which are saved. *Nothing is more costly than new beginnings.*

'The greater the advantages in the struggle for survival, the greater will be the expense of maintenance and production (nutrition and reproduction), and the greater will be the risk and the probability of perishing before reaching the summit of life.'[39]

732

Marriages among the *bourgeoisie*, understood in the most honourable sense of the word 'marriage', are no more a matter of love than they are of money – for no institution can be founded on love – but of giving two people permission to gratify each other sexually, subject to certain conditions, of course, but conditions devised with a view to the *interests of society.* It is obvious that among the various presuppositions of such a contract will be the parties' delight in, and substantial goodwill towards, each other, a goodwill shown by their willingness to be patient, sympathetic and tender with one another; but we should not misuse the word 'love' to refer to such a union! For two lovers, in the fullest sense of the word, even sexual gratification is nothing essential and is merely a symbol, for one, of unconditional submission, and, for the other, of his assent to that submission, and of his taking possession of what has been offered.

Marriage in the noble sense of the word, marriage as antiquity understood it, was a matter of *breeding* a race (and is there still a nobility nowadays? *Quaeritur*)[40] – and therefore a matter of maintaining a fixed and definite type which is fit to rule, to which end the desires of husbands and wives had to be sacrificed. It goes without saying that neither love, nor that measure of goodwill upon which the good bourgeois marriage depends, were prerequisites to such marriages – on

the contrary! The interest of one's lineage took precedence, and beyond that the interest of the class. Such a conception of marriage has prevailed in every healthy aristocracy from ancient Athens to eighteenth-century Europe. Warm-blooded, tender-hearted creatures that we are, we 'moderns' are scarcely able to suppress a slight shudder at the cold calculation all this involves. But it is precisely the strictness of marriage in the aristocratic world which explains why romantic love, passion in the greatest sense of the word, was *invented* there – where restraint and austerity were also the greatest . . .

733

Concerning the future of marriage. Additional tax on inheritance, etc., also additional military service for bachelors of a certain minimum age within the community. *Advantages* of all sorts for fathers who bring more boys into the world: under certain circumstances, plural votes. A *medical protocol* prior to any marriage, signed by community boards, in which more specific questions must be answered by the betrothed and physicians (a 'family history'). As a remedy for *prostitution*, or as a means of endowing it with respectability, legalizing temporary marriages (for a term of years, months or days), with guarantees for the children. Every marriage sponsored and endorsed by a certain number of trusted members of the community, as a matter of interest to the community.

734

Another commandment of philanthropy. There are cases in which having children would be a crime, for example, cases of chronic illness and nervous exhaustion. What is to be done with them?

We might at least try to persuade them to make vows of chastity, aided, perhaps, by the music of *Parsifal*. Parsifal himself, that typical idiot, had ample reason not to procreate. The problem is, a certain inability to 'control' oneself (*not* to react to stimuli, even the smallest sexual stimuli) is precisely a regular consequence of complete exhaustion. For example, it would be a mistake to imagine that someone like Leopardi could be chaste.

Here, the priest and the moralist are playing a losing game; they would do better to send such a man to the chemist. In the end, society has a *duty* to fulfil, and there are few obligations more urgent or more fundamental. Society, as the great representative of life, must answer *to life itself* for failed lives – it also has to atone for them; consequently, it *should* prevent them. In many such cases, society *should* act to prevent procreation; to this end, and without regard to birth, rank or intellect, it may avail itself of the most severe measures of coercion and deprivations of liberty, and under certain circumstances castration.

The Biblical prohibition 'thou shalt not kill' is a piece of naïveté in comparison with the seriousness of the prohibition life itself addresses to *décadents*, 'thou shalt not procreate!' . . . For life itself recognizes no solidarity, no 'equal rights' between the healthy and degenerate parts of an organism; the latter must be *excised* – lest the whole perish.

To have *compassion* for *décadents*, to demand *equal rights* for the ill-constituted, would be profoundly immoral; it would be to take what is *contrary to nature* for morality itself!

735

There are men of delicate and sickly constitution, so-called idealists, who lack the energy for anything more than a crime, *cru*, *vert*;[41] yet this becomes the great justification of their pallid little lives, their redemption from a long habit of cowardice and dishonesty, their brief *moment* of strength. And afterwards, it destroys them.

736

In our civilized world, for the most part we only hear of the degenerate criminal, the criminal who is overwhelmed by the contempt and execration of society, who distrusts even himself, and who oftentimes belittles and maligns his own actions, that is to say, the *unsuccessful kind of criminal* . . . and we resist the idea that *all great men were criminals* but on a grand scale instead of a paltry one, that crime is inherent in greatness (for such is the testimony of all who have tried the reins and *sounded the depths* of great souls). To become an outlaw from

tradition, conscience and duty – every great man is acquainted with this danger. And yet, he would not have it be otherwise; for he *wills* great ends, and therefore wills their means.

737

The ages in which men were *governed* by *rewards* and *punishments* were ages in which society was concerned with men of a lower, more primitive type: it dealt with them as with *children* . . . In our latter-day culture, the unavoidable effect of degeneration is something which completely takes away the point of reward and punishment . . . This paternalistic *determination* of action by the prospect of reward and punishment presupposes young, strong and vigorous races . . . In old and decrepit races, impulses are so *irresistible* that a mere idea is quite powerless against them . . . The inability to offer any resistance to a stimulus, the *compulsion* to react to it – this extreme sensitivity of *décadents* renders such systems of punishment and *betterment* completely meaningless . . .

The notion 'betterment' [rests] on the presupposition of a normal and strong man whose individual action should somehow be *adjusted*, to prevent him from being *lost*, to prevent him from becoming an *enemy* . . .

738

The effect of prohibition. Every power which prohibits something, which knows how to excite fear in the man to whom it is prohibited, gives rise to a 'bad conscience' (i.e. a desire for something, coupled with a sense of the *danger* involved in gratifying it, and thus with the necessity of secrecy, clandestine means and caution). Every prohibition corrupts the character of those who do not submit to it voluntarily, but are compelled to do so.

739

'Reward and punishment' . . . these two things stand or fall together. Nowadays we seek no reward, and we *acknowledge* no one's right to punish . . . This has put us on a war-footing: we *want* something, we meet with opposition, perhaps the

most reasonable way to attain our object is *to come to terms with each other* – to make a *contract*. A modern society regards each individual as having made a 'contract', and the criminal as one who has violated it . . . Whatever one may think of this, the notion seems clear enough. It would seem to follow that we ought not to tolerate anarchists and *principled* opponents of a particular social arrangement within said society . . .

740

Crime falls under the concept 'revolt against the social order'. One does not 'punish' a rebel, one *suppresses* him. He may be a paltry and contemptible man, but there is nothing intrinsically contemptible about rebellion – and as far as it goes, to be rebellious against our kind of society does not diminish the value of a man. There are cases in which we would honour such rebels precisely because they perceive something in our society against which war should be waged, cases in which such a man rouses us from our slumbers.

The fact that the criminal performs a particular deed against a particular person does *not* alter the fact that his whole nature is instinctively at war with the whole social system: the deed is a mere symptom.

The notion of punishment ought to be reduced to the notion of a suppression of a rebellion, a security measure (total or partial imprisonment) against those suppressed. But punishment should not be an expression of *contempt*: a criminal is in any case a man who has risked his life, his honour, his freedom – a man of courage. Nor should we regard the punishment as penance or retribution, as if there is an exchange relation between guilt and punishment – punishment does not purify, *because* crime does not defile.

We should not preclude the possibility of the criminal making his peace with society, provided he does not belong to a *race of criminals*. In the latter case, we should wage war against him even before he commits a hostile deed (the first operation as soon as he is in custody should be to castrate him).

We should not hold the criminal's bad manners or even his low degree of intelligence against him. Nothing is more

common than for a criminal to misunderstand himself (especially when he has not yet reflected on his rebellious instinct, the *rancune du déclassé*,[42] due to a *faute de lecture*).[43] Nothing is more common than for a criminal to malign and dishonour his deed under the influence of fear at its failure. This is quite distinct from those cases in which, upon closer examination, the criminal is found to have yielded to an impulse he himself misunderstood, and, by virtue of a subsidiary action performed at the time, has imputed the wrong motive to his deed (such as a robbery, when what mattered to him was the bloodshed . . .).

We should take care not to measure the worth of a man by an isolated act. Napoleon warned us against this. Our *haut-relief*[44] deeds are especially insignificant. If one of us has no crime, e.g. murder, on our conscience, why is that? Because, for us, a few favourable circumstances were missing. And supposing we had committed a few crimes, would that diminish our value? On the contrary: not everyone is in a position to commit a few crimes. We would be objects of contempt were we not deemed capable of killing a man under certain circumstances. Nearly every crime is the expression of character traits which no man should be without. Dostoevsky has said, and not without justification, that the inmates of the Siberian penal settlements constituted the strongest and most valuable portion of the Russian people.[45] If for us the criminal is a malnourished and languishing creature, then it reflects badly on our social relations; during the Renaissance the criminal flourished, and acquired his own kind of virtue – virtue, of course, as the men of the Renaissance understood it, *virtù*, moraline-free virtue.

We are able [to] elevate only those whom we do not despise; moral contempt is a greater indignity and injury than any crime.

741

Opprobrium became a part of punishment when certain penalties were associated with those most *despised* (e.g. slaves). It was they who were *most* frequently punished, and *eventually* punishment itself was a reproach.

742

In ancient penal codes a *religious* notion was influential: the expiatory power of punishment. Punishment purified; in modern society, however, punishment sullies. Punishment discharged a debt; a man was actually *rid* of that for which he had so *willingly* suffered. Provided that he believed in the power of punishment, afterwards there was a *sigh of relief*, which actually approximated a restoration of health. He not only made his peace with society, but he also regained his self-respect, and became 'pure' . . . Today, however, the stigma of punishment isolates the criminal even more than his law-breaking did; his subsequent *undoing* has become so great as to be irremediable. When he emerges from punishment, society regards him as an *enemy* . . . and henceforth, he joins the ranks of those who are its enemy in fact . . . The *jus talionis*[46] *may* be dictated by the spirit of retaliation (i.e. by a sort of moderation of the instinct for revenge); but in *Manu*, e.g., it is the necessity of having some equivalent in order to *atone*, in order to be religiously 'free' again.

743

My fairly radical objection to all your criminal laws is this: supposing that the punishment should fit the crime – and, at bottom, that is what you all want! – then it must be meted out to each criminal in proportion to his sensitivity to pain: that is, would an *antecedently* established punishment, a penal code, not be *impermissible*? But it would be no easy matter to determine the degrees of pleasure and pain which are correlated with specific crimes and punishments for a particular criminal. *In praxi*, we would probably have to abstain from punishment altogether, would we not? What a shame, no? Consequently –

744

Ah, jurisprudence! That is a science which, like all moral sciences, is not even in *nappies*! Even among free-thinking jurists, people still misunderstand, e.g., the earliest meaning of punishment – it is not understood at all. Until jurisprudence is built on a new foundation, namely history and ethnological

comparison, it will remain embroiled in unfortunate debates about essentially false abstractions which pass for jurisprudence nowadays. However, all of these abstractions are taken from modern man, and being such a tangled skein, even with regard to his legal value judgements, he admits of the most diverse *interpretations.*

745

A Chinese elder once said he had heard that mighty empires were doomed when they began to have too many laws.[47]

746

Schopenhauer would have had all *rogues* castrated, and all the *silly geese* cloistered;[48] but from what standpoint would this be desirable? The rogue has the advantage over the mediocre in that he is not mediocre; and the fool has the advantage over *us* in that he does not suffer at the sight of mediocrity . . . It would be more desirable to widen the gulf, such that roguery and foolishness would increase . . . In this way human nature is *enlarged* . . . But in the end, this is precisely what has to happen, and it does not depend upon whether we like it or not. Foolishness and roguery increase: this is *part* of 'progress'.

747

In today's society, people exhibit a great deal of thoughtfulness, of tact and consideration, of willing observance of others' rights and even of their demands; still more, they instinctively make certain charitable assumptions about the worth of men which reveal themselves in all sorts of expressions of trust and confidence; *respect* for men, and not only for the most virtuous – this is perhaps the element which most sharply distinguishes us from the Christian attitude. We hear those who still preach morality with a keen sense of irony. A man lowers himself in our estimation and becomes ridiculous when he preaches morality.

This tolerant manner in which we exercise moral judgement is one of the most promising signs of the times in which we live. When we find cases in which this tolerance is decidedly lacking,

it seems to us like an illness (the case of Carlyle in England, of Ibsen in Norway and of Catholic priests throughout Europe). If anything reconciles us to our own time, it is the considerable amount of *immorality* which we allow ourselves without thinking less of ourselves. On the contrary! What, then, constitutes the superiority of culture over barbarism? Of the Renaissance over the Middle Ages? This alone: the considerable amount of *acknowledged* immorality. It follows of necessity that, in the eyes of the moral fanatic, every height of human development must represent the *non plus ultra* of corruption (let us recall Plato's judgement of Athens under Pericles, Savonarola's judgement of Florence, Luther's judgement of Rome, Rousseau's judgement of the society of Voltaire and Germany's judgement *contra* Goethe).

748

A little fresh air! This ridiculous condition that Europe is in cannot last much longer. Is there any thought at all behind all this cattle-like nationalism? What possible value can there be in encouraging this sort of brutal self-regard when everything today points to larger common interests? And to think that it calls itself a 'Christian state'! And that we find in the highest circles this rogue of a chaplain![49] . . . And that 'the new German Empire' has been founded upon the most obsolete and rejected of ideas: equal rights and universal suffrage . . .

On one side, a party of peace, free from sentimentality, which forbids its members or their children to wage war; which forbids recourse to courts of law; which provokes conflict and opposition, and invites its own persecution; the party of the oppressed, at least for a while, but soon thereafter the *great* party; a party antagonistic towards feelings of *revenge* and *regret*.

On the other side, a *party of war*, equally principled and self-disciplined, proceeding in the opposite direction.

*

And that obviously takes place under conditions of *intellectual interdependence* and increasing cosmopolitanism, in which the real value and significance of contemporary culture lie in hybridization and cross-fertilization!

Both the economic unification of Europe – and the response to it, the *party of peace* – are inevitable . . .

What a struggle for ascendancy there is under these unfavourable conditions, within this culture of metropolises and newspapers, with its feverish pace and 'aimlessness'.

749

European princes should really consider whether they can do without our support. We immoralists – today we are the only power which needs no allies to be victorious; with that we are by far the strongest of the strong. We do not even have to lie: what other power could dispense with that? A strong seduction fights for us, perhaps the strongest there is: the seduction of the truth . . . The truth? Who put this word into my mouth? But I spit it out again, scorning proud words: we have no need of them, and would be mighty and victorious even without the truth. The enchantment which fights for us, the eye of Venus which bewitches and blinds even our opponents, is the *magic of the extreme*, the seduction exercised by everything extreme; we immoralists – we are the *most extreme*.

750

The eradication of the 'instincts'. Virtues which are unattainable, or virtues which slaves who are controlled by priests esteem the most.

The corrupt ruling classes have ruined the image of rulers. The 'state', exercising judicial power, is a piece of cowardice, because there is no great man by whom one can be judged. Ultimately the feeling of insecurity becomes so great that men grovel before *anyone* who commands with confidence and authority.

NB. *Scorn* for kings with petit-bourgeois virtues.

751

'The will to power' is so hated in democratic ages that the whole of psychology seems directed at belittling and slandering it . . . The type of man who seeks the highest honours is supposed to be someone like Napoleon! And Caesar! And Alexander! *As if these were not the very men who had most despised honour!*

And Helvétius educes that we strive for power in order to enjoy those pleasures the powerful have at their command; he understands this striving for power as the desire for pleasure, as hedonism . . .

752

There is *oligarchic* or *democratic* rule, depending on whether a people feels that 'the few' have the prerogative, the judiciousness, the gift of leadership, etc., or that 'the many' have it.

Monarchy *symbolically* expresses the belief in one who is wholly superior, a leader, a saviour, a demigod. *Aristocracy* symbolically expresses the belief in an elite of mankind and in a higher caste. Democracy symbolically expresses the *disbelief* in great men and in elite society: 'everybody is equal to everybody', 'at bottom, the lot of us are self-serving cattle and mob'.

753

I am opposed to (1) Socialism because of all that gregarious nonsense about 'goodness, truth, beauty', and about equal rights, which are the dream of every Socialist (anarchism has the same ideal, but pursues it in a more brutal manner), and (2) parliamentarianism and the press, because these are the means whereby the gregarious animal becomes master.

754

The arming of the people – is ultimately the arming of the mob.

755

Socialists seem ridiculous to me, with their silly optimism about the 'inherently good man' who will come out from behind the bushes as soon as we abolish the existing 'order' and give free rein to all our 'natural impulses'.

But the opposition is just as ridiculous, because they refuse to acknowledge the violence with which the law acts, the hardness and selfishness in every kind of authority. 'I and my kind' shall remain and prevail; whoever is depraved must be expelled or exterminated. [This] feeling lies at the basis of every ancient act of legislation.

The idea of a *superior* sort of man excites more hatred than any monarch. The anti-aristocratic affect hatred of monarchs, but only as a mask, and . . .

756

How treacherous are all parties! For a party brings something of its leader to light which he may have taken great care to hide under a bushel.

757.

Modern Socialism wants to create a secular version of Jesuitism: *everybody* a perfect instrument. But the purpose remains to be discovered. What is it all for!

758

The *slavery of the present age*: barbarism! *Where* are the masters *for whom* these slaves work? One must not always expect the *simultaneous appearance* of the two complementary social castes.

Utility and pleasure are *slave theories* of life: the 'blessing of work' is an ennobling phrase for slaves. Incapacity for *otium*.[50]

759

There is no such thing as a right to life, a right to work or a right to 'happiness'; in this respect man is not different from the lowest worm.[51]

760

We must think of the masses as ruthlessly as nature herself: they preserve the species.

761

We look wistfully upon the neediness of the masses; they desire something of which *we* are capable – Ah, the irony!

762

European democracy is an unfettering of energies only to a small extent; above all, it is an escape of sloth, lassitude and *weakness* from the bonds which formerly confined them.

763

Workers should learn to feel like *soldiers*. They should receive an honorarium, a stipend, but no wages! There should be no relationship between compensation and *performance*; rather, the individual should be placed, *each according to his nature*, so that he achieves the *highest performance* at whatever comes within his purview.

764

One day workers shall live as the bourgeois do now; but *above* them, as *the higher caste*, distinguishing themselves by their austerity! Therefore poorer and simpler, but in possession of power.

*

Zarathustra III: the *others* may *obey*; but their vanity demands that they seem to depend, not on great men but on 'principles'.

*

For *inferior* men, the value judgements are reversed: it is a matter of implanting virtues in them. Absolute commands, terrible taskmasters, they tear away from a life of ease.[52]

765
'The Atonement for all Sin'

(1)

People speak of the 'profound injustice' of the social pact, as if the fact that one man is born under favourable circumstances whereas another is born under unfavourable ones, were from the very beginning an injustice; or even that it is already an injustice for one man to be born with certain inherent characteristics when the other is not. The more sincere among these enemies of society decree: 'We ourselves, with all our admittedly bad, morbid and criminal characteristics, are only the inevitable *consequence* of worldly oppression of the weak by the strong'; they lay the guilt for their character on the ruling classes. And so they threaten, they rage, they curse; they become virtuous out of indignation – they do not wish to have become bad men and *canaille* for nothing . . . I am given to understand that this posture, an invention of

recent decades, is even called pessimism, that is to say, the pessimism of indignation. Here the claim is made to judge history, to divest it of its inevitability, in order to discover who is responsible for it, who is to *blame*. For they need someone to blame. The unfortunates, the *décadents* of all kinds, are up in arms about *themselves*, and require someone to sacrifice, so as not to quench their thirst for destruction by destroying themselves (which in itself would perhaps be a reasonable course of action for them). To that end they require a semblance of justification, that is, a theory according to which the fact of their existence, of their being as they are, could be *shifted* to a scapegoat. This scapegoat may be God – in Russia there is no lack of such atheists born of *ressentiment* – or the social order, or education and upbringing, or the Jews, or the nobility, or finally, all manner of men who have turned out well. 'It is a crime for a man to be born under favourable circumstances, for in so doing he disinherits others, pushing them aside and condemning them to vice or even to *labour*.' . . . 'How is it *my* fault that I am miserable! But it must be someone's fault, *otherwise it would be unbearable*.' . . . In short, the pessimism of indignation *invents* responsibility in order to create an *agreeable* sensation – revenge . . . 'Sweeter than honey', old Homer called it.[53]

(2)

That the meaning of such a theory can no longer be properly discerned, or should I say, despised, is due to that lingering trace of Christianity coursing through our veins; so that we are tolerant towards things simply because they have a faint odour of Christianity about them . . . Socialists appeal to Christian instincts, which is subtly clever of them . . . Thanks to Christianity, we have now grown accustomed to the superstitious notion of the 'soul', to the 'immortal soul', to the monadic soul, which actually belongs somewhere else, and under certain circumstances just happens to fall into 'earthly' existence, as it were – it just happens 'to become flesh', but without its essence being affected by it, let alone *dependent* on it. Social, familial and historical circumstances at most furnish

the soul with opportunities or, perhaps, quandaries; in any case, it is not the product of them. With this idea, the individual is transformed into something transcendent; it allows him to attach an absurd amount of importance to himself. As a matter of fact, it was Christianity which first invited the individual to arrogate to himself the position of judge of anything and everything, which almost made megalomania obligatory: it has even tried to enforce *eternal* rights against everything temporal and conditional, with *utter disregard* for the state, society, legal tradition and physiology. Here speaks something beyond the world of becoming, something immutable throughout history; here speaks something immortal, something 'divine', a '*soul*'! . . . Another, no less mad, Christian notion which has been even more deeply incorporated into the tissue of modernity is that of the *equality of all souls before God*. It is the prototype of all theories of equal rights. Mankind was first taught to babble the principle of equality in a religious way; later, a morality was made out of it; and no wonder man ends up taking it in a serious sense, taking it in a *practical* sense! That is, a political, democratic, Socialistic, indignantly pessimistic sense . . .

Wherever responsibility has been sought, it was the instinct for revenge which did the seeking. In the course of thousands of years, this instinct for revenge came to dominate mankind to such an extent that the whole of metaphysics, psychology, the idea of history and, above all, *morality*, bears its signature. In so far as man has thought, he has infected things with revenge. He has made God Himself sick with it, and deprived existence in general of its innocence: that is to say, by attributing every manner of being to the will, to intentions, to acts for which someone must be held responsible. The whole doctrine of the will, the most disastrous *falsification* in psychology hitherto, was invented essentially for the purpose of revenge. It was the social *utility* of punishment which lent this notion its dignity, its power, its 'truth'. The originators of this psychology – the psychology of the will – must be sought in those classes which administered criminal justice, first and foremost among the priests at the head of the most ancient polities; they wanted

to create for themselves a right to take revenge – or wanted God to create it for them. To this end, man was considered 'free'; to this end, every action had to be considered voluntary, and the origin of every action had to be considered as falling within consciousness. In these propositions alone is the old psychology preserved. Today, when Europe seems to be moving in the opposite direction; when we Halcyonians in particular are striving with all our might to withdraw, to remove, to eliminate the *notions of guilt and punishment*; when our most serious efforts are directed towards cleansing psychology, morality, history, nature, social institutions and sanctions, and even God Himself, of this filth – who must be regarded as our most natural antagonists? Precisely those apostles of revenge and resentment, those indignant pessimists *par excellence* who make it their mission to sanctify their filth under the name of 'indignation' . . . The rest of us who wish that the world of becoming would regain its innocence would prefer to be the missionaries of a purer notion: that no one has given to man his qualities – neither God, nor society, nor his parents and ancestors, nor he himself – that no one is to *blame* for him . . . There is no being who could be held responsible for the fact that someone exists at all, that someone is a particular way, that someone was born under these circumstances and in this environment. *It is a great relief that there is no such being* . . . We are *not* the result of some eternal purpose, of a will, of a wish; we are *not* a part of some attempt to attain an 'ideal of perfection', an 'ideal of happiness' or an 'ideal of virtue' – nor are we a mistake on God's part, the contemplation of which would inspire anxiety even in Him (a thought with which it is well known that the Old Testament begins).[54] There is no place, purpose or meaning to which we could shift responsibility for our existence or the manner of our existence. Above all, *no one is in a position to do this*; it is *quite impossible* to judge, measure, compare or even deny the whole! Why not? For five reasons, all of them available even to those of modest intelligence; for example, *because there is no thing outside the whole.* And, I repeat, this is a great relief, for therein lies the innocence of all existence.

2. The Individual

766

It is a *fundamental error* to regard the herd as an end and *not* isolated individuals! The herd is only a means, nothing more! But now we are trying to conceive of the *herd* as an *individual*, and to ascribe a greater degree of importance to it than to the individual – a profound misunderstanding!!! Similarly, that which fosters gregariousness, *sympathy*, is characterized as the *more valuable* aspect of our nature!

767

The individual is something quite new, and *makes* something new.

The individual is something absolute, and all his actions are entirely his own.

In the end he determines the value of his actions himself: because he has to attach an *entirely individual meaning* even to the words handed down to him. At least his *interpretation* of a formula is personal, even if he does not create the formula itself: as an *interpreter*, he is still *creative*.

768

The 'ego' enslaves and kills: it works like a cell in an organism; it is predatory and violent. It wants to regenerate itself – pregnancy. It wants to give birth to its god and see all mankind at its feet.

769

Every organism reaches as far as its strength permits, subduing the weaker – thus enjoying itself. What makes this tendency *increasingly 'human'* in character is beginning to feel ever more *acutely how difficult* it is really to *absorb* the other; while inflicting grosser forms of injury make clear our power over him, they also *alienate* him from us – and thus make it more difficult to subdue him.

770

The highest form of individual freedom, of sovereignty, would in all probability be found not five paces from its opposite,

that is to say, where the danger of slavery hangs over life, like a hundred swords of Damocles. Let us review history from this point of view: the times when the 'individual' ripens to perfection, that is, becomes *free*, when the classical type, the *sovereign man*, is attained: oh no! These were no humane times!

We must have no choice: we must be either at the top – or at the bottom, like a serpent, despised, destroyed and trodden underfoot. We must be pitted against tyrants to become tyrants, i.e. to become *free*. It is no small advantage to have a hundred swords of Damocles hanging over our heads: it is in this way that we learn to dance, that we achieve 'freedom of movement'.[55]

771

More than any animal, man was originally *altruistic* – hence his prolonged development, his upbringing, through education, from infancy to adulthood, hence, too, his utmost and last form of egoism. Beasts of prey are much more *individualistic*.

772

Observe the involuntary naïveté of La Rochefoucauld, who believed that he was saying something bold, subtle and paradoxical – at that time, the 'truth' in psychological matters was something that produced astonishment – when he said: '*Les grandes âmes ne sont pas celles qui ont moins de passions et plus de vertu que les âmes communes mais celles seulement qui ont de plus grands desseins.*'[56] To be sure, J. Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort 'the more *high-minded* and more philosophic La Rochefoucauld of the eighteenth century') sees in him only the most astute observer of everything in the human breast which is due to 'habitual selfishness' and adds: 'a generous spirit could not have borne to chain itself down to the contemplation of littleness and meanness, unless for the express purpose of showing to others against what degrading influences, and in what an ungenial atmosphere, it was possible to maintain elevation of feeling and nobleness of conduct.'[57]

773

The morphology of the sense of self-esteem: first aspect.

(a) The extent to which a *sense of sympathy and community* are the lower or preparatory stages, at a time when personal self-esteem and initiative in the determination of values on the part of individuals is not yet possible.

(b) The extent to which the *height of collective self-esteem*, the pride in the distinction of the clan, the sense of difference and the aversion towards conciliation, equality, appeasement, is the school for *individual self-esteem*, especially in so far as it compels the individual to *represent* the pride of the whole . . . He must speak and act with extreme respect for himself, in so far as he represents the community in his person . . . Similarly, when the individual feels himself to be the *instrument and voice of the Godhead.*

(c) The extent to which these forms of *depersonalization* actually confer upon the person an immense importance, in so far as higher powers make use of him; religious awe of oneself is the condition of the prophet, of the poet . . .

(d) The extent to which responsibility for the whole enables the individual to permit himself, to *assume to himself the right to*, a breadth of vision, a stern and terrible hand, a prudence and coldness, a grandeur of bearing, of gesture which he would never allow himself for his own sake. *In summa*, collective self-esteem is the great preparatory school for personal *sovereignty.* The nobility is the class for which this tutorial is its inheritance.

774

The masked forms of the will to power.

(1) The desire for *freedom* and independence, also for balance, peace and harmony; also the hermit, 'freedom of thought'; in its lowest form: the will to exist at all, the 'impulse towards self-preservation'.

(2) *Subsumption* into the larger whole in order to satisfy its will to power; *submission*, making oneself indispensable and useful to those in power; *love*, a secret path to the

heart of the more powerful – in order to exercise control over him.

(3) The sense of duty, conscience, the comforting delusion of having a *higher* rank than the actual authorities; the recognition of a hierarchy which allows one to stand in *judgement*, even over the more powerful; self-condemnation. The invention of *new standards* (the Jews being the classical example).

775

What is praise? Harvests, good weather, victory, weddings, peace – all festivals require some *subject* or other, so that we may give vent to feelings of *praise* and *gratitude* towards them. We wish for everything good which happens to us to be done to us *on purpose*, we wish for there to be an *agent* behind it. The same holds true of an artwork: we are not content with it unless we can praise the artist. What is it to praise then? It is a kind of *compensation* for benefits received, a way of *returning* them, an attestation of *our* power – he who praises thereby assesses, expresses approval, judges and passes sentence; he arrogates to himself the right to, the *ability* to, express approval, to confer honours . . . An elevated sense of happiness and vitality is also an elevated *sense of power*: inspired by this sensation, a man *praises* (inspired by this sensation, he seeks, or invents, an *agent*, a '*subject*').

Gratitude is thus the *good* kind of *revenge*: it is most rigorously demanded and exercised where both equality and pride must be maintained, where revenge is best exercised.

776

Concerning the 'Machiavellianism' of power (of the unconscious variety). The *will to power* appears:

(a) As a desire for '*freedom*' among the oppressed and slaves of every kind; merely getting away from something seems to be the goal (or to put it in moral and religious terms: 'being responsible to one's conscience alone', 'evangelical freedom', etc.).

(b) As a desire for supremacy by a stronger kind of man who is coming into power; if he is initially unsuccessful, he will

limit himself to a desire for '*justice*', i.e. for the *same rights* as the other, dominant kind of man possesses. A struggle for equal rights ensues . . .

(c) As *love*, among the strongest, richest, most independent and bravest; the 'love of mankind', of the 'people', of the gospel, of the truth, of God; as compassion, 'self-sacrifice', etc.; as overpowering, abducting, pressing into service; as an instinctive identification with a great quantum of power to which one is able to give direction; the hero, the prophet, the Caesar, the Saviour, the shepherd. (Sexual love also belongs to this category; it seeks to overpower, to possess – it merely *seems* like self-surrender . . .) At bottom, [it is] only a man's love of his instrument, of his 'mount' . . . his conviction that something *belongs* to him because he is in a position *to use* it.

'Freedom', 'justice' and 'love'!!!

777

Love. Peer inside this love, this compassion of woman – what could be more egoistic? . . . And when they sacrifice themselves, their honour, their reputation, to whom do they sacrifice themselves? To the man? Or rather to their own wanton desires? These lusts of theirs are just as selfish, regardless of whether they do good to others and implant gratitude . . . It is remarkable the extent to which such a hyperfetation[58] of a single assessment can *sanctify* everything else!

778

'*Senses*', '*passions*'. When a fear of the senses, of the desires, of the passions, goes so far as to *dissuade* us from them, this is already a symptom of *weakness*; extreme measures always indicate abnormal conditions. What is lacking here, or more precisely, what is *waning*, is the strength to *resist* an impulse; when we instinctively feel that we must yield to an impulse, i.e. that we *must* react, then we had best avoid the opportunities ('temptations') to do so.

The 'stimulation of the senses' is only a *temptation* for those creatures whose systems are too easily moved and dominated;

in the contrary case, with creatures whose systems show great firmness and stolidity, strong stimuli are necessary to set the functions in motion . . .

To us, dissipation is only an objection in those who have no right to it; and almost all the passions have fallen into disrepute on account of those who were not strong enough *to turn them to their own advantage.*

We must understand that *passions* are open to the same objections as *diseases*; yet we dare not do without disease, and still less without passion . . .

We *need* the abnormal; we give life a tremendous *choc* with these major diseases . . .

*

In particular, we must distinguish between the following:

(1) The *dominating passion*, which is accompanied by the supreme form of health; in this case the coordination of the internal systems and their operations in the service of the whole organism is best attained – but that is almost a definition of health!

(2) The antagonism of the passions, when one has two, three or many 'souls in one breast';[59] a very unhealthy condition of inner ruin and disintegration, betraying and increasing an inner discord and anarchy – unless one passion becomes master. *Restoration of health.*

(3) The coexistence of passions, with *neither* antagonism *nor* alliance between them; often coming and going at regular intervals, and then, once the pattern becomes stable, the condition may even be a healthy one. The most interesting men belong here, the chameleons; they are not at odds with themselves, they are happy and secure, but they undergo no real development – their states coexist, however different from each other they may be. Such men alter, but they do not *become* . . .

779

Concerning the *perspective* from which *value judgements* are made:

The influence of the *magnitude* (great or petty) of the *ends.*

The influence of the *intellectuality* of the *means*.

The influence of *bearing* on the *action*.

The influence of *success* or failure.

The influence of *opposing* forces and their worth.

The influence of what is *permitted* and what is *prohibited*.

The *magnitude* of the *aims* and its effect on the perspective from which value judgements are made: the *great* and the *petty* criminal. The magnitude of the *aims* sought also determines whether he who seeks them has self-respect, or feels pusillanimous and miserable.

Then, the degree of *intellectuality* of the means employed and its effect on the perspective from which value judgements are made. How different the impression conveyed by the philosophical innovator, experimenter and man of authority, as contrasted with robbers, barbarians and adventurers! He conveys the appearance of being 'disinterested'.

Finally, noble bearing, demeanour, valour, self-confidence – how they alter the assessment of what has been accomplished in this way!

780

The *artifices* by which actions, measures and emotions are made possible, which from an individual standpoint are no longer 'permissible' – are no longer even 'palatable' – include:

Art, which '*makes them palatable for us*', which transports us to such 'alien' worlds.

The *historian*, who *shows that they possess a certain justification and rationality*; travel, exoticism, psychology, criminal law, the madhouse, criminals, sociology.

Impersonality: so that as *media* of a collective entity, we allow ourselves these emotions and actions (the judiciary, jurists, citizens, soldiers, ministers, princes, society, 'critics') . . . it makes us feel that *we would be offering a sacrifice*.

781

A preoccupation with oneself and one's 'eternal salvation' is *not* the expression of a rich and self-assured nature: because such a man does not give a damn about beatitude – he has no

interest in happiness in any form; he is force, action, desire incarnate – he imposes himself on things, he *violates* things . . . Christianity is a sort of Romantic hypochondria afflicting those who cannot stand on their own two feet. Whenever the *hedonistic* point of view comes to the fore, we may infer the presence of suffering and a certain *infirmity*.

782

When Parisian philosophers such as M. Fouillée speak of the 'growing autonomy of the individual',[60] they would do well to consider the *race moutonnière*[61] to which they themselves belong! . . .

Open your eyes, you sociologists of the future!

The 'individual' has become strong under the *opposite* conditions: you describe the most extreme weakening and atrophy of man; you even wish it, and to that end need the whole dishonest apparatus of the old ideal! You are *of the kind* that actually considers your needs, the needs of a gregarious animal, *ideal*!

What a complete lack of psychological integrity!

783

I have at last come to understand that the modern European is characterized by two seemingly opposite traits: *individualism* and the *demand for equal rights*. To wit, the individual is exceedingly prone to vanity and, being aware that his vanity is easily wounded, demands that all others are to be regarded as his equal, that he is only *inter pares*. This is characteristic of a social race in which the gifts and abilities of its members do not in fact differ appreciably. The pride which makes a man prefer solitude or the company of a few admirers defies comprehension; a truly 'great' success is achieved only through the people, although one scarcely understands that in reality, a popular success is always a *petty* success; for *pulchrum est paucorum hominum*.[62] Moralities know nothing of a 'hierarchy' among men; jurists know nothing of the conscience of a community. The principle of individualism rejects *truly great* men, and among equals requires a keen eye for, and ready recognition of,

a talent; and because in a mature and civilized culture where such a principle prevails, everyone has his share of talents, and can therefore expect to receive his share of honour, today we find an emphasis on minor achievements as never before – this gives the age a patina of being *infinitely fair*. Where it is unfair is in its infinite hatred, not of tyrants and sycophants, including those in the arts, but of *noble* men who scorn popular acclaim. The demand for equal rights (e.g. the right to sit in judgement on everything and everybody) is *anti-aristocratic*. Just as noble men are foreign to the age, so too is the assimilation of men into great types, the absence of any real individuality or the desire to possess it: for many elevated men in the past (the greatest poets among them), it was this which they pursued with diligence and in which they sought distinction. Just as foreign to the age is the desire to be a part of a 'city-state', as in Greece, or the Jesuit order, or the Prussian officer corps, or a bureaucracy; or to be an apprentice and successor to a great master – to which end, an unsociable disposition and the absence of *petty vanity* are necessary.

784

Individualism is a modest and still unconscious form of the 'will to power'; here, it seems to the individual sufficient to *free himself* from the superior forces of society (be these of the state or of the Church). He does not place himself in opposition *as a person*, but merely as an individual; he represents all individuals as against the collective. In other words, he instinctively regards himself as *equal to any individual*; whatever he wins, he does not win for himself as a person, but as a singular being[63] as against a collective one.

Socialism is merely a *means of agitation employed by individuals*: the Socialist grasps the fact that in order to achieve something, one must organize, take collective action and become a 'power'. But what the Socialist desires is not that the individual sacrifice himself to society as an *end in itself*, but that society serve as a *means* of enabling many individuals to pursue ends of their own. This is the instinctive tendency of Socialists, about which they frequently deceive themselves (setting aside

the fact that in order to prevail, they must frequently deceive). Altruistic moral preaching in the service of individual egoism is one of the most common forms of hypocrisy in the nineteenth century.

Anarchism, in turn, is also merely a *means of agitation employed by Socialism*; with it the Socialist inspires fear, with fear he begins to fascinate and to terrorize; above all – he draws the courageous and bold to his side, even those who are so as yet only in spirit.

But for all that, *individualism* is the *most modest* stage of the will to power.

Even when one has attained a certain degree of independence, one always wishes for more; a *differentiation* emerges according to degree of strength; the individual no longer regards himself as equal without further ado; rather, *he seeks out his equals* – he contrasts with others. Individualism is followed by the formation of *members* [and] *organs*; related tendencies consolidate themselves and become active as powers; and between these centres of power there arises friction, war, knowledge of respective strengths, counterbalancing, rapprochement and *establishment of reciprocity*. In the end, a *hierarchy* is established.

NB. (1) The individuals emancipate themselves.

(2) They enter into conflict, and agree on 'equal rights' (justice) as an end.

(3) Once this is attained, the actual *inequalities of strength* begin to produce an *enlarged effect* (because peace reigns for the most part, and many with smaller amounts of strength discern differences which in the past amounted to almost nothing). Now the individuals organize themselves into *groups*; these groups then strive for privilege and predominance. The conflict rages anew, albeit in a milder form.

NB. We wish for *freedom* only when we have no power. Once we attain power, we wish for supremacy; if we do not gain it (if we are still too weak for it), then we wish for '*justice*', *i.e. equal power.*

785

Clarification of the idea of egoism. When we grasp in what way the notion '*individuum*' is a mistake, but rather that every individual being just is the *whole process* which leads directly to him (not merely as an 'inheritance', but as he himself . . .), this individual being then acquires an *immensely great importance.* The voice of *instinct* is quite correct with regard to that. When the strength of this instinct begins to *wane* (i.e. when the individual *seeks* his worth only in service to others), we may safely infer that exhaustion and *degeneration* have set in. An altruistic disposition, when it is fundamental and without Tartuffery, is the instinctive tendency to create a *secondary* value for oneself in the service of the egoism of *others.* On the whole, however, it is only *apparent* – a *circuitous path* to the preservation of *one's own sense of vitality and worth.*

786

The history of moralization and de-moralization

First proposition. There are no such things as moral actions; they are purely imaginary. They are not only *indemonstrable* (a fact which e.g. both Kant and Christianity admitted) – but they are *not even possible.* Owing to a psychological misunderstanding, an opposition to the motive forces was invented and it was believed that a different kind of motive force was being described: a *primum mobile* was invented which simply does not exist. If we were to adopt the position according to which there is an opposition between 'moral' and 'immoral', we would have to say that *there are only immoral intentions and actions.*

Second proposition. This whole distinction between 'moral' and 'immoral' assumes that moral as well as immoral actions are actions of a free spontaneity – in short, that there is such a thing, or, in other words, that moral judgement in general only applies to a particular genus of intentions and actions, the *free* ones. But this whole category of intentions and actions is purely imaginary; the world to which moral standards alone are applicable simply does not exist; there are neither moral nor immoral actions.

The psychological error out of which the notion that there is an *opposition* between 'moral' and 'immoral' action arose, and that some actions are 'selfless', 'unegoistic', 'self-denying' (when all of them are *unreal*, invented) was an erroneous dogmatism with respect to the 'ego'. It was taken for something atomistic, and falsely opposed to what is 'not the self'; it was detached from the world of becoming, and regarded as something which belonged to the world of being. The *false substantialization of the self* (in the belief in individual immortality) was made an article of faith under the pressure of religio-*moral discipline*. Following this artificial separation of the ego and the declaration of its self-sufficiency, a seemingly incontestable distinction presented itself between the value of the *individual ego* and the value of the immense domain of what is *not the self*. It seemed obvious that the value of the individual ego could only lie in how it relates itself to the immense domain of what is not the self, by subordinating itself to it and existing *for its sake*. Here, the influence of the *gregarious instincts* was decisive: nothing is more contrary to these instincts than the sovereignty of the individual. But if we suppose that the ego is self-sufficient, then its value must lie in *self-denial*.

Thus:

(1) The false independence of the 'individual' as an *atom*.

(2) The appraisal of the herd, which abhors the desire to remain an atom, and perceives it to be hostile.

(3) As a consequence, the individual is overcome by shifting his aims.

(4) At this point, there seemed to be actions which were *self-denying*; a whole sphere of oppositions was imagined with respect to them.

(5) It was asked, in which kind of actions does man most strongly *affirm himself*? Upon these (sexuality, avarice, ambition, cruelty, etc.) prohibition, hate and contempt were heaped; it was *believed* that there were such things as unselfish motives. Everything selfish was condemned; unselfishness was *demanded*.

(6) And what is the consequence of all this? The strongest, the most natural, the *only real* motives have been

prohibited; henceforth, in order to find an action praiseworthy, we must deny the presence of such motives behind it.

This involves an *immense falsification in psychologicis*. Even every kind of 'self-satisfaction' must first be rendered possible again by misunderstanding and construing it *sub specie boni*. Conversely, that *species* of men who found their advantage in *depriving* man of his self-satisfaction (those representatives of the gregarious instinct, such as priests and philosophers) were subtle and psychologically perceptive in showing how selfishness nonetheless prevailed everywhere. The Christian conclusion was that '*everything* is sin, even our virtues. Man is utterly reprehensible. Selfless actions are *impossible*', that man is subject to original sin. In short, once man had opposed his instincts to a purely imaginary world of goodness, he ended with self-contempt for his *inability* to perform 'good' actions. NB. As a result, Christianity represents *progress* in psychological insight: La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It grasped that *human actions are essentially equal*, and that on the whole they are equal in value (that is, they are all *immoral*).

Now one set about *in earnest* to form men (*priests, saints*) in whom selfishness was extinguished. And if there was some doubt as to whether 'perfection' was possible, there was *no* doubt as to what it was. The psychology of the saint, of the priest and of the 'good man', turned out to be purely phantasmagorical. The *actual* motive of action had been declared *bad*; in order to be able to prescribe actions, in order to be able to act at all, actions which are quite impossible had to be characterized as possible and, as it were, *sanctified*. The same *falsehood* which had been used to slander was now used to honour and idealize. *Inveighing* against the vital instincts came to be regarded as sacred and worthy of veneration. The priestly ideal: absolute chastity, absolute obedience, absolute poverty. The lay ideal: almsgiving, compassion, self-sacrifice, chivalry; renunciation of beauty, of reason and of sensuality; and a morose view of all the strong qualities one possesses.

We take a step forwards: the *slandered instincts* also attempt to create a justification for themselves (e.g. in Luther's

Reformation, where the crudest form of moral hypocrisy appeared in the guise of 'evangelical freedom'); we christen them with holy names. The *slandered instincts* attempt to demonstrate that they are *necessary* in order for virtuous men to be possible at all: we must *vivre, pour vivre pour autrui.*[64] Egoism becomes a means to an end . . . We go further, and attempt to confer the right to exist upon both the egoistic and altruistic motives, thinking that from the utilitarian standpoint there should be rights as much for the one as the other. But we go still further and see an even greater benefit in preferring the egoistic standpoint over the altruistic, greater benefit in the sense of more happiness for the majority, or of the furtherance of mankind, etc. Thus there is an emphasis on the rights of the egoistic, but from an extremely altruistic perspective (the 'collective benefit of mankind'). We attempt to reconcile the *altruistic* mode of action with what is *natural.* We attempt to show that the altruistic is inherent in life itself. We attempt to show that the altruistic and the egoistic are equally inherent in the essence of life and of nature. We dream of the disappearance of the opposition between them in some future when, through continued adaptation, the egoistic becomes at the same time the altruistic . . . At last we grasp that altruistic actions are merely a *species* of the egoistic – and that the degree to which a man loves and spends himself is a proof of the degree of individual *power* and *personality.* In short, *that as we make man more evil, we make him better* – and that a man cannot be the one without the other . . . With that, the curtain rises which concealed the *immense falsification of the psychology of man hitherto.*

Consequences. There are *only* immoral intentions and actions; the so-called moral ones therefore must be shown to be *immoral.* (This is the task of the *tractatus politicus.*) All emotions must be derived from a single will to power: they are consubstantial. The notion of life – in the apparent opposition (between 'good and evil'), *degrees of power in the instincts* are expressed. A temporary hierarchy is established according to which certain instincts are either held in check or pressed into service. Morality is economically justified, etc.

Against the second proposition. Determinism is the attempt to rescue the moral world by *translocating* it – into the unknown. Determinism is only a way of making our value judgements disappear, once they no longer have a place in a world conceived in mechanistic terms. We must therefore *attack* and *undermine* determinism, just as we must *dispute* our right to a separation of a world of things-in-themselves from that of phenomena.

787

It is absolutely necessary *to get rid of higher purposes entirely*; otherwise we may fail to make an effort of our own either, and end by surrendering ourselves and abandoning all self-discipline! Only the innocence of becoming gives us the *greatest courage* and the *greatest freedom*!

788

NB! *To restore to the evil man a good conscience* – has this been my involuntary endeavour all along? That is to say, the evil man in so far as he is the strong man (*Dostoevsky's* judgement about criminals in prison should be mentioned here).[65]

789

What a sense of freedom we emancipated minds have in feeling that we are *not* saddled with a teleological system in which everything serves some 'purpose'. Likewise, that the notions 'reward' and 'punishment' do not have their seat in the nature of existence! Likewise, that good and evil actions are not good or evil per se, but are so called only from the point of view of their propensity to contribute to the self-preservation of particular kinds of human communities! Likewise, that our account balances with regard to pleasure and pain have no cosmic, let alone metaphysical, significance! That pessimism which offers to weigh on the scales the pleasure and pain of existence themselves, with its arbitrary confinement within that old pre-Copernican prison and perspective, would be something backwards and backsliding, if it isn't just some Berliner's idea of a joke (Eduard von Hartmann's pessimism).

790

If the 'why' of one's life is clear, then the 'how' will take care of itself. It is already a sign of doubt in the 'why', in the purpose and meaning of life, indeed, a sign of a *lack of will*, when the value of pleasure and pain come to the fore, when hedonistic and pessimistic teachings find a sympathetic ear. Renunciation, resignation, virtue, 'objectivity': these *may* be signs that the absence of the most important factor, the ability to set goals for oneself, is already beginning to be felt.

791

There has been as yet no German culture. Against this, it is no objection to say that there have been isolated examples of great men in Germany, e.g. Goethe, for they had *their own* culture. But it was just these men who were always surrounded *and opposed* by the remainder of all things German; it was just these mighty, defiant and lonely crags that were always surrounded by this marshy, soft and uncertain ground. And with every step foreigners took upon it, they made an 'impression' and created 'forms', for 'German cultivation' possessed no character of its own and offered almost no resistance.

792

Germany, which is full of clever and well-tutored scholars, is so lacking in *great* souls or *mighty* spirits that it seems to have forgotten what they are; and nowadays men who are mediocre, and ill-mannered to boot, stand in the public square with something like a clear conscience and, devoid of embarrassment, laud themselves as great men and reformers; as it is with Eugen Dühring, for instance, a clever and well-tutored scholar who betrays in almost every word he utters that he harbours a petty soul, bruised feelings and an intense envy; and who also betrays that it is not a mighty, exuberant, beneficent and lavish spirit that drives him – but ambition! In this day and age, to covet honours is more unworthy of a philosopher than ever before, now that the mob rules, now that the mob confers the honours!

793
My 'future'

A rigorous polytechnic education . . . as well as conscription, so that as a rule every man of the higher classes should hold the rank of an officer, whatever else he may be.

Part 4. The Will to Power as Art

794

Second chapter. Historical proof that religion, morality and philosophy are *décadent* forms of mankind.

(1) The world of truth and the world of illusion.
(2) The philosopher as a type of *décadence.*
(3) The religious man as a type of *décadence.*
(4) The good man as a type of *décadence.*
(5) The *contrary movement: art*; the problem of tragedy.
(6) *Paganism* in religion.
(7) *Science* against philosophy.
(8) *Politica.*
(9) Critique of the present.
(10) Nihilism and its counter-image: those who return.
(11) The will to power.

795

For the Preface. Perhaps a sequel: *the artist*-philosopher (the scientific attitude towards religion and politics hitherto mentioned); a superior notion of *art.* The question is whether man is able to stand at so great a distance from other men in order to *mould them.* (Preliminary exercises: (1) The man who forms himself, the hermit. (2) The artist *hitherto*, i.e. to reach a small degree of perfection in a certain medium. No!) This includes the *ranking* of superior men, which must be shown.

796

The work of art where it appears without an artist, e.g. as a body, an organization (Prussian officers' corps, the Jesuit

order). The extent to which the artist is only a preliminary stage. What does 'subject' signify?

The world as a work of art which gives birth to itself –

797

The phenomenon, 'artist', is the most *transparent* – through it we behold the *fundamental instincts of power*, of nature, etc.! Even of religion and morality! 'Play', that which is useless, is the ideal of him who is lavish with his strength, is 'childlike'. The 'childlikeness' of God, παῖς παίζων.[66]

798

Apollonian, Dionysian. There are two states in man in which art arises as an elemental force, and disposes of him whether he wishes it or not: on the one hand, an irresistible impulse towards the visionary, and on the other hand, an irresistible impulse towards the orgiastic. Both states are also present in normal life, though in the weaker forms of dreaming and of intoxication. But the same contrast as exists between the visionary and the orgiastic also exists between dreaming and intoxication: both states unleash artistic powers within us, but each of them does so in a fundamentally different manner: dreaming unleashes the power of vision, of association, of poetry; intoxication unleashes gesture, passion, song and dance.

799

Dionysian intoxication contains sexuality and voluptuousness; it is usually lacking in the Apollonian state. There must also be a difference of *tempo* between the states . . . *The extreme calm of certain feelings of intoxication* (or, more strictly, the diminution of the sense of time and space) is reflected in the vision of the calmest gestures and acts of the soul. The classical style essentially represents calm, simplification, abbreviation and concentration. The *intoxication of nature*: the *supreme sense of power* is concentrated in the classical type. Slow to respond; enlarged consciousness; no sense of struggle.

800

The contrary movement: *art*

The sense of intoxication actually corresponds to an *increase of strength*:

It is strongest in the mating season;

It is associated with new organs, accomplishments, colours, forms;

'Beautification' is a consequence of *elevated* strength.

Beautification is an inevitable consequence of the elevation of strength. It is an expression of a *victorious* will, of an increased coordination and harmonization of all the strong appetites, of an unerring poise and emphasis. Logical and geometrical simplification is a consequence of an elevation of strength; conversely, the *perception* of such a simplification in turn elevates the sense of strength . . . The zenith of development: the grand style. Ugliness signifies the *décadence of a type*; opposition and imperfect coordination among the appetites within signifies a decline in the ability to *organize*, or, physiologically speaking, in the 'will'.

The state of pleasure which we call *intoxication* is precisely a superior sense of *power* . . . Perceptions of space and time are altered; tremendous distances are surveyed, and first become *perceivable*, as it were; the *expansion* of the vision to encompass greater masses and distances; the *refinement of the faculty* for the perception of the smallest and most transitory things; *divination*, the power of understanding at the slightest hint or suggestion, that is, an 'intelligent' *sensibility* . . . *Strength* as a sense of muscular control, as suppleness of, and delight in, movement, as dance, as ease and *presto*; strength as the desire to prove one's strength, as bravado, adventurousness, fearlessness: the strength of a heedless creature . . . All these elevated moments of life stimulate each other; the imagery and imagination of the one suffices as a suggestion for the other . . . Such states which are perhaps better kept apart finally intertwine with each other. For example, the sense of religious rapture and sexual excitement (two profound sensations which are found in combination to an extent which is well-nigh amazing. What

is it that pleases all pious women, both young and old? The answer: a saint with handsome legs, still young, still an idiot.) For another example, cruelty and compassion in tragedy (which are also normally found in combination). Springtime, dance, music, all competition of the sexes – and even that Faustian 'infinite longing' . . .

Artists, if they are worth anything, are strong (even physically), extravagant, powerful animals, sensual; without a certain sexual overheating, a man like Raphael is inconceivable . . . To make music is also a kind of procreation; chastity is sometimes merely the artist's method of economizing his energies – and in any case even with artists, artistic productivity ceases along with sexual potency . . . Artists should not see things as they are, but fuller, simpler, stronger; and to that end they must possess a kind of eternal youth and springtime, and embody a kind of habitual intoxication . . . Beyle[67] and Flaubert, two men who are reliable in such matters, in fact commended chastity to artists for the sake of their craft; I would also mention that Renan gives the same advice; Renan, however, is a priest . . .

801

Aesthetica. Aesthetic states involve projecting our own states of *transfiguration* and *abundance* into things and poetizing about them, until these things reflect our own abundance and love of life back to us. Such states include: sexuality, intoxication, feast, springtime, victory over our enemies, scorn, bravado, cruelty and the ecstasy of religious feeling. Primarily *three* elements are involved: sexuality, intoxication, cruelty; all these belong to the oldest festive *joys* of man, and all these likewise predominate in budding artists.

Conversely, when we encounter things which themselves exhibit this transfiguration and abundance, our animal existence responds with *excitement in each sphere* where these various pleasurable states are situated – and the *aesthetic state* consists precisely in a blending of these very delicate nuances of our animal sense of wellbeing and our animal desires. This state occurs only in men whose natural bodily vigour is such that they are capable of bestowing and overflowing at all: such

vigour is always the *primum mobile*. Sober, weary, exhausted, dried-up souls (e.g. that of the scholar) can derive absolutely nothing from art because they lack the one thing necessary to art, the elemental force from which it springs: inner riches.

'Perfection': in these states (sexual love in particular, etc.), what the deepest instinct regards as superior, more desirable and more valuable in general betrays itself: the ascending movement of its type; and likewise towards what state this upward movement is actually striving. Perfection consists in the extraordinary expansion of its sense of power, riches and the inevitable spilling-over of all boundaries . . .

802

[*Aesthetica.*] Art reminds us of states of animal vigour; on the one hand, it is the product of an excess of flourishing bodily health, flowing out into the world of images and fantasies; on the other hand, art serves to incite the animal functions by means of images and fantasies of increased vitality – to elevate and stimulate the sense of vitality.

To what extent can the ugly also possess this power? In so far as it still imparts something of the victorious energy of the artist who has become master over the ugly and the terrible; or in so far as it gently excites our delight in cruelty (in some circumstances even the delight in doing ourselves harm, in self-violation, and thus in the sense of power over ourselves).

803

To the artist, 'beauty' is therefore something not within any hierarchy, because in beauty all opposition is quelled. That is the supreme sign of power, to wit, power over opposing forces, and, moreover, without any tension between them. The fact that violence is no longer necessary, that everything so readily conforms to his intentions, and obeys him with such an amiable mien – this is what so delights the artist's power-seeking will.

804

Aesthetica; on the origin of beauty and ugliness. Those things which we instinctively regard as aesthetically *repulsive* are

the very things which the whole course of human experience has shown are harmful, dangerous and suspicious; the sudden expression of the aesthetic instinct (e.g. in disgust) includes a judgement. In this respect, the *beautiful* falls within the general category of biological values, along with the useful, the beneficial, the life-enhancing; but in such a way that a host of stimuli which are distantly associated with, and reminiscent of, beneficial things and conditions, affect us with a sense of beauty, i.e. the augmentation of a sense of power (and therefore not just things, but the sensations which accompany such things, or their symbols).

With this, beauty and ugliness are recognized as conditioned, that is, by our supreme values with respect to self-preservation. Apart from this, choosing to regard anything as beautiful or ugly is quite meaningless. Objects can no more be *intrinsically* beautiful than acts can be *intrinsically* good, or propositions *intrinsically* true. In each individual instance, it is again a matter of the conditions for the preservation of a certain type of man; thus the *gregarious* man will be affected with a sense of beauty by other things than the *exceptional* or the superior man.

It is the *foreground perspective*, which only takes into consideration the *immediate consequences*, that gives rise to the value of the beautiful (or for that matter, the good or the true).

All instinctive judgements are *short-sighted* with regard to the chain of consequences; they merely advise what must be done *at once*. The human understanding is essentially an *inhibitory apparatus* which guards against an immediate reaction on the basis of instinctive judgements: it constrains, it engages in further deliberation, it takes into account more remote consequences.

Judgements *of beauty and ugliness are short-sighted* – they always have the understanding *against* them – but they are *extremely persuasive*; they appeal to our instincts where the latter unhesitatingly decide and say yes or no *before* the understanding has an opportunity to speak . . .

The usual affirmations of beauty *incite and excite each other*; where the aesthetic impulse is at work, an abundance of perfections which have their origin elsewhere begin to crystallize

around the 'individual instance of beauty'. It is impossible to remain *objective*, or to suspend the interpreting, supplementing, completing and poetizing power (the latter is the very nexus of affirmations of beauty). The sight of a 'beautiful woman' . . .

Therefore: (1) the judgement of beauty is *short-sighted*, in that it sees only immediate consequences; (2) it *lavishes* upon the object which provokes it an *allure* which is conditioned by the association of various judgements of beauty – which, however, *is quite alien to the essence of the object*. To perceive a thing as beautiful means inevitably to perceive it incorrectly . . . (which is incidentally the reason why marriage for love is, socially speaking, the most unreasonable kind of marriage).

805

On the genesis of art. The tendency of a cerebral system overloaded with sexual energies is to transform the world into an image of *perfection* (an evening with the beloved transfigures the least coincidences; life is a succession of sublime things, 'the sorrows of the unfortunate lover are worth more than anything else'); on the other hand, everything *perfect* and *beautiful* serves as an unconscious reminder of that amorous condition and of its manner of seeing – every *perfection* and all the *beauty* of things is reawakened by *contiguity*[68] to this aphrodisiac bliss. *Physiologically*, it is a matter of the creative instinct of the artist and the distribution of his *semen* in his blood . . . The *longing for art and beauty* is an indirect longing for the ecstasies of the sexual impulse, which is communicated to the cerebrum. The *world made perfect* through 'love' . . .

806

Sensuality in its various disguises. Sensuality appears as idealism (in Plato), peculiar to youth, creating the same kind of concave mirror image as the image which the beloved manifests, bejewelling, magnifying and transfiguring everything, conferring upon them a sense of infinity; in the religion of love, 'a handsome young man and a beautiful woman', in some way divine; a bridegroom, a bride of the soul; in *art*, as the power of 'embellishment', just as a man sees a woman and confers upon

her every excellence, so too the sensuality of the artist invests an object with whatever else he honours and cherishes – in such a way he *completes* an object (he 'idealizes' it). The woman, well aware of what the man feels in relation to woman, *accommodates his endeavour to idealize her* by adorning herself, by walking and dancing gracefully, by expressing tender thoughts; similarly, she conducts herself with *modesty*, restraint and reserve – with the instinctive knowledge that in so doing, she *increases* the man's faculty of idealization. Given the tremendous subtlety of the feminine instincts, modesty is by no means an expression of conscious hypocrisy; she divines that it is precisely *ingenuous and unaffected modesty* by which man is most easily seduced and driven to an exaggerated opinion of her. That is why woman is ingenuous – out of instinctive subtlety, which advises her of the advantages of innocence . . . A wilful closing of one's eyes to oneself . . . Whenever the disguise is more effective when it is unconscious, it *becomes* unconscious.

807

What makes all things possible like that state of intoxication called 'love', and yet which is something other than love! But each man has his own knowledge of that. The muscular strength of a girl *increases* as soon as a man comes near; there are instruments which can measure this. When the sexes are in an even closer relationship, for example, as is entailed by dancing and other social practices, this strength increases to such an extent as to enable actual *feats of strength*; in the end, we cannot believe our eyes – or our watches! To be sure, we must take into account the fact that dancing itself, like every kind of brisk movement, already involves a kind of intoxication of the vascular, nervous and muscular systems as a whole. In this case, we are dealing with the combined effects of a double intoxication. And how wise it is sometimes to have a little tingle! . . . There are certain realities which people must never acknowledge, not even to themselves; but then, we *are* speaking of women, are we not? Of those who possess all the feminine '*pudeurs*'?[69] . . . Yes, those young creatures dancing over there are obviously out of touch with reality; they dance

with nothing but ideals in tangible form; what is more, they even see ideals sitting around them, their mothers! . . . Here is an opportunity to cite *Faust*[70] . . . They look incomparably better, the pretty creatures, when they have their little tingle – oh how well they know that too! They are even amiable *because* they know that! Lastly, they are inspired by their finery, which is their *third* little source of intoxication! They believe in their dressmaker as they believe in God – and who would dissuade them from this faith? The faith makes them blessed! And self-admiration is healthy! Self-admiration protects one from catching a cold. Question: did a pretty woman ever catch cold when knew she was well dressed? Never! I myself assume she was hardly dressed at all . . .

808

Love. Do you wish to see the most stupendous proof of how far the transfiguring power of intoxication extends? The proof is 'love', or what is everywhere *called* love, in all that is said or left unsaid. In the intoxication of love, the lover copes with reality in such a way that the cause of this condition is effaced from his consciousness and something else seems to take its place – a flickering and a flashing in all the magic mirrors of Circe . . . It makes no difference whether he is man or beast, let alone whether he possesses intelligence, virtue or integrity . . . If he is fine, he is made a fine fool; if he is gross, he is made a gross fool; but love (and even where it is the love of God, the saintly love of 'redeemed souls') remains in essence the same: a fever which [has] good reason to transfigure itself, an intoxication which does well to lie about itself . . . And in any case, when a man loves, he lies well, both to himself and about himself; he thinks himself transfigured, stronger, richer, more perfect; he *is* more perfect . . . Here we find that *art* serves an organic function; we find it expediently placed within the most angelic instinct of life; we find that it is the greatest stimulus of life – and hence that art is sublimely expedient for us, even in the fact that it lies . . . But we do it an injustice if we stop with its power to lie; it does more than merely imagine: it changes value itself, and not just by changing the impression of what is

valuable . . . The lover is more valuable: he is stronger. In animals, new weapons, ornaments, colours and forms spring from this condition, especially new movements, new rhythms, new love-calls and seductions. In man it is just the same. He who loves is richer than ever, mightier, *more whole* than he who does not. He becomes a spendthrift; he is rich enough to do so. He dares as he has never dared before, he becomes an adventurer, he becomes asinine in his magnanimity and innocence; he believes in God again, he believes in virtue because he believes in love; and on the other hand, this happy idiot grows wings and new abilities – even the door to art is opened to him. If we remove from the poetry of tones and words any suggestion of this internal fever, what remains of poetry and music? . . . *L'art pour l'art* perhaps; the virtuoso croaking of impotent frogs, despairing in their swamp . . . All the *rest* was created by love.

809

The contrary movement: art. All art exercises the power of suggestion over the muscles and the senses, which were originally active in the naïve artistic temperament; it only ever speaks to artists – it speaks to this kind of subtle irritability of the body. The term 'layman' is a misnomer. The deaf man is not a subspecies of those with good hearing.

All art operates as a *tonic*, increasing strength, kindling desire (i.e. the sense of strength), exciting all the subtler memories of intoxication – there is a special kind of remembrance which descends upon us in such states – a distant, fleeting world of sensations returns . . .

Ugliness, i.e., the antithesis of art, is that which is *excluded* from art, its *negation* – whenever decline, impoverishment of life, impotence, dissolution or corruption are suggested, however faintly, the aesthetic man reacts with his *negation* of them.

Ugliness operates as a *depressant*, as the expression of a depressed state, *sapping* strength, impoverishing, oppressing . . .

Being in an ugly mood *suggests* ugly things; health conditions may serve to demonstrate the various ways in which being indisposed also increases the ability to imagine ugly things. The selection of subject matter, interests and questions alters; being

in a logical frame of mind is a condition closely related to being in an ugly mood – it is ponderous and dull . . . When we are in an ugly mood, mechanically speaking, our balance is lost; we stumble and fall . . . It is the opposite of the divine *ease* of the dancer . . .

The aesthetic state possesses a *superabundance of means of communication*, together with an extreme *receptivity* to stimuli and signs. It is the culmination of the ability living beings possess to communicate and convey thoughts to each other – it is the source of languages.

It is here that languages have their point of origin: whether they consist of tones, gestures or glances. The wider phenomenon always comes at the beginning; our abilities as civilized men are drawn from a wider range of abilities. But even today we still hear with our muscles, even read with our muscles.

Every mature art rests upon a multitude of conventions, in so far as it is a language. Convention is a condition of great art, *not* a hindrance to it . . .

Every elevation of life likewise increases the human capacity for communication and likewise the human capacity for understanding. The *ability to see through another's eyes* originally had nothing to do with morality, but with a physiological susceptibility to suggestion; 'sympathy', or what is called 'altruism', is a mere embodiment of that psycho-motor rapport which is attributable to the intellect (*induction psycho-motrice*, with Ch. Féré).[71] We never communicate thoughts, we communicate movements, mimetic signs which we *read back* into thoughts . . .

810

Compared with music, all communication by means of *words* is shameless; words dilute our meaning and dull our minds; words depersonalize; words render common that which is uncommon.

811

The contrary movement: art. There are three exceptional conditions which determine the character of the artist; all three

conditions are deeply related and intertwined with pathological phenomena in such a way that it does not seem possible to be an artist and not be ill. The physiological conditions which are bred, as it were, into the 'personality' of the artist and which are inherent to some degree in every man, are:

(1) *Intoxication*, the elevated sense of power; the inner compulsion to make things a reflection of our own fullness and perfection.

(2) *The extreme acuteness* of certain senses, which makes them capable of understanding – and creating – a totally different language of signs; the same condition which seems to be connected with some nervous diseases; the extraordinary volubility, from which an extraordinary eloquence arises; the desire to speak on the part of everything which knows how to make signs; a need to unburden oneself, as it were, by means of signs and gestures; the ability to speak of oneself in a hundred different figures of speech . . . an *explosive* condition. We must first imagine a state of exuberance in which one is compelled to unburden oneself of inner tension by means of all sorts of muscular activity and movement; then as an involuntary coordination of this movement with inner processes (images, thoughts, desires) – a kind of automatism of the whole muscular system as it is impelled from within by the operation of strong stimuli; the inability to *inhibit* reaction; the inhibitory apparatus is, as it were, *suspended*. Every inward motion (feeling, thought, emotion) is accompanied by *vascular changes* and consequently by changes in colour, temperature and secretion, as is the case with the *suggestive* power of music, its '*suggestion mentale*'.[72]

(3) The *compulsion to imitate*, extreme irritability, in which a certain example becomes contagious – a state is divined and *represented* after only a few signs . . . An inwardly appearing image already sets the limbs in motion . . . A certain suspension of the *will* occurs (as in Schopenhauer!!!!). There is a kind of deafness and blindness towards the external world – the realm of *tolerated* stimuli is sharply circumscribed.

This is what differentiates the artist from the layman (he who merely appreciates art); the latter reaches the height of his sensibility in receiving, the former in giving – such that the antagonism between these two gifts is not only natural but desirable. These conditions have opposing points of view; demanding of the artist that he adopt the point of view of the spectator (or of the critic) means demanding that he *waste* himself and his peculiar strength . . . There is here a kind of difference between the sexes: we should not demand of the artist who *gives* that he become female, that he '*receive*' . . . Our aesthetics have hitherto been a female aesthetics, in so far as only those who receive have reduced their experiences of 'what is beautiful' to formulas. Up to now, the whole of philosophy has passed over the artist in silence . . . That, as suggested above, is an unavoidable error; were the artist to begin to grasp himself, he would thereby *mishandle* himself – he must not look back on what he has done, he must not look at all; he must give. It is to an artist's credit that he is incapable of *critique* . . . otherwise he is neither one thing nor another, he is 'modern'.

812

I set down here the psychological conditions which are signs of a full and flourishing life, conditions which nowadays we are accustomed to adjudge *unhealthy*. But we know better now than to speak of an opposition between healthy and unhealthy; it is a matter of degree – my contention in this instance is that what is called 'healthy' nowadays represents a lower level of what under favourable circumstances *would be* healthy . . . and that we are, relatively speaking, unhealthy . . . The artist belongs to a still stronger race . . . What to us would be harmful, what for us would be unhealthy, for him is natural.

An *overabundance* of vital fluids and forces can just as easily bring in their train symptoms of partial automatism, from sensory hallucinations or from susceptibility to suggestion, as the impoverishment of life can . . . The stimulus has a different cause, but the effect remains the same . . . But more particularly, the *subsequent* effect is not the same; the extreme lack of physiological tone in all naturally morbid individuals,

in accordance with their nervous eccentricities, has nothing in common with the states of the artist: the artist does not have to *atone* for his better moments . . . He is rich enough for that; he can squander without impoverishing himself.

Just as 'genius' might be adjudged a form of neurosis nowadays, the same might perhaps be said of the artistic power of suggestion – and our *artists*, as a matter of fact, are all too similar to hysterical females!!! But that is more a criticism of 'nowadays' than it is of 'artists' . . .

One might object that it is precisely the *impoverishment* of the apparatus which renders this extravagant susceptibility to every suggestion possible: witness our hysterical little females. Or, for that matter, 'our psychic researchers'.

Inspiration; description. The inartistic states are those of *objectivity*, reflection, suspension of the will . . . *Schopenhauer's* scandalous misunderstanding consisted in regarding art as a bridge to the denial of life . . . The inartistic states are those which impoverish, disengage and deflate, states under whose gaze life suffers . . . The Christian . . .

813

The modern artist who, in his physiology, is akin to the hysteric, is also distinguished in possessing a character arising from this morbidity. The hysteric is false: he lies for the sheer joy of lying; he is wondrously gifted in all the arts of dissimulation – unless his morbid vanity plays a trick on him. This vanity is like a constant fever which requires the administration of stupefacients and which recoils from no self-deception and from no *farce* which promises relief, however fleeting it may be. The *inability* to experience pride and the unceasing need to take revenge for a deep-seated self-contempt – this is almost the definition of this sort of vanity. The extraordinary irritability of his nervous system, which creates a crisis out of every trifle and invests every incident in life with an element of 'the dramatic', thereby deprives him of a life of regularity and predictability; he is no longer a person; he is at most an assemblage of personalities which assert themselves, one by one, with shameless assurance. It is precisely on this account that he is great as an actor; all

these poor spineless, submissive people, whom doctors study so closely, prove astonishingly adept at mimicry, at transfiguration, in their ability to assume almost any character *required.*

814

Artists are *not* men of great passion, whatever tale they would like to tell us or even tell themselves. And that is so for two reasons: they are utterly shameless towards themselves (they watch themselves *while they live*, they spy upon themselves, they are much too inquisitive) and they are utterly shameless in the presence of great passion (as artists they exploit it with all the avarice of their talent . . .). Second, though, (a) their vampire, that is to say, their talent, usually will not begrudge the expenditure of energy on what is called great passion; and (b) their artistic *avarice* protects them from passion. He who has a talent is sacrificed to a talent and lives subject to the vampirism of his talent; he lives [for it] . . . A man does not satisfy his passions *by way of* representing them; rather, he satisfies his passions and *then* he represents them. (Goethe taught otherwise: he wanted to misunderstand himself in this regard, he sensed the indelicacy.)

815

On living reasonably. A relative chastity, a principled and prudent caution in regard to erotic matters, even in thought, may be a great part of living reasonably even for those with richly endowed and whole natures. The principle applies in particular to *artists*; it is a better part of wisdom for them. Thoroughly trustworthy voices have already been raised in this regard, for example, Stendhal, Th. Gautier and even Flaubert. The artist is perhaps by his very nature necessarily a sensual man, generally excitable, receptive in every sense to stimuli, accommodating to even the faintest suggestion of a stimulus. Nevertheless, given the authority his task has over him and his determination to attain mastery in it, as a rule he is actually a moderate and often even a chaste man. His dominating instinct *demands* this of him; it does not allow him to spend himself in this or that fashion. It is one and the same kind of strength which is spent in artistic conception and in the sexual act: there is only one

kind of strength. For the artist to yield *here*, to spend himself *here*, is treacherous; it betrays a lack of instinct, of will in general; it may be a sign of *décadence* – in any case, it diminishes the value of his art to an incalculable degree.

816

In comparison with the *artist*, the appearance of the *scientific* man is, in fact, a sign of a certain curtailment and abasement of life (but also of an *increase of strength, rigour, severity and will-power*).

There is a way in which falseness and indifference towards *truth* and *utility* may be a sign of youth, of '*childishness*', in an artist . . .

Note their habitual manner, their unreasonableness, their ignorance about themselves, their indifference to eternal values, their seriousness at 'play' . . . In their lack of dignity, they are buffoons and gods cheek by jowl, both saints and *canaille*[73] . . .

For the artist, *imitation* is an imperious instinct.

Those who *affirm* as opposed to the artists of decline. *Artists of ascent, artists of decline; the question is whether they do not belong to all phases . . . Yes.*

817

Would any link be missing in the whole chain of science and art if women, if women's work, were absent from it? Granting the occasional exception – they prove the rule – woman is capable of perfection in everything which does not spring from a sense of vocation – in letters, in memoirs, in the most delicate handiwork, precisely because she perfects herself in them, because she thereby obeys that sole artistic impulse which she possesses, namely, to *please* . . . But what has woman to do with the passionate indifference of the genuine artist, who attaches more importance to a tone, a shade, a piece of tomfoolery, than to himself? Who paws at his own innermost secrets? Who attaches no value to a thing that does not know how to give itself form (to reveal itself, to make itself public)? Art as it is practised by the artist: do you not understand what it is? An attempt to assassinate all *pudeurs*? . . .

It was not until this century that woman dared to take a turn at literature (*'vers la canaille plumière, écrivassière'*, in the words of old Mirabeau);[74] she writes, she paints, she loses her instincts. And *to what end*, if I may be so bold?

818

The price of being an artist is that what everyone else calls 'form' becomes for him the *content*, the matter itself. Thus the artist lives, of course, in a *world turned upside down*; for he soon finds that content has also become for him something merely formal – his own life included.

819

Physiology of art. The truly *modern* sense for and delight in nuance, in the idiosyncratic, runs counter to the impulse whose delight and strength lie in capturing the *typical*: like Greek taste in its best period. In such a taste, an abundance of vitality is subdued and moderation prevails; what underlies it is the tranquillity of a strong soul who is slow to act and averse to an excess of vitality. The general case, the law, is *honoured* and *emphasized*; conversely, the exception is set aside and nuance effaced. That which is firm, mighty and substantial, the life which is formidable in repose and conceals this strength – that is what ultimately *'pleases'*, i.e. what corresponds with what we think of ourselves.

820

In the main, I consider the artists to be more in the right than any previous philosophers: they have not lost track of what life is, they love the things of 'this world' – they love their own senses. To strive for desensualization seems to me a mistake, or a disease, or a cure for one, when it is not merely hypocrisy or self-deception. What I want for myself and for all who live – and *must* live – without the pangs of a puritanical conscience, is an ever-growing intellectualization and variegation of the senses; indeed, we should be grateful to the senses for their acuity, scope and power and offer them in return the best we have in the way of intellect. What do we care about priestly and metaphysical

denunciations of the senses! We have no further need of them: it is a mark of a good constitution when someone like Goethe embraces with ever-greater warmth and joy the 'things of this world' – in this way he holds fast to the grand conception of man, the conception of man as he who, in learning to transfigure himself, *transfigures existence*. 'What are you talking about?' you may well ask. 'Is it not precisely among artists today that one finds the worst pessimists? What about Richard Wagner, for instance? Isn't he a pessimist?' I scratch my head.

821

The contrary movement: art; pessimism in art? The artist gradually becomes enamoured of artistic means through which the state of intoxication can be discerned and comes to regard them as ends in themselves: extremely delicate as well as resplendent colour, clarity of line, *nuance* of tone, *distinctness* where normally distinctness is absent and so on. Everything distinct, every nuance, in so far as it calls to mind the extreme increase in strength which intoxication produces, awakens this sense of intoxication in reverse; the effect of the work of art is to *excite in the spectator the state of the artist*, to excite intoxication . . .

The essence of art lies in the *perfecting* of existence, in the bringing forth of perfection and abundance; art is essentially the *affirmation, blessing and deification of existence* . . . What does it mean to call an *art pessimistic*? . . . Is that not a *contradictio*? Yes. Schopenhauer is *wrong* to think that certain portions of art promote pessimism. Tragedy does *not* teach 'resignation' . . . To represent terrible and questionable things is, in and of itself, an expression of the artist's instinctive desire for power and glory; he does not fear them . . . There is no such thing as pessimistic art . . . Art affirms. Job affirms. But Zola? The Goncourt brothers? The things they show are ugly; but the fact that they show them stems from their *delight in ugliness* . . . There is no avoiding it! You deceive yourselves if you think otherwise.

How liberating Dostoevsky is!

822

Fundamental insight: what is beautiful and ugly; aesthetica. If my readers have been sufficiently initiated into the doctrine that in the great, universal drama of life, even 'the good man' represents a form of exhaustion, then they will have to admire Christianity for its consistency in having conceived of the good man as ugly. Christianity was right about that.

It is unworthy of a philosopher to say that the good and the beautiful are one; if he goes so far as to add 'and also the true', we should thrash him. Truth is ugly: *we have art* lest we perish from the truth.

823

The moralization of the arts. Art as freedom from moral narrow-mindedness and parochial perspectives, or as mockery of them. The flight to nature, where the *beautiful* is paired with the *terrible.* The conception of the great man.

Fragile, useless, self-indulgent souls, who are made gloomy by almost nothing; '*beautiful souls*'.

Awaken *faded ideals*, in their relentless severity and brutality, as the magnificent monsters that they are.

An exultant delight at the psychological insight into the unknowing deviousness and theatricality of all artists who moralize.

Bring to light the *falseness* of art, its immorality.

Bring to light the fundamental 'idealizing' powers (sensuality, intoxication, exuberant animality).

824

Aesthetica. Modern *counterfeiting* in the arts understood as *necessary*, that is to say, as commensurate with the *underlying needs* of the *modern soul.*

The artist fills up the gaps in his *talent* and still more in his *education*, his knowledge of tradition and his technical *training*, in the following way:

First, he seeks a *less artistic* public which is unconditional in its love (and is ready to fall on its knees before a *personality*).

To that end, the superstition of our century, the superstitious belief in '*genius*', serves nicely . . .

Second, he harangues the obscure instincts of the dissatisfied, ambitious and self-deceived of a democratic age; the importance of *poses*.

Third, the artist transfers the procedures of one art to the realm of another; confounding the purposes of art with those of science, or the Church, or the interests of the race ('nationalism'), or with philosophy – he rings all bells at once and awakens the vague suspicion that he is a 'god'.

Fourth, the artist flatters women, the suffering and the indignant. He also brings *narcotica* and *opiatica* into preponderance in art. He tickles the fancy of 'cultured' people, of readers of poetry and ancient history.

825

NB. The separation between 'public' and 'private' spheres: in the former, a man today must be a charlatan, in the latter, he must be a virtuoso and nothing more! The 'geniuses' of our century bridged the gap between them and were great in both; the great charlatanism of Victor Hugo and R. Wagner was coupled with such genuine virtuosity that it satisfied even the most refined artistic connoisseurs. Hence the *lack of greatness*: the aspect under which they appear keeps alternating, now catering to the coarsest needs, now to the most refined.

826

False 'strengthening'. In *romantisme* this unremitting *espressivo* does not indicate strength, but rather a sense of deficiency.

Picturesque, or so-called dramatic music, is above all *easier* (as is also the brutal *colportage* and the juxtaposition of *faits* and *traits* in the novel of *naturalisme*).

'*Passion*' is a matter of nerves and weary souls; as is the delight in high mountains, deserts, storms, orgies and horrors – in everything massive and formidable (e.g. historians).

In fact, there is a cult of excessive feeling. How is it that the strong ages have a need for the opposite from their art – a need for something which transcends passion?

The colours, the harmony, the nervous brutality of orchestral sound; the garish colours in the novel. The preference for *exciting* material (*erotica* or *Socialistica* or *pathologica*): all these things indicate for whom the artist labours today – for the *overworked* and *distracted*, or else for the debilitated. *The artist is obliged to play the tyrant in order to be effective at all.*

827

Modern art as the art of tyrannizing. A heavy-handed and rigorously worked-out *logic of delineation*; the *motif* reduced to a formula – and then the formula plays the tyrant. Within the lines, a wild diversity and overwhelming mass, before which the senses are confused; brutality of coloration, of subject matter, of desires. For example: Zola, Wagner and, on a more intellectual level, Taine. Thus everything is reduced to *logic, mass and brutality* . . .

828

Physiology of art. In regard to the painter: '*Tous ces modernes sont des poëtes qui ont voulu être peintres. L'un a cherché des drames dans l'histoire, l'autre des scènes de mœurs; celui-ci traduit des religions, celui-là une philosophie.*'[75] This one imitates Raphael, that one the early Italian masters; the landscape painters employ trees and clouds to make odes and elegies. *Not one* of them is simply a painter; they are all archaeologists, psychologists and impresarios of any number of remembrances or theories. They enjoy themselves with our erudition and our philosophy. Like us, they are filled to excess with general ideas. They are enamoured of forms, not for what they are, but for what they *express*. They are the sons of a learned, tormented generation, pale reflections of the past – a thousand miles away from the Old Masters, who never read and only thought to feast their eyes.

829

At bottom, even Wagner's music is still literature, no less than the whole of French Romanticism [is]; over sentimental stay-at-homes it exercises the charm of exoticism, of strange

times, customs and passions; it offers the delight of entering immeasurably distant, strange, primeval lands, accessible only through books in which the whole horizon has been painted with new colours and possibilities . . . Intimations of still more distant and undiscovered worlds; *dédain* towards the boulevard . . . We must admit that nationalism is also only a form of exoticism . . . Romantic musicians merely relate what exotic books have made of them: they would like to experience *exotica* and landscapes in the Florentine or Venetian style; ultimately *they content themselves* by seeking them in a *picture*. What is essential for them is a kind of *new* desire, a kind of wish to imitate the lives and works of those who went before them, the better to cloak and conceal their souls . . . In this sense, Romantic art is only a makeshift for a defective 'reality'.

With Napoleon, we see a new passion, new possibilities of the soul . . . An enlargement of the soul . . .

One attempts to *do* new things: the Revolution, Napoleon's ambitions . . . But when the will becomes exhausted, the desire to feel, imagine and dream new things becomes all the more licentious.

The experience of excessive things has as its consequence a craving for excessive sensations . . . And it was foreign literatures which afforded the strongest spices . . .

830

Winckelmann's and Goethe's Greeks, V. Hugo's *Les Orientales*,[76] Wagner's characters from the *Edda*,[77] W. Scott's thirteenth-century Englishmen[78] – some day the whole comedy will be exposed; all of it was historically false beyond measure, *but* – modern. Truly!

831

On the characteristics of *national genius* with regard to what is foreign and borrowed.

The *English* coarsen and naturalize everything they receive;

The *French* dilute, simplify, rationalize, tidy up;

The *Germans* mix, mediate, complicate and imbue with moral significance;

The *Italians* have made by far the freest and finest use of borrowed material and have put a hundred times more into it than they have extracted from it; as those with the *richest* national genius, they had the most to give.

832

The Jews have touched upon genius in the realm of art with H. Heine and Offenbach. Offenbach was the wittiest and most high-spirited of satyrs, a musician who held fast to the great tradition and who offered (for those who listen with more than just their ears) a suitable deliverance from the sentimental and ultimately *degenerate* music of German Romanticism.

833

Offenbach: French music imbued with a Voltairean wit; free, haughty, with a little sardonic grin, but light and witty almost to the point of banality (he never uses *make-up*) and without that *mignardise*[79] of morbid or blond-Viennese sensuality.

834

If by artistic genius we understand the greatest freedom under law, divine ease and insouciance in what is most difficult, then Offenbach (or Edm. Audran)[80] has even more claim to the title 'genius' than Wagner has. Wagner is heavy and ponderous; nothing is more foreign to him than the moments of the most high-spirited perfection which this buffoon Offenbach achieves as many as five or six times in almost every one of his *bouffonneries*. But perhaps we may be allowed to understand something else by genius.

835

A chapter: music. On the doctrine of 'intoxication' (enumeration, e.g. adoration of *petits faits*).[81] German and French and Italian music. (Our lowest periods politically are the most fruitful culturally.) The Slavs? The cultural and historical ballet; it has conquered the opera. It is a mistake to think that what Wagner has created is a form – it is a kind of formlessness. The possibility of a dramatic construction remains to be found.

Music for the stage versus music for musicians. Rhythmic. Expression at any cost. In honour of *Carmen*. In honour of H. Schütz (and the 'Liszt Society'). Meretricious instrumentation. In honour of Mendelssohn: an element of Goethe in him and nowhere else! Just as another element of Goethe came to perfection in Rahel![82] And a third [in] H. Heine.

836

Descriptive music lets reality *work its effects* on the listener . . . All these kinds of art are *easier to produce and more readily lend themselves to imitation* – which is why the untalented resort to them. It is a form of art which appeals to the instincts: *suggestive* art.[83]

837

Aesthetica. With regard to our modern music, the decay of melody is the same thing as the decay of 'ideas', of dialectic and of the freedom of the most intellectual activity – it is merely ungainly and cloying, qualities which evolve into new feats of daring and even principles – but in the end, a man has only the principles of his gifts, or the limitations of his gifts. In what concerns the basic conditions of genius, Offenbach was as much a genius as Wagner . . . 'Dramatic music'? Nonsense! It is simply bad music, as surely as ['music-drama' is bad music. Instead, music should give us] the surrogates of scorn, dancing and mocking *intellectuality*. 'Feeling' and 'passion' are surrogates for high intellectuality and delight in same (e.g. Voltaire's) when one no longer knows how to attain them. Technically speaking, 'feeling' and 'passion' are easier – they presuppose much poorer artists. The recourse to drama betrays that an artist is a master of means which are more apparent than genuine. Thus we have dramatic painting, dramatic poetry, etc.

838

What we lack in music is an aesthetic which would know how to impose rules on musicians and create a conscience in them; and we consequently lack a real struggle over 'principles' – for as musicians we laugh at Herbart's velleities in this domain just

as much as we laugh at Schopenhauer's. As a matter of fact, a great difficulty presents itself here: we no longer know how to *justify* our notions of what constitutes an artistic 'model', or an artist's 'mastery', or 'perfection' in a work – we grope about blindly in a realm of values, instinctively guided by our old affection and admiration, almost believing that 'good is whatever pleases *us*' . . . I am always suspicious when I hear Beethoven everywhere referred to in all innocence as a 'classical' composer; on the contrary, I would most strictly maintain that, in other arts, Beethoven is the very opposite of classical. But when Wagner's even more complete and glaringly obvious dissolution of style, his so-called dramatic style, is taught and revered as an 'exemplar', as a form of 'mastery', as a kind of 'progress', then my patience is at an end. Dramatic style in music as Wagner understood it is the renunciation of style in general; it is the assumption that something is a hundred times more important than music, namely, drama. Wagner could paint; he used music not for its own sake, but to lend strength to his poses and his poetry; ultimately, he appealed to 'fine sentiments' and heaving bosoms, just as any other theatrical artist does – with it all he persuaded women and even philistines. But what do women and philistines care about music? None of them are conscientious about art; none of them suffer when all of the cardinal and indispensable virtues of an art are trampled underfoot and made light of in favour of incidental purposes, as *ancilla dramaturgica.* What good is any enlargement of the means of expression, if that which is expressed, art itself, has lost its own self-governance? The picturesque grandeur and power of tones, the symbolism of sound, rhythm, the colour tones of harmony and disharmony, the suggestive significance of music with respect to the other arts, the whole sensuality of music in which Wagner achieved mastery – all this Wagner discerned in music, drew out of it and developed. Victor Hugo did something similar for language; but already the French are asking themselves with regard to the case of Victor Hugo, whether this did not lead to a corruption of language . . . whether the increase of sensuality in language has not led to the suppression of reason, intellectuality and profound lawfulness in language?

The fact that the poets in France have become sculptors, that the musicians in Germany have become actors and cultural paint-slingers – are these not signs of *décadence*?

Wagner makes all sorts of things possible with the help of music which is not really music: he gives us intimations of enlargement, virtue and passion. For him, music is merely a means to an end. But as a result, has music not lost all the more intellectual forms of beauty? Has it not lost the high and haughty perfection which still embraces gracefulness in feats of daring, the ravishing leap and dance of logic, the . . . [?]

839

There is nowadays a sort of musician's pessimism even among those who are not musicians. Who has not experienced him? Who has not cursed him? I mean the unhappy youth who tortures his piano until it cries out in despair and who personally wallows in the mire of the darkest and most turbid harmonies? This enables us to *recognize* his pessimism . . . but whether it also enables us to recognize his musicality is a point on which I remain unconvinced. A Wagnerian *pur sang*[84] is unmusical: he is subject to the elemental forces of music in much the same way that a woman is subject to the will of a hypnotist – and in order to be *able* to do so, he must not be made suspicious by a strict and refined conscience *in rebus musicis et musicantibus*. I said 'in much the same way that', but perhaps what we are dealing with here is more than a mere likeness. Consider the means of producing an effect which Wagner preferred to employ (means which he, for the most part, had to invent first): choice of tempos, the timbre of his orchestration; the appalling eschewal of any structure in rhythmic phrasing; the skulking, stalking, mysterious, hysterical character of his 'endless melody'); they are disconcertingly similar to the means by which hypnosis is induced. And is the state into which, for example, the prelude to *Lohengrin* sends men in the audience, let alone the women, essentially any different from a somnambulistic trance? After listening to the aforementioned prelude, I heard an Italian woman say (with that comely, ecstatic expression in her eyes

which female Wagnerians are so adept at making): '*Come* si dorme *con questa musica!*'[85]

840

'German' means: religion in music. How much satisfaction all religious needs still receive in Wagnerian music, although this remains unavowed or even unknown! How much prayer, virtue, unction, 'virginity', 'salvation', still speaks through it! . . . Oh what an advantage it derives from the fact that music may dispense with words or concepts, this wily saint who leads us back, *seduces* us back, to everything in which we once believed! . . . Our intellectual conscience need not be ashamed – it remains uninvolved – when some ancient instinct drinks with trembling lips from *forbidden* cups . . . This is prudent, healthy and even a good sign, in so far as it betrays shame in the presence of satisfaction of the religious instinct . . . Insidious Christianity: this is the type of music we find in 'late Wagner'.

841

Courage. I distinguish between courage before persons, courage before things and courage before the written word. David Strauss's courage, for example, was of the last variety. I further distinguish between the courage before witnesses and the courage without witnesses: the courage of a Christian, or of believers in God in general, can never be the courage without witnesses – but this alone cheapens it. I finally distinguish between the courage which is merely the expression of temperament and the courage which is the fear of one's own fear; moral courage is a particular instance of the last species. In this connection, we should add the courage born of despair.

Wagner as seducer: Wagner possessed such courage. His position in regard to music was, at bottom, a desperate one. He was deficient in the two capacities which *good* musicians possess: nature and culture, a predisposition for music and discipline and training in music. But he had courage: he made a principle of his deficiencies – he devised for himself a new species of music. 'Dramatic music' as devised

by him was the music of which *Wagner was capable*; its very notion is defined in terms of Wagner's limitations. And he was misunderstood – or was he? . . . Five-sixths of the artists of today are in his situation. Wagner is their saviour; and incidentally, five-sixths is rather on the low side. Wherever nature has shown herself to be inclement to the artist and wherever his culture has remained haphazard, tentative, dilettantish, he turns instinctively – what am I saying? *enthusiastically* – to Wagner; in the words of the poet, 'half-pulled, half-plunging'.[86]

Wagner's success is itself a great *seducer*. Let us suppose that this seducer were to learn to speak, that it assumed the form of a wise friend and counsellor of conscience to young musicians who carry in the depth of their bosoms a small catastrophe – and we were to hear it speak, friendly and respectable, out of an angelic tolerance for all 'small catastrophes' . . .

842

The will to power as art: music and the grand style. The greatness of an artist is not to be measured by the 'fine sentiments' which he excites, as the little old ladies would like to believe. Rather, it should be measured by the degree to which he approximates the grand style, is capable of the grand style. This style resembles great passion in that it disdains to please; in that it forgets to persuade; in that it commands; in that it *wills* . . . To become master of the chaos within oneself; to compel this chaos to assume form; for this form to become necessary: logical, simple, unambiguous, mathematical; for it to *become law* – that is the great ambition here. It keeps us at arm's length; nothing inspires more love for such authoritative men than this – a desert forms around them, a stillness, a fear as before some great sacrilege . . .

All the other arts are familiar with such men who aspire to the grand style; why are they lacking in music? Has any musician yet created anything comparable to the work of the architect who designed the Palazzo Pitti?[87] . . . Herein lies a problem. Did music perhaps belong to that culture in which the realm of authoritative men had already come to an end? Is the

very notion of the grand style already at odds with the soul of music, with the 'woman' in our music? . . .

With this, I touch upon a cardinal question: where does the whole of our music belong? How should it be classified? The age of classical taste knows nothing comparable to it; it blossomed when the world of the Renaissance was in its twilight, when 'freedom' had already bidden farewell to customs and even to aspirations: is it characteristic of music to be a part of a counter-Renaissance? Or, in other words, an art of *décadence*? Somewhat as the Baroque style is an art of *décadence*? Is it the sister of that Baroque style, since in any case it is its contemporary? Is music, modern music, not already a form of *décadence*? . . .

Music is a counter-Renaissance development in the arts; it is also a form of *décadence* as social expression.

I have put my finger on this question before. Is our music not an instance of counter-Renaissance art? Is it not closely akin to the Baroque style? Has it not grown in opposition to every classical taste, so that it would of its own accord forbid itself any aspiration to classicism?

There could be no doubt about the answer to this question of the first importance, if there had been a proper appreciation of the fact that music in the form of Romanticism attains to its greatest maturity and abundance – likewise in the form of a reactionary movement against classicism . . .

*

Mozart is a tender and loving soul, but entirely of the eighteenth century, even in his seriousness . . . Beethoven is the first great Romantic in the *French* sense of the term, just as Wagner is the last great Romantic . . . both of them instinctive opponents of classical taste, of severe style – to say nothing of 'grand' style. Both of them . . .

843

The man of substance and magnanimity, as opposed to the man of yearning and aspiration. The aesthetic conditions are twofold.

*

The *Romantic*: an ambiguous figure, like all modern figures.[88]

844

A Romantic is an artist whose great dissatisfaction with himself has become creative – whose eyes are drawn away from himself and his contemporaries and towards the past.

845

Is art a consequence of *dissatisfaction with reality*? Or is it the expression of *gratitude for the happiness one has enjoyed*? In the first case, it is *Romanticism*; in the second, aureole and dithyramb (in short, an art of *apotheosis*): Raphael belongs here too, apart from the fact that it was somewhat duplicitous of him to deify a *semblance* of the Christian interpretation of the world. He felt gratitude for existence where it did not appear specifically Christian.

With the *moral* interpretation the world becomes unbearable; Christianity was the attempt thereby to 'overcome' the world, that is, to negate it. *In praxi* such an attack of madness – a mad conceit of man's in the face of the world – had the consequence [of] darkening, belittling and impoverishing man; the only kind of man that it took into account, that it *furthered*, if you will, was the most mediocre, the most innocuous kind: the gregarious kind of man.

Homer was an artist of apotheosis, as was Rubens. Music has not yet had such an artist.

The idealization of the *great transgressor* (the sense of his *greatness*) is Greek; the depreciation, defamation and denigration of the sinner, is Jewish and Christian.

846

What is Romanticism? With regard to all aesthetic values I now avail myself of this fundamental distinction: in every case I ask myself, 'has *want* or rather *abundance* been creative here?' From the outset, another distinction would seem to have more to recommend it – it is far more obvious – namely, whether the desire for the fixed and eternal, for *being*, on the one hand, or rather the desire for destruction, for change, for *becoming*, on the other, has been the principle of creation. But both kinds of desire prove on closer examination to be ambiguous, that is

to say, explicable precisely in accordance with the preceding scheme to which I have (and, it seems to me, rightly) given pride of place.

The desire for destruction, for change, for becoming, *can* be the expression of a power overflowing and pregnant with hope (my *terminus* for this, as is well known, is 'Dionysian'); but it can also be the *hatred* of the ill-constituted, deprived and unfortunate man who destroys and *must* destroy, because he is provoked and enraged by what exists, indeed, by existence itself.

On the other hand, the desire to 'immortalize' in art or letters can be the product of gratitude and love; works born of such a desire are always a kind of apotheosis, perhaps a dithyrambic one, as in Rubens, or a blissful one, as in Hāfez, or a bright and benevolent one, as in Goethe, works which spread an Homeric nimbus of light over all things. However, this desire can also be the expression of the tyrannical will of a great sufferer who would make what is most personal, individual and intimate, what is actually idiosyncratic about his suffering, into a binding *law* and constraint and to take his revenge upon all things, so to speak, stamping and branding them with his own image, the image of his torment. The latter impulse finds its most expressive form in Romantic pessimism, whether it be as Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will, or as Wagner's music.[89]

847

Might not the antithesis, *active* and *reactive*, be what lies hidden behind that other antithesis, *Classical* and *Romantic*? . . .

848

Aesthetica. To be classical, one must be possessed of all the strong and apparently contradictory gifts and passions; but in such a way that they are harnessed together at just the *right* time to bring a *genus* of literature or art or politics to its highest pinnacle (but not *after* this has already taken place . . .); in such a way that they reflect in one's deepest and innermost soul a comprehensive condition (be it one's people or one's culture) at a time when such a condition still exists and has not yet

been painted over by the imitation of something alien (or is still dependent . . .); not a reactive spirit, but rather a spirit which brings what has gone before to a *conclusion*, while at the same time pointing the way towards what is to come, a spirit which is affirmative in all circumstances, even in its hatreds.

'Is the highest personal worthiness *not* a part of it as well?' . . . We should consider whether moral prejudices do not perhaps play a role here and whether great moral attainments are not perhaps at odds with what is classical . . .

To '*Mediterraneanize*' music: that is *my* watchword . . .

We should consider whether moral monsters must not of necessity be Romantics in word and deed . . . Such a preponderance of any one trait over others (as in the case of the moral monster) is even inimical to the classical ability to maintain equilibrium; supposing someone possessed these attainments in morality and were nevertheless classical; we should without hesitation conclude that he also possessed similar attainments in immorality! This was perhaps the case with Shakespeare (assuming that he was really Lord Bacon).

849

Things of the future. Against the Romanticism of great 'passion'. It is important to understand that a certain amount of coldness, lucidity and rigour is inseparable from all 'classical' taste; above all, logic, delight in intellectuality, 'the three unities' and concentration; hatred of everything sentimental, comfortable or witty, hatred of everything complex, uncertain, aimless or portentous, as well as of everything cursory, intricate, pretty or good-natured.

Artistic formulas should not be trifled with; life should be refashioned in such a way that it subsequently *demands* to be formulated.

The fact that the contemporaries of Herder, Winckelmann, Goethe and Hegel claimed to have rediscovered the classical ideal – and at the same time, Shakespeare! – was a light farce at which we have only now learned to laugh, because it is only now that we have begun to *understand* it. And this same generation had in the most shameful fashion turned apostate from the school

of French classicism! As if the essential thing could not have been learned there just as well as here! . . . But what was wanted was 'nature', 'naturalness'! Oh, the stupidity of it all! These Germans thought that Greek classicism was a kind of naturalness! We should thoroughly consider, without prejudice or sentiment, on what soil a classical taste can grow. Becoming harder, simpler, stronger and more evil are inseparable from each other; each is necessary if a man is to develop a classical taste. Such a man will have a preference for logical and psychological simplification and a contempt for detail, complexity or indeterminacy.

The German Romantics did *not* protest against classicism, but against reason, Enlightenment, taste, the eighteenth century. The sensibility of Romantic-Wagnerian music: antithesis, the *classical sensibility*. The Romantics had the determination to impose unity (because when one imposes unity, one plays the tyrant, namely, over the listener and the spectator), but lacked the ability which would have allowed them to play the tyrant with respect to what is most important, namely the work itself (by omission, abbreviation, clarification, simplification). Wagner, Victor Hugo, Zola, Taine – they all overwhelm us with mass but never with their own greatness.[90]

850

The nihilism of artists. Nature is cruel in her serenity, cynical in her sunrises. We are antagonistic towards *tender emotions.* One flees to where nature moves our senses and our imagination, where we have nothing to love, where we are not reminded of the moral speciousness and scrupulousness of this Northern nature of ours – and so it is with the arts. We prefer that which no longer reminds us of 'good and evil'. Our moralistic irritability and vulnerability are, however, redeemed in a formidable and fortunate nature, in the senses and energies which fate has given us. Life without goodness.

The benefit consists in the sight of nature's magnificent *indifference* to good and evil. There is no justice in history, no goodness in nature: that is why the pessimist, if he is an artist, takes an interest in subjects *in historicis* where the absence of justice is displayed with admirable naïveté, where downright

perfection is expressed . . . and he likewise takes an interest in *nature*, where her characteristic wickedness and indifference are not concealed, where she exhibits her characteristic *perfection . . . The nihilistic artist betrays himself in his choice of, and preference for, cynical history, cynical nature.*

851

What is tragic. I have repeatedly put my finger on the following error in Aristotle: his belief that he had discerned in two *depressing* emotions, fear and pity, the emotions of tragedy.[91] Had he been right, tragedy would be a life-threatening form of art; one would have to warn against it as something disreputable and a public menace. Art, ordinarily the great stimulus of life, a form of intoxication with life, an expression of the desire for life, would find itself in the service of a downward movement, and as a servant to pessimism, so to speak, would have become *harmful to health.* (For to suppose, as Aristotle seems to have believed, that by exciting these emotions tragedy 'purges' us of them is simply not true.) For to conceive of something which habitually excites fear or pity, disrupts, weakens and discourages – and further supposing Schopenhauer were right in maintaining that therefore the lesson to be drawn from tragedy is resignation, i.e. a meek renunciation of happiness, of hope and of the will to live – this would be to conceive of an art in which art denies itself. Tragedy would then signify a process of dissolution, and the instincts of life would destroy themselves in the instinct of art. Christianity, nihilism, tragic art, physiological *décadence*; these things would go hand in hand, they would become preponderant at the same time and impel each other onwards, *downwards*! . . . Tragedy would thus be a symptom of decline.

This theory can be refuted in the most cold-blooded way, namely by measuring the effect of a tragic emotion with a dynamometer. And the result would be something which ultimately only a system-builder completely taken in by his own disingenuousness would be psychologically capable of misunderstanding: that tragedy is a *tonicum.* If Schopenhauer *refused* to grasp this point, if he regarded general depression as a tragic

state, if he would have given the Greeks (who much to his chagrin were not 'resigned' . . .) to understand that they did not have the loftiest view of the world, that is merely *parti pris*,[92] the need for consistency in his system, the fraudulence of a system-builder, one of the many pernicious frauds with which Schopenhauer step by step corrupted his whole psychology (he deliberately and wilfully misunderstood genius, art itself, morality, pagan religion, beauty, knowledge and almost everything else).

852

Aesthetica: the tragic artist. Whether and where [the] judgement 'beautiful' is made depends on an individual's or a people's *strength.* The sense of abundance, of *accumulated strength* which bravely and cheerfully accepts many things before which the weakling *trembles* – a man suffused with a sense of *power* judges beautiful even things and conditions which the instinctively impotent condemn: they can only regard something *hateful* as 'ugly'.[93] Our ability to follow the scent of those things which would nearly put an end to us were we to confront them in the flesh as dangers, problems, temptations – this ability likewise determines our aesthetic affirmation. ('This is beautiful' is an *affirmation.*)

From this it follows that, on the whole, a *penchant for questionable and terrible things* is a symptom of *strength*, whereas the taste for *pretty and dainty* things is characteristic of weak and delicate constitutions. Delight in tragedy [is] a symptom of strong ages and strong constitutions: its *non plus ultra* is perhaps the *Divina Commedia.* It is the *heroic* spirits who in tragic cruelty affirm themselves, who are hardy enough to feel pain as delightful . . . On the other hand, supposing the *weak* wish to receive enjoyment from an art which was not intended for them; what will they do to make *tragedy* more palatable for them? They will read *their own sense of what is valuable* into it; e.g. the 'triumph of the moral world order', or the doctrine of the 'worthlessness of existence', or the call to resignation (or even semi-medicinal and semi-moral emotional discharges, *à la* Aristotle). Finally, the *art of the terrifying*, in so

far as it excites the nerves, may be highly regarded by the weak and exhausted as a *stimulans*, which is the reason why, e.g., Wagnerian art is so *highly regarded* today.

It is a sign of our sense of wellbeing and power how much we allow ourselves to acknowledge of things their terrible, their questionable character and whether we are in need of any 'solution' at the end.

This kind of artist's pessimism is exactly the opposite of that religio-moral pessimism of people who suffer from the 'corruption' of man and the riddle of existence. This requires a solution to the riddle, or at least the hope of a solution . . . The suffering, the despondent, the inherently suspicious – in a word, the *sick*, have always had need of rapturous *visions* in order to endure it (*this* is the origin of the notion 'beatitude').

A related case would be that of the *décadent* artists, who maintain an essentially *nihilistic* attitude towards life and take *refuge* in the *beauty of form* . . . in those select instances in which nature has become perfect, in which she is indifferently great and indifferently beautiful . . .

The 'love of the beautiful' may therefore be something other than the *ability* to *see* or *create* the beautiful; it may be precisely the expression of the *inability* to do so.

The truly formidable artists who produce *harmony* from discord are those who allow things to enjoy the benefit of their own might and self-redemption; they express their innermost experience in the symbolism of each work of art – their act of creation is a form of gratitude for their existence.

The *profundity of the tragic artist* consists in the fact that his aesthetic instinct surveys the more distant consequences, that he does not linger briefly on that which is nearest, that he affirms the *large-scale economy* which justifies *the terrible, the evil and the questionable* . . . and more than justifies it.

853

(1)

The conception of the world which lies behind this book is peculiarly dark and disagreeable; among the previously known types of pessimism, none seems to have attained this degree

of malignity. Here you will find no trace of the opposition between a true and apparent world: there is but one world and it is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive and senseless . . . A world so constituted is the world as it truly is. *We are in need of lies* in order to triumph over this reality, this 'truth', that is, *in order to live* . . . The lie which is needed in order to live is part and parcel of the terrible and questionable character of existence . . .

Metaphysics, morality, religion, science – they are portrayed in this book as nothing more than different forms of deception; with their help we can *believe* in life. 'Life is *supposed* to inspire confidence'; the task thus imposed is tremendous. In order to solve this problem, man must already be an inveterate liar, but he must above all else be an *artist*. And so he is: metaphysics, religion, morality, science – all are mere artefacts of his determination to create appearances, to lie, to escape from 'truth', to *deny* the 'truth'. This ability, man's artistic ability *par excellence*, thanks to which he violates reality with his lies – he has in common with all that is. After all, he himself is a part of reality, truth and nature; how could he help but share in its *genius for lying*! . . .

The fact that the character of existence shall be *misunderstood* – that is the most profound, the most lofty secret intention behind everything that is virtuous, scientific, pious and artistic. There are many things which man never sees; many things he does not see aright; and many things he thinks he sees which are not there at all: oh how clever we are under circumstances where the last thing we think we are is clever! Love, enthusiasm, 'God' – these are only so many subtle forms of extreme self-deception; they represent nothing but temptations to embrace life, expressions of the belief in life! In those moments in which man was deceived, in which he outwitted himself, in which he believed in life: oh, how his heart swelled within him! What delight he took in it! What a sense of power he felt! How much of an artistic triumph there was in that sense of power! . . . Man once more became the master of his '*materials*' – the master of the truth! . . . And whenever man rejoices, his joy is always the same; he rejoices as an artist,

he enjoys his power, he enjoys the lie as the source of his power . . .

(2)

Art and nothing but art! She is the great enabler of life, the great temptress to life, the great stimulant of life.

Art is the only opposing force which is superior to the will to deny life in all its forms.

Art is the anti-Christian, the anti-Buddhistic, the anti-nihilistic force *par excellence.*

Art is the *redemption of the man of knowledge* – the redemption of him who sees the terrible and questionable character of existence, who is willing to see it, the redemption of the tragic man of knowledge.

Art is the *redemption of the man of action* – the redemption of him who not only sees the terrible and questionable character of existence, but also lives it and is willing to live it, the redemption of the tragic and warlike man, the hero.

Art is the *redemption of the man of sorrows* – it is a way to states in which pain is willed, transfigured, deified, in which sorrows are a form of great delight.

(3)

One can see that in this book pessimism or, to put it more clearly, nihilism is taken to be the truth. But truth is not taken to be the highest standard of value, still less the highest power. The will to appearance, illusion, deception, becoming and change (to objective deception) is here taken to be more profound, more primordial, more metaphysical than the will to truth, reality and being – the latter is merely a form of the will to illusion. Pleasure is likewise taken to be more primordial than pain; pain is only taken to be contingent upon and a consequence of the will to pleasure (of the will to becoming, growth, fashioning, that is, *to creation*; creation, however, includes destruction). A state is here conceived in which existence is affirmed to the highest degree, a state from which the highest degree of suffering may not be excluded: the tragic and Dionysian state.

(4)

This book is even to a certain extent anti-pessimistic, that is to say, in the sense that it teaches something which is stronger than pessimism, which is more 'divine' than the truth. No one, it seems, would be more willing seriously to propose not merely a condemnation of life but a radical negation of it, an actual negation *by deeds*, than the author of this book, but for the fact that he knows – for he has experienced it and perhaps experienced nothing else! – that art is of *far greater value* than the truth.

In the Preface, in which I seemed to extend a personal invitation to Richard Wagner to enter into dialogue with me, this article of faith, this gospel for artists, appears: 'Art as the proper task of life, art as its *metaphysical* activity . . .'[94]

BOOK IV

DISCIPLINE AND CULTIVATION

Part 1. Hierarchy

1. The Doctrine of Hierarchy

854

In this age of *suffrage universel*, in which everybody is allowed to sit in judgement upon everything and everybody, I feel compelled to re-establish the *principle of hierarchy*.

855

Rank is determined and distinguished by quantities of power alone: nothing else.[1]

856

For the third book. The will to power. What manner of men they must be who would undertake this revaluation. Degree in the hierarchy is determined by degree of power; war and danger are required, if the standards for a degree in the hierarchy are to be maintained. The most magnificent example of this is man in nature, the weakest of creatures, but also the shrewdest, making himself master, subjugating all the less intelligent forces.

857

I distinguish between the type which represents ascending life and the type which represents decay, degradation and weakness. Are we really to believe that there is an open question here as to which of these two is higher in rank? . . .

858

What determines your rank is the amount of power which you represent; the rest is cowardice.

859

I stand equally aloof from both moral movements, individualism and collectivism; because the first knows nothing of hierarchy and would give one individual the same freedom as another. To my way of thinking, nothing turns on the degree of freedom which is to be granted to this one or that one or to everyone, but rather on the degree of *power* which this one or that one should exercise over another, or over all; the question is: to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, or even enslavement, may provide the basis for the production of a *higher type*. Or, to put the idea in its most extreme form: *how could we sacrifice the development of mankind* in order to assist a higher species than man to come into existence?

860

Concerning rank. The terrible consequences of 'equality' – in the end everybody thinks he is entitled to every problem. All hierarchy has vanished.

861

It is necessary for the *superior men* to declare war on the masses! Everywhere we see ordinary people closing ranks to make themselves master! Anything that pampers men, makes them soft, or emphasizes 'the people' or 'woman', inures to the benefit of *suffrage universel*, i.e. domination by *inferior* men. But we should make reprisals by exposing the entire business (which began in Europe with Christianity) and bringing it to the bar of judgement.

862

A doctrine is needed which is harsh enough to *cultivate* a doctrine that strengthens the strong, but paralyses the world-weary and breaks their spirit.

The destruction of the degenerate races. European degeneracy.

The destruction of slavish value judgements.

Dominion over the earth as a means of producing a higher type.

The destruction of the Tartuffery known as 'morality'. (Christianity as a hysterical kind of honesty in this regard, Augustine, Bunyan.)[2]

The destruction of *suffrage universel*, i.e. that system by virtue of which the naturally inferior prescribe their own nature as a law binding on the superior.

The destruction of mediocrity and the prestige afforded by it. (The one-sided, the individuals – nations, e.g. the English. Dühring. To strive for natural abundance through the pairing of opposites: the mixture of races to this end.)

A new courage – no *a priori* truths (precisely the ones sought by those who were accustomed to faith!), but *free* submission to a ruling idea whose time has come, e.g. time as a characteristic of space, etc.

2. The Strong and the Weak

863

The notion 'stronger and weaker man' amounts to nothing more than the fact that in the former case a great deal of strength has been inherited – the strong man represents a summation – in the latter, *as yet little* (the inheritance is *not* adequate, or has been dissipated). Weakness may be an *initial* phenomenon; '*as yet little*'; or a *terminal* phenomenon: 'no more'.

The starting point: where great strength is present, where strength is to be discharged – the masses, which represent the totality of the *weak*, react *slowly* . . . defending themselves against much for which they are too weak . . . against that from which they receive no benefit; they *never* create, they *never* progress . . . This is said in opposition to the theory which denies the importance of the strong individual and claims that the 'masses do it all'. The difference here is the difference between separate generations; four or five generations may pass between the *active man* and the masses . . . a *chronological* difference.

NB. NB. The *values of the weak* are in the ascendant because the strong espouse them, in order to *lead* with them . . .

864

Why the weak triumph. In summa, the sick and the weak have more *sympathy* and are more 'humane'; the sick and the weak have more *intellect*, are more versatile, more complex, more entertaining – and more malicious; the sick alone invented *malice*. (A morbid precocity is often found in the rickety, scrofulous and tubercular.) *Esprit* is characteristic of more aged races (Jews, Frenchmen, Chinese). (The anti-Semites do not forgive the Jews for having 'intellect' – and money. Anti-Semitism is just another word for the 'unfortunate'.) The fool and the saint – the two most interesting kinds of men . . . And closely related to them, the 'genius', the 'great adventurers and criminals'.

The sick and the weak have always had *fascination* on their side; they are more *interesting* than the healthy. And all great men, the healthiest first and foremost, at certain periods of their lives *fall ill* – great emotions, the passion for power, love, revenge, are all accompanied by profound disturbances. And as for *décadence*, every man who does not die young embodies it in almost every sense – he therefore knows from experience the instincts which belong to it; for *half his life almost every man is décadent*.

And finally, *woman! Half of mankind* is weak, chronically ill, wavering, inconstant – woman requires strength in others in order to cling to it; she also requires a religion of the weak, which glorifies *weakness*, love and humility as divine . . . or, better still, she makes the strong weak – she *prevails* when she succeeds in overcoming the strong . . . Woman has always conspired with priests, the typical *décadents*, against the 'mighty', the 'strong', against *men*. Women bring *children* over to the cult of piety, of compassion, of love – the *mother* convincingly represents altruism.

Finally, increasing civilization, which of necessity brings with it a simultaneous increase in morbid elements, e.g. the *neurotic* and *psychiatric* element, *the criminal* element and so on . . . A sort of *intermediate species* arises, the *artist*, who is restrained by his weak will and social timidity from criminality, but is not yet ripe for the madhouse; a being with antennae inquisitively

reaching into both spheres; this specific cultural growth, the modern artist, painter, musician and, above all, *romancier*, who refers to his mode of being with the very improper word '*naturalisme*' . . . Lunatics, criminals and 'naturalists' are on the increase, a sign of a growing culture plunging headlong towards the abyss – that is, the scrap, the refuse, the waste are gaining in importance – the decline *proceeds apace* . . .

Finally! *the social mishmash*, a consequence of the Revolution, of the establishment of equal rights, of the superstitious belief in 'equal men'. Thus those who bear within them the instincts of decline (*ressentiment*, discontent, the impulse to destroy, anarchism and nihilism), including the slavish instincts, the instincts of cowardice, craftiness and roguery, *long confined* to the lower strata, mingle with the blood of all the classes; two or three generations later, the race is no longer recognizable – everything has become *rabble*. The result is a pervasive, instinctive aversion to *selectivity*, to *privilege* of any kind, an aversion of such power and certainty, stubbornness and practical cruelty, that in fact even the *privileged* classes quickly succumb to it – all those who still wish to hold power flatter the mob, work with the mob and *must* have the mob on their side – the 'geniuses' first and foremost: the latter become the *heralds* of those feelings with which one inspires the masses – the note of compassion, of reverence even, for all that suffers, for all that has lived humbly, despised and persecuted, rings out above all other notes (examples: V. Hugo, R. Wagner). The emergence of the mob means the re-emergence of the *old values* . . .

With such an extreme movement with respect to *tempo* and means as characterizes our civilization, man's emphasis shifts. The men on whom the most depends, who take it upon themselves to compensate for the very great danger of such a morbid movement, become procrastinators *par excellence*, obstinate, tenacious, relatively stable men in the midst of this tremendous transformation and combination of elements. Under such circumstances the emphasis necessarily shifts to the *mediocre*; against the rule of the mob and of the eccentric (both usually allied with each other) *mediocrity* consolidates itself

as the custodian of the future. Thus emerges a new opponent for *exceptional men* – or a new temptation. Provided that they do not accommodate themselves to the mob and appeal to the instincts of the 'disinherited', they will find it necessary to be 'mediocre' and 'sound'. They know that *mediocritas* is also *aurea* – it alone actually has money and *gold* (has all that *glisters*) at its disposal . . . And once again the old virtue and the whole *spent* world of ideals in general gains a gifted advocate . . . The result is that mediocrity acquires intellect, wit and genius; it becomes entertaining, even tempting.

Result. One more word about the third force: a high culture – craft, trade, agriculture, science, a great part of art – that is something which can only stand upon a broad basis, upon a strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. *Science* – even art – labour in its service and are served by it in turn. Science could not have wished for anything better; in essence it belongs to an ordinary sort of man – it is out of place among the exceptional – there is nothing instinctively aristocratic, let alone anarchic, about it.

The power of the middle classes is then maintained by the marketplace, but, above all, by means of the currency markets; instinctively, the great financiers oppose any extreme measures – the Jews are therefore at present the most *conservative* power in this otherwise threatened and precarious Europe of ours. They have no need of revolutions, Socialism or militarism; if they want and need to have power even over the revolutionary party, that is only the consequence of the preceding and it in no way contradicts it. They occasionally need to inspire fear of other extreme tendencies – by showing all that they hold in their hands. But they themselves are instinctively, unalterably, conservative and 'mediocre' . . . Wherever there is power, they know how to be powerful; but the use of their power always has one tendency. The polite term for *mediocre*, as is generally known, is the word 'liberal', which is not particularly amusing and not at all true . . .

Reflection. It is senseless [to] presuppose that this whole *triumph of values* is anti-biological; we must try to explain it in terms of a *vital* interest, to wit, the *preservation* of the type

'man', even by way of this method which involves domination by the weak and unfortunate – if things were otherwise, man might cease to exist? Problem . . . The *improvement* of the type may prove fatal to the *preservation of the species*? Why?

The lessons of *history*: the strong races *decimate* each other: war, lust for power, adventurousness; their existence is costly and brief – they wear each other down. The strong emotions: *wastefulness* – strength is no longer *capitalized* . . . Mental disturbance due to excessive strain – there occur periods of *profound lassitude* and inertia, all great ages have to be *paid* for . . . Afterwards, the strong are weaker, more irresolute, more absurd than ordinary weaklings. They are *profligate* races.

'*Persistence*' in itself has no value: we might well prefer a shorter but *more valuable* existence for the species. Even so, it remains to be seen whether a greater yield in value might not be attained in the case of the longer existence, i.e. that man, as an accumulation of strength, gains a much higher degree of dominion over things if things continue as they are now . . .

We stand before a problem in *economics* . . .

865

There is an attitude which calls itself idealism, which will not allow mediocrity to be mediocre or woman to be woman. No regimentation! People must be made to realize just how *dearly bought the creation of a virtue is*; and that virtue is nothing generally desirable, but a *noble madness*, a beautiful exception which comes with the privilege of a *strong* disposition . . .

866

It is *necessary* to show that an ever-more economical expenditure of men and mankind, an ever-more intricately intertwined 'machinery' of interests and activities, *contains within it a contrary tendency.* For that machinery gives us *the luxury of producing and setting aside men who are not strictly necessary to it*, and from their midst a *stronger* type, a higher type, will come to light, one which arises and flourishes under conditions different from those of the common man. As everyone knows,

my term, my *metaphorical expression* for this type, is the word 'superman'.

The first path, which can now be completely surveyed, leads to mutual adaptation, levelling, a higher mandarinism, instinctive modesty and contentment with the reduction of man – a kind of *stagnation in the level of man.* Once the total economic administration of the earth is at hand, an event which is both inevitable and imminent, mankind will be *able* to find its highest purpose as machinery in the service of that administration: as an immense wheel-work of ever-smaller and more intricately 'interlocked' cogs and wheels perfectly adapted to one another; as a machine in which all the dominating and commanding elements are becoming ever more superfluous; as a totality possessing immense power whose individual components represent *a minimum of power* and *a minimum of value.* To oppose this reduction and adaptation of man to a specialized utility requires an opposite tendency – the production of the man who *synthesizes, embodies and justifies* it all; that man for whom the mechanization of mankind is a precondition and underpinning of his existence, on the basis of which he can devise his *superior mode of being* . . .

He is just as much in need of the *opposition* of the masses, of those who are 'levelled', the sense of distance from them; he stands upon them, he lives off them. This superior form of *aristocracy* is the form of the future. Morally speaking, the total machinery and the cooperation of all its cogs and wheels represent a *maximum* in the *exploitation of man*; but it presupposes those for whom this exploitation has *meaning.* Otherwise it would actually be nothing but the total reduction of the human *type*, its reduction in *value* – a *retrograde phenomenon* on a grand scale.

One can see that what I am combating is *economic* optimism, as if the increasing cost borne by *all* would necessarily increase the benefit to all. The opposite seems to me to be the case: *the cost to all adds up to a net loss*; man is *diminished* – we no longer know what purpose this immense process has served. A purpose? A *new* 'purpose!' – that is what mankind requires . . .

867

Insight into the *increase in total power*: determine how the decline of individuals, of estates, of ages and of peoples, is *encompassed* in this growth. The shift of *emphasis* in a culture. The *costs* of every major growth: who bears them! *By now they must be enormous.*

868

Overview of the future European: he is the most intelligent slave animal, very industrious, at bottom modest, curious to excess, complex, pampered, irresolute, a veritable chaos of cosmopolitan passions and intelligence. How could a *stronger* kind of man arise from this chaos? One which would have *classical* taste? This consists of the determination to simplify and strengthen oneself, to make one's good fortune visible, to be formidable, and the courage to be psychologically *naked* (the determination to simplify oneself is the consequence of the determination to be strong; allowing one's happiness to become visible, likewise psychological nakedness, is a consequence of the determination to be formidable . . .). In order to fight one's way upwards out of that chaos, to achieve this particular *form* – this requires a certain *urgency*; a man must have no choice but to *prevail* or perish. A master race can only spring from terrible and violent origins. Problem: where are the *barbarians* of the twentieth century? Obviously they will appear and consolidate themselves only after tremendous Socialistic crises – they will consist of those elements which are capable of the *severest self-discipline* and can guarantee the most *lasting resolution* . . .

869

The *theory of opposites* (good, evil, etc.) has value as an *educational* measure because one is forced to take sides.

The most powerful and most dangerous passions of man, those passions from which he is most likely to perish, are so thoroughly proscribed that, as a result, the most powerful men have become impossible; at the very least they would be obliged to regard themselves as *evil*, as 'harmful and forbidden'. This

is a great loss, but it has been hitherto necessary; now that a whole host of opposing forces have been cultivated by the temporary suppression of these passions (ambition, delight in change and deception), it has again become possible to unleash them, as they will no longer possess their old barbarity. We allow ourselves a domesticated form of barbarism: just look at our artists and statesmen.

870

The root of all evils is the fact that slavish morality has *triumphed*, is the victory of humility, chastity, absolute obedience and selflessness.

Men who are naturally dominant were thus condemned to (1) hypocrisy and (2) remorse – men who are naturally creative felt self-conscious, constrained by eternal values and like rebels against God.

The barbarians showed that they were unfamiliar with *the capacity for self-restraint*; they feared and maligned the passions and natural instincts – the Caesars and ruling classes took a similar view.

On the other hand, the suspicion arose that all *moderation* is a sign of weakness, or of age and exhaustion (thus La Rochefoucauld had a suspicion that 'virtue' is a euphemism for no longer being able to take pleasure in vice).

Self-restraint was represented as a matter of firmness, self-control, asceticism, as a conflict with the Devil, etc. The natural *delight* men of an aesthetic nature take in measure, the *enjoyment* they derive from the *beauty of measure*, was *overlooked* or *denied*, because one preferred an *anti*-eudaemonistic morality.

In summa, the best things have been *denigrated* (because weak men and inordinate swine have cast them in a bad light) – while the best men have *remained concealed* and have often *misjudged* themselves.

*

Belief in the *pleasure* inherent in *self-restraint* has been lacking thus far – the pleasure of a rider on a fiery steed!

The temperance of men who are naturally weak has been mistaken for the moderation of the strong![3]

871

The *vicious* and the *unbridled* and their depressing influence upon the *value of the appetites*. It was the appalling barbarity of customs, in the Middle Ages first and foremost, which required the existence of a veritable 'league of virtue' – along with the equally appalling exaggerations about what constitutes the *value* of man. 'Civilization' (in other words, *taming*) needed all manner of shackles and instruments of torture in order to preserve itself in its struggle with formidable and naturally predatory men.

Here a confusion has arisen between *men of power and resolve* and men who are vicious and unbridled, which is entirely understandable, even though such a confusion has had the most pernicious influence. What the former are able to demand of themselves is also a measure of what they may also permit themselves. Such men are by nature the very opposite of the vicious and the unbridled, although under certain circumstances they may do things which would convict a lesser man of vice and intemperance.

Here the notion '*equality* of men *before God*' would do an extraordinary amount of harm; actions and sentiments which are by their very nature among the prerogatives of men of strong constitutions were forbidden, as if they were unworthy of man per se. All the propensities of the strong man were brought into disrepute by virtue of the fact that measures designed to protect the weakest (including those for protecting the weakest from themselves) were made a standard of value.

The confusion here is so great that people have actually branded the great *virtuosos* of life (whose self-mastery presents the sharpest contrast to the vicious and the 'unbridled') with the most ignominious epithets. Even now we feel obliged to disapprove of a Caesar Borgia, which is simply ludicrous. The Church has excommunicated German emperors on account of their vices, as if a monk and a priest should have a say in what a Frederick II may demand of himself. A Don Juan is sent to hell, which is rather naïve. Has anyone ever noticed that there are no interesting men in heaven? . . . This is only a hint to the girls as to where they may best seek their salvation . . . If we

consider the matter more closely and, moreover, with a deeper insight into what a 'great man' is, then there can be no doubt that the Church sends all 'great men' to hell – it *combats* all 'greatness in man' . . .

872

The rights that a man claims for himself are proportionate to the duties which he assumes and the tasks he *feels up to*.

The vast majority of men have no right to exist, but are a misfortune to their betters: I do not give the *ill-constituted* that right. There are also ill-constituted peoples.[4]

873

The naturally vulgar *misunderstand egoism*. They know nothing of the joys of conquest and the insatiability of great love and likewise know nothing of the effusion of feelings of strength, of wanting to subdue things and bend them to one's will, of wanting to take oneself seriously – such egoism is the instinct of an artist for his material or, if nothing else, the territorial instinct,[5] seeking territory for itself. In ordinary 'egoism' it is precisely the 'non-ego', the *profoundly mediocre creature*, whose desires merely serve the preservation of the human race – and when the *latter* egoism is perceived by men who are not mediocre, but rare and fine, they become indignant. For they judge: 'We are *nobler*! *Our* preservation is more important than that of cattle!'

874

The *degeneration of the rulers and of the ruling classes* has laid the foundation for the greatest mischief in history! Without the Roman Caesars and Roman society, the madness of Christianity would not have prevailed.

There is great danger in lesser men beginning to doubt the very existence of superior men. For that is when they end up discovering that even they have *virtues*, even the subjugated and the poor in spirit, and that all men are equal *before God* – which was the most idiotic idea ever conceived, the *non plus ultra* of arrant nonsense! That is to say, superior men eventually measure themselves by a standard of virtue set by

slaves – find themselves 'proud', etc. – find all their *superior* qualities reprehensible!

When Nero and Caracalla sat on the throne, the paradox arose: the most inferior man is still *worth more* than they are! And an *image of God* was advanced which was *diametrically opposed* to the image of the most powerful – the God on the cross!

875
Superior man and gregarious man

When there is a *want* of great men, one makes gods and demi-gods of the great men of the past: the outbreak of religion proves that man no longer *delights* man ('nor woman neither', as Hamlet says). Or: lots of men are thrown together in a heap as a parliament, in the hope that they will rule with the same tyranny.

'Tyrannizing' is just how it is with great men: they *stupefy* lesser men.

876

Buckle affords the best example of the extent to which a plebeian agitator of the mob is incapable of clarifying our understanding of the superior man's nature. The opinion that he so passionately opposed was that 'great men' – individuals, princes, statesmen, geniuses, generals – are the levers and causes of all great movements. But he instinctively misunderstood what constitutes this superiority, as if what were essential and valuable about such men lay in their ability to set the masses in motion, that is, in their effect . . . But the superiority of the great man lies precisely in his alienness, his ineffability, his aloofness from lesser men – *not* in any of the effects he may produce, even if he shakes the world.

877

The French Revolution made Napoleon possible; that is its justification. For the sake of such a prize, we should be willing to see our entire civilization collapse into anarchy. Napoleon made nationalism possible; that is his shortcoming.

It goes without saying that all of this is separate from the question of his morality and immorality, because these notions do not even begin to determine the *value* of a man. In the first place . . .

The value of a man does not lie in his usefulness, for it would persist even if there were no one to whom he could be useful. And it might be that the very man who produced the most pernicious effects would be that man who was the best of the entire human type, a man who was so high, so superior, that all would perish with envy of him.

878

To estimate a man's worth by how much he benefits other men, or costs them, or harms them, is no better or worse than estimating a work of art by the *effects* it produces. That said, a work of art is meant to be compared with other works of art, whereas a man's *worth* remains completely untouched *by a comparison with other men.*

'Moral value judgement', in so far as it is a *social* judgement, measures a man solely by his effects.

A man with his own sense of taste, surrounded and hidden by his solitude, incommunicable, incommunicative – an *enigmatic* man, i.e. a man of a superior, or at least a *different*, species: how are you able to deprecate that which is unknowable and incomparable?

I find a characteristic piece of stupidity with respect to *this* kind of worth in the writings of that characteristically English *numbskull* J. S. *Mill*, when he says (of A. Comte) that '[he regarded] Napoleon's name and memory . . . with a bitterness highly honourable to himself . . . But in his later writings . . . he regards Napoleon as a more estimable "dictator" than Louis Philippe [something which] . . . measures the depth to which his moral standard had fallen'.[6]

Moral deprecation has to a considerable extent impaired our judgement; a man's intrinsic worth is not only not given sufficient weight, it is almost overlooked, if not denied outright. This is the remnant of a naïve *teleology*, in which *a man's worth exists only in relation to other men.*

879

Preoccupation with moral issues indicates a low position in the intellectual hierarchy; a man thereby shows that he lacks an instinctive sense of privilege, of being *a parte*, the sense of freedom possessed by those who are naturally creative, by those who are 'children of God' (or the Devil). And regardless of whether he preaches the prevailing morality or *criticizes* it for failing to meet his own ideal, he thereby shows that he belongs to the herd – even if only as its foremost need, as its 'shepherd' . . .

880

We must *replace* being moral with *willing* our ends and *thus* our means, the categorical imperative with the *categorical imperator.*

881

On hierarchy. Wherein lies the *mediocrity* of the typical man? In failing to understand that all good things have their inevitable *drawbacks*; in combating evils as if we could dispense with them; in refusing to accept that the one goes with the other – he would like to efface and obliterate *the typical character of a thing*, a condition, an era or a person, endorsing only a portion of their characteristics and wanting to *abolish* the rest. The 'aspirations' of the mediocre are that which we few who are different combat; they conceive of the *ideal* as something in which nothing harmful, evil, dangerous, questionable or destructive should remain. Our view is quite the contrary: that every development of man has its inevitable drawbacks; that the *supreme man*, if such a notion is admissible, would be that man who most strongly represented *the antagonistic character of existence*, rather as its glory and its sole justification . . . Ordinary men may represent only a little nook and corner of this natural character; they perish the moment the multiplicity of opposing elements and the tension between them increase; but this is the precondition of *human greatness.* That man must become better *and* more evil is my formula for this inescapable fact . . .

The majority of people represent only bits and pieces of men; only in combination do they result in a complete man. Whole ages and peoples are somewhat fragmentary in this sense; perhaps it is a part of the economy of man's development that he develop piecemeal. But we cannot for one moment allow ourselves to overlook the fact that our only concern is with the emergence of the synthetic man; that inferior men, the vast majority, are but preludes and rehearsals, out of whose interaction, here and there, a *whole man* arises, a human milestone who indicates how far mankind has advanced. Mankind does *not* advance in a straight line; oftentimes a type which has already been attained is subsequently lost . . .

For example, despite three hundred years of effort, we have not yet equalled the man of the Renaissance and the man of the Renaissance, in turn, remains far behind the *man of antiquity* . . .

One must have a *standard*; I distinguish the *grand style* from all others; I distinguish *activity* from reactivity; I distinguish *extravagant prodigality* from passionate suffering (as with the 'idealists').

882

NB. We acknowledge the *superiority* of the men of ancient Greece and of the Renaissance – but would prefer to do without their causes and conditions: there is a lack of deeper insight into the Greeks to this very day.

883

'*Purification of taste*' can only be the result of the *strengthening* of the type. Our society today only *simulates* cultivation; the cultivated man himself is *absent*. The great *synthetic man* is absent: the man in whom the various forces are unhesitatingly harnessed together in the service of a common aim. What we have instead is the *complicated* man, the most interesting example of chaos that has ever existed, but *not* the chaos which *preceded* the creation of the world, rather the chaos which followed it: that is what the complicated man is. *Goethe* is the finest expression of this type (*completely and utterly un-Olympian!*).

884

Handel, Leibniz, Goethe and Bismarck are characteristic of the *strong German type*. Living with equanimity amid contradictions, they were full of that supple kind of strength which guards against convictions and doctrines by pitting them against each other, while reserving freedom for itself.

885

This much is clear: if the emergence of great and rare men had been made dependent upon popular acclaim (provided, of course, that the masses *knew* which characteristics are a part of greatness and likewise at whose expense greatness develops) – well, there would never have been any; they would have prevented the emergence of any important men . . .

The fact that things pursue their course *without* the consent of the majority is the principal reason why a few astonishing things have managed to smuggle themselves into the world at all.

886

The hierarchy of human values.

(a) Our estimation of a man should not be based on his individual deeds. *Actions* are *superficial*. Nothing is rarer than a genuinely *personal* action. The influence of a class, a caste, an ethnicity, an environment, even sheer accident – any of these are more likely to express themselves in a deed or an act than a 'person'.

(b) We should by no means presume that very many people are 'persons'. Some are *many* persons, while most are *none*. Wherever ordinary qualities predominate, those on which the preservation of the type depends, being a person would be a waste, a luxury; it would make no sense to demand 'personhood' of ordinary men. They are merely bearers of these qualities and instruments of their transmission.

(c) A 'person' is a relatively *isolated* fact; in view of the much greater importance of the perpetuation and ordinariness of these qualities, it is almost something *unnatural*. For a genuine person to emerge, a man must be isolated from an early age, compelled to live a life of offence and defence,

as if surrounded by ramparts; he must possess a greater capacity for seclusion; but above all, he must be far less impressionable than ordinary men, whose humane qualities are *contagious*.

The *principal question* with respect to *hierarchy* is how *gregarious* or *solitary* someone is. (In the former case, his value consists in those qualities which help ensure the survival of his herd, his type; in the latter case, it consists in those which set him apart, isolate him, defend him and which make his solitude possible.)

Conclusion: the estimation of the solitary type should not be made from the standpoint of the gregarious type, or *vice versa*.

Viewed from above, both types are necessary, as is their antagonism – and nothing is more to be dispelled than the notion of the 'desirability' of developing some third thing out of both (as some sort of hermaphroditic 'type'). That is no more desirable than is the rapprochement and reconciliation between the sexes. *The two types must be further developed and the gulf between them widened more and more . . .*

The notion of *degeneration* is applicable in both cases, when the herd begins to take on the qualities of the solitary creature and *vice versa* – in short, when they begin to *converge*. Naturally, this notion of degeneration is distinct from any question of moral judgement.

887

Where those who are stronger are to be found. The ruin and degeneration of the *solitary* species is much *greater* and more terrible; they have the instinct of the herd and the traditional values against them; their defences, their protective instincts, are insufficiently strong or reliable from the outset – they require many favourable accidents if they are to *thrive* (they thrive among the lowest elements, the elements most forsaken by society; if you are seeking *persons* it is there that you will find them, certainly much more so than in the middle classes!).

When the struggle between the estates, the class struggle which aims at 'equality of rights', is almost settled, the *struggle* begins against the *solitary person*. In a certain sense *the latter*

can maintain and develop himself most readily in a democratic society, where cruder means of defence are no longer necessary and certain habits of order, honesty, justice, trust, are a part of ordinary conditions.

The *strongest* must be firmly bound, supervised, chained and guarded: so says the gregarious instinct. For them, a regime of self-subjugation, of ascetic detachment or of the 'duty' to engage in exhausting labour which prevents them from recovering their self-possession.

888

I am attempting an economic justification of virtue. The task is [to] make man as useful as possible, as much like an infallible machine as possible; for that purpose he must be endowed with the *virtues of a machine* (he must learn to regard those states in which he works in a mechanically useful way as supremely valuable; to that end, it is necessary that the *other* states be as distressing for him as possible, be made as dangerous and disreputable as possible . . .).

The first stumbling-block is the *tedium*, the *monotony*, which all mechanical activity entails. To learn to endure *this* and not only to endure it, but to see tedium as invested with a higher charm, has hitherto been the task of all higher education. To learn something which does not concern us and to feel precisely this, this 'objective' activity, to be our 'duty'; to learn to ascertain duty without regard to the pleasure it may bring – that is the inestimable benefit and accomplishment of higher education. It is for this reason that the philologist has hitherto been the *ideal* educator, because his activity itself furnishes the very model of monotonous activity rising to greatness; under his banner youths learn to 'cram', which is the first prerequisite to early proficiency in mechanical performance of one's duties (as civil servants, husbands, bureaucratic scribblers, newspaper readers and soldiers). Such an existence perhaps more than any other requires a philosophical justification and transfiguration; *pleasant* feelings must be deprecated as inferior by some sort of infallible authority; a sense of 'inherent duty' must be instilled, perhaps even a pathos of reverence with respect to anything unpleasant – and this

demand must speak in the imperative mood, as if it transcended all considerations of mere utility, amusement or expediency . . . The mechanical form of existence regarded as the supremely venerable form of existence, worshipping itself. (Type: Kant as the fanatic of the formal concept 'thou shalt'.)

889

The economic *assessment of previous ideals.* The lawgiver (or the instinct of society) selects a number of states and emotions through whose operation a regular performance is guaranteed (a mechanicalism as a consequence of the regular requirements of those emotions and states).

But suppose that ingredients of these states and emotions inflict pain, a means must be found to alleviate them by associating them with an idea of value, by making people experience the displeasure as worthwhile and therefore honourable, i.e. pleasurable. Reduced to formulas: '*How can something unpleasant become pleasant?*' For example, when it can serve as a proof of strength, power, self-control. Or when our obedience and our submission to the law are honoured by it. Likewise as proof of a sense of community, a sense of neighbourliness, a sense of patriotism, of our 'humanization', 'altruism' and 'heroism'.

That one does unpleasant things gladly . . . that is the *purpose of ideals.*

890

The *diminution* of man must be considered the sole aim for a long while, because a broad foundation must first be created upon which a *stronger* kind of man may stand, in that, previously, *every stronger* kind of man *has stood upon the basis of an inferior class of men* . . .

891

The *principal consideration* is that social *distances* should be opened up, but *no opposites created.* The *intermediate forms* must be supplanted and their influence diminished; this is the principal means of preserving social distances.

*

There is an absurd and contemptible form of idealism which would have mediocrity *not be mediocre and* which, instead of feeling triumphant at being an exception, is indignant at cowardice, falseness, pettiness and wretchedness. *One should not wish things to be otherwise!* The gulf between them should be *widened*! *The superior kind of men should be compelled to distinguish themselves* by the sacrifices which they have to make to be what they are[7] . . .

892

Who would wish to spoil mediocrity for the mediocre! As one can see, I do the opposite, for every step away from it – so I teach – leads to *immorality* . . .

893

To hate mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher; it almost calls into question his *right* to 'philosophy'. It is precisely because he is the exception and ordinary people are the rule that he has to take them under his protection and clasp them to his bosom.

894

What *I* struggle against is the notion that the exception should make war on the rule instead of grasping that the continued existence of the rule is a presupposition of the *value of the exception.* E.g., there are women who, instead of experiencing their abnormal needs as a distinction, would like to change the position of woman in general.

895

The *augmentation of strength* despite the temporary decline of the individual:

To establish a *new level.*

A method of the accumulation of forces, of the preservation of small achievements, as opposed to uneconomical waste.

Destructive nature meanwhile subjugated as an *instrument* of this future economy.

The preservation of the weak, because an enormous amount of *lesser* work needs to be done.

The preservation of an attitude by which existence remains *possible* for the weak and the suffering.

To implant an instinctive *solidarity* as against an instinctive fear and servility.

The struggle with accident, including with the accident of 'great men'.

896

The struggle against *great* men can be justified on economic grounds. Such men are dangerous; they are accidents, exceptions, storms; they are strong enough to call into question things which have taken a long time to build and establish. Explosives are not only to be detonated harmlessly, but, where possible, their formation prevented in the first place . . . this is the fundamental instinct of civilized society.

897

Anyone contemplating how the human type might be enhanced so as to embody the greatest splendour and power will grasp from the start that he must place himself outside morality; for morality was directed in all its essentials towards the opposite goal: to arrest or annihilate that splendid development wherever it was under way. For, as a matter of fact, such a development consumes such an immense number of people in its service that a movement in the *opposite* direction is only too natural; the weaker, softer, more ordinary types thus find it necessary to make common cause *against* those glorious beings so filled with life and strength; and to that end, a new estimation must be placed before them which enables them to condemn, and if possible to destroy, these beings who represent life in its greatest abundance. Morality is therefore essentially a tendency hostile to life, in so far as it wishes to overpower the strongest types of life.

898

The strong who are to come. In the past, it was only by a combination of necessity and chance that the conditions for the production of a *stronger kind of man* were occasionally

realized. But now, we can understand and consciously *choose* them: we can create the conditions under which such an elevation is possible.

So far, 'education' has sought to benefit society: *not* as much as possible for the sake of mankind's future, but for that of present-day, established society. What was wanted were 'tools' for its use. But suppose the *accumulated wealth of energy were greater*, we could contemplate the possibility of *setting aside a certain amount of that* for the purpose of investing, not in society, but in the future. The present form of society is undergoing such a powerful transformation that at some point *it will no longer be able to exist for its own sake*, but only as an *instrument* in the hands of a stronger race. The more the extent of this transformation is understood, the more urgent it will be to set such a task.

The progressive diminution of man is precisely what compels us to consider the cultivation of a *stronger race*: a race which would have a surplus of precisely that in which the diminished *species* had become weak and was growing weaker (will, responsibility, self-assurance, the ability to set goals for oneself).

The *means* to accomplish this would be those which history teaches: *isolation* by virtue of the fact that one's needs and interests are contrary to those which are usual nowadays; practice in the contrary value judgements; distance as pathos; a clear conscience about what is today most belittled and forbidden.

That great process, the *levelling* of European man, is not to be retarded; it should even be accelerated.

The necessity for *widening gulfs*, for *social distance* and for *hierarchy*, is thereby established; not the necessity for slowing that process.

This *levelled* species requires a justification, once it has been attained; its justification is the service it provides to a superior, sovereign species who stands upon it and can arise and accomplish its tasks only upon this basis.

I am not speaking of a master race whose tasks are thereby limited to governing, but a race with *its own sphere of existence*, with a surplus of energy for beauty, bravery, culture and

manners, even in the most intellectual affairs; an *affirmative* race which may allow itself to indulge in every great luxury . . . strong enough to have no need of the tyrannical imperatives of virtue, rich enough to have no need of frugality and pedantry, beyond good and evil; a greenhouse for rare and exotic plants.

899

Our psychologists, whose attention is irresistibly drawn to the symptoms of *décadence*, have repeatedly led us to distrust the intellect. All that they see are the pampering, debilitating and disabling effects of the intellect, but now we are witnessing the emergence of *new barbarians*, cynics, experimentalists, conquerors, who represent a combination of intellectual superiority with a sense of wellbeing and an excess of strength.

900

I am pointing out something new: certainly with such a democratic creature there is the danger of barbarism; but one sees it only in the depths. There is also *another* kind of *barbarian* that comes from the heights: a kind of natural conqueror and ruler who comes in search of materials to mould. Prometheus was such a barbarian.

901

The *principal consideration* is that we must never regard it as the *responsibility* of a superior *species* to provide *guidance* to their inferiors (as e.g. Comte does). Rather, we should regard it as the purpose of the inferior *species* to assist their superiors in their endeavours and to provide a *foundation* upon which they can stand. The conditions under which [a] *strong* and *noble species* preserves itself (with regard to intellectual discipline) are the opposite of those under which the 'industrial masses', the shopkeepers *à la* Spencer, exist.

Idleness, escapades, scepticism, even debauchery – these are only open to the *strongest* and most *productive* of men, indeed, these are what enable them to live. But extending the same liberty to ordinary men would – and also does – lead to their inevitable destruction. Industry, regularity, temperance and

firm 'conviction' (in short, all the gregarious virtues) – these are far better suited to them and under their guidance this ordinary sort of man becomes perfect.

902

The *lordly* types and their psychology: the man (a consequence of a victory); the legislator; the conqueror; the priest. The 'shepherd' as opposed to 'the master' (the former is a means of preserving the herd, the latter is the reason why the herd is there in the first place). The *noblesse*. What is *beauty*? The expression of those who are *victorious* and have *become master*.

903

The problem of life: as the will to power. The temporary preponderance of the sense of value associated with sociability is both understandable and useful; it is a matter of building a *foundation* upon which eventually a *stronger* species will be made possible. The standard of strength: to be able to live under the *contrary* value judgements and to will their eternal recurrence. State and society as a foundation; in world-economic terms, education as *cultivation*.

904

An insight *lacking* among 'free-thinkers' is that the very *discipline* which makes the naturally strong stronger still and capable of great undertakings, withers and breaks the mediocre. Doubt; *la largeur* [*de sympathie*];[8] experiment; independence.

905

The Will to Power.
An attempt at a revaluation of all values.
In four books.

First book: the danger of dangers (representation of nihilism); as the *necessary consequence of the previous value judgements*.

Second book: critique of values (logic, etc.).

Third book: the problem of the legislators. *How* such men must be constituted who make the contrary value judgements. Men who possess *all* the characteristics of the modern soul,

but who are strong enough to transform them into sheer healthiness.

Fourth book: the hammer; their means to their task.

Sils-Maria, the summer of 1886.[9]

906

The strong man, a man in whom the instincts characteristic of robust health are powerful, digests his deeds in just the same way that he digests his meals; he can even cope with heavy fare; in the main, however, he is guided by a sound and firm instinct in such a way that he never does anything contrary to his nature, just as he never eats anything contrary to his taste.

907

If only we *could foresee* the favourable circumstances under which the worthiest creatures arise! The conditions of success are a thousand times too complicated and the probability of failure is *very great*, so there is no eagerness to strive for them! Scepticism.

On the other hand, we can foster courage, insight, firmness, independence and the sense of unaccountability, improve the accuracy of our scales and expect that fortuitous events will come to our aid.

908

Before we can think of acting, an enormous amount of work has to be done. In the main, however, the most advisable course would be if we *shrewdly took advantage* of the given situation. If we are to *create* conditions like those created by chance we shall need men of *iron*, the likes of which the world has never seen. First, the personal ideal must be made *real*; it must become the *prevailing* ideal!

Whoever *understands* human nature *and how superior men arise, trembles before man and is loath to act*, but this is merely the result of inherited prejudices!!!

I take comfort in the thought that human nature is *evil*, for this guarantees man's *strength*!

909

The typical forms of self-development, or the eight principal questions:

(1) Whether we want to be more complex or simpler.
(2) Whether we want to be happier, or more indifferent to both happiness and unhappiness.
(3) Whether we want to be more self-satisfied, or more exacting and more implacable.
(4) Whether we want to be softer, more yielding and more humane, or more 'inhumane'.
(5) Whether we want to be more prudent, or more reckless.
(6) Whether we want to attain a goal, or evade all goals (like the philosopher, for instance, who smells a limit, a *cul-de-sac*, a prison, a bit of foolishness in every goal . . .).
(7) Whether we want to become more respected, or more feared? Or more *despised*!
(8) Whether we want to become tyrants, or seducers, or shepherds, or gregarious animals?

910

Type of my 'disciples'. What I wish for those men who are of any concern to me at all is that they experience suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment and indignities – that profound self-contempt, the torment of self-distrust and the misery of the vanquished not remain unknown to them: I have no pity for them because I wish for them the only thing which can prove today whether one has any value or not – that he stands firm . . .

I have not yet met any idealists, but I have met many liars –

911

The happiness and self-contentment of the *lazzaroni*[10] (or the 'beatitude' of 'beautiful souls' and consumptive bodies) and the Herrnhut Pietists,[11] proves nothing in regard to the *hierarchy* among men. A great educator has mercilessly to thrash such a race of 'blessed men' into unhappiness; the danger of diminution, of repose is right there; I am *opposed* to Spinozistic or

Epicurean happiness and to all repose in contemplative states. But if virtue is the means to such happiness, well then, *we must even master virtue.*

912

I cannot see how anyone can make up for not having had a *strict schooling* at the proper time. Such a man does not know himself; he goes through life without ever having learned to walk; his slack muscles betray themselves at every step. Sometimes life itself is merciful enough to make up for this lack of strict schooling: perhaps in the form of a long, lingering illness, which demands the utmost will-power and self-sufficiency; or in the form of a calamity which suddenly befalls him and his wife and child at the same time, forcing him to take action in such a way as to restore his energy and *resilience*, strengthening his 'moral' fibre and his will to live. The most desirable thing, however, is always to have had strict discipline at *the right time*, that is, at that age when it makes us proud to see that much is demanded of us. For what distinguishes strict schooling, as good schooling, from every other kind is that much is required; that it is rigorously required; that the good, the outstanding even, is required as normal; that praise is accorded sparingly; that indulgence is conspicuous by its absence; that rebuke is sharp, matter-of-fact and made without regard to talent or origin. Such a schooling is in every respect necessary, applying as much to the mental as to the physical; it would be disastrous to try to separate them! The same discipline makes for both a proficient military man and a proficient scholar; and, examined more closely, there are no proficient scholars who do not embody the instincts of a proficient military man . . . to stand with the rank and file and yet to be capable at any time of taking the lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh too carefully what is permitted and what is forbidden as if in a grocer's scales; to be more hostile to pettiness, slyness and parasitism than to wickedness . . .

What is it that one *learns* from a strict schooling? To obey and to command . . .

913

Deny merit and do only that which is beyond all praise, indeed, beyond all understanding.

914

For the chapter '*our virtues*':[12] a new form of morality: *oaths of allegiance* concerning what the members of associations intend to do and leave undone; very *specific* renunciation of many things. Tests to determine whether one is mature enough for this.

With regard to our approach to science, we are free to omit those things which we no longer consider difficult and no longer take seriously; this is itself a kind of immorality.

915

I also wish to make *asceticism natural* again, but practised in a spirit of *self-fortification*, as a gymnastics of the will, rather than in a spirit of self-denial; there should be privations and intermittent periods of fasting of various kinds, even in the most intellectual spheres. (*Dîners chez Magny*:[13] all of them have an intellectual sweet tooth which has given them indigestion.) We should dispassionately investigate our actions to determine the cogency of our opinions about our strengths; to this end, we should have adventures and expose ourselves to arbitrary dangers. We should devise *tests* even for our ability to keep our word.

916

The things which have been ruined through the Church's abuse of them:

(1) *Asceticism*. Hardly anyone has the courage to call attention to the natural utility and indispensability of asceticism for the purpose of training the will. Our ridiculous education system (which envisions the 'useful civil servant' as a guiding model) believes that it can make do with 'instruction', with brain-training, without having even the slightest notion of the need for something else *first* – the development of *will-power*. Examinations are taken in everything

except the main thing: whether the young man can *will*, whether he is able to *keep his word*; he *finishes* his schooling without the least curiosity about the most important question concerning his inherent worth.

(2) *Fasting*. In every sense, even as a means of maintaining the refined capacity for the enjoyment of all good things (e.g. to give up reading for a while, to cease listening to music for a while, to cease to be amiable for a while: we have to observe days of fasting from our virtues too).

(3) *The 'monastery'*. Temporary isolation, along with a strict refusal of, e.g., correspondence; a most profound type of introspection and self-recovery, which eschews not 'temptations' but 'duties'; an escape from the daily round of one's *milieu*; an escape from the tyranny of pernicious little habits and rules; a struggle against the squandering of our strength in mere reactions; an attempt to give our strength the time to accumulate; to become spontaneous again. Take a close look at our scholars: they can only think *reactively*, i.e. they must read something first before they can think.

(4) *Feasts*. A man must be quite uncouth not to find the presence of Christians and Christian values oppressive enough to send all festive moods to the Devil. Feasts include pride, high spirits, exuberance; prankishness; mockery of anything earnest or respectable; a divine self-affirmation out of animal abundance and perfection – all of which are conditions the Christian dare not honestly affirm. A feast is a piece of paganism *par excellence*.

(5) *Discouragement in the face of one's own nature*. Dressing it up in 'moral' costumes. We should have no need of *moral formulas* in order to *countenance* our own emotions; this is the measure of how much we can affirm our own nature – how much or how little we have to appeal to morality . . .

(6) *Death*.

*

Death: we must turn the stupid physiological fact into a moral necessity and live in such a way that we are willing to die at the right time![14]

917

Feeling stronger – expressed otherwise, feeling *joy* – always presupposes a comparison (*not* necessarily with others but with oneself, during a period of growth, without *knowing* that one is comparing) – *artificial* strengthening, whether by means of stimulating *chemica* or stimulating errors ('delusions').

Take, for example, the Christian's sense of *security*; he feels strengthened in his trust, in his patience and composure; he owes this artificial strength to the delusion that he is protected by a god.

Take, for example, the feeling of *superiority*, e.g. when the Caliph of Morocco is able to see only globes on which his three united kingdoms occupy four-fifths of the surface.

Take, for example, the feeling of *uniqueness*, e.g. when the European imagines that the march of civilization takes place only in Europe and when he regards himself as some kind of summary of the world process; or when the Christian makes all of existence revolve around the 'salvation of man'.

It depends on where one begins to feel the pressure, the constraint, and this, in turn, will determine what produces a sense of *being stronger.* A philosopher, for example, in the midst of the most dispassionate and transmontane feats of abstraction, feels in his element like a fish in water, whereas colours and tones oppress him, to say nothing of those dull desires which others call 'the ideal'.

918

A clever little boy will give you a wry look if you ask him: how would you like to become virtuous? But his eyes will widen with interest if you ask him: how would you like to become stronger than your friends?

'How one becomes stronger'. By being slow to decide and firm in one's decisions when they are made. Everything else follows. The *impulsive* and the *fickle*: the two kinds of weak men. We must not mistake ourselves for them; we must be sensible of our distance from them – before it is too late! Beware of the good-natured! Dealings with them lull us into a false sense of security. Dealings in which we are obliged to exercise our

offensive and defensive instincts are good. We must exercise all of our ingenuity in putting our will-power to the test . . . The differences are to be found *here*, *not* in knowledge, acumen or wit . . . We must learn in time to command – as well as to obey. We must learn how to be modest and *to exercise discretion* in being modest; that is to say, we must learn how to confer distinction and honour by being modest . . . and likewise how to confer distinction and honour with our trust and confidence . . .

For what must we atone most severely? For our misplaced modesty; for having paid no attention to our own needs; for mistaking ourselves; for vulgarizing ourselves; for turning a deaf ear to our instincts. This *lack of self-respect* exacts retribution through all sorts of *losses*: health, friendship, wellbeing, pride, joy, refinement, strength and tranquillity. We never forgive ourselves later on for this lack of genuine egoism; we consider it an objection which raises doubts as to whether we even *have* an ego . . .

919

The one thing they find hardest to forgive is self-respect. They find such a creature simply appalling, for he reveals what tolerance really is, the only virtue available to the rest, available to all . . .

I want a man to begin by respecting himself; everything else follows from that. Of course, if he were to do *that*, the others would be all done with him, for that is the last thing they forgive. What? A man who respects himself?

This is something quite different from the blind impulse to love oneself. Nothing is more common in the love between the sexes, or in that duality which is called the 'self', than contempt for what one loves, than fatalism in love.

920

'I am intent on such-and-such'; 'would that such-and-such were so'; 'I know that such-and-such is so' – the degrees of strength: the man of *will*, the man of *longing*, the man of *faith*.

921

The means by which a stronger kind of man maintains himself.

By allowing himself a right to perform exceptional actions, as a test of his power of self-control and his freedom.

By placing himself in circumstances in which he is not allowed *not* to be a barbarian.

By gaining superiority and sureness with respect to will-power through ascetic exercises of every kind.

By not communicating; silence; caution in the presence of charm.

By learning to obey in such a manner that it furnishes a test of self-preservation. Casuistry with regard to points of honour pushed to the extreme of subtlety.

By never concluding: 'What is right for one is fair for another' – but conversely!

By regarding retribution, the *licence* to repay in kind, as a privilege, as a distinction.

By not aspiring to *others'* virtues.

922

The kind of means we are obliged to employ in dealing with primitive peoples and the fact that 'barbarism' in this regard is nothing high-handed or arbitrary, becomes immediately apparent *in praxi* as soon as we find ourselves transported, along with all our European pampering, to the Congo, or to some other place where it is necessary to remain master over barbarians.

923

Warlike and peaceful people. Are you a man who embodies the warrior instinct? And if so, the question still remains: do you instinctively attack or defend? The rest of mankind, those whose instincts are *not* warlike, desire peace, harmony, 'freedom', 'equal rights'; these things are but names for, and stages of, one and the same thing: the desire to go where there is no need for them to defend themselves (for such men become disgruntled whenever they are compelled to resist attack); to

create circumstances in which there is no more war at all; and, if worse comes to worst, to submit, to obey, to adapt; for anything is better than waging war! Thus advises, for example, the Christian's instinct.

With the born warrior there is something akin to being armed, in character, in choice of circumstances and in the development of each of his qualities; for the first type of born warrior, it is the 'weapon' which is best developed, while for the second type it is the shield. The unarmed and defenceless, however, have need of other expedients and virtues which enable them to resist – or even to prevail.

924

What becomes of the man who no longer has any reasons to attack or defend? What remains of the emotions which are lost to him, emotions which constituted his means of attack and defence?

925

A marginal note on a niaiserie anglaise. 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.' This passes for wisdom; this passes for prudence; this passes for the basis of morality, i.e. 'the golden rule'. John Stuart Mill believes in it and who among the English does not? . . . But the maxim will not withstand scrutiny. To calculate that we should 'do nothing to others which we would not have done to ourselves' would be to prohibit actions because of their harmful consequences; the tacit assumption is that an action is invariably *repaid*. What if someone with *Il Principe*[15] in his hands were to say, 'Precisely such actions *must* be done so that others do not do them first – lest they do them to *us*'? On the other hand, consider the Corsican whose honour requires *vendetta*. He too does not wish to take a bullet; but the prospect of such, the likelihood of being shot, in no way prevents him from seeking satisfaction . . . And in all *decent* actions are we not deliberately indifferent to their consequences for us? To always avoid an action which would have damaging consequences for us would be tantamount to *prohibiting* decent actions altogether . . .

That said, the maxim is valuable because it betrays a certain *type of man*; it is the *gregarious instinct* which expresses itself through him – we are equal, we regard each other as equal: as I am to you, so you are to me. Such men actually believe that an *equivalence of actions* is possible when, in point of fact, such a thing simply does not exist. It is *impossible* to reciprocate any action; between real 'individuals' *there is no such thing as an equivalent action*, hence no such thing as 'retribution' . . . When I do anything I am very far from thinking that it is in any way possible for a man to do something similar: my action belongs to *me* . . . No one can pay me back; the most a man can do is commit some *other* action against me.

926

NB. Against justice (against J. Stuart Mill). I abhor the man's vulgarity when he says, 'What is right for one man is fair for another; do unto others as you would have them do unto you.' Such principles would found the whole of human relations on the basis of *reciprocal services*, so that every action would appear to be a kind of payment for something done for us. What is *presupposed* here is *ignoble* in the worst sense: it is presupposed that there is some sort of *equivalence in value* between my actions and yours; the most *personal value of an action* is simply annulled (that aspect of it which is incommensurable and uncompensable). This notion 'reciprocity' is really quite vulgar. On the contrary, it is precisely the fundamental conviction – that what *I* do *could not* and *should not* be done by another; that there must be *no compensation* (except in the most *select circles*, among 'my equals', *inter pares*); that in a profound sense we can never truly repay anyone, because we are *unique* and only do what is unique – which is the source of *aristocratic isolation from the multitude*, because the multitude believe in 'equality' and *consequently* in compensability and 'reciprocity'.

927

The narrow-minded provincialism of moral deprecation, with its notions 'useful' and 'harmful', is sensible; it represents

the necessary point of view of society, which is only able to see the immediate *consequences* of a thing. The state and its politicians are already in need of a more *supra-moral* mode of thought, because they have to take into account a causal nexus of much greater magnitude. Similarly, we can imagine a global economy whose aims extended so far into the future that all of its particular demands in the present seemed unjust and arbitrary.

928

'*Should we follow our feelings?*' Putting one's life in danger on the impulse of the moment, *yielding* to a sense of generosity, is of little value . . . it does not even distinguish one . . . all are equally capable of this – and in the willingness to do so, the criminal, the bandit or the *Corsican* surpasses more respectable men like ourselves, surely . . .

The better course would be to overcome these onrushes of feeling and, *instead* of performing heroic deeds at their bidding, to do so dispassionately, *raisonnable*, without the torrential flood of pleasurable sensations . . .

The same holds good of compassion, which must first be habitually *sifted by raison*; for otherwise it is just as dangerous as any other passion . . .

Blindly yielding to a passion, without regard to whether it be a generous, compassionate or hostile one, is the cause of the *greatest evils* . . .

Greatness of character does not consist in the *absence* of these passions – on the contrary, one may have them to a frightful degree, but in reining them in . . . and even this should be done without taking pleasure in subduing oneself, but merely because . . .

929

'To give one's life for a cause' – that is quite impressive. But there are many things for which we might give our life; our every passion clamours for gratification. Whether it be compassion, or anger, or revenge, the fact that we stake our life on it changes nothing with respect to its worth. Just consider how

many have sacrificed their lives, or what is worse, their health, for pretty girls. If we have the temperament for it, we instinctively choose dangerous things, e.g. if you are a philosopher, adventures in speculation; or, if you are virtuous, immorality. One kind of man wishes to risk nothing, while others are more bold. Do we others despise life? On the contrary, what we seek is life *raised to a higher power*, life lived in danger . . . So, I repeat, we have no desire to be more virtuous than others. Pascal, e.g., wished to risk nothing and remained a Christian: that perhaps was more virtuous. *A man always sacrifices something* . . .

930

People have always misunderstood love: they believe that here at least they are selfless, because they further the interests of a creature other than themselves, often to their own detriment; but in exchange for that, they hope to take *possession* of that creature . . . In other cases, love is a refined form of parasitism, a pernicious and inconsiderate implantation of one soul into another . . . and at such expense! And not only at that of the 'host'!

How often a man sacrifices his interests, how rarely is he 'selfish'! All his emotions and passions assert their rights – and how remote an emotion is from the prudent utility of selfishness!

A man does not want to be 'happy'; one would have to be English to be able to believe that a man always seeks his own self-interest. Our appetites vehemently wish to violate things – their accumulated strength seeks out resistance.[16]

931

All of the emotions are *useful*, some more directly, others more indirectly; with respect to their utility it is absolutely impossible to establish any scale of values – to be sure, from an economic point of view, all of these natural energies are good, i.e. useful, however much disasters both terrible and irrevocable may also emanate from them. At most, we could say that the most powerful emotions are the most valuable, in so far as there are no greater sources of energy.

932

The well-meaning, helpful, good-natured dispositions have emphatically *not* come to be honoured on account of their usefulness, but because they are the conditions peculiar to *rich souls* who have more than enough to give away and whose value lies in their sense of possessing an abundance of vitality. Just look into the eyes of a benefactor! What you see is the exact opposite of self-denial, of hatred of the *moi*, of '*Pascalisme*'.

933

In summa, what is needed is mastery of the passions, *not* their weakening or eradication! The greater a man's strength of will, the more freedom he may afford to his passions. What makes the 'great man' great is the latitude he grants to his desires and the even greater ability he has to press these magnificent monsters into service.

In every stage of civilization, the 'good man' is both the least dangerous and the most useful, a kind of mean, a person who is generally regarded as someone from whom one has nothing to fear, but whom one nevertheless must not despise . . .

In essence, education is distracting, tempting and debilitating: the means of *ruining* the exception in favour of the rule.

That may seem harsh, but from an economic perspective it is perfectly reasonable. At least for that long period . . .

In essence, culture is the means of directing taste against the exceptional in favour of the ordinary.

A culture of the exception, of experiment, of danger, of nuance, is a result of a great *abundance of strengths and abilities – every* aristocratic culture tends in that direction.

Only when a culture has at its disposal an excess of strengths and abilities, may it also [build] on its basis a greenhouse of a culture of luxury . . .

934

These are all questions of *strength*: to what extent should we oppose the conditions necessary for the preservation of *society*, including its prejudices?

To what extent should we unleash *our most formidable qualities*, qualities whose possession would ruin most people?

To what extent should we confront the *truth* and embrace its most questionable aspects?

To what extent should we confront *suffering*, self-contempt, compassion, disease, vice, when it is remains to be seen whether we can master them? (What does not destroy us makes us *stronger* . . .)

Finally, to what extent should we acknowledge the rights which belong to men who are the rule and not the exception, the rights of the common man, of the little, good and righteous man, men of an ordinary nature, without becoming vulgar ourselves? . . .

The strongest test of character is not allowing ourselves to be ruined by the temptation to be good. *Goodness* should be regarded as a luxury, as a refinement, as a *vice* . . .

3. The Noble Man

935

The opposite type: true goodness, nobility and magnanimity, are born of abundance, of . . . which does not give that it may receive – which has no desire to *elevate* itself by being good – extravagance is typical of true goodness; personal abundance is its presupposition.

936

The ideals of the gregarious animal (against them, I defend *aristocratism*). At present these ideals are the culmination of everything on which 'society' places *supreme value*. There is an attempt to give them a cosmic, even a metaphysical, value. A society which preserves within itself a sense of *respect* and *tact* in regard to freedom, must consider itself to be an exception and to be confronted by a power with which it contrasts itself and towards which it is hostile and condescending. The more rights I relinquish and the more I regard myself as everyone's

equal, the more I fall under the domination of the ordinary and ultimately of the *great majority*. The preservation of a high degree of freedom among the members of an aristocratic society presupposes the extreme tension which arises from the presence of the *contrary* impulse in all its members: the will to power . . .

If you want to do away with strong contrasts and difference of rank, you will abolish strong love, high-mindedness and the sense of individuality as well.

Regarding the *actual* psychology of societies based upon freedom and equality, *what is it that diminishes?*

The determination to *assume responsibility for oneself* – a sign of the decline of autonomy.

Proficiency in the arts of attack and defence, even in intellectual matters – the ability to command.

The sense of *reverence*, of subordination, of the ability to be silent.

The *great passion*, the great mission, tragedy and cheerfulness.

937

In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what De Montlosier had said in his work, *De la Monarchie française*: he answered with a cry of indignation and set himself to his task. That exile had said: '*Race d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrachés de nos mains, peuple tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous fut octroyée d'être libres, et non pas à nous d'être nobles; pour nous tout est de droit, pour vous tout est de grâce. Nous ne sommes point de votre communauté; nous sommes un tout par nous-mêmes.*'[17]

938

How the aristocratic world allows itself to be ever more thoroughly fleeced and bled! By virtue of its noble instincts it surrenders its privileges, and by virtue of its superior refinement and culture, it takes an interest in the people, the weak, the poor and the poetry of the little people, etc.

939

There is such a thing as a noble and dangerous form of insouciance which allows of profound conclusions and insight; the

insouciance of the soul which has never *tried* to make friends, but knows only hospitality and understands how to practise it – the soul of a man whose heart and home are open to all who wish to enter, be they beggars, cripples or kings. This is genuine affability; he who possesses it has hundreds of 'friends', but probably not one friend.

940

The teaching μηδὲν ἄγαν[18] applies to men of surpassing strength – not to ordinary men.

ἐγχράτεια[19] and ἄσχησις[20] are but steps to higher things: above them stands the 'golden nature'.[21]

'Thou shalt' – unconditional obedience in Stoics, in the Christian and Arabian orders, in Kant's philosophy (it is immaterial whether this obedience is shown to a superior or to a concept).

Higher than 'thou shalt' stands 'I will' (the mythological heroes);[22] higher than 'I will' stands 'I am' (the gods of the Greeks).

The barbarian gods show no sense of *measure* or the joy it imparts – they are neither modest, nor mild, nor moderate.

941

What is significant about our gardens and palaces (and all longing for riches) is *that they remove disorder and vulgarity from our sight and allow us to create a setting suitable for our soul's nobility.*

Most people believe that being in beautiful and tranquil places *affects* them, *ennobles* them: this is the significance of visiting Italy, travelling abroad, reading literature, attending the theatre etc. *People want to be formed* – that is the significance of their cultural pursuits!

But the strong, the mighty, want *to form and have nothing foreign about them!*

This, then, is why so many are beckoned to the wilderness, not to find themselves, but to lose themselves and to forget themselves. The desire '*to get away from one's self*' is common among the weak and to all who are discontented with themselves.

942

The only nobility is nobility of birth, nobility of blood. (I do not refer here to the particle '*von*' and the *Almanach de Gotha*:[23] this is a parenthesis for asses.) Wherever reference is made to the 'aristocracy of intellect', generally there is no lack of reasons for concealment; it is a well-known watchword among ambitious Jews. Intellect alone does not ennoble; on the contrary, *to ennoble the intellect* something is needed beforehand. What then is needed? Blood.

943

What is noble? Preface to 'Mixed Opinions and Maxims'.

To care for outward appearances, even to the point of frivolity in word, dress and bearing, in so far as this care marks a man off from others, keeps them at bay and guards him against being mistaken for them.

To comport oneself in an unhurried manner, even to gaze upon things with an unhurried eye. There are few things of value and these come, and are willing to come, of their own accord to those who are themselves of value. We are slow to admire.

To bear poverty, indigence and even illness.

To shun minor honours and distrust anyone who is quick to praise, for he who praises believes that he understands what he praises; but instead to understand (as Balzac, that prototype of the social climber, once put it) that *comprendre c'est égaler*.[24]

To have profound doubts as to whether the secrets of the heart can be communicated; not to choose solitude, but to take it for granted.

To be convinced that one has duties only to one's peers and to behave towards others as one sees fit; that justice is to be hoped for (but alas! by no means to be expected) only *inter pares*.

To treat the 'gifted' with irony; to believe that in morals, too, there are those of noble birth. 'Aristocrats of the intellect' is a watchword among Jews.

Always to regard oneself as *conferring* honours, while seldom finding anyone from whom one would accept them.

Always to be disguised: the higher the type of man, the greater the need to assume an *incognito*. A regard for common decency if nothing else demands that, were there a God, He show Himself to the world only in human form.

To have *otium*, to be absolutely convinced that while no disgrace attaches to plying a trade in any sense, it is certainly ignobling to do so. However much we may respect them, the 'industrious' in the bourgeois sense are not noble, nor are those tireless artists who brood like hens, cackle, lay an egg and then cackle again. Although we *protect* artists and poets and those who are in any way masters, we are beings of a higher order than those who only have *abilities*, than those who are merely 'productive' and are not to be confused with them.

To delight in *formality*; to preserve all the forms of propriety in the conviction that courtesy is one of the great virtues; to distrust all kinds of self-indulgence, including any freedom of the press or freedom of opinion, because under these conditions the intellect grows lax and foolish and falls asleep.

To take pleasure in *women*, as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate and softer kind of creature. What good fortune to meet with creatures who have only dancing and finery and folly in their heads! They have enraptured every profound and anxious masculine soul whose life is burdened with heavy responsibilities.

To take pleasure in princes and in priests, because they maintain belief in disparities of value between human beings – in short, in the principle of hierarchy – even when assessing historical figures, at least as regards their *symbolic* value and, on the whole, even their actual value.

To be able to be silent, but not say a word of this to anybody.

To sustain protracted hostilities: not to be easily reconciled.

To be disgusted with demagogues, with the 'Enlightenment', with 'amiability', with vulgar familiarity.

To collect precious things to satisfy the demands of a lofty and fastidious soul; to wish to have nothing in common. To have *one's own* books, *one's own* landscapes.

We are not readily affected by good or bad experiences and we avoid hasty generalizations. How we smile at the exception when it has the bad taste to behave as if it were the rule.

We love naïve things and naïve people, but as spectators and superior beings; we think Faust just as naïve as his Gretchen.

We hold the good in low esteem, regarding them as gregarious animals; and know that often it is the worst, harshest and most mischievous men who have a precious golden drop of goodness hidden within them which [is more valuable than] all mere benevolence and [milk-soppishness][25] . . .

We maintain that a man of our kind is belied neither by his vices, nor by his follies. We realize that we are not easily recognized and that we have good grounds for furnishing ourselves with foregrounds.

944

What is noble? Being constantly obliged to cut a fine figure. Seeking out situations in which one is constantly required to comport oneself well. Ceding happiness to the *majority*, that is, the happiness which consists of peace of mind, virtue and comfort (Anglo-angelic grocerdom *à la* Spencer). Instinctively seeking out heavy responsibilities. Knowing how to make enemies everywhere, at a pinch even out of oneself. Constantly contradicting the *majority* not in words, but in deeds.

945

Morality as the *greatest threat* to man. Virtue, e.g. as truthfulness, as *our* noblest and most dangerous luxury; we must not refuse the disadvantages which it brings with it.

946

We want no *praise*, for we merely do what serves our purpose, what gives us pleasure, or what we *must*.

947

What is chastity in a man? It means that his taste in sex has remained noble; that *in eroticis* he does not incline to what is brutal, or morbid, or prudent.

948

The 'notion of honour' rests upon the belief in 'good society', in chivalry, in the obligation to continually cut a fine figure.

Essentially, it means that one does not take one's life too seriously; that one unconditionally requires the most respectful manners of everybody with whom one has dealings (at least in so far as they are not one of '*us*'); that one is neither familiar, nor amiable, nor jocular, nor modest, except *inter pares*; that one *always cuts a fine figure.*

949

The fact that we put our lives, our health and our honour at stake is the result of high spirits and of an overflowing and extravagant will; we do this *not* out of philanthropy, but because every great danger provokes our curiosity concerning the measure of our strength and courage.

950

'Eagles strike directly.' Nobility of soul may be discerned not least of all by the magnificent and haughty imprudence with which it attacks – 'directly'.

951

War against the effete conception of 'nobility' – a certain amount of brutality is indispensable, as is something approaching criminality. Even 'smug complacency' has *no* place here; a man must be willing even to venture his self, tempt his self, ruin his self – none of this 'beautiful soul' twaddle – I want to make room for a *more robust ideal.*

952

'Paradise is under the shadow of swords'[26] – this is also a symbol and a motto by which those with souls of noble and martial ancestry betray themselves and recognize one another.

953

A point in time when man has a superabundance of *strength* at his disposal; science intends to bring about this *enslavement of nature.* Then man acquires the *leisure* necessary to *develop* himself into something new and higher. *A new aristocracy.* Then a host of *virtues* which had been *conditions of existence outlive* their usefulness. Qualities which are no longer needed

are *consequently* lost. *We no longer have need of the virtues*, *consequently* we lose them; likewise we lose the morality of 'the one thing needful', of the salvation of the soul, of immortality: a means of *enabling* men to achieve tremendous *self-control* (through the emotion of tremendous *fear*). The various types of hardship through which the breed of men is formed; hardship teaches work, thought and self-restraint.

A theory of *forms of domination*: instead of *sociology*.

Physiological purification and strengthening. The new aristocracy has need of an opponent against which it must contend; there must be a terrible urgency to its need to preserve itself.

The two futures of mankind:

(1) Pervasive mediocrity.

(2) Deliberate withdrawal and self-development.

A doctrine which would create a *gulf*, preserving the *highest and lowest kind* of man, while destroying the intermediate. Previous aristocrats, religious and secular alike, prove *nothing* against the necessity of a new aristocracy.

4. The Lords of the Earth

954

A question occurs to me again and again, a tempting and wicked question perhaps; may it be whispered into the ears of those who are entitled to such questionable questions! The strongest minds of today, whose greatest power is over themselves: in light of the extent to which the 'gregarious animal' type is being developed in Europe nowadays, is it not high time that we attempted the essentially artificial and deliberate *cultivation* of the opposite type and its virtues? And would it not provide a kind of goal, redemption and justification for the democratic movement if someone were to come along who could *make some use of it* – so that ultimately in addition to its new and sublime refinement of slavery (for that is what European democracy must become in the end) there would be that superior kind possessed of lordly and Caesarian intellects who would stand upon it, maintain themselves by it, elevate

themselves by it? To new, hitherto impossible prospects *of their own*? To tasks *of their own*?[27]

955

I am filled with hope at the sight of modern Europeans; it will soon become apparent that a bold ruling race has arisen, resting on the broad basis of Europe's highly intelligent and gregarious masses. Before long the consolidation of the masses will no longer be in the foreground.

956

The same conditions that further the development of the herd animals also further the development of the animals which herd them.

957

The great task and question draws nigh, inexorable, unwelcome and terrible as fate: how shall the earth be governed as a whole? And *to what end* shall man as a whole – no longer as a nation or a race – be raised and bred?

Moral codes that lay down laws are the principal means by which creative and profound individuals are able to mould mankind as they please, provided that such artists of the highest order hold sway and can impose their creative will over long stretches of time in the form of legislation, religions and customs. Such men, the ones who undertake great works, the truly great men as I understand them, will be sought in vain at the present time and probably for some time to come: they are *missing* – and will be until after much disappointment it begins to be understood why they are missing and that nothing could be more inimical to their emergence and development than that which in Europe is now called without hesitation 'morality', as if there were none other, as if none other were permitted – that aforementioned gregarious morality which strives on earth with all its might for the happiness of a common grazing ground, that is, for a life of security, safety, comfort and ease, and, last but not least, 'if all goes well', even hopes to rid itself of all kinds of shepherds and bellwethers. Its

two most abundantly preached doctrines are called 'equality of rights' and 'compassion for all who suffer' – and suffering itself is regarded by these two doctrines as something which must be utterly *done away with*. That such 'ideas' can still be fashionable gives a bad impression of [us]. Yet anyone who has carefully considered where and how the plant 'man' has hitherto shot up with the most vigour would have to suppose that this has occurred under the *opposite* conditions. To that end the danger of his situation must grow to monstrous proportions; under this long pressure and constraint he must be forced to fight his way up with ingenuity and disingenuousness; his will to live must swell into an unconditional will to power and to supremacy. Danger, hardship and violence, danger in the street and in the heart, inequality of rights, secrecy, Stoicism, the art of temptation and devilry of every kind – in short, the opposite of the aspirations of the gregarious – are necessary for *elevating* the human *type*. To be able to teach a morality whose intention is the opposite of gregarious morality, a morality that cultivates men of stature instead of men of comfort and mediocrity and whose intention is to cultivate a ruling caste – the future *lords of the earth* – it must be introduced as something built on existing customary law and under the guise of its dictates; to that end, many means of facilitating this transition and deception need to be devised. As a single lifetime means almost nothing compared to the carrying-out of these longer tasks and more remote intentions, the first and most important thing is to cultivate *a new type of man* in which the selfsame will, the selfsame instinct, is guaranteed to last for many generations to come: a new ruling type and caste – this is just as well understood as the long and involved 'etceteras' of this idea. We are contemplating the preparation of a *reversal of values* for a particularly strong type of man endowed with the highest intellectuality and supreme will-power and, for this purpose, the slow and cautious unfettering of a host of instincts in him that have been held in check and slandered. Anyone who contemplates this is one of us, a free-thinker – although admittedly a new and different kind of 'free-thinker' than before, for what they wanted

was pretty much the opposite. It seems to me they include, first and foremost, the pessimists of Europe, the poets and intellectuals whose disappointed idealism fills them with disgust, in so far as their dissatisfaction with existence in general *entails* their dissatisfaction with contemporary man in particular; by the same token, certain insatiably ambitious artists who fight against 'the gregarious animal', demanding without hesitation or conditions the privileges of superior men and who, with the means of seduction afforded by their art, lull into complacency all the instinctive wariness of the herd that still subsists within the more select spirits; third and last, all those critics and historians who courageously continue the work so propitiously begun by the German intellect, that *new* Columbus who discovered the Old World of antiquity – I say *continued* because we are still in the early stages of this conquest. To wit, in antiquity, another, grander morality than today did indeed prevail; and under its educative influence, the man of antiquity was a man of greater strength and depth than the man of today – so far he alone has been 'the well-constituted man'. The seductive influence antiquity exerts on the well-constituted, i.e. on strong and enterprising souls, is still the subtlest and most effective of all anti-democratic and anti-Christian forces, as it was during the Renaissance.

958

I write for a breed of men that does not yet exist: for 'the lords of the earth'.

Religion, as a source of consolation and relaxation, is *dangerous*: man then believes he may *take his ease*.

In the *Theages* Plato writes: 'everybody would like to become a despot, if possible, over all men, or better, to become *God*'.[28] *This* attitude must be resumed.

Englishmen, Americans and Russians . . .

959

That verdure of the primeval forest known as man always appears where the struggle for power has been waged the longest. *Great* men.[29]

960

From now on there will be favourable preconditions for more comprehensive forms of domination the likes of which have never been seen before. And this is by no means the most important thing: it is now possible for international kinship groups to emerge which would set themselves the task of rearing a master race, the future 'lords of the earth' – a new and prodigious aristocracy based upon the strictest self-governance, in which the intentions of philosophical authorities and artistic tyrants will be realized and made to endure for thousands of years – a superior kind of man who thanks to a superior resolve, knowledge, wealth and influence, would make use of democratic Europe as the most compliant and most flexible instrument with which such men could gain control of the destiny of the earth, so that they might, as artists, refashion 'man' himself.

Suffice it to say that the time is coming when we will have to reconsider everything we thought we knew about politics.

5. The Great Man

961

My attention is directed towards points in history at which great men are most noticeable. The significance of *moralities* that exercise a prolonged *despotism*: they draw the bow, provided they do not break it.

962

NB. A great man, a man whom nature has devised and constructed like a building in the grand style, what is he? First, all of his actions follow with the consistency of a long-term plan that, owing to its very length, is difficult to comprehend – thus everything he does is misleading; in broad areas of his life he has the ability to bend things to his will, to despise and discard all that is petty, even when such things are among the most beautiful, the most 'divine' things in the world. *Second*, he is *more cold and indifferent, more brazen and fearless in the*

face of 'opinion'; he lacks the virtues associated with 'respect' and with those who have become respectable, being altogether devoid of the 'virtues of the gregarious'. When he cannot *lead*, he goes alone; and on occasion he growls at some of what he encounters along the way. Third, he seeks not 'sympathy', but servants, instruments; in his dealings with men, he is always eager to *make* something out of them. He knows that what he is, is incommunicable: he finds it distasteful to be 'intimate'; and he is usually not when he is reputed to be. When he is not in communion with himself, he wears a mask. He would rather lie than tell the truth: lying requires more wit and *will*. [He is] unaffected by praise or censure, [he is] his own jurisdiction, answering to no authority but his own.

963

An intellect determined to achieve greatness and to possess the means thereto is necessarily a sceptic; but that is not to say that he should also appear as such. Freedom from convictions of any kind, the *capacity* for unobstructed vision, is a part of his strength. Great passion, the basis and driving force of his existence, more enlightened and despotic than he himself is, enlists his whole intellect not just into its possession but into its service and makes him unscrupulous. Great passion gives him the courage to use unholy means (even in order to sanctify). Passion allows convictions, which it makes use of and even squanders, but it never submits to them, for it alone knows itself to be sovereign. Conversely, the need for faith and for some unconditional affirmation or negation is a need born of weakness. All weakness is weakness of the will and all weakness of the will is due to the absence of a commanding passion or categorical imperative.[30]

964

The great man senses that he has power over a people and that his concurrence with a people or a millennium is only temporary; he has an enlarged sense of himself as *causa* and *voluntas* that is often misunderstood as 'altruistic' love. This forces him to adopt new means of communication; all great

men are *ingenious* in devising such means. They want to transform people into great communities; they want to give a single form to the heterogeneous and haphazard; for them, chaos is a source of excitement.

Love has been misunderstood. There is a slavish love that submits and yields, that idealizes and deceives itself – and then there is a divine love that despises as it loves, that creates and *uplifts* the beloved.

To attain that tremendously energetic quality possessed by great men, the quality most needed in moulding the men of the future, requires not only the cultivation of these men but also the annihilation of millions of the ill-constituted. The difficulty is to do such a thing and not be devastated at the thought of the suffering produced, suffering the like of which has never before been seen!

965

In my opinion, the hardships that nations suffer from revolution and turmoil is smaller than the *hardship* great individuals suffer in their development. Don't be fooled: the many hardships suffered by all these little people do not form a *collective* hardship, except the one suffered by the *powerful* at the sight of it.

To think of oneself first in a crisis, to think of how to make use of the misfortune of many – that can be (although this varies considerably from case to case) a sign of *great* character, of someone who has mastered his sense of compassion and justice.

966

Unlike the animals, man has cultivated in himself a plethora of *conflicting* impulses and instincts: by virtue of this synthesis he has become lord of the earth. This manifold world of instinct is organized into locally circumscribed *hierarchies*, that he might not perish from his instincts being at *cross-purposes*; moralities are merely an expression of such hierarchies. Thus one instinct is master, while its contrary instinct, weakened and refined, serves as the impetus that *stimulates* the activity of the primary instinct.

The most superior man would have the greatest diversity of instincts in the greatest intensity that he can bear. As a matter of fact, where the plant known as man has proved strong, we find instincts strongly *opposed* to each other (e.g. Shakespeare), but tamed.

967

Are we not justified in thinking that all *great* men are *evil*? This is not always evident in individual cases. Often they are able to play such a masterful game of hide and seek that they can assume the demeanour and outward appearance exhibited by men of great virtue. Often they revere the virtues in all earnestness and practise them with a passionate severity towards themselves, but only out of cruelty – seen from afar, such things can be misleading. Some have even misunderstood themselves, as they . . . Not infrequently a great task will call forth great qualities, e.g. fair-mindedness. It is essential to bear in mind that while the greatest men may possess great virtues, they also possess their corresponding vices. It is my conviction that the presence of such internal conflicts and the feelings they engender gives rise to *the bow with the great tension*, the great man.

968

In *great men*, the characteristics specific to life, that is, injustice, lies and exploitation, are at their greatest. But in so far as they have had an *overwhelming* effect, their nature has at best been misunderstood and interpreted as good. Carlyle was this type of interpreter.

969

In general, *a thing is only worth what we paid for it*. This of course does not apply if we take the individual in isolation; the great capabilities of an individual are out of all proportion to what he himself has done, sacrificed or suffered for them. But if we consider his ancestry we discover therein the history of a tremendous saving-up of strength, its 'capital accumulation' if you will, attained through all sorts of renunciation, struggle, labour and determination. It is because the great man has

cost so much, *not* because he is a miracle, a gift from heaven or a 'stroke of luck', that he became great. Our conception of 'heredity' is mistaken. One's ancestors have already paid the price for what one is.

970

The good: the danger of modesty. To adapt ourselves too early to a *milieu*, to tasks, company and daily routines in which chance has placed us, at a time when neither our strength nor our purpose in life has entered our consciousness with the force of law; the sense of reassurance, relief and commonality which is gained all too soon, this premature sense of modesty about ourselves, flatters, indulges and suppresses the feelings in the most dangerous way; to learn respect in accordance with our 'peers', as if we had no standard or right of our own to determine values; the effort to appreciate as others do, against our own better judgement, against the voice of taste which is also a voice of conscience . . . all this is a dreadful, if subtle, form of bondage and if it does not ultimately lead to some kind of explosion which bursts all the bonds of love and morality in an instant, then such an intellect becomes stunted and petty, effeminate and impersonal. The opposite of this is bad enough, but is nonetheless better; to suffer from one's environment, to be wounded as much by its praise as by its disapprobation and to fester inwardly without betraying the fact; to learn to be silent, perhaps concealing this with chatter; to create nooks and places of impenetrable solitude in which one may, for a moment, heave a sigh, shed a tear or find sublime solace – until one is finally strong enough to say, 'what have I to do with all of *you*?' and to go one's own way.

971

Those men who are destinies, men who by bearing themselves also bear destinies, the whole species of *heroic* bearers of burdens: oh how much they would like to take a rest from themselves for once! How they yearn for stout hearts and shoulders to bear their burden, that they might rid themselves of that which oppresses them, even if it only be for a

few hours! And how futile is their yearning! . They wait; they observe all that passes before them; nobody they meet is bearing even a thousandth part of their suffering and passion; nobody divines what they are waiting *for* . . . At long last, they learn their first piece of practical wisdom – to wait *no more*; and shortly thereafter they learn their second – to be affable, to be modest; and from that time onwards to endure everyone and everything – in short, *to bear just a little more* than they had borne before . . .

6. The Highest Man as Legislator of the Future

972

The legislators of the future. After I had long sought to attach a definite meaning to the word 'philosopher', I finally found that there are two kinds: (1) those who seek to *establish* some large body of evidence, (2) those who are *legislators* of value judgements. The former seek to appropriate the world, past or present, by summarizing events in symbols: they want to make everything clear, distinct, intelligible and manageable – they assist man in his task of using all things for his benefit. However, the second kind issue commands and say: 'Thus shall it be!' They alone determine the benefit, *what* is of benefit, to man; they have at their disposal the preliminary work of scientific and scholarly men, but to them, knowledge is only a means to creation.

This second kind of philosopher seldom prospers; as a matter of fact, their situation is dreadful and fraught with danger. How often have they deliberately blindfolded themselves so that they might no longer behold the thin edge that lies between them and a plunge into the abyss: for example Plato, when he persuaded himself that the good as he would have it was not Plato's good, but rather the good in itself, an eternal treasure which some man by the name of Plato happened to stumble upon! Cruder forms of this same wilful blindness prevail among founders of religions: their 'thou shalt' must on no account sound to them

like 'I want' – they are emboldened to accomplish their mission only if they regard it as divinely commanded; their conscience is able to *bear* the otherwise overwhelming burden of legislating values only if they regard themselves as 'inspired'. As soon as we abandon these two sources of consolation, whether that of Plato or that of Muhammad, and thinkers are no longer able to ease their conscience with the hypothesis of a 'god' or of 'eternal values', the demand made on legislators of new values becomes formidable to a new and unprecedented degree. Now those elect ones upon whom the faintest suspicion of such a duty is beginning to dawn and who regard it as their greatest danger, prefer trying to evade it by some dodge: for example, by convincing themselves that it is not 'the proper time', that the mission is already accomplished, or that it is impossible, or that they would not be able to shoulder the responsibility, or that they are already overburdened with other, more immediate tasks, or that this new and less immediate duty is nothing but a moral disease, a temptation by which they are seduced and led astray from the path of duty altogether, that it is even a kind of madness. Many of them may very well succeed in shirking it; traces of these shirkers and their bad consciences can be found throughout the whole of history. But in most cases there came to such men of fate that time of redemption, that harvest time of ripening when they *had* to do what they did not even 'want' to do – and then the act which they had most dreaded fell from the tree, without effort or intention and without any alternative, almost as a gift.[31]

973

The human horizon. We may regard philosophers in general, and Plato in particular, as those who make the utmost efforts to *examine* how high man might *rise*, how *far* his power extends. But they do this as individuals; perhaps the Caesars and the founders of states, etc., were more ambitious in thinking how far man could be driven to *develop* under 'favourable circumstances'. What they did not sufficiently understand, however, was the nature of these 'favourable circumstances'. The great question is, where do we find the most splendid growth of the

plant called 'man' so far? To answer this, a comparative study of history is necessary.

974

A fact or work exercises a *fresh* eloquence over every age and every new type of man. History always enunciates *new truths*.

975

Artists excel at *remaining objective, rigorous, firm and strict* in executing a design; but when one has need of men to do so (as is the case with teachers, statesmen, etc.), the calmness, indifference and severity soon disappear. In the character of a man like Caesar or Napoleon we may divine something of the 'disinterestedness' with which a sculptor shapes his marble, however large the sacrifice in men might be. To bear the greatest responsibility and *not to collapse under its weight*: it is in this direction that the future of the superior man lies. Hitherto such men have almost always required false inspirations, lest they themselves cease to *believe* in their *entitlement* and *ability* to act.

976

The reason why the philosopher *seldom* prospers is that his preconditions include characteristics which usually ruin a man:

(1) He must have an enormous multitude of characteristics; he must be a compendium of human nature, of all its loftiest aspirations and basest desires, thus exposing himself to the danger of internal conflicts and even of self-disgust.
(2) He must be curious about the various aspects of things – thus exposing himself to the danger of fragmentation.
(3) He must be just and equitable in the highest sense, but deeply love and deeply hate (and be deeply unjust) as well.
(4) He must not only be a spectator but a lawgiver – be both judge and judged (in so far as he is a compendium of the world).
(5) He must be a man of many parts, yet strong and firm. Resilient.

977

The truly *royal* calling of the philosopher (according to Alcuin the Anglo-Saxon): '*Prava corrigere, et recta corroborare et sancta sublimare.*'[32]

978

The new philosopher can only arise in connection with a ruling caste, as its loftiest intellectualization. Great politics, world government, is nigh; the *principles* for it are entirely lacking. (The irony of the *empty* German intellect.)

979

The fundamental idea is that new values must first be created – and we shall not be *spared* the necessity of creating them! The philosopher must be like a lawgiver. New kinds of men. The kinds of 'accidents' that previously cultivated the most superior kinds of men (e.g. Greeks) must now be *consciously intended.*

980

Suppose we conceive of a philosopher as a great educator who is powerful enough to reach down from his solitary height and pull up after him, link by link, the chain formed by successive generations; then he must be allowed the extraordinary privileges of a great educator. An educator never says what he himself thinks, but only what will benefit those he educates. It is essential that no one penetrate his disguise; a part of his consummate skill consists in seeming to be honest. He must be well versed in all the arts of training and discipline: some are only driven onwards by the lash of scorn, while others – the idle, the irresolute, the cowardly, the vain, – perhaps require exaggerated praise. Such an educator is beyond good and evil; but nobody must know it.

981

We should *not* try to 'better' men, we should *not* harangue them in any way about morality as if 'morality in itself' or an ideal kind of man could ever be taken for granted; rather, we should *create circumstances* in which *stronger men are necessary*, who

in turn will require and therefore will *have* a *morality* (or, to put it more clearly, a *physical and intellectual discipline*) *which makes them strong!*

Do not be misled by blue eyes or heaving breasts: *greatness of soul has nothing Romantic about it* . . . And unfortunately, *nothing amiable about it either* . . .

982

From wars we learn: (1) to associate death with the interests we are fighting for – that makes us venerable; (2) to sacrifice *many* and to take our cause seriously enough to be unsparing in our treatment of men; (3) rigid discipline and, in wartime, to allow ourselves to be violent and cunning.

983

The *inculcation* of those rulers' virtues, which restrain the impulses even of benevolence and compassion, the great virtues of the cultivator ('forgiving one's enemies' is child's play in comparison) *bring* the *creative passion* up to the *mark* – let's have no more of this chipping away at mere marble! The exceptional and powerful position of these beings, compared to the position of princes so far, is that of the Roman Caesar with Christ's soul.

984

Greatness of soul should be inseparable from intellectual greatness. For the former involves independence, which should not be allowed in the absence of intellectual greatness. It only leads to mischief, even when animated by the desire to do good and exercise 'justice'. Inferior intellects must *obey* – therefore they cannot possess *greatness.*

985

The superior man, the philosophical man who is surrounded by solitude, not because he prefers to be left alone, but because he is, by his very nature, without equal; what dangers and new sufferings await him now, just when we have lost our belief in rank and therefore no longer know how to honour this solitude or even to understand it! Formerly, the popular conscience

took the hermit to be almost self-sanctifying in the manner of his withdrawal from worldly affairs; today the hermit appears to be encircled by a cloud of dark doubts and suspicions. And so he seems not only to the envious and the wretched; he cannot help but feel that there is some misunderstanding, neglect and superficiality in every kindness shown to him; he is well acquainted with the insidiousness of compassionate but narrow-minded friends who only feel good and saintly when trying (perhaps by providing more comfortable positions or companions of more regular habits and reliable character) to 'save' him from himself – yes, he has to admire how mediocre minds are unwittingly driven to oppose and destroy him in full assurance of their right to do so! For men of such incomprehensible mental isolation it is even necessary that they thoroughly and firmly wrap themselves in the mantle of physical seclusion: that is a part of their wisdom. Today, even cunning and disguise are needed for such a man to preserve himself, to keep his head *above* water and not to be dragged under by the dangerous rapids of this age. He has to atone for every attempt to abide *in* the present and *with* the present, for every rapprochement with modern men and modern aims, as if it were an actual sin: and he may well marvel at the latent wisdom of his nature, which immediately answers all such attempts with illness and serious accidents and thereby calls him back to himself again.

986

'*Maledetto colui . . . che contrista un spirto immortal!*'
Manzoni (*Conte di Carmagnola*, Act II)[33]

987
For the introduction

The highest form a human being can take, the form most difficult to achieve, is that of the specimens least likely to succeed: that is why the history of philosophy exhibits such a profusion of failures and disappointments and progresses but slowly; whole millennia intervene to stifle whatever had been accomplished, with continuity being repeatedly interrupted. It is an

appalling history – this history of the highest man, of the *sage*. It is precisely to the memory of great men that the most injury is done, for the partial successes and the failures lead us to misjudge them, blunting the force of their example by referring us to their 'achievements'. Whenever someone proves to have an 'influence', a mob enters upon the scene; it is painful to listen to the chatter of the petty and the poor in spirit, especially for those who shudder to think that *the fate of mankind depends upon the success of its highest type*. Ever since I was a child I have pondered the question: what conditions are necessary for the development of the sage? And I cannot conceal my joy, for it is now my conviction that in Europe he has again become *possible* – if only for a short time.

988

However, we new philosophers do not begin with a description of the hierarchical relations that actually obtain between men and the differences in what they value, in order to strive for some kind of assimilation or equalization between them; rather, we want the exact opposite. We teach estrangement in every sense; we open up chasms the like of which have never been seen before and we want man to become more wicked than ever. For the present we live in concealment, unknown even to each other. For many reasons we find it necessary to be hermits and wear masks – we are therefore not well situated to find our peers. We will live alone and probably suffer the torments of all seven solitudes. But if we should chance to cross each other's path, I would wager that we misjudge or betray one another.

989

'*Les philosophes ne sont pas faits pour s'aimer. Les aigles ne volent point en compagnie. Il faut laisser cela aux perdrix, aux étourneaux . . . Planer au-dessus et avoir des griffes, voilà le lot des grands génies.*' – Galiani.[34]

990

I neglected to mention that such philosophers are serene and that they enjoy sitting under the boundless depths of a cloudless

sky – they need means of enduring life different from those of other men, for they suffer in another way (that is to say, as much from the depth of their contempt for man as from their love). The most wretched animal on earth devised for itself – *laughter*.

991

'Cheerfulness' has been misunderstood. It is a temporary respite from prolonged tension; it is the exuberance, the Saturnalia of a spirit which consecrates and prepares itself for dire and lasting resolutions. *The 'fool' in the guise of 'science'.*

992

The new hierarchy among spirits: men of a tragic nature no longer take precedence.

993

High above the filth and squalor of the lowlands there lives a *superior* and *more enlightened* kind of man, of whom there are very few – for by their very nature, all things pre-eminent are rare. A man does not belong to this kind because he is more gifted, more virtuous, more heroic or more loving than the people down below, but rather because he is *colder, clearer, more far-sighted and more solitary*; because he endures, prefers and claims solitude as his good fortune, his prerogative, even as the condition of his existence; because he lives amid clouds and lightning as among his peers and likewise among sunbeams, dewdrops, snowflakes and all that of necessity comes from on high, and should he set himself in motion, that motion will be forever *downwards*. No, we do not aspire *upwards*, towards the heights. That we leave to heroes, martyrs, geniuses and enthusiasts of all kinds, for such men are not nearly taciturn, patient, discerning, dispassionate or imperturbable enough for us.

994

It is my absolute conviction that impressions as to what is valuable are simply different for those above and those below; that for those below countless experiences are wanting; that

when those above are seen from below, misunderstandings are inevitable.

995

How does a man acquire great strength and a task commensurate with it? He acquires every power and ability, whether physical or intellectual, laboriously, a little at a time. He confines himself to a few things and pursues them with great industry and self-discipline. He repeats, persistently and faithfully, the same endeavours and privations, over and over again. But there are other men who are lords and heirs of the manifold riches in powers and abilities that their ancestors gradually accumulated in this way; and thanks to felicitous and sensible marriages, as well as a few felicitous accidents, the acquired strengths of preceding generations have not been squandered and dissipated, but are connected together by substantial links and bequests. In the end, a man appears whose stupendous strength demands a stupendous task. For it is our strengths that have us at their disposal, not the reverse; and the wretched intellectual game of aims, intentions and motives is only a foreground – even though the near-sighted may take them for the thing itself.

996

Nutrition, possessions, reproduction, sexual pleasure as the performance of anaesthesia, the surmounting of [otherwise painful] pulsations.

The sublime man is of the greatest value, even though he is most delicate and fragile, because he represents an abundance of things quite difficult and rare, which have been cultivated together and conserved over many generations.

The *Romans*: beasts of the primeval forest.

997

I teach that there are superior and inferior men and that under certain circumstances a single individual can justify the existence of whole millennia – i.e. a richer, greater, more complete

and more comprehensive man can justify the existence of countlessly many incomplete fragments of men.

998

Superior men live above all rulers, free from restraint – and in rulers they have their instruments.

999

Principle of hierarchy: he who *determines* the value and directs the will of millennia and does so by directing the naturally superior men, is *the most superior man*.

1000

For the title: 'A prophecy'

As for the most superior man, I believe I have *divined* something of his soul – and though it may be the ruin of us, we who have caught a glimpse of him must help to make him *possible*.

My fundamental idea is that when it comes to our value judgements, we must regard the future as *decisive* – and that where rules of conduct are concerned, we must leave the past *behind* us!

1001

Not 'mankind', but the *superman* is the goal! Misunderstanding in *Comte*!

1002

come l'uom s'eterna . . . (Inf. XV, 85).[35]

Part 2. Dionysus

1003

To him who is well constituted, who does my heart good, who is carved from wood which is hard, fine and fragrant – who delights even my nose – this book is dedicated.

He savours that which is wholesome.

His enjoyment of anything ceases as soon as it goes beyond the bounds of wholesomeness.

He divines the remedies for minor injuries; his illnesses are the great *stimulantia* of his life.

He knows how to take advantage of his own bad luck.

He grows stronger through the misfortunes which threaten to destroy him.

He instinctively gleans from everything he sees, hears and experiences only that which serves his main purpose; he proceeds on a principle of *selectivity*; he allows much to fall by the wayside.

He reacts with a leisureliness born of long caution and deliberate pride – he examines the stimulus to determine where it comes from, where it is going, without submitting to it.

He is always in his *own* company, whether his commerce is with books, with people or with landscapes: he honours things by choosing them, permitting them, *trusting* them . . .

1004

Having obtained a bird's-eye view of things, we begin to grasp that everything happens just as it *ought to happen* and that all manner of 'imperfections', together with all their attendant sufferings, are part of that which is *eminently desirable.*

1005

Around 1876 I was horrified to see all my previous hopes *compromised*, once I realized what Wagner was doing; and I was bound very closely to him by a profound harmony of interests, by gratitude, by his irreplaceability and by the absolute privation I saw looming before me. Around the same time it seemed to me that I was inextricably entangled in my philological research and teaching – *imprisoned* in a life born of accident and expediency – I did not know how to escape and I was weary, exhausted, spent.

Around the same time I realized that I was instinctively opposed to what Schopenhauer was doing; I was seeking a justification of life, even in its most terrible, most ambiguous and most mendacious aspects, for which I possessed the formula 'Dionysian'. Against the idea that the 'intrinsic nature of things' is necessarily good, blessed, true and unitary, Schopenhauer's interpretation of the thing-in-itself as *will* was a step in the right direction; but he did not know how to *deify* this will: he still clung to the moral-Christian ideal. Schopenhauer was still so much under the sway of Christian values that, once he could no longer regard the thing-in-itself as 'God', it had to be bad, stupid, utterly reprehensible. He did not realize that there can be countlessly many ways of being different, even countlessly many ways of being God.

A curse on that narrow-minded dichotomy, good versus evil.

1006

Until now moral values have been the supreme values; does anybody doubt this? . . . If we remove these values from that position, we alter all values; the principle which had previously determined their *relative rank* is thereby overthrown . . .

1007

To revalue values – what would that involve exactly? It requires the existence of all the new, prospective tendencies *which have already arisen of their own accord*, tendencies which evince strength but which continue to be called by the wrong names and subjected to the wrong assessments, tendencies which

have not yet *become aware* of themselves as such. It involves having the courage to become aware of and *affirm* everything which we have already *achieved* – and then to get out of the rut of these old value judgements which have cast aspersions on us precisely for the best and strongest things which we *have* achieved.

1008

A doctrine for which the necessary preparations have not been made, for which the marshalled forces and stockpiled explosives are inadequate, would be completely superfluous. A revaluation of values can only be achieved when there is a tension generated by new needs, a tension in the men who harbour these new needs, who suffer from the old assessment without being aware of it . . .

1009

The points of view for *my* values: whether out of abundance or longing . . . whether looking on, or lending a hand . . . or looking away and stepping aside . . . whether the pent-up energy is also released 'spontaneously' or is only *reactively* stimulated or provoked, whether one is *simple* out of a paucity of elements, or out of such an overwhelming command over a multiplicity of them that one can press them into service as needed . . . whether one is a *problem* or a *solution* . . . whether one is perfect with a small task, or imperfect with an extraordinary aim . . . whether one is *genuine* or only an *actor*, whether one is a genuine actor or only the bad copy of an actor, whether one is a 'representative' or the thing represented – whether one is a 'personage' or merely a rendezvous of various people . . . whether one is *ill* from a disease or from an *excess* of health . . . whether one goes on ahead as a shepherd, or as an 'exception' (or, for a third species, as a fugitive) . . . whether one has need of *dignity* – or of 'the buffoon'? Whether one seeks resistance or evades it? Whether one is imperfect by being 'too early' or 'too late' . . . whether one's nature is affirmative or negative or a peacock's tail of many different colours? Whether one is proud enough to be unashamed even of one's own vanity? Whether

one is still able to feel the bite of conscience? (This *species* is becoming rarer; formerly conscience had too much to gnaw on, but now it seems as if it no longer has enough teeth to do so.) Whether one is still able to have a sense of 'duty'. (There are those who would be deprived of what little lust for life remains if they allowed themselves to be *robbed* of 'duty', especially the little women and the humbly born.)

1010

Suppose that our usual way of regarding the world were a *misunderstanding*: could a new kind of *perfection* be conceived within whose limits even such *misunderstandings* would be *sanctioned*?

My idea is that those things which do *not* accord with our sense of logic, 'beauty', 'goodness' or 'truth' might well be perfect in a higher sense than our ideal itself is.

1011

We have largely confined ourselves to what we know and have refused to make an idol out of what we do not; after many false starts and much wasted effort, we have scarcely begun to know anything.

And yet, we have discovered a 'New World'; we have been compelled to acknowledge *the extent to which we are the authors of our own sense of what is valuable and what is not* – and therefore *able* to assign a meaning to history.

The logical outcome of our belief in truth, as you know, is that if there is anything to worship, it is illusion that must be worshipped; for is it not the lie, and *not* the truth, which is . . . divine?

1012

Whatever advances rationality, likewise lends renewed strength to its antagonists: mysticism and folly of every kind.

We should recognize that *every movement* is:

(1) *partly* weariness with a previous movement (satiety with it, feeble spite towards it, illness), and

(2) *partly* a newly awakened, long-dormant, pent-up energy, joyous, exuberant, violent health.

1013

Healthiness and sickliness: but here we have to be careful! The standard remains physical efflorescence, intellectual agility, courage and cheerfulness – but also, of course, *how much sickness one can put up with and overcome* – how much of it one can *transform* into health. The very things which would ruin a man of more delicate constitution are among the things which stimulate *great* health.

1014

It is only a matter of strength: one must have all the pathological traits of the century, but offset by the superabundant strength necessary to recuperate from them, to sculpt them into something more. *The strong man*: a sketch.

1015

Concerning the strength of the nineteenth century. We are *more medieval* than the eighteenth century; not merely more curious about or more excited by the strange and the rare. We are in revolt against the French Revolution . . .

We have freed ourselves from the *fear of raison*, which was the spectre of the eighteenth century; we again dare to be absurd, lyrical and childish . . . in a word, 'we are musicians'. We are no more *frightened* of the *ridiculous* than we are of the *absurd*. The *Devil* finds that tolerance of God works in his favour; more than that, he has an interest as one who has been misunderstood and slandered from time immemorial – we are defenders of the Devil's honour. We no longer separate the great from the terrible. We account the *good* things, in all their complexity, together with the *worst* things; we have overcome the aspiration of the past (which was to have the growth of goodness without the growth of wickedness). *Cowardice* in the face of the Renaissance ideal has subsided – we dare to aspire to *Renaissance morality* itself. At the same time, intolerance towards the priests and the Church has come to an end; 'belief in God is immoral', but precisely that is what we regard as its best possible justification.

We have given all these things their *due*. We are not afraid of the *obverse* of 'good things', e.g. Greek antiquity, morality,

reason, good taste: we *seek them out*, being brave and curious enough to do so. We have recalculated the losses which all these treasures incur; such a treasure is *almost enough to reduce one to poverty.* Nor do we conceal from ourselves the obverse of 'bad things' either . . .

1016

On modernity; that which does us honour. If anything does us honour, it is our conviction that the things which are to be taken *seriously* lie elsewhere: *humble* things, things which are perpetually despised and neglected, we regard as important; 'fine sentiments', on the other hand, we hold cheap . . . Is there a more dangerous aberration than contempt for the body? Was not the entire realm of the intellect thereby condemned to become morbid, condemned to the *vapeurs* of 'idealism'?

Nothing devised by Christians and idealists makes any sense; we are more radical. We have discovered that the 'smallest world' is usually the decisive one; we are, in a dangerous manner, in the . . .

We know the value of well-paved streets, fresh air in our rooms, clean lodgings, wholesome food; we take all the *necessities* of life seriously and *despise* everything that smacks of the 'beautiful soul' as [a] kind of 'levity and frivolity'. That which has been previously most despised now takes precedence. To that I add immorality: morality is only a form of immorality, which, with regard to the advantage which a certain kind has therefrom . . .

1017

In the place of Rousseau's 'man of Nature', we in the nineteenth century have discovered a much truer image of 'man' – having had the courage to do so . . . On the whole, the Christian notion 'man' has thereby been re-established. What we have not had the courage to do was to approve of this 'man in himself' and to see in him the guarantor of man's future. Similarly, we refuse to see that the further development of man's formidableness is a concomitant of the further development of culture; in this respect we are still subservient to the Christian ideal, and

side with it against paganism as well as against the Renaissance notion of *virtù*. But this is not the key to culture; and *in praxi*, historical fabrications persist which redound to the benefit of the 'good man' (as if he alone represented human progress), as does the Socialist ideal (i.e. the residue of Christianity and of Rousseau in the de-Christianized world).

We have been struggling against the influence of the eighteenth century; it was Goethe and Napoleon who surmounted it more than any others. Even *Schopenhauer* struggled against it, but inadvertently found himself returning to the seventeenth – he is a modern Pascal, with Pascalian value judgements *sans* Christianity . . . Schopenhauer was not strong enough for a new affirmation.

With *Napoleon* we begin to comprehend that the superior and the formidable man form a necessary unity. The 'male' is restored; woman once again receives the contempt and fear she deserves. 'Totality' as health and highest activity; the straight line, the grand style in action rediscovered; the most powerful instinct of life itself, ambition, is affirmed.

1018

(*Revue des deux mondes*, 15 February 1887. *Taine*.)

'Suddenly the *faculté maîtresse*[36] reveals itself; the *artist*, which was enclosed within the politician, is drawn *de sa gaine*;[37] he creates *dans l'idéal et l'impossible*.[38] He is once more recognized for what he is: the posthumous brother of Dante and of Michelangelo; and indeed, in the clear outlines of his vision, the intensity, the coherence and inner logic of his dream, the depth of his meditation, the superhuman grandeur of his conception, he is thus their like *et leur égal: son génie a la même taille et la même structure; il est un de trois esprits souverains de la renaissance italienne.*'[39]

Nota bene . . .

Dante, Michelangelo, Napoleon –

1019

Religion. In the inward economy of the *primitive* man's psyche, the *fear of evil* prevails. What is *evil*? Three things: the

accidental, the indeterminate and the unexpected. How does primitive man combat evil? He conceives of it as something rational, powerful, even personal. Thus he is able to enter into agreements with it and even to influence it in advance – to prevent it. Another expedient is to maintain that its wickedness and harmfulness are merely illusory; he regards the consequences of the accidental, of the indeterminate, of the unexpected as *well intentioned*, as meaningful . . . And above all, he interprets misfortune as 'deserved'; he justifies evil as punishment . . . *In summa, he submits to it*: the whole interpretation of evil in moral and religious terms is nothing but a form of submission to it. The belief that there is some good purpose to evil means relinquishing the struggle against it.

Now, the entire history of civilization represents a decreasing *fear of the accidental*, of the uncertain and of the unexpected. Being civilized means precisely learning to *calculate*, learning to think in terms of causes, learning how to prevent evils, learning to believe in necessity. With the growth of civilization, man is able to dispense with that *primitive* form of submission to suffering known as religion or morality and is able to dispense with that 'justification of suffering'. Now he wages war against suffering – he abolishes it. There is even a possible condition in which man becomes weary with his own sense of security, with his own belief in law and predictability – in which *an inclination towards the accidental, the indeterminate and the unexpected* becomes thrilling . . .

Let us pause for a moment to consider this symptom of the *highest* culture; I call it the *pessimism of strength*. Man *no longer* needs a 'justification of suffering'; 'justification' is precisely what he finds abhorrent; he enjoys suffering *pur, cru*;[40] he regards *senseless suffering* as the most interesting kind. If he had need of a god in the past, he now delights in a disordered world without God, a world of accident, a world in which terror, ambiguity and seduction are essential.

In such a condition, it is precisely *goodness* which stands in need of 'justification', i.e. it must have its foundation in something evil and dangerous, or else involve some great stupidity; *then it still pleases us*. Animality no longer horrifies us; a witty

and cheerful exuberance in favour of the animal in man is, in such times, the most triumphant form of intellectuality. Man is now strong enough to be ashamed of *believing in God* – he now may play *advocatus diaboli* all over again. If *in praxi* he supports the preservation of virtue, he does so for those reasons which reveal that virtue involves subtlety, cunning, that it is a form of covetousness and ambition.

Even this *pessimism of strength* culminates in a *theodicy*, i.e. in an absolute affirmation of the world, but for those reasons which formerly led to its denial: and in this way, to a conception of this world as the actually *achieved ideal*, as the *highest ideal imaginable*.

1020

The main types of pessimism:

The pessimism of *sensitivity* (excessive irritability with a preponderance of the feelings of displeasure).

The pessimism of the '*unfree will*' (in other words, lack of inhibition, an inability to resist stimuli).

The pessimism of *doubt* (a hesitancy in the face of anything solid and substantial, or comprehensible and tangible).

The corresponding psychological conditions may all be observed in the madhouse, albeit with a certain degree of exaggeration. Likewise 'nihilism' (the penetrating sense of 'nothingness').

But how are we to classify:

Pascal's *moral pessimism*?

The *metaphysical pessimism* of the Vedanta philosophy?

The *social pessimism* of the anarchists (or Shelley's)?

The pessimism of *compassion* (that of Tolstoy, A. de Vigny)?

Are all these things not also phenomena indicating disease and decay? . . . Attaching excessive importance to moral values, or to 'otherworldly' fictions, or to social calamities, or to *suffering* in general: any such *exaggeration* of a *particular point of view* is already a sign of disease. Also the preponderance of negation over affirmation!

However, *we must not confound any of this* with the passion for denial and destruction characteristic of all rich and powerful men and ages, a passion which arises from the immense strength and energy with which they *affirm*. This passion is, if you will, a luxury, as well as a form of courage which confronts everything formidable, a sympathy for everything terrible and questionable; because, among other things, one is terrible and questionable oneself: the *Dionysian* in will, intellect, taste.

1021
My Five 'No's

(1) My struggle against the *sense of guilt* and the introduction of the notion of *punishment* into the physical and metaphysical world, likewise into psychology and the interpretation of history. The insight into the manner in which every philosophy and value judgement hitherto has *brought morality into everything*.

(2) My recognition and exposure of the *traditional* ideal, of the Christian ideal, even where the dogmatic form of Christianity lies in ruins. *The danger of the Christian ideal* lies in its sense of what is valuable; it can dispense with its doctrinal expression; my struggle against *latent Christianity* (e.g. in music, in Socialism).

(3) My struggle against the eighteenth century (as embodied in *Rousseau*), against its 'Nature', its 'good man', its belief in the reign of sentiment – against the pampering, weakening and moralizing of man; it is an ideal born of *hatred for aristocratic culture*, which *in praxi* is the reign of unbridled resentment, an ideal devised as a standard to rally around in a struggle against one's betters – the Christian morality of guilt; the morality of resentment (posturing by the mob).

(4) My struggle against *Romanticism*, in which the ideals of Christianity and of Rousseau are combined, but which possesses at the same time a hankering for *olden times* of priestly and aristocratic culture, [for] *virtù*, for the 'strong man' – something utterly hybrid, the notion of a *stronger* mankind which is ultimately false, an imitation; Romanticism, which holds extreme conditions in general

in high esteem and sees in them a symptom of strength (the 'cult of passion') – the desire for strong men, extreme conditions – an imitation of the most expressive forms, a *furore espressivo* born *not* out of abundance but out of *want* (among poets, e.g. Stifter and G. Keller give signs of more strength and inner wellbeing than . . .).[41]

(5) My struggle against the *ascendancy of gregarious instincts*, now that science has made common cause with them; against the renewed hatred with which every kind of hierarchy and superiority is treated.

Engineering, cheerful music, etc. are born out of relative abundance and are pursued with pleasure. Great feats of engineering and invention, the natural sciences, possibly history, all are products of the relative strength and self-confidence of the nineteenth century.

1022

From the pressure of superabundance, from the excitement of energies which are continually growing within us and which we do not yet know how to discharge, a condition arises like that which precedes a thunderstorm; our own nature *darkens*. That, too, is pessimism . . . A doctrine which puts an end to such a condition by *commanding* something, a revaluation of values by virtue of which the accumulated energies are shown a way, a whereto, so that they explode into action and flashes of lightning – such a doctrine by no means needs to *teach* happiness; for by releasing pent-up energy which was compressed to an agonizing degree, *it brings happiness*.

1023

Pleasure arises from power. Happiness consists in the dominant, dawning consciousness of power and triumph. Progress: the strengthening of the type, the capacity for great willing: everything else is misunderstanding, danger . . .

1024

We have entered a period where the old masquerade, in which the emotions were festooned with moral significance, now

excites disgust: we would sooner have *naked nature*, where the *amounts of power* are simply admitted to be *decisive* (in *determining rank*) and where, as a consequence of *grand passion*, the *grand style* returns.

1025

The task of culture is *to press into service* everything formidable, individually, gradually and tentatively; but until it is *strong enough* to do so it must combat, moderate, conceal and even curse these things.

Wherever a culture regards something as *evil*, it is an expression of *fear* and therefore of *weakness* . . .

Thesis: everything good is a former evil which has been rendered serviceable.

Standard: the greater and more formidable the passions which an age, a people or an individual allow themselves, because they are able to use them *as a means, the higher their culture is* (the realm of evil is becoming ever *smaller* . . .).

The more mediocre, weak, servile and cowardly a man is, the more things he will regard as *evil*: according to him the realm of evil is the most extensive. The most inferior man sees the realm of evil (i.e. that which is forbidden to him and hostile to him) everywhere.

1026

It is not a fact that 'happiness follows virtue' – rather, it is the more powerful man who *first* declares his happy state to *be* virtue.

Evil actions are characteristic of the mighty and the virtuous: vicious actions are associated with the subjugated.

The mightiest man would have to be the most evil, in as much as he makes his ideal prevail over all men in *opposition* to their ideals and fashions them according to his own image – the creator.

Evil, in this respect, means hard, painful, oppressive.

Men such as Napoleon must come again and again, thereby confirming afresh our belief in the autonomy of the individual: he himself, however, was corrupted by the means he *had* to stoop to and thus *lost noblesse* of character. If his foes had been different

sorts of men, he could have availed himself of other means and thus it would not seem *necessary* that a Caesar *become bad*.

1027

Man is both *beast* and *super-beast*; the superior man is both subhuman and superhuman: these two belong together. With man's every ascent into the heights of greatness, he also descends into the depths of cruelty; we should not desire the one without the other – or rather, the more thoroughly we desire the one, the more thoroughly we attain the other.

1028

Formidableness is a part of greatness; let us not deceive ourselves.

1029

I have presented such terrifying images of knowledge that any 'Epicurean delight' is thereby rendered impossible. Only Dionysian rapture *suffices – I was the first to discover the tragic*. The Greeks misunderstood it, thanks to their sententiousness and superficiality. Also, resignation is *not* the lesson tragedy teaches – but rather a misunderstanding of it! The longing for nothingness is the *denial* of tragic wisdom, its opposite!

1030

Rich and powerful souls not only manage to deal with painful, even terrible losses, hardships, robberies and insults; they emerge from such hells with an even greater richness and power, and – the most essential thing – with a newly developed sense of the rapture of love. I believe that he who has divined something of the most fundamental conditions for the growth of love will [understand] Dante for having written over the portal of his *inferno*: 'Even I was created by eternal love.'[42]

1031

To have traversed the entire circumference of the modern soul and to have occupied every point thereon – that is my ambition, my torture, my happiness.

To have really *overcome* pessimism – and as a result to have acquired the eyes of a Goethe, filled with love and goodwill.

1032

The first question is by no means whether we are satisfied with ourselves, but whether we are satisfied with anything at all. Suppose that we said yes to a single moment, then we have not only said yes to ourselves, but to the whole of existence. For nothing stands alone, either in ourselves or in things; and if our soul did but once vibrate and resound with a chord of happiness, then all of eternity was necessary to bring forth this one occurrence – and in this single moment when we said yes, all of eternity was embraced, redeemed, justified and affirmed.

1033

The *affirmative* emotions.

Pride.
Joy.
Health.
Love between the sexes.
Enmity and war.
Reverence.
Beautiful gestures, manners and objects.
Strong will.
The discipline of high intellectuality.
The will to power.
Gratitude to the earth and to life.

In short, all that is rich and munificent, that bestows, gilds, immortalizes and deifies life – the whole sway of the *transfiguring* virtues . . . everything that gives countenance, that affirms in word, that affirms in deed.

1034

We few or many who again dare to live in a world *from which all moral meaning has fled*, we pagans in faith, are probably also the first to understand what a pagan faith actually involves: the obligation to imagine not just *beings which are superior* to

man, but beings which are beyond good and evil; the obligation to regard everything which is superior as immoral. We believe in Olympus – and *not* in the 'Crucified'.

1035

More recently, man has exercised his capacity for idealization with respect to *gods* mostly by the increasing *moralization of them* – but what does that mean? Nothing good, a diminution in man's strength –

That said, there is nothing inherently impossible about doing the reverse and there are some indications that this is being done. Such a god could be thought of as being emancipated from morality, as gathering into himself the *whole* plenitude of life's contradictions, *redeeming and justifying* them in a divine agony – God as above and beyond the wretched loiterers' morality of 'good and evil'.

1036

NB. The world with which we are acquainted does not permit us to *demonstrate* the existence of a humanitarian God; nowadays we can force you to admit as much – but what conclusion do you draw from that? He is not demonstrable to us; that is epistemological scepticism. But the conclusion which you all fear is, 'from the world with which we are acquainted quite a different God would be demonstrable, one who is not humanitarian in the least' . . . i.e. you cleave fast to your God and invent for Him a world with which *we are not acquainted.*

1037

Let us banish the highest good from our notion of God: it is unworthy of a god. Let us likewise banish the highest wisdom: philosophers' vanity is responsible for this absurd notion that God is a monster of wisdom, that He should look as much as possible like them . . . No! God as *the supreme power* – that is sufficient! Everything – even the 'world'! – follows from that *symbolice*, that we might have a distinctive mark by which *dominus omnipotens* may be recognized.

1038

From '*On the history of the concept of God*'. And how many new gods are still possible! . . . I myself, in whom the religious, that is, the god-*making* instinct sometimes wishes to come to life again: how differently, how diversely, the divine has revealed itself to me each time! . . . So many strange things have passed before me in those timeless moments, which fell as if from the moon into my life, moments in which I no longer knew how old I already was or how young I might yet become! . . . I would not doubt that there are many kinds of gods . . . There is no lack of gods who possess even a certain undeniable Halcyonism and blitheness . . . Perhaps even light feet belong to the notion of a god. Is it necessary to explain that a god knows how to remain at all times beyond everything rational and respectable? Even, I might add, beyond good and evil? His outlook is *free* – as Goethe would say.[43] And to invoke the inestimable authority of Zarathustra: Zarathustra goes as far as to confess, 'I would only believe in a god who knew how to *dance* . . .' To say it again: how many new gods are still possible! Admittedly, Zarathustra himself is merely an old atheist. Understand him well! For while it is true that Zarathustra says that he *would* – Zarathustra *will* not . . .

*

The divine type modelled on the type of the creative intellect, of the 'great man'.[44]

1039

Art. Preface.

For me, talking about art is incompatible with a sullen deportment: I want to talk about it in the same way that I talk to myself on wild and lonely walks, where I sometimes catch sight of a sacrilegious happiness and ideal on a serene horizon. To spend one's life amid delicate and absurd things; a stranger to reality; half artist, half bird and metaphysician; without regard for reality other than to occasionally acknowledge it as good dancers do, with the tips of their toes; always tickled by any sunbeam of happiness; ebullient and encouraged even by sorrow – for sorrow *preserves* the fortunate; pinning a little tail of buffoonery

to even the holiest of things. This, it goes without saying, is the ideal of a heavy, hundredweight spirit – a *spirit of gravity* . . .

1040

From the military academy of the soul.[45]
Dedicated to the brave, the cheerful, the austere.

I do not wish to underestimate the importance of the amiable virtues, but greatness of soul is not compatible with them. Even in the arts, the grand style excludes what is pleasing.

~

In times of strain and vulnerability, choose war: it toughens, it develops muscles.

~

The deeply wounded have their Olympian laughter; a man only has what he needs to have.

~

It has gone on for ten years now: no sound *reaches* me any more – a land without rain. A man must have humanity to spare in order to not languish in such a *drought*.

~

Every *faith* is instinctively dishonest; it defends itself against every truth which threatens its conviction that it already possesses the 'truth' – it shuts its eyes, it resorts to slander . . .

~

We have a faith because it 'makes us blessed'; we do not consider something true if it does not 'make us blessed'.
A *pudendum*.

1041

How I recognize my equals. Philosophy, as I have thus far understood it and lived it, is the voluntary exploration of even the accursed and odious aspects of existence. From my long experience of wandering through ice and desert, I learned to view previous philosophizing quite differently – the *hidden* history of the philosophers, the psychology of its great names, was revealed to me. 'How much truth can an intellect *stand*; how much truth does an intellect *dare*?' – this for me became the actual measure of value. Error is *cowardice* . . . and every

attainment of knowledge is the *result* of intellectual courage, rigour and scrupulousness . . . Such a discipline knows in advance, on a trial basis, the possibilities of even the most thoroughgoing nihilism, without implying that it would stop at a 'no', at the will to 'no'. On the contrary, it wants the very opposite, a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without deduction, exception or selection; it wants the eternal cycle: the same things, the same logical or illogical connections. The supreme condition a philosopher can attain is a Dionysian attitude towards life; my formula for this is *amor fati* . . .

This discipline includes understanding that the previously negated aspects of existence are not only necessary, but desirable; and not only desirable in terms of the previously affirmed aspects (perhaps as their concomitants or preconditions), but for their own sake, as the more powerful, more fruitful, *truer* aspects of existence in which its will expresses itself most clearly. It likewise includes deprecating the aspects of existence which were previously affirmed to the exclusion of all others. It includes understanding from where this previous assessment originates and how little a Dionysian evaluation of life is bound by it; I identified and understood *what* it was that was actually saying 'yes' here (in the first instance, the instinct of the suffering; in the second, the instinct of the gregarious and in the third, the *instinct of the majority* in their conflict with the exceptions). Thus I surmised that another, stronger kind of man would inevitably approach the elevation and improvement of man from another perspective; he would regard these *superior creatures* as being beyond good and evil, as beyond those values whose origin lies within the sphere of [the] suffering, the gregarious and the majority – I have sought the beginnings of this contrary ideal's formation in history (in the newly discovered and expounded notions 'pagan', 'classical' and 'noble').

1042

The synthesis of oppositions and opposing impulses in a people is a sign of their total strength: *how much* of this can they *subdue*?

But now we see a new conception of holiness (which was ultimately attributable to Plato's naïveté); the opposition of heretical impulses to each other is no longer in the foreground. This demonstrates the extent to which the Greek religion was *superior* to the Judeo-Christian. The latter triumphed because the Greek religion had itself degenerated (*had regressed*).

The aim should be the sanctification of the most powerful, most terrible, most disreputable forces; to use an old figure of speech, the deification of the Devil.

1043

It should come as no surprise that a couple of millennia were needed to re-establish a connection with the past – what are a couple of millennia!

1044

There must be those who consecrate *all* that we do, not only eating and drinking; and not only in remembrance of them, or to become one with them,[46] but that this world might be made *ever anew and in ever new ways* transfigured.

1045

The most intellectual men feel the charm and magic of sensual things in a way in which other men, whose hearts are set on 'things of the flesh', neither can nor should imagine – the former are sensualists in the best sense of the word, because they allow a more fundamental value to the senses than those fine sieves, those apparatuses of rarefaction and reduction, or however else one might characterize what is popularly called the 'intellect'. The strength and power of the senses – this is the most essential thing in a well-constituted and whole man: the splendid beast must be there first – otherwise to what purpose is all 'humanization'!

1046

(1) We want to have faith in the senses, to adhere to what they tell us – and to work out the implications of all we learn

from them! The absurdity of previous philosophers in this regard is mankind at its most absurd.

(2) The world available to us, the world that all earthly living things have constructed to appear substantial and *gradually* changing, is a world we want to *continue* to construct – not to regard as false or argue away!

(3) Our value judgements construct it by emphasis and accentuation. What does it mean when a whole religion says: 'it is entirely bad and false and evil!' This condemnation of the whole process can only be the judgement of the ill-constituted!

(4) Of course, might it not be that they suffer the most and therefore are the most refined? That contented people are of little worth?

(5) The artistic phenomenon known as life must be understood as *the constructive spirit*, which constructs under the most unfavourable circumstances in the most gradual way . . . the *proof* that all the world's combinations must be given anew is that it is still here, that *it has been preserved.*

1047

Sexuality, ambition, the pleasure derived from illusion and deception, great, joyous gratitude towards life and its typical conditions – that is what is essential to pagan cults and has a good conscience on its side. That which is *unnatural* (already apparent in Greek antiquity) combats paganism, as morality, dialectics and asceticism.

1048

An anti-metaphysical view of the world – yes, but an artistic one. A pessimistic, Buddhistic view of the world, a sceptical, rigorous view of the world – but *not* a positivistic one.[47]

1049

The illusion of *Apollo*: the *eternity* of the beautiful form; the aristocratic legislation '*thus shall it ever be!*'

Dionysus: sensuality and cruelty. Transience could be interpreted as the enjoyment of procreative and destructive energies, as continual creation.

1050

The contrary movement: art – The Birth of Tragedy

According to Nietzsche,[48] these two artistic forces of nature are opposed to each other as the Dionysian and the Apollonian; he asserts that . . .

The word 'Dionysian' expresses: an urge towards unity as the abyss of oblivion, a longing to reach beyond personality, the ordinary, society, reality; a passionately painful overflow into darker, fuller, more open states; an ecstatic affirmation of the general character of life, as that which remains the same amid all change, the same in power, the same in beatitude; the great pantheistic sharing of gladness and sorrow which endorses and sanctifies even the most terrible and questionable qualities of existence out of an eternal will to procreation, to fertility, to eternity: as a sense of unity born of the necessity of creation and destruction . . . . The word 'Apollonian' expresses: the impulse towards perfect self-sufficiency, towards the typical 'individual', towards everything which simplifies and emphasizes, everything which makes a thing strong, clear, unambiguous and typical: freedom under law . . .

The further development of art is just as dependent upon their antagonism as the further development of mankind is dependent upon the antagonism between the sexes. The wealth of power and restraint, the highest form of self-affirmation in a cool, noble, austere beauty: the Apollonianism of the Hellenic will.

The origin of tragedy and comedy may be regarded as a *palpable vision* of a divine type in a state of total ecstasy, as a witnessing of the legendary scene, of the visitation, miracle, act of foundation, of 'drama'.

This dichotomy of the Dionysian and of the Apollonian in the Greek soul is one of the great enigmas by which Nietzsche is drawn in considering the essence of the Hellenic. At bottom, Nietzsche endeavours to ascertain precisely why

Greek Apollinianism had to spring from Dionysian soil; the Dionysian Greek had to become Apollonian, that is, he had to break himself of the will to the monstrous, the multifarious, the indeterminate and the horrible and replace it with a will to moderation, simplicity and subordination to rules and concepts. The immoderate, the chaotic, the Asiatic, lie at the basis of the Greek character. The bravery of the Greek consists in his struggle with his Asiaticism; his beauty was not a gift, any more than the logic or the naturalness of his customs were – it was won by conquest, determination and struggle – it is his *victory* . . .

1051

It is only fair that the highest and most illustrious human joys, those in which existence celebrates its own transfiguration, should come only to the incomparable and the best constituted, although only after they and their ancestors have, unbeknownst to themselves, spent their lives in preparation for them. It is then that a superabundance of the most diverse forces and at the same time a swift power of 'free' decision and magisterial decree can amicably coexist in the same man, for then the intellect is just as much at home in the senses as the senses are at home in the intellect; and all that takes place in the one also awakens a refined and exceptionally felicitous play in the other. And conversely! Take a moment to consider this converse process in Hāfez; even Goethe gives us an inkling of this process, albeit in an attenuated form. It is probable that in such perfectly well-constituted men, enjoyments of a wholly sensual nature are ultimately transfigured into allegorical reveries of the highest intellectuality; they experience in themselves a kind of *deification of the body* and are at the greatest remove from that ascetic philosophy which is expressed in the proposition 'God is a spirit': which only goes to show that the ascetic is the 'ill-constituted man', the man who merely takes something intrinsic to him and especially that in him which judges and condemns and calls it *good* – calls it 'God'. By contrast, the Greeks knew of a whole vast spectrum of *happiness*, from that height of joy where man thoroughly feels himself to be a deified

form and self-justification of nature, all the way down to the joy of robust peasants and robust half-human animals. In the face of this, they quivered with the gratitude of the initiate and gave it, with much circumspection and pious reticence, the divine name of Dionysus. What then do modern men, the children of a frail, often ailing and unlikely mother, *know* of the *extent* of the Greeks' happiness? What *could* they know about it! What could possibly entitle the slaves of 'modern ideas' to participate in Dionysian revels!

When the Greek body and soul were 'flourishing', rather than languishing in mania and madness, there arose that mysterious symbol of the highest affirmation of the world and transfiguration of life ever attained on earth. This provides a *standard* according to which everything that has grown up since must be deemed too stunted, too impoverished, too inhibited – we need only utter the word 'Dionysus' before the best modernity has to offer, before such names as Goethe, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare, or Raphael, and suddenly we feel that our best things and moments have been *judged* and found wanting. Dionysus is a *judge*! Do you understand me? There can be no doubt that the Greeks drew upon their Dionysian experiences to interpret the ultimate mysteries 'concerning the fate of the soul' and everything they knew about education and refinement and, above all, about the immutable hierarchy and inequality among men; and yet without access to these experiences everything Greek is buried in a great and profound silence – *we do not know the Greeks* as long as this secret subterranean passage into their world is still obstructed. The prying eyes of scholars will never bring to light some of these things, however much scholarship remains to be done in the service of that excavation – even the noble enthusiasm of such lovers of antiquity as Goethe and Winckelmann has something improper and almost presumptuous about it. But he who waits and prepares himself; who awaits the welling-up of new springs; who prepares himself in solitude for strange visions and voices; who purifies his soul more and more of the fairground dust and noise of this age; who not only dismisses everything Christian, but who *overcomes* it by something heretical and supra-Christian[49] – for

it was the Christian doctrine that was the heresy set in opposition to the Dionysian; who rediscovers the *South* in himself and spreads above himself the canopy of a clear, brilliant and mysterious Southern sky; who recaptures his soul's Southern vigour and latent power; who becomes, step by step, more comprehensive, more supra-national, more European, more supra-European, more Oriental and ultimately more *Greek* – for the Greeks were the first to consolidate and synthesize everything Oriental and, in so doing, *inaugurated* the European soul and discovered *our* '*new* world' – he who lives in obedience to such imperative demands, who knows what *he* might encounter one day? Perhaps even – a *new day*!

1052
The contrary movement: religion
The two types: Dionysus and the Crucified

Note the typically *religious* man – a form of *décadence*? The great innovators are, one and all, morbid and epileptic; but are we not leaving out the religious man who is *pagan*? Is the pagan cult not a form of thanksgiving and affirmation of life? Must not its supreme representative itself be a defence and deification of life? The type of spirit which is fully formed and rapturously overflowing . . . the type of action which incorporates and *redeems* everything in existence which is contradictory and questionable?

It is here that I situate the *Dionysus* of the Greeks: the religious affirmation of life, life in all its fullness, not life divided and disowned; it is typical that the sexual act awakens profound emotion, mystery and awe.

Dionysus versus the 'Crucified'; there you have the contrast. It is *not* that their respective martyrdoms differ – but that each one has a different *meaning*. Life itself, life's eternal fruitfulness and recurrence requires agony, destruction and the will to annihilation . . . In the other case, the suffering of the 'innocent man crucified' constitutes an objection to this life, a formula for its condemnation. As one might have gathered, the problem is the meaning of suffering; whether it is to be given a Christian meaning or a tragic meaning . . . In the first case it is the way to

a blessed existence; in the latter, *existence is sufficiently blessed* already to justify an immense amount of suffering. The tragic man affirms even the bitterest suffering; he is strong enough, rich enough, deifier enough, to do so; the Christian denies even the happiest lot on earth; he is weak enough, poor enough, disinherited enough to suffer life in any form. 'God on the cross' is a curse upon life, an indication that one should be delivered from it; Dionysus cut into pieces is a *promise* to life: that it will be eternally born anew, that it will return from its destruction.

Part 3. The Eternal Recurrence

1053

My philosophy introduces the triumphant idea which will ultimately destroy all other ways of thinking. It is the great *cultivating* idea: the races unable to bear it are doomed; the races which consider it the greatest blessing are destined to rule.

1054

For the fourth book. For this greatest of all battles, a new *weapon* is required. This hammer forces a terrible decision on Europe, confronting it with *consequences*, asking it if it is bent on its own destruction. Mediocrity must be avoided. Far better to perish!

1055

Under certain circumstances, a pessimistic way of thinking and doctrine, an ecstatic nihilism, may be essential, particularly for the philosopher: as the mighty press and hammer with which he smashes and disposes of degenerate and dying races, [in order] to make way for a new order of life, or in order to inspire a longing for the end in what was going to degenerate and die anyway.

1056

I want to teach the idea which gives the many a right to expunge themselves – the great cultivating idea.

1057

Eternal Recurrence. A book of prophecy.

(1) The exposition of the doctrine and its theoretical presuppositions and corollaries.

(2) The proof of the doctrine.
(3) Presumed consequences of its being *believed* (it brings everything to the *breaking point*).
  (a) The means of enduring them.
  (b) The means of remedying them.
(4) Its place in history as a *turning point*.

The time of greatest danger. The establishment of an oligarchy *above* peoples and their interests: education for a universal politics. *Counterpart of Jesuitism.*

1058

The two greatest philosophical points of view (discovered by Germans), that of *becoming*, of *development,* and that which concerns itself with the *value* of *existence* (but the wretched form of German pessimism must first be overcome!), are reconciled by me in a *decisive* manner. Everything becomes and eternally recurs – *escape* is *impossible*! Suppose that we *could* judge the value of existence, what would follow from that? The thought of recurrence is a principle of *selection* in the service of *power* (and barbarity!!). Man is *mature enough* for *this* thought.

1059

(1) The presuppositions of the thought – what must be true for it to be true, and what it entails in turn.
(2) The thought as the most *serious* thought: its probable effect unless it is prevented, i.e. unless we revalue all of our values.
(3) The means of *bearing* it: the revaluation of all values: instead of the desire for certainty, a delight in uncertainty; instead of the idea 'cause and effect', the idea of a perpetually creative activity; instead of the will to life, the will to power, etc. Instead of the humble phrase 'it is all *merely* subjective', let us say, 'it is also *our* work!' Let us be proud of it!

1060

To *bear* the thought of recurrence, we need freedom from morality and new methods of dealing with *pain* (pain regarded

as the instrument, as the father of pleasure – there is no *cumulative* consciousness of suffering). We need to find *enjoyment* in being uncertain and experimental in all sorts of ways, to counterbalance an extreme fatalism. We must rid ourselves of the notion that things are *necessary*, that there are 'wills', that there is any such thing as 'knowledge-in-itself'.

The greatest elevation of man's consciousness of strength is in those who create the superman.

1061

The two most extreme ways of thinking, the mechanistic and the Platonic, are reconciled as ideals in the *eternal recurrence*.[50]

1062

If the world had some purpose, this would have to have been achieved already. Were there some unintended final state in store for it, this too would have to have been achieved already. Were it at all capable of 'being', of remaining stationary or arriving at a steady state, if it had possessed this capacity for 'being' even if only for a moment in the course of its development, then all development would have long since come to an end, along with all thinking and all 'intellect'. The fact that 'intellect' *develops* over time proves that the world has no purpose, no final state and is thus incapable of being. However, the old habit of thinking of things in the light of their purposes, of thinking of the world in terms of divine creation and guidance, is so powerful that the thinker has to be careful not to think that the world's very failure to achieve any purpose is itself intentional. This idea – that the world intentionally *evades* achieving any purpose and even devises expedients to avoid falling into a cycle – inevitably occurs to all those who would like to insist upon the world's *boundless capacity for innovation*, in other words, the finite, determinate energy of invariable magnitude that is 'the world' possesses the wondrous facility for *infinitely* reconfiguring its forms and states. The world is supposed to be capable of divine creative power, an infinite power of transformation, even if God no longer is; it is supposed to *prevent* itself of its own accord from falling back into one of its earlier

forms; it is supposed to have not only the intention, but also the *means* of *guarding* itself from any repetition; and thus at every moment it is supposed to *monitor* each of its movements to avoid achieving any purposes, arriving at any final states, or initiating any repetitions – and whatever else may follow from such inexcusably preposterous reasoning and wishful thinking. This is just the persistence of the earlier religious reasoning and wishful thinking, a kind of longing to believe that somewhere or other, in *some way or other*, the world is the same as the old, beloved, infinite and limitlessly creative God after all – that in some way or other 'the old God still lives' after all – that longing of Spinoza's which expressed itself in the words '*deus sive natura*' (he even experienced it in the form of '*natura sive deus*'). However, what proposition and belief provides the most definitive formulation of the decisive turning point, the present *ascendancy* of the spirit of science over the spirit of religion that creates fictitious gods? Is it not that the energy of the world may not be thought unlimited, because it is *unthinkable* – that we forbid ourselves the concept of an *infinite* energy *because it is incompatible with the concept 'energy'*? From which it follows that the world lacks even the capacity for boundless innovation.

1063

The *eternal recurrence* is an inevitable consequence of the principle of the conservation of energy.

1064

The fact that a state of equilibrium is never reached proves that it is impossible. But in indeterminate space it would have to be reached, likewise in spherical space. The *form* of space must be the cause of perpetual movement and ultimately of all 'imperfection'.

'Force', 'rest' and 'self-identity' are mutually exclusive. There is a fixed amount of force, but its essence is in flux, eliciting, constraining . . .

The notion 'timelessness' is to be rejected. Force cannot remain inert; at any given moment in which it operates, a new

distribution of forces is absolutely conditioned. 'Change' is essential to force, therefore so too is temporality. But this is just to say that change is subject to necessity, which is the same thought in a different guise.

1065

A certain emperor[51] kept constantly before him the transitory nature of all things, so as not to attach too much *importance* to them and to remain tranquil in their midst. Conversely, to my mind it seems that everything is far too valuable to be so fleeting. I seek an eternity for everything – should the most precious salves and wines be poured into the sea? – and my consolation is that all that has been is eternal: the sea will wash it ashore again.

1066
The new world-conception; the eternal recurrence; philosophy

(1) The world exists; it neither becomes nor passes away.[52] Or, rather, it becomes, it passes away, but it becomes without beginning and it passes away without end – it *subsists* in both . . . It lives on itself, it feeds on its excretions . . .

(2) The hypothesis of a *created* world need not detain us for a moment. The notion 'creation' is today utterly indefinable and inapplicable, a mere word, a vestige of a superstitious age, and nothing is explained by words alone. A final attempt to conceive of a world that *began* has been recently made several times with the help of logical rigmarole – and in most of these cases, as one might imagine, the attempts were made with an ulterior theological motive.

(3) Recently, people have tried several times to show that the notion of a world with an infinite *past* involves a contradiction;[53] these attempts even met with success, though at the price of mistaking the head for the tail. Nothing can prevent me from counting the moments gone by, beginning with the present and working backwards and saying: 'I shall never come to the end of them'; just as I can count the moments to come, starting from the present and

proceeding forwards to infinity. Only if I wanted to make the mistake – I shall take care not to do so – of equating this correct notion of a *regressus in infinitum* with the *entirely inapplicable* notion of an infinite *progressus up to* the present, despite the fact that the *direction* is a matter of complete indifference, would I take hold of the head of the present and think I hold the tail; I leave that to you, Herr Dühring! . . .

(4) I have encountered this thought in five thinkers, and on every occasion I found that it was prompted by ulterior motives (mostly of a theological character, in favour of a *creator spiritus*). If the world could in any way ossify, wither away, perish, sink into *nothingness*; or if it could reach a state of equilibrium; or if it had an aim at all which would in itself entail permanence, immutability and a final condition (to put it in metaphysical terms, if becoming *could* pass over into being or nothingness), this state should have been reached. But it has not been reached, from which it follows . . . This is the only thing we can be certain of and which serves as a corrective to a great many world-hypotheses which are intrinsically possible. If, e.g., the mechanical interpretation cannot escape the conclusion that Thomson[54] has traced out for it, that the world will arrive at a final state, then the mechanical interpretation is thereby *refuted*.

(5) If it is *possible* to think of the world as a determinate magnitude of force, as a determinate number of centres of force – and every other idea remains indeterminate and therefore *useless* – then it follows that it must go through a calculable number of combinations, in the great game of chance that is its existence. If an infinite amount of time has elapsed, then at some moment or other every possible combination must have been realized; and what is more, it would have been realized an infinite number of times. And since every other possible combination must have come and gone between each of these 'combinations' and its next 'recurrence', and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same

series, a cycle of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated. The world is a cycle which has already been repeated an infinite number of times and plays its game *in infinitum*.

This conception is not simply mechanistic; for if it were, it would not require an infinite recurrence of identical cases, but a final state. It is *because* the world has not reached this final state that the mechanistic interpretation must be regarded as an imperfect and merely provisional hypothesis.

1067

And do you know what I take 'the world' to be? Shall I hold my mirror up to it? This world is a monster of energy, without beginning or end, a fixed and invariable magnitude of energy, no more, no less, which is never expended, merely transformed, of unalterable size as a whole, whose budget is without either expenses or losses, but likewise without gains or earnings, surrounded and bounded by 'nothingness'; it is nothing indefinite or dispersed, nothing infinitely extended, but rather a determinate amount of energy set in a determinate space and not a space which would be 'empty' anywhere, but on the contrary a space everywhere filled with energy, a play of energy and waves of energy, simultaneously the 'One' and the 'Many', waxing here and waning there, an ocean of tempestuous and torrential energies, forever changing, forever rolling back, with enormous periods of recurrence, with an ebb and flow of its configurations, bringing forth the most complicated from the simplest, the most fiery, fierce and self-contradictory from the most still, rigid and cold and then from this profusion returning again to simplicity, from this play of contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in the identity of its courses and ages, forever blessing itself as that which eternally recurs, a becoming which knows no satiety, disgust or weariness – this, my *Dionysian* world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction, this mysterious world with its two forms of voluptuousness, this my beyond good and evil, which has no aim if it does not lie in the happiness of the circle, which has no will, if a ring has no goodwill towards itself – do you

want a *name* for my world? A *solution* to all its enigmas? A *light* for you who are best concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most Northerly, most midnightly?[55] *This world is the will to power – and nothing besides!* And even you yourselves are this will to power – and nothing besides!

Notes

BOOK I

EUROPEAN NIHILISM

1. §§ 2, 13, 22 and 23 were produced by cannibalizing a larger continuous note which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, II, 14–16.
2. Nietzsche might have been quoting Madame de Staël's *Corinne*, 'Tout comprendre rend très-indulgent [to understand all makes one very indulgent]', but in all other instances where he gives the full sentence, he uses the more familiar formulation, 'Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner [to understand all is to forgive all]', from Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, trans. Rosemary Edmonds (London: Penguin Classics, 1982), p. 117. In *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, he opines that 'Tout comprendre, c'est tout mépriser [to understand all is to despise all]'. *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 682.
3. See note 1, Bk I.
4. *Tartuffery*: Hypocrisy, behaviour reminiscent of the character Tartuffe in Molière's play of the same name. Jean-Baptiste Molière, *The Misanthrope and Other Plays*, trans. John Wood and David Coward (London: Penguin Classics, 2000), pp. 29–88.
5. See note 1, Bk I.
6. See note 1, Bk I.
7. 'Warum sind der Thränen unterm Mond so viel [Why are the tears under the moon so many]?' is a poem by Christian Adolph Overbeck (1755–1821), which was used as the lyric for lieder by Johann Abraham Peter Schulz in 1782 and by Carl Piutti in 1880.
8. 'Better a gay monster than a sentimental bore', in a letter from Abbé Galiani to Jean-Baptiste-Antoine Suard dated 30 June 1770, in *Correspondance inédite de l'abbé Ferdinand Galiani, conseiller du roi de Naples, avec M^me^ d'Épinay . . . et autres*

personnages célèbres du xviiie siècle, 2 vols (Paris: Treuttel and Würtz, 1818), I, p. 129.

9. ἀδιαφορία: *Adiaphoria*, indifference.
10. Claude Bernard, *Leçons sur la chaleur animale sur les effets de la chaleur et sur la fièvre* (Paris: Librairie J.-B. Baillière et Fils, 1876), p. 391.
11. *système fortifiant*: Fortifying system.
12. *a god who remains unmoved by anything*: Compare the conception of the unmoved mover in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.
13. *lycées*: The later stage of secondary education in France.
14. *the scum of the earth*: Compare 1 Corinthians 4:13, 'we are made as the filth of the world, and are the offscouring of all things unto this day.'
15. *chandalas*: The 'untouchables' in the Indian caste system.
16. *The Will to Power* (1906) transcribes this note without regard for Nietzsche's corrections; accordingly our transcription differs slightly. See *KGW*, div. 9, IX, 32; also see *Kritische Studienausgabe* (henceforth *KSA*), 15 vols (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), XIV, p. 431.
17. *triers of the hearts and reins*: 'Oh let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end; but establish the just: for the righteous God trieth the hearts and reins', Psalm 7:9.
18. *entailed property*: A form of land title which can be inherited but not sold.
19. § 68 is a patchwork of texts which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, III, 180, 190.
20. *La largeur de sympathie*: Breadth of sympathy. 'We can admire them in their turn, we even must, if we have "breadth of sympathy", that fine phrase for what after all is little else than indifference; we can hardly admire them together, no more than we can admire at the same time the regularity of "good sense" and the riot of imagination', Ferdinand Brunetière, *Études critiques sur l'histoire de la littérature française*, third series (Paris: Hachette & Cie, 1887), p. 325. Ferdinand Brunetière (1849–1906) was a professor of French language and literature at the École Normale Supérieure from 1885. He was widely known for his free-thinking, which is perhaps why Nietzsche read him closely and extensively, although a few years after Nietzsche's collapse he converted to Catholicism. In this section and similar sections, we follow with slight modifications the translation in *Brunetière's Essays in French Literature : A Selection*, ed. and trans. D. Nichol: A selection Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898).

21. *document humain*: This expression appears in the Preface of Edmond and Jules de Goncourt, *Quelques créatures de ce temps* (Paris: G. Charpentier, 1876).
22. *colportage novel*: A type of popular fiction of the late nineteenth century, inexpensively priced and sold door-to-door. Nietzsche appears to be criticizing the French Naturalist novel (e.g. Émile Zola's notion of the novel as a scientific experiment, as he explains in his *Le Roman expérimental*) by likening it to a form of cheap sensationalism.
23. *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*: To understand all is to forgive all; see note 2, Bk I.
24. *l'art pour l'art*: Art for art's sake.
25. *Dîners chez Magny*: A Parisian restaurant at which many of the leading lights of French arts and letters would meet in the 1860s and 1870s. The conversations there became well known through accounts of them published in the journals of Jules and Edmond de Goncourt, with which Nietzsche was acquainted. The slogan 'l'art pour l'art' (art for art's sake) is usually attributed to Théophile Gautier, a French Romantic writer; 'la description' is an allusion to literary realism as exemplified by, e.g., the French writer Gustave Flaubert, who could be characterized as 'anti-Romantic'. Both writers frequented the dinners. Nietzsche's source of information about the subject is Edmond and Jules de Goncourt, *Journal des Goncourt. Mémoires de la vie littéraire* 1862–1865 (Paris: Charpentier, 1887).
26. *un monstre et un chaos*: Nietzsche is quoting from Bruntière's characterization of Pascal's view, 'so this is the true religion and by not believing in it, you not only put your eternal salvation at risk, but everything that is rewarding about the life of this world; and, in addition, you yourself would be, like nature and history, a monster and a chaos.' Bruntière, *Études*, p. 53, which in turn is reminiscent of *Pensées*, § 434: 'What sort of freak then is man! How novel, how monstrous, how chaotic, how paradoxical, how prodigious!', Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, trans. A.J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin Classics, 1995), p. 34.
27. *au fond*: At bottom.
28. *Voltaire's line*: 'Better a gay monster than a sentimental bore.' Also see note 8, Bk I.
29. *Bourget*: Paul Bourget (1852–1935), French writer. 'The same law governs the development and decadence of that other organization that is language. A style of decadence in where the unity of the book is broken down to make way for the independence

of the page, where the page breaks down to make way for the independence of the sentence and the sentence to make room for the independence of the word. Examples abound in the current literature that supports this fruitful hypothesis.' *Essais de psychologie contemporaine* (Paris: 1883), p.25 (translation ours).

30. *ruere in servitium*: Rush into servitude. 'In Rome, people rushed into servitude: consuls, senators, equestrian-ranked [*At Romae ruere in servitium consules, patres, eques*].' Tacitus, *Annals*, trans. Cynthia Damon (London: Penguin Classics, 2013), p. 6.
31. *l'amas de contradictions*: '[Pascal's] explanation of the "incomprehensible mystery" or the "mass of contradictions" that we are is the dogma of original sin.' Brunetière, *Études*, p. 53.
32. *propre, exact et libre . . . burlesque*: 'Propre, exact et libre' means clean, accurate and free; both this and the reference to burlesque derive from Nietzsche's reading of the following: 'The glory of Buffon . . . rendered him, the author of the *Theory of the Earth and Epochs of Nature*, especially qualified to expound the theory of this clean, accurate and free style, which is the style of the seventeenth century. It remains for us to examine what Mr Krantz called the indirect consequences of the Cartesian influence on classical literature. The first consequence is the elimination of burlesque.' Brunetière, *Études*, p. 23.
33. *vetitum*: 'Vetitum Ecclesiae. A prohibition, in the form of a precept, imposed by ecclesiastical authority on a particular individual, would also be a personal impediment if it had a general character; it affects only the capacity of an individual. This precept is imposed to delay a marriage until a given condition has been fulfilled, for instance, till the removal of the obstacle to a marriage arising from a preceding betrothal to another person.' *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, ed. Charles George Herbermann et al., 15 vols (New York: Encyclopedia Press, 1910), VII, p. 697.
34. Most of § 100 is a reading note which closely follows Brunetière, *Études*, pp. 271, 272–4, 276, 278, 287–9, from which most of the French phrases and quotes are derived; *honnêtes gens, de la bonne compagnie*: 'of good people', 'of good society'; *Pour 'la canaille', un dieu rémunérateur et vengeur*: 'For "the mob", a rewarding and revengeful God.'
35. *campagna Romana*: Roman countryside.
36. *il fallait que Romulus*: 'Romulus must have been drunk when he thought of building a city in such an ugly landscape', Charles de Brosses, *L'Italie il y a cent ans, ou Lettres écrites d'Italie à quelques amis, en 1739 et 1740* (Paris: A. Levavasseur, 1836), p. 340.

37. *Fénelon compares*: 'B. This is very amusing. According to you, a sermon, full of antitheses and similar ornaments, is like a church built in the Gothic style. A. Yes, that is it precisely.' François Fénelon, 'Dialogues sur l'éloquence' (1718), in *Œuvres diverses de Fénelon* (Paris: Chez Lefèvre Libraire, 1824), p. 82.
38. *Chateaubriand*: The letter (actually dated 10 January 1804), which François-René de Chateaubriand himself published on 3 March 1804 in *Mercure de France*, is a meditative essay and is considered a classic of early Romantic literature. See Chateaubriand, 'Lettre à Monsieur de Fontanes sur la campagne romain', in *Œuvres romanesques et voyages*, ed. Maurice Regard, 2 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), II, pp. 1476–96.
39. *Lamartine*: Sorrento is an Italian town just south of Naples; Posillipo is a district in Naples; the reference is to descriptions in Alphonse de Lamartine's memoir *Graziella* (Paris: Librairie nouvelle, 1852).
40. *V. Hugo*: The alleged Victor Hugo quote is in fact from Théophile Gautier: 'Spain is the quintessential Romantic country; no other nation has less borrowed from antiquity, because it has not undergone any classical influence [*L'Espagne est le pays romantique par excellence; aucune autre nation n'a moins emprunté à l'antiquité*]', Théophile Gautier, *Tableaux à la plume* (Paris: G. Charpentier, 1880), p. 102. Nietzsche derives the attribution from Albert Bournet, *Rome: études de littérature et d'art* (Paris: Plon, 1883), p. 141. Much of the information in § 103 appears to come to him from this source.
41. *Even Delacroix*: Nietzsche's remark about Rome is a paraphrase of Bournet, *Rome*, p. 141: 'E. Delacroix, the great Romantic poet of the canvas, the Victor Hugo of contemporary painting, only had a fleeting urge to go to face, at home, in their sanctuary in *aedibus Vaticanis*, Michelangelo and Raphael. "Rome disturbed him in advance, frightened him," said Ch. Blanc. "It seemed that all his qualities would dissolve in the face of the great masters." Venice was his Rome, as it was for Shakespeare, Byron, G. Sand and all the masters of the Romantic school.'
42. § 103 is a patchwork; much of the information in it is taken from Nietzsche's reading of Albert Bournet, *Rome*, pp. 39, 67, 74, 141.
43. *Ingres, a passionate musician*: The reference is to 'If I could make you all musicians, you would gain as painters', quoted from Bournet, *Rome*, p. 246.
44. *Likewise Horace Vernet*: The reference is to 'Two days ago I was for the first time in a small circle with Horace Vernet and

played there. He had previously told me that his most favourite and esteemed music was ""Don Juan", especially the Duet and the Commendatore at the end.' Mendelssohn, letter, Rome, 17 January 1831, *Reisebriefe von Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy aus den Jahren* 1830 *bis* 1832, ed. Paul Mendelssohn Bartholdy (Leipzig: Hermann Mendelssohn, 1861), p. 97.

45. *Stendhal too*: The quote is 'How many leagues would I not walk and to how many days in prison would I not submit myself, to hear *Don Juan* or *Matrimonio Segreto*! And I know not for what else I would make this effort.' Albert-Marie Collignon, *L'art et la vie de Stendhal* (Paris: Germer Baillière, 1868), p. 278; *Il matrimonio segreto* (1792) is an opera by Italian composer Domenico Cimarosa (1749–1801); 'Don Juan' refers here to Mozart's *Don Giovanni* (1787).

46. *Thekla*: A character in Friedrich Schiller's *Wallenstein* trilogy of plays, Wallenstein's daughter and love interest of the doomed Max Piccolomini. See Benjamin Constant de Rebecque, 'Quelques réflexions sur le tragédie de Wallstein et sur le théâtre allemand', in Friedrich Schiller, *Wallstein, tragédie en cinq actes et en vers* (Paris and Geneva: J. J. Paschoud, 1809).

47. *The Flying Dutchman*: Wagner's opera *Der fliegende Holländer* (1843).

48. *le ténébreux*: The dark. A reference to the stock character of the 'beau ténébreux', the dark and handsome young man attractive to women for his melancholic and taciturn demeanour. Nietzsche's source is a comment in the *Journal des Goncourt* by Flaubert about an Alexandre Dumas play *Antony* (1831), whose date Flaubert wrongly gives as 1830, possibly confusing it with Victor Hugo's *Hernani* (1830). Since Flaubert compares the character of Antony to the actor Paul Grassot, he was probably thinking of the actor who played Antony, 'Bocage' (Pierre-Martinien Tousez). 'Sunday 1 April [1860]. We were talking today about the love of fashion, the ladies' man of the hour and the renewal every thirty years, of the physiognomy of the seducer. The *ténébreux* is dated 1830, but who replaced him? The butler, the wag, the impressionist. And that change comes from the influence of theatre on women. In 1830, it was Antony who was at a premium, now it is Grassot. The leading actor of the day seems to set the tone for romantic seduction.' From a conversation with Flaubert in *Journal des Goncourt. Mémoires de la vie littéraire.* (1851–61), 9 vols (Paris: G. Charpentier, 1887), I, p. 319.

49. *Credo quia absurdus est*: 'I believe because it is absurd', commonly attributed to Tertullian (160–225), Christian theologian. The 'quote' is usually given as 'Credo quia absurdum est', which is a paraphrase of 'it is immediately credible – because it is silly [*prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est*]', in Tertullian's *Treatise on the Incarnation*, trans. and ed. Ernest Evans (London: S.P.C.K., 1956), pp. 18, 19.
50. *right way*: The Lord says that Faust is 'impelled in darkness, yet/Is well aware of what the right way is'. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust: The First Part of the Tragedy*, trans. David Constantine (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), p. 15.
51. *the first kind of nihilism*: That is, the nihilism to which Christianity is a response. See § 4.
52. *revenge against life itself*: Immediately after the first paragraph the manuscript continues, 'We have drawn our middle class, that is, the "people" to whom we have handed over the power of political decision-making, from the servant caste, the Sudras; commerce and the landed estates; the military; the learned classes', which Nietzsche has crossed out but which *The Will to Power* (1906) includes, up to 'Sudras'. Also see note 15, Bk I.
53. *pure fool*: An allusion to Wagner's *Parsifal* (1882).
54. *shared suffering*: The German word 'Mitleid', like the English 'compassion', is constructed from two morphemes which separately mean 'shared suffering'.
55. *niaiserie*: Silliness.
56. *marasmus femininus*: Withering femininity.
57. Letter of Abbé Galiani to Madame d'Épinay, Naples, 1 August 1778, *Correspondance*, II, p. 470.

BOOK II

CRITIQUE OF THE HIGHEST VALUES HITHERTO

1. *altération de la personnalité*: Multiple personality disorder. This expression appears to be first used with this meaning by Eugène Azam in *Hypnotisme, double conscience, et altérations de la personnalité* (Paris: Librairie J.-B. Baillière et fils, 1887).
2. *mesquine*: Petty.
3. *in puncto puncti*: With regard to chastity; short for: *in puncto puncti sexti* = with regard to the Sixth Commandment (of the Ten

Commandments). Brigitte Alsleben, *Duden, Redewendungen: Wörterbuch der deutschen Idiomatik* (Mannheim, Leipzig, Vienna, Zürich: Dudenverlag, 2002), p. 384.

4. *the laws of Manu*: The *Manusmṛti*, an ancient Hindu book of laws. See *The Laws of Manu*, trans. Wendy Doniger and Brian K. Smith (London: Penguin Classics, 1991).
5. § 145 is a patchwork of *KGW*, div. 7, II, 206–7; *KGW*, div. 8, III, 172–3; and *KGW*, div. 8, III, 156–7. See Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall, *Die Geschichte der Assassinen, aus morgenländischen Quellen* (Stuttgart and Tübingen: Cotta, 1818), pp. 87, 123 and 337.
6. *demonstration of power*: See 1 Corinthians 2:4: 'And my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power.'
7. § 159 is one of Nietzsche's notes (not a verbatim quote) from his reading of Leo Tolstoy's *Ma religion*, 2nd edn (Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1885) and of Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, *Les Possédés. Traduit du russe par Victor Derély* (Paris: Plon, 1886). A misperception has arisen that these notes are 'really' by Tolstoy. However, in no instance (in the texts reproduced in *The Will to Power*) does Nietzsche copy Tolstoy's French verbatim and then translate it word for word into German (although there are passages by other authors for which this is the case, especially Ferdinand Brunetière); in general, these are 'reading notes' which summarize the gist of a page, or larger points that Tolstoy makes in the book as a whole. Since Nietzsche's own express views in *The Anti-Christ* about Jesus are substantially the same as Tolstoy's, what these notes document is the process of the influence of one thinker on another, not copying.
8. See note 7, Bk II.
9. *for theirs is the kingdom of heaven*: Matthew 19:14, 'But Jesus said, Suffer little children, and forbid them not, to come unto me: for of such is the kingdom of heaven.' Luther's Bible has 'denn solcher ist das Reich Gottes'. Nietzsche's phrasing ('denn ihrer ist das Himmelreich') is more suggestive of Matthew 5:3, about 'the poor in spirit', which Luther's Bible reads as 'denn das Himmelreich ist ihr' but which later German translations often render as 'denn ihrer ist das Himmelreich'.
10. *above the earth: Psalm* 103:11, 'For as the heaven is high above the earth, so great is his mercy towards them that fear him.' Nietzsche's expression 'above the earth [*über der Erde*]' only appears twice in Luther's Bible and only here in reference to 'heaven [*Himmel*]'.

11. *change of heart in individuals*: The quote is from Albrecht Ritschl (1822–89), German liberal theologian. 'The just course of action, which is made clear in the Sermon on the Mount and which finds its unity in the formula of the two highest commandments, the love of God and love of neighbour (Mark 12:29–31), is the positive content and the implementation of the prescribed change of heart in individuals', in *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 3 vols (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1870–74), II, p. 32.
12. *even 'prune' yourself*: Mark 9:43, 'And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched.' In *The Anti-Christ*, § 45, Nietzsche quips about the later verse, 'if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out' (Mark 9:47), that 'It is not exactly the eye that is meant . . .' and, by extension, neither is the right hand. Thus 'to prune [*verschneiden*]' (which does not itself appear in Luther's Bible in these contexts) is Nietzsche's sarcastic euphemism for castration.
13. *let your good works be seen*: Matthew 5:16, 'Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.'
14. *Who shall enter into heaven*: Matthew 7:21, 'Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven [*Es werden nicht alle, die zu mir sagen: HERR, HERR! ins Himmelreich kommen, sondern die den Willen tun meines Vaters im Himmel*].' Most of the admonitions in § 163 are to be found in Matthew 5–6.
15. See note 7, Bk II.
16. *fig tree*: Matthew 21:18–19, 'Now in the morning as he returned into the city, he hungered. And when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came to it, and found nothing thereon, but leaves only, and said unto it, Let no fruit grow on thee henceforward for ever. And presently the fig tree withered away.' (The editors of *The Will to Power* (1906) interpolated this passage into the text.)
17. *A prophet is not without honour*: Mark 6:4.
18. See note 7, Bk II.
19. *False prophets*: Matthew 7:15, 'Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.'
20. *Prophesying*: Matthew 7:22–3, 'Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy

name have cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity.'

21. *ecclesia militans*: The Church militant.
22. See note 7, Bk II.
23. See note 7, Bk II. The passage § 166 is a reading note for Tolstoy's *Ma religion*. See *My Religion*, trans. Huntington Smith (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1885), pp. 166–7.
24. See note 7, Bk II. 'I became convinced that the doctrine of the Church, although bearing the name of "Christian", is one with the darkness against which Jesus struggled and against which he commanded his disciples to strive.' Tolstoy, *My Religion*, p. 218.
25. See note 7, Bk II.
26. See note 7, Bk II.
27. § 170 is one of Nietzsche's notes (not a verbatim quote) from his reading of Julius Wellhausen, *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten. Drittes Heft. Reste arabischen Heidenthumes* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1887).
28. *by their fruits*: Matthew 7:15–20, 'Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.'
29. *The song in praise of love*: 1 Corinthians 13.
30. *foeda superstitio*: Vulgar superstition.
31. *One must feel about the 'cross' as Goethe did*: 'Just one or two are the things I abominate, or, more precisely, / Four: tobacco (the smoke), bedbugs and garlic and †.' Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 'Venetian Epigram 66', in *Selected Poems* (*Goethe: The Collected Works I*), ed. Christopher Middleton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 127.
32. *alteration of personality*: See note 1, Bk II.
33. *a mere 'leitmotif'*: Nietzsche is comparing St Paul to Richard Wagner and the Passion to an opera based on myth.
34. *the impulse which created it*: This remark requires some exegesis. Nietzsche's claim is that the original Christian sentiment is the resentment of the oppressed. This in turn inspires the invention of a standard according to which the hostility towards the

oppressed that the oppressor manifests is a moral failing and, by this standard, the oppressed are the oppressor's moral superiors. However, having redefined hostility as a moral failing, Christianity paints itself into a corner, because Christianity is inspired by chronic hostility towards the oppressor in the first place and thus must constantly struggle to live up to its own standards if it can in good conscience apply them to those whom it wishes to judge and find wanting. This in turn makes Christianity difficult to decipher because it displays both disapproval of hostility as such (disapproval of 'resisting evil', 'judging' and the like) and a fair amount of hostility (towards 'the world', 'Mammon', etc.) itself.

35. See note 7, Bk II.
36. *dolce far niente*: Delicious idleness.
37. *emancipated Judaism*: This expression 'emancipirtes Judenthum' (including spelling and grammatical variants) appears occasionally in nineteenth-century German texts. Only once, the earliest instance in 1844, does it refer as here to early Christianity. All other references concern the removal of modern legal restrictions on Jews and their assimilation into Christian society, i.e. 'the Jewish question'.
38. *a number of works*: The word Nietzsche uses here is 'Werken', which calls to mind Luther's contrast between justification through works and justification through faith and the disposition to good works that grace confers on the believer – below, Nietzsche places these words in scare-quotes to reinforce the allusion.
39. *deed*: 'Deed [*Tat*]' can have the connotation of 'criminal offence', lending a certain irony to the sentence, in that Judaism's wrongdoing is, so to speak, the invention of a certain conception of wrongdoing. The word we render as both 'guilt' and 'debt' is 'Schuld', the suggestion being that thanks to Judaism we interpret misfortune as deserved, as something we owe and that instead of having moral obligations to others, we only have religious obligations to God. All of this is explored in far more detail in the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, ed. Robert C. Holub, trans. Michael A. Scarpitti (London: Penguin Classics, 2013).
40. *the first German statesman*: Otto von Bismarck (1815–98), German statesman, founder of the modern state of Germany, Chancellor of Germany (1871–90), discussing German unity and nationhood, which became an issue for the German revolutionaries of 1848.

41. See note 7, Bk II.
42. *his faith a cheat*: The word we render as 'cheat' is 'Eselsbrücke' (asses' bridge), which refers to German translations of Greek and Latin texts used illicitly by students in classics coursework, instead of texts in the original languages. Nietzsche's point is that like a student who cannot pass exams that require a reading knowledge of Greek or Latin, Luther cannot perform Christian acts; the doctrine that salvation is through faith alone is thus Luther's free pass to heaven without the requisite ability or effort.
43. See note 7, Bk II. 'He who knows the truth indispensable to his happiness must believe in it, just as a man who knows that he is drowning grasps the rope of safety. Thus the question: what must I do to believe? is an indication that he who asks it does not understand the doctrine of Jesus.' Tolstoy, *My Religion*, p. 172.
44. See note 7, Bk II. 'As opposed to the personal life, Jesus taught us, not of a life beyond the grave, but of that common life which comprises within itself the life of humanity, past, present and to come.' Tolstoy, *My Religion*, p. 151 (translation modified).
45. *the Mystery*: The Mithraic Mysteries was an ancient Roman mystery religion whose iconography focused on bull sacrifice.
46. See note 7, Bk II.
47. § 196 is also one of Nietzsche's notes (not a verbatim quote) from his reading of Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidenthumes*.
48. *Except ye become as little children*: Matthew 18:3, 'And [Jesus] said, Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.'
49. *pia fraus*: Pious fraud.
50. *fond*: Reserve.
51. *From now on you will see*: Matthew 26:63–4, 'But Jesus held his peace. And the high priest answered and said unto him, I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God. Jesus saith unto him, Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.'
52. See note 7, Bk II.
53. *Reynard the Fox*: An animal trickster figure of medieval folk tales, often perceived as a sort of peasant hero. His most frequent opponent is a wolf named Isengrim (representing the nobility), whom he usually overcomes by wit instead of brawn.
54. *l'appétit vient en mangeant*: 'The appetite which comes with eating', a French idiom which means 'the more you have, the more

you want'. Nietzsche's text, 'en mangeant Appetit bekommen', mixes French and German, obscuring the idiom; we have taken the liberty of stating the full idiom in French.

55. § 211 is the result of an attempt to meld together two different drafts of the same note; we follow the later draft. See Concordance below for details.
56. See note 7, Bk II.
57. This section is a note from Nietzsche's reading of Dostoevsky, *Les Possédés*.
58. See note 7, Bk II.
59. See note 7, Bk II.
60. *as Voltaire said on his deathbed*: There are various reports of Voltaire's last words. Nietzsche seems to be referring to this one: 'He was taken away in a few hours. Many priests had sought credit for his confession; but he refused them all. The parish priest of Saint-Sulpice spoke to him of God. "I've always worshipped sincerely. But do you believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ? In the name of God, do not speak to me of this man here, and let me die in peace." He died 30 May 1778, between ten and eleven o'clock in the evening, aged eighty-four years and a few months.' *Œuvres Complètes de Voltaire*, ed. Charles Lahure et al., 35 vols (Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette et Cie, 1859–62), I, p. xxxiii.
61. § 224 is a patchwork of texts which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, II, 340–42. See note 7, Bk II. The passages are from Tolstoy, *My Religion*, pp. 116–19.
62. See note 57, Bk II.
63. *compendium of nature*: 'A man is a compendium of nature, an indomitable savage; . . . as long as he has a temperament of his own, and a hair growing on his skin, a pulse beating in his veins, he has a physique which disdains all intrusion, all despotism; it lives, wakes, alters, by omnipotent modes, and is directly related there, amid essences and *billets doux*, to Himmaleh mountain chains, wild cedar swamps, and the interior fires, the molten core of the globe.' *Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, with Annotations*, 1838–1841, ed. Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911), p. 495.
64. *idée fixe*: Obsession. The practice of hypnotizing hens by drawing a chalk line in front of them is a real phenomenon and has been commented upon for centuries. Perhaps the earliest reference to it is in 1646 in Athanasius Kircher, *Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae*, 2nd edn (Amsterdam: 1671), pp. 112–13.

65. *folie circulaire*: Bipolar disorder or manic-depressive illness.
66. *Mitchell's cure*: Silas Weir Mitchell (1829–1914), American physician. The Mitchell cure was essentially bed rest. See his *Rest in the Treatment of Nervous Disease* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1875).
67. *demonstration from power*: See note 6, Bk II.
68. *the one truly shocking thing*: Hell.
69. *sub specie boni*: That things are directed 'under the guise of the good'. This is a reference to the Scholastic maxim 'quidquid appetitur, appetitur sub specie boni', 'whatever is desired is desired under the guise of the good'. The central context in which this principle arises is the philosophy of action, where it expresses the thesis that every agent always strives for what he thinks is best (and thus bad actions stem from misunderstanding); as applied to God, who is capable of neither misunderstanding nor failure to achieve His intentions, it entails that everything that happens at all is for the best.
70. *modus*: Mode. Although Nietzsche refers more generally to determinism here, the allusion is to Spinoza's version of it, which holds that there is only one being in existence (God or nature) and that individuals inhere in it as properties.
71. *as Pascal would have it*: A reference to his 'Prayer, to Ask of God the Proper Use of Sickness' (1659), in Pascal's *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Léon Brunschvicg, Pierre Boutroux and Félix Gazier, 14 vols (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1904–14), IX, pp. 319–40. Both Pascal and Nietzsche suffered from debilitating migraines.
72. *the first Christian*: St Paul.
73. *conciliation*: An allusion to 'Conciliation', Ch. 14 of Herbert Spencer's *The Data of Ethics* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1879).
74. *tables of goods*: 'Gütertafeln', a coinage of Nietzsche's which also barely occurs outside discussions of Nietzsche subsequently. Since the compound word is invariably associated with evaluation in Nietzsche and each of its components is plural, the metaphor seems to be a commercial one: printed tables containing the prices of commodities. Such things enable one to determine at a glance what something is worth.
75. §§ 256, 534 and 1061 were derived from a sheet of paper found with correspondence from 7 May 1885 to Franz Overbeck and Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche; therefore they can be dated to the spring of 1885 and belong to the conclusion of the notes from

April–June 1885 in Nietzsche's notebook N VII 1. See *KGW*, div. 7, IV/2, 71.

76. *πόλις*: *Polis*, city-state.

77. *morality of custom*: In Nietzsche's *Dawn* § 9, he contrasts 'the morality of custom [*Sittlichkeit der Sitte*]' with a post-Socratic 'morality of self-control and abstinence [recommended] to the individual as most in his own interest'. We have completed the sentence with the phrases 'previously discussed' and 'the morality of self-interest'.

78. *ἐποχή*: *Epochē*, suspension of belief.

79. *honnête*: Gentlemanly (not 'honest'), usually in the phrase 'honnête homme', 'gentleman', which refers to an ideal of refined sociability first advanced in French literature and salon discussions in the seventeenth century.

80. *first servant*: As Frederick the Great referred to himself.

81. We follow a later draft of this section than the one followed by *The Will to Power* (1906). See Concordance below for details.

82. *causa prima*: First cause. The notion of a first cause, and infinite regress ('cosmological') arguments to show that there must be such a thing or principle, appear in Aristotle (in *Physics*, Bk VIII); Scholastics in turn identified this with the personal God of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. However, Kant criticizes the idea of a first cause and infinite regress arguments to establish its existence in connection with the idea of free will, as here, in the Third Antinomy of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

83. *Simplicius*: See Simplicius, *On Epictetus' Handbook* '1–26, trans. Charles Brittain and Tad Brennan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002) and Simplicius, *On Epictetus' Handbook* '27–53, trans. Tad Brennan and Charles Brittain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). Though Simplicius was a pagan and not a Christian Neoplatonist, Nietzsche says in a postcard to Franz Overbeck dated 9 January 1887 that he 'has the whole philosophical scheme on which Christianity is delineated before him' and that he 'makes the most Christian impression possible'. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe*, 8 vols (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), VIII, p. 9.

84. *in the words of the hymn*: Nietzsche is mocking a hymn, 'Who only lets dear God rule [*Wer nur den lieben Gott läßt walten*]' (1657) by Georg Neumark (1621–81), the first line of the final verse of which reads 'Sing, pray and walk in God's ways [*Sing, bet' und geh auf Gottes Wegen*]'. J. S. Bach based a cantata on it.

85. This section was taken from Nietzsche's notebook W I 8, dated autumn 1885–autumn 1886, and can also be found at *KGW*, div. 9, V, 53.
86. *Egoism means*: The line 'Egoism means becoming yourself; altruism, becoming someone else [*Der Egoismus als die Ver-Ichlichung, der Altruismus als Ver-Änderung*]' depends on a coinage and an untranslatable (bad) pun, which literally would read something like 'Egoism as ego-ation, altruism as alter-ation', since *Veränderung* means 'change' or 'alteration', literally 'becoming-other', so the contrast to 'becoming-other' would be 'becoming-self'.
87. *Nil admirari*: 'Admire nothing'. This Stoical expression occurs in Cicero, Horace and Seneca, in the sense of 'let nothing take you by surprise'.
88. In the manuscript, this section is preceded by the heading

> On the supremacy of virtue.
> How one helps virtue to prevalence.
> A tractatus politicus.
> By Friedrich Nietzsche.
> Preface.

The Will to Power (1906) reads 'How one helps virtue to prevalence' as 'How one brings virtue to prevalence' (which we render as 'How to make virtue prevail') but uses it as a chapter title instead; and inserts 'On the ideal of the moralists' before the note, which we omit.

89. *pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans toute son âpreté*: Nietzsche is quoting Abbé Galiani in a letter to Mme d'Épinay dated 5 September 1772: 'In politics I only admit pure Machiavellianism, without admixture, crude, outright, in all its strength, in all its harshness', in *Correspondance*, II, p. 114.
90. *esse . . . operari*: The Scholastic maxim is 'acting follows being [*operari sequitur esse*]'; Nietzsche claims that, by contrast, the moralist acts contrary to his own being or nature.
91. *sub specie boni*: See note 69, Bk II. Here Nietzsche is saying that the moralist's conception of the good, being one in which as many people as possible behave in accordance with the moralist's conception of good conduct, may be one with which the moralist has not to comply precisely in order to realize it more generally. Thus even though the moralist behaves immorally by his own lights, this 'immoral' action is well intentioned.

92. The original text of this section was crossed out by Nietzsche and can be found in his notebook W II 3, dated November 1887–March 1888 (see *KGW*, div. 9, VII, 176).
93. *nervus sympathicus*: Sympathetic nerve. 'Melancholia' (depression) was often thought in the nineteenth century to be caused by disorders of the sympathetic nervous system.
94. *vetitum*: Prohibited thing.
95. *a parte*: Separately.
96. *deus myops*: Short-sighted god.
97. *The Will to Power* (1906) transcribes the note from the manuscript from which § 321 was taken very differently than we do.
98. *cum grano salis*: With a grain of salt.
99. *Kant himself thought*: A reference to the *Critique of Practical Reason*; the premise of imperfect compliance with the moral law plays a crucial role in Kant's postulate of immortality, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, in *Practical Philosophy* (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 128–30.
100. *two things*: Nietzsche is paraphrasing 'Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: *the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me*.' Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 269.
101. *sensorium*: The seat or totality of our perceptual faculties.
102. *susceptibility to any kind of suggestion by a foreign will*: As in hypnosis.
103. See note 7, Bk II.
104. *self-absorption*: Our rendering of 'Verselbstung', 'self-absorption' is the nominalization of 'verselbsten', an unusual expression found almost exclusively in Goethe, who writes of 'fulfilling the plans of the deity when, while compelled on the one hand to concentrate into ourselves [*uns zu verselbsten*], we do not neglect, on the other hand, to expand, in regular pulsations, away from ourselves'. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *From My Life: Poetry and Truth: Parts One to Three* (*Goethe: The Collected Works*, IV), ed. Thomas P. Saine and Jeffrey L. Sammons, trans. Robert R. Heitner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 263.
105. *buffo*: Buffoon; a comedic male role in opera.
106. *thinning*: As in thinning of the blood.

107. *superfetation*: The re-impregnation of one already pregnant, thus leading to two non-twin foetuses. As Nietzsche develops the metaphor he seems to be likening the foetuses to 'selves', an earlier, less irenic self and a later, more irenic self, which compete for uterine resources. However, he also seems to think that the second foetus would have the advantage; this seems not to be so. Although there is the phenomenon of asymmetrical intra-uterine growth restriction with twins, which can lead to the death of one of two foetuses sharing the same uterus, there's no reason to think that the later foetus would be the beneficiary. In such cases, when the two foetuses are brought to term, the second one would be born prematurely and thus weaker.
108. *Nature is good*: See Brunetière, *Études*, pp. 276–8.
109. *German citizen*: The expression is 'Reichsdeutscher', which, penned in 1887, means an ethnic German who also resides within the boundaries of the Second Reich, the German state founded in 1871. To translate it as 'German Imperialist', as Ludovici does (Kaufmann leaves it untranslated), would seem to imply support for some sort of German imperialism, which would be a mistake. In part, the connotation is 'a good citizen (e.g. here in Germany)' and is compatible with liberalism or conservatism. However, it is also relevant to Nietzsche's discussion of ideals and privilege, because many ethnic Germans did not have the privilege of German citizenship and the German nationalist, rather than enjoying that sense of superiority, as Nietzsche advises, 'idealistically' wanted it extended to all ethnic Germans.
110. *hemiplegia*: Paralysis of one side of the body.
111. *descries evil*: He 'descries evil even in his every thought and inclination' is an allusion to Genesis 6:5, 'And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.'
112. Compare, 'It would have been worth the trouble, expressly to emphasize that in the notion of divine power and dominion – particularly Allah's – among the Arabs as well as among the ancient Hebrews the ability to benefit and the ability to harm are always united and no dualism is experienced. The nullity of a god as well as that of a man is always expressed by the fact that he is in no condition to either benefit or harm.' Wellhausen, p. 218.
113. *The good people*: Sir Samuel White Baker, *The Albert N'Yanza, Great Basin of the Nile*, 2 vols (London: MacMillan, 1866), I, pp. 249–50, which Nietzsche has copied from an 1867 German translation. Though Nietzsche will later make a great deal of the distinction

between 'böse' (evil) and 'schlecht' (bad) in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, we follow Baker's English. Between this remark and the next, about 'calamity', the manuscript has the unrelated remark 'Gin is Arabic and means spiritus (= ğinn)', which *The Will to Power* (1906) omits, an omission we mark by the centred asterisk.

114. *Calamity does not strike feeble hearts*: From 'The Landlady' in Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Poor Folk and Other Stories*, trans. David McDuff (London: Penguin Classics, 1988), p. 196. Nietzsche read this sentence in a peculiar French translation of *Notes from Underground* which incorporated elements from 'The Landlady' into its text. See Fyodor Dostoevsky, *L'Esprit souterrain*, trans. E. Halpérine and Ch. Morice (Paris: Plon, 1886), p. 120.

115. Nietzsche has crossed out this text, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 9, VI, 121.

116. § 358 is a patchwork of several different texts. For the first portion, *The Will to Power* (1906) substitutes an earlier, rejected (crossed-out) draft, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 9, VI, 121, which reads: 'The ideal slave (the "good man"). He who cannot regard himself as an end in himself, who is entirely unable to determine ends on his own initiative, honours a morality of self-denial, as if by instinct. Everything persuades him to it: his prudence, his experience, his vanity. And faith too is a form of self-denial.' The sentence on 'atavism' can be found at *KGW*, div. 7, I, 344. The sentence on diligence, which Nietzsche has also crossed out but for which we can find no later draft, can also be found at *KGW*, div. 9, VI, 121. For the final portion, *The Will to Power* (1906) substitutes an earlier, rejected (crossed-out) draft, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 9, VI, 121 and reads: 'It is not a matter of going on ahead (with that, one is at best a shepherd, i.e. a paramount necessity for the herd), it is rather a matter of being able to go one's own way, of being able to be different.'

117. At this point, five lines have been deleted, which read: 'the highest honour and power among men: even for the most powerful / the only genuine form of happiness / an exclusive right to God, immortality, under certain circumstances to *unio* / the power over nature – the "miracle-worker" (Parsifal) / power over God, over salvation and damnation of the soul, etc.'

118. § 360 is a patchwork of three separate texts which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, I, 152, 306 and *KGW*, div. 8, II, 11.

119. *increase the ills in the world*: 'But there cannot possibly be a duty to increase the ills in the world and so to do good *from compassion*.' Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, p. 575.

120. § 368 is one of Nietzsche's reading notes of the following passage by Kuno Fischer on Kant: 'The suffering of another infects us. Compassion is nothing more than one such infection, a pathological, not a practical feeling. What good is it if I feel compassion? What good is it if, instead of the one who is afflicted by the evil, now two suffer? The one suffers in truth, the other in the imagination. Why the imaginary suffering? In Kant's eyes, compassion seems a waste of feeling in regard to moral health, as a parasite, which one must not nourish. "It cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in the world." Compassion is such a needless multiplication. Help where and as much as you can; where you cannot, do not coddle yourself with imaginary feelings and render yourself unable to act: this is Kant's conflicting morality concerning compassion. Compassion is pathological; it is not based on maxims, but upon affections.' Kuno Fischer, *Immanuel Kant, Entwicklungsgeschichte und System der kritischen Philosophie*, II (Mannheim: Verlagsbuchhandlung von Friedrich Bassermann, 2 vols, 1860), II, pp. 271–2.
121. *Thou shalt not lie*: Nietzsche quotes, not the biblical commandment of Exodus 20:16 or Deuteronomy 5:20: 'Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour', but rather its paraphrase 'Du sollst nicht lügen', which is a response to the question: what is the brief content of the ten commandments of God?' in the German Catholic catechism.
122. *inter pares*: Among equals.
123. *Schopenhauer II pp. 440 ff.*: The Schopenhauer reference is to 'On Genius', in *The World as Will and Representation*, 2nd edn, trans. E. F. J. Payne, 2 vols (New York: Dover, 1966), II, pp. 384–5.
124. *occasional cause*: Occasionalism is the view, associated with the French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), that only God is a genuine cause and that ordinary objects never exert a causal influence on each other independently; Nietzsche is likening Schopenhauer's thing-in-itself to Malebranche's God, as Schopenhauer himself does: 'In any case, Malebranche is right; every natural cause is only an occasional cause. It gives only the opportunity, the occasion, for the phenomenon of that one and indivisible will which is the in-itself of all things, and whose graduated objectification is this whole visible world.' *The World as Will and Representation*, I, p. 138.
125. § 386 is a patchwork of texts which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, II, 217–18 and 247–8.

126. [*Pascal's*] *relationship with his sister*: Jean-Marie Guyau, *L'Irréligion de l'avenir: étude sociologique*, 2nd edn (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière, 1887), p. 162. The specific reference to Pascal begins at 'We remember the confidences of Madame Périer on Pascal', but the entire page's discussion of 'religious morality based on God's love' is relevant.
127. *Hyperboreans*: An imaginary people of Greek mythology who lived in the far North. Nietzsche uses this expression in *The Anti-Christ*, §§ 1 and 7. See *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), pp. 127, 131.
128. *Illness makes people better*: Nietzsche appears to be paraphrasing Pliny the Younger, who said, 'we are never so virtuous as when we are ill'. *The Letters of Pliny the Younger*, ed. and trans. Betty Radice (London: Penguin Classics, 1963), p. 202.
129. *long-hidden, long-mysterious suffering*: Nietzsche's wordplay with 'heimlich-unheimlich', which we render as 'hidden' and 'mysterious' respectively, defies translation.
130. *peace on earth . . . rejoicing in one another*: Nietzsche's phrases 'Frieden auf Erden' and 'Wohlgefallen an einander' are modelled on Luke 2:14, 'on earth peace, good will toward men', which in Luther's Bible reads 'Frieden auf Erden und den Menschen ein Wohlgefallen', but the sense of the second phrase is closer to our rendition.
131. *by their fruits*: Matthew 7:16.
132. § 397 is a patchwork of two non-adjacent notes from the same notebook which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, III, 238–9 and 247; Nietzsche crossed out the first portion.
133. *The Will to Power* (1906) substantially rearranges this material; we have followed the manuscript.
134. *the greatest and most impartial of its supporters*: Plato.
135. *The Will to Power* (1906) uses an earlier, rejected passage from the same page (see notebook W 18, autumn 1885–autumn 1886, *KGW*, div. 9, V, 31–2), in place of the final sentence, which reads: 'A hidden Yes drives us thereto, stronger than all our "No"s. Our strength itself no longer tolerates being on the old rotten soil: we venture into the distance, we venture ourselves thereto; the world is still rich and undiscovered, and it is even better to perish than to become half-hearted and venomous. Our strength itself forces us to sail, to where all suns have hitherto set: we know of a new world.'
136. *epochistic*: See note 78, Bk II.

137. § 417 is a patchwork of two different notes, a portion of one of which has been removed and used instead as § 673.
138. *what Napoleon said about Goethe*: 'After looking at me attentively, he said, "You are a man." I bow. [*Nachdem er mich aufmerksam angeblickt, sagte er: "Vous êtes un homme." Ich verbeuge mich.*]' Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 'Unterredung mit Napoleon', 2 October 1808, in *Goethe Werke*, ed. Emil Staiger, 6 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 1965), VI, p. 181.
139. *déniaiser la vertu*: To take away the innocence of virtue.
140. *the words he puts into the mouths of the Athenian ambassadors*: 'So far as the favour of the gods is concerned, we think we have as much right to that as you have . . . Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence and we shall leave it to exist for ever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way.' Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, rev. edn, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin Classics, 1972), pp. 404–5.
141. *Grote*: See George Grote, *History of Greece*, 2nd edn, 12 vols (London: John Murray, 1846–56), VIII, pp. 477–550.
142. See note 53, Bk I.
143. § 431 is a patchwork of two different notes written years apart. The initial, longer passage can be found in his notebook W II 5, spring 1888, at *KGW*, div. 9, VIII, 109.
144. *muzhiks*: Russian peasants.
145. ἀδιάφορα: *Adiaphora*, indifference.
146. *it must lead us to what is 'prior'*: See Plato's *Meno* and its account of a priori knowledge as recollection.
147. ἀπάθεια: *Apatheia*, without passion.
148. πραΰτης: *Prautēs*, meekness.
149. *The science of the limits of reason*: 'To that extent, metaphysics is a science of the limits of human reason.' Immanuel Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics*, in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770* (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), trans. and ed. David Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 354.

150. *the art of discovering truth*: The closest passage in Aristotle is probably the following: 'And it is also right that the study of the truth is called philosophy [*ὀρθῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλεῖσθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἀληθείας*].' Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Classics, 1998), p. 44 (Aristot. Met. 2.993b19–20). Nietzsche's source for this note may have been Eugène Roberty: 'The Epicureans availed themselves of the sensualist elements of Aristotle's theory of knowledge and it is through this theory that they opposed his views on philosophy as a way of discovering the truth, which also belonged to the opinion of the Platonic idealists and all materialists, including Democritus, the real founder of the school. The scepticism of the Epicureans in this respect was deep and irreversible; they considered the philosophical search for truth with a disdain that looked quite similar to the contempt of the sceptics for all abstractions. For them, such research was not only misleading but also unnecessary in view of the ultimate goal of philosophy – the greatest possible amount of happiness; hence their approach to philosophy as the art or theory of life, hence their tendency to materialism had so little effect on their ethics.' Eugène Roberty, *L'Ancienne et la nouvelle philosophie: essai sur les lois générales du développement de la philosophie* (Paris: Germer Baillière, 1887), pp. 86–7.

151. *consider the nose*: This passage, which resembles *Twilight of the Idols* § III: 3, has been deleted from prior editions of *The Will to Power*. In the earlier, 1901 edition of *The Will to Power* the final sentence of this section (there numbered § 259) follows the manuscript, but the 1906 edition instead reads: 'Overall insight: the previous highest values are a special case of the will to power; morality itself is a special case of immorality.'

152. § 462 is a patchwork of two different notes which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, II, 6–7 and 136.

153. Ironically, in the manuscript § 465 immediately follows what appears to be Nietzsche's final plan for a magnum opus, a plan which is different from and supersedes the plan adopted by the editors of *The Will to Power* (1906), and which reads:

> I. Redemption from Christianity: The Anti-christ
>
> II. from morality: The Immoralist
>
> III. from the 'truth': The Free-Thinker
>
> IV. from nihilism: Nihilism as the necessary consequence of Christianity, morality and the notion of truth of the philosophers. The signs of nihilism . . .

BOOK III

PRINCIPLE OF A NEW DETERMINATION OF VALUES

1. § 469 is a rough draft of *The Anti-Christ* § 13, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 9, IX, 66.
2. *Hence insects react*: Especially as regards the colours of flowers, to which pollinating insects are attracted. Nietzsche is likely referring to remarks on this subject by Carl Wilhelm von Nägeli, in his *Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre* (Leipzig: Oldenbourg, 1884), pp. 154–6.
3. *Euclidean space*: Kant had argued in the, 'Transcendental Aesthetic' of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the fact that physical space is Euclidean is due to the mind imposing a Euclidean structure on its own sensations.
4. *If, according to Aristotle*: See Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ, 3, 'Here, indeed, we have our securest of all principles, which entirely fits the standards that we have set for it . . . And that is why the principle is the ultimate root of all demonstration . . .', in *Metaphysics*, p. 88. Otto Liebmann quotes and discusses this passage in his *Gedanken und Thatsachen: philosophische Abhandlungen, Aphorismen und Studien. H. 1: Die Arten der Nothwendigkeit. Die mechanische Naturerklärung. Idee und Entelechie* (Strassburg: Trübner, 1882), p. 24. § 516 is heavily indebted to Nietzsche's reading of Liebmann, one of the earliest Neo-Kantians, who coined (in 1865) the slogan 'Back to Kant!'
5. *the opinion that mental and physical phenomena are two faces, two manifestations, of the same substance*: As Spinoza argued.
6. *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*: *Prōton pseudos*, first falsity. A term in Aristotelian logic referring to the first false premise in a deduction, from which more false statements are deduced. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, Bk II, Ch. 18, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), II, p. 105.
7. *omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte percipitur*: 'Everything is true, that is perceived clearly and distinctly.' This precise formulation does not seem to appear anywhere in Descartes, although it is close to 'In quartâ, probatur ea omnia quae clare er distincte percipimus, esse vera [In the Fourth Meditation, everything that we clearly and distinctly perceive is proved to be true].' René Descartes, *Meditations and Other*

Metaphysical Writings, trans. Desmond M. Clarke (London: Penguin Classics, 1998), p. 16. Nietzsche's source for the misquotation is actually Otto Liebmann.

8. *simplex sigillum veri*: Simplicity is the sign of truth.
9. See note 75, Bk II.
10. *Herbert Spencer*: The two quotes are actually characterizations of Spencer's views which Nietzsche read in John Stuart Mill, *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, 2nd rev. edn (London: N. Trübner & Co., 1866), pp. 72–3. In the second quote we have followed Mill's actual language rather than an English translation of Nietzsche's German translation of it; in the first quote we have followed Nietzsche because there is no precisely corresponding passage in Mill.
11. *The Will to Power* (1906) reverts to an earlier draft; we follow the most recent draft.
12. Nietzsche has crossed out a final phrase, 'not because thinghood is something real', except for the word 'not'; accordingly, *The Will to Power* (1906) does not include it, while the *KGW* includes only the 'not'.
13. The quotes are paraphrases of Richard Avenarius (1843–96), a German-Swiss philosopher. We have moved and added the quotation marks to indicate more accurately where Nietzsche is paraphrasing and where he is commenting. See Avenarius' *Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses. Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der reinen Erfahrung* (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1876), pp. 58–60.
14. § 588 is a patchwork of texts which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, I, 319–20.
15. *All is false! All is permitted!*: Nietzsche is alluding to the Order of the Assassins, which he read about in Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall. 'That nothing is true and all permitted remained the foundation of the secret doctrine.' See his *Die Geschichte der Assassinen*, p. 84.
16. § 604 was originally intended for *Beyond Good and Evil*.
17. *the principle of greatest stupidity*: A play on 'the principle of least action' in physics.
18. The quotes are paraphrases of Richard Avenarius, *Philosophie*, pp. 46–50.
19. *τέλη*: Telē (as in 'teleological'), purpose or goal.
20. *mezzo termine*: 'Middle term, measure or period'. Although the expression in Italian philosophy refers to the term in a syllogism which is in the premises but not the conclusion, this does not

seem to be Nietzsche's point, nor is he saying as a matter of empirical fact that 'powers' do not ever take half-measures or compromise with one another. Rather, Nietzsche is addressing the same question that Aristotle broached in *De Interpretatione*, § 9, about tomorrow's sea battle. If the law of contradiction applies to future events, then either tomorrow's sea battle occurs or it does not; since one of these propositions must be true, then it must have always been true. But, as Aristotle says, 'this view leads to an impossible conclusion' because it rules out deliberation, choice and action, as well as natural potentiality and its actualization; the former is crucial to Aristotle's ethics and the latter to his metaphysics and natural philosophy. For Aristotle, there must be some way in which the existence of the sea battle tomorrow can be indeterminate (an intermediate condition between happening and not happening) today. It is precisely the possibility of this kind of indeterminacy which Nietzsche is denying and he welcomes the implications for the philosophy of action as well as for natural philosophy: not only is there no such thing as free will, there is no such thing as natural potentiality and its actualization.

21. The quotes are paraphrases of Richard Avenarius, *Philosophie*, p. 45, but the views themselves are David Hume's.

22. *a progressus in infinitum*: Or as we would more often say, an infinite regress. If everything that occurs gets its meaning and value from some further end that it serves, eventually something must have meaning and value in its own right, on pain of infinite regress.

23. *it is a process which leads to nothingness*: As the German philosopher Eduard von Hartmann had argued.

24. *l'animal ne fait jamais de progrès comme espèce; l'homme seul fait de progrès comme espèce*: 'The animal never progresses as a species; man alone has made progress as a species.' Nietzsche is quoting Émile Blanchard's paraphrase in *La Vie des êtres animés: les conditions de la vie chez les êtres animés* (Paris: G. Masson, Libraire de l'Académie de Médecine, 1888), p. 72, of J. P. M. Flourens in the following quote from his article 'Instinct et Intelligence des Animaux': 'The animal never progresses as a species. Individuals are making progress as we have seen, but no species actually develops. The generation of today is not greater than that which preceded it and the generation which is to follow will not exceed the current one. Man alone has made progress as a species, because only man possesses the power of thought,

this supreme facility which I define as the action of mind over mind', *Dictionnaire universel d'histoire naturelle*, ed. Charles d'Orbigny, 13 vols (Paris: Renard, Martinet et Cie., 1846), VII, p. 93.

25. *Spinoza's proposition concerning self-preservation*: 'Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being.' Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. Edwin Curley (London: Penguin Classics, 1996), p. 75.
26. *It is not the satisfaction of the will*: See Eduard von Hartmann, *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*, 2nd edn, trans. William Coupland, 3 vols (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1893), I, pp. 250–51, 254–5; II, p. 95; III, p. 36.
27. Pietro Verri (1728–97), Italian philosopher. 'On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain': 'The only motive principle of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure. Pleasure has no positive being.' The first and third sentences appear to be derived from a sentence at the beginning of the seventh paragraph of the Preface to *Discorsi del Conte Pietro Verri. Dell' Instituto delle Scienze di Bologna. Sull' indole del Piacere e del Dolore; sulla Felicità; e sulla Economia Politica* (Milan: Giuseppe Marelli, 1781), which reads: 'All these signs show that Plato, Cardano, Montaigne, Locke and Magalotti knew that pleasure has no positive being, indeed they further discovered that pleasure is nothing but a cessation of an evil, and that the only motive principle of man is pain.' The middle sentence seems to be taken from the title of Ch. XI of *Sull' indole del Piacere e del Dolore*, which reads: 'Pain precedes every pleasure and is the motive principle of man,' which can be found on p. 76. The reference to Kant, 'I subscribe to these tenets of Count Veri with full conviction,' is in his discussion of pleasure and pain in § 60 in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, in *Anthropology, History and Education* (*The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*), ed. Robert B. Louden, Günter Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 334. Nietzsche's own source for this is the following passage from Léon Dumont: 'and especially Verri, in a noteworthy treatise "On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain" (1781), noted that pleasure is only a cessation of pain and that pain was the chief driving force of human life: "Pleasure", says Verri, "has no positive being. Pleasure is nothing but a cessation of pain; and the only motive power of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure." Even the enjoyment of the fine arts arises from some vague, obscure, vague sensations of pain: "The pleasures of the fine arts

are born of nameless pain." It is from Verri that Kant claims to have borrowed his theory of pleasure and pain. (*Anthropology*, § 59 [*sic*]).' The footnote to this passage reads: '"These tenets of Count Verri, I subscribe to with full conviction." (Kant).' Léon Dumont, *Vergnügen und Schmerz. Zur Lehre von den Gefühlen* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1876), p. 36.

28. *choc*: Shock. This entire discussion is informed by Nietzsche's reading of Charles Féré, *Sensation et mouvement: études expérimentales de psycho-mécanique* (Paris: Germer Ballière, 1887), p. 140.
29. *As I say this*: Nietzsche is referring to the text of *Twilight of the Idols*, 'The Four Great Errors', § 2, which immediately follows this note in the manuscript. See *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*, pp. 58–9.
30. *Cornarism*: Luigi Cornaro, Italian author of *Discorsi della vita sobria* (Padua, 1591). *The Will to Power* (1906) has omitted the phrase 'and which has, among other things, a long life and many descendants in consequence (Cornarism)' and reads the second paragraph quite differently as follows: 'Let us reverse these evaluations: all excellence is a consequence of a fortuitous organization, all freedom a consequence of excellence (freedom being understood here as facility in self-direction. Every artist will understand me.)' The text of § 705 is derived from an unpublished sheet #124r, from folder XVII, forthcoming in *KGW*, div. 9, XIII, 124.
31. *a parte ad totum*: From the part to the whole, i.e. the fallacy of composition.
32. The quote from the Laws of Manu was inserted in *The Will to Power* (1906) in the form of German translations from Louis Jacolliot, *Les Législateurs religieux: Manou – Moïse – Mahomet. Traditions religieuses comparées des lois de Manou, de la Bible, du Coran, du rituel égyptien, du Zend-Avesta des Parses et des traditions finnoises* (Paris: Lacroix, 1876), p. 275. We translate directly from the French.
33. See note 32, Bk III. This quote is from Jacolliott, *Législateurs*, p. 252.
34. See note 7, Bk II. This is a reading note of Tolstoy, *My Religion*, p. 45.
35. *ambitiosi*: Canvassers, those who engage in *ambitus*, the Roman practice of courting the people in the pursuit of public office; also, those who seek to influence judicial opinions (whether openly or through corruption). The term is not synonymous with the

English word 'ambitious' or the German word 'ambitiös', which relate more to the character trait or psychological condition this may manifest. For an example of *ambitus* with an unsuccessful outcome, see Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, III. i–iii.

36. See note 7, Bk II. This is a reading note of Tolstoy, *My Religion*, pp. 168–9.
37. *a sign of immaturity in a man, p. 123*: *The Will to Power* (1906) deletes 'p. 123', which is a reference to Emanuel Herrmann, *Cultur und Natur: Studien im Gebiete der Wirthschaft*, 2nd edn (Berlin: Allgemeiner Verein für Deutsche Literatur, 1887), p. 123, 'The defences of plants and animals are positively related to each other; they usually consist of plates, scales, shells, armour, etc. Here both kingdoms of the organic also agree that the immature individuals primarily use defensive means, while the mature primarily use offensive means.'
38. *πόλις*: See note 76, Bk II.
39. *The greater the advantages*: Nietzsche is paraphrasing 'The higher a being ascends in the scale of organization, the richer it will be in advantages in the struggle for survival, the greater, of course, the expense of maintenance and production (nutrition and reproduction) and the greater the risk of perishing before the goal of life, full development, is achieved.' Emanuel Herrmann, *Cultur und Natur*, p. 85.
40. *Quaeritur*: The question is raised.
41. *cru, vert*: Raw, green.
42. *rancune du déclassé*: Rancour of those of lower social class.
43. *faute de lecture*: Lack of reading.
44. *haut-relief*: High relief (i.e. superficial).
45. *Dostoevsky has said*: 'How much youth had been buried in vain within these walls; how much power and strength had perished there for nothing! For the whole truth must be told: all these men were remarkable. These were perhaps the most gifted, the strongest of all our people. But mighty powers had perished in vain, perished abnormally, unlawfully, irrevocably. Yet who is to blame?' Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The House of the Dead*, trans. David McDuff (London: Penguin Classics, 1986), p. 355.
46. *jus talionis*: Law of retaliation.
47. *A Chinese elder once said*: Nietzsche's source is Albert Hermann Post. 'In our time, which suffers from a kind of mania for legislation, one thinks of the ideas of Scho-hiang, the Minister of Tseu-chan, in the year 536 BC in the criminal code which was cast in bronze in the kingdom Ching. The politic Chinese said

that if the people know that there are laws, then they no longer fear the higher authority; everyone becomes prone to disputes, seeks justification for their actions in texts and reckons it an honour to enforce something; and as a result they become ungovernable. He concludes his speech by saying that he had heard when kingdoms perish, they have many laws.' *Bausteine für eine allgemeine Rechtswissenschaft auf vergleichend-ethnologischer Basis*, 2 vols (Oldenburg: Schulzesche Hof-Buchhandlung & Hof-Buchdruckerei, 1880-81), I, p. 58.

48. *Schopenhauer would have had all rogues castrated*: 'If we could have all rogues castrated and all stupid geese cloistered and give men of noble character a whole harem and procure men, that is to say, whole men, for all girls of intellect and understanding, then a generation would soon arise which would produce a better age than that of Pericles.' Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, II, p. 527 (translation modified).
49. *this rogue of a chaplain*: Adolf Stoecker (1835–1909), court chaplain to Kaiser Wilhelm II and founder of the Christian Social Party. Also see note 7, Bk II.
50. *otium*: Leisure.
51. See note 7, Bk II.
52. § 764 is a patchwork of three different notes, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 7, I, 373, 536 and div. 7, III, 358.
53. *old Homer called it*:

> If only strife could die from the lives of gods and men
> and anger that drives the sanest man to flare in outrage –
> bitter gall, sweeter than dripping streams of honey,
> that swarms in people's chests and blinds like smoke –
> just like the anger Agamemnon king of men
> has roused within me now . . .

Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Robert Fagles (London: Penguin Classics, 1998), p. 471.

54. *a thought with which it is well known that the Old Testament begins*: See Genesis 3:22–3.
55. *The Will to Power* (1906) includes as the first sentence of § 770, 'The degree of resistance which has to be continually overcome in order to remain at the top is the measure of freedom, whether for individuals or for societies: freedom being recognized as positive power, as desire for power', despite the fact that Nietzsche has crossed out this sentence.

56. *Les grandes âmes*: 'Great souls are not those with fewer passions and more virtues than the ordinary run, but simply those with a stronger sense of purpose.' François duc de La Rochefoucauld, *Maxims*, trans. Leonard Tancock (London: Penguin Classics, 1982), p. 119.
57. *J. Stuart Mill*: 'The error of La Rochefoucauld has been avoided by Chamfort, the more high-minded and more philosophic La Rochefoucauld of the eighteenth century.' John Stuart Mill, 'Aphorisms: Thoughts in the Cloister and the Crowd' (1837), in *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, ed. John M. Robson et al., 33 vols (London: Routledge, 1963–91), I, p. 423. (*The Will to Power* (1906) provides the Mill quote in German translation; we have provided the original.)
58. *hyperfetation*: Also known as 'superfetation'. See note 107, Bk II.
59. *many 'souls in one breast'*: 'Two souls, alas, reside within my breast.' Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, Part I, trans. Stuart Atkins, in *Goethe: The Collected Works*, 12 vols (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994–5), II, p. 30.
60. *the 'growing autonomy of the individual'*: Nietzsche is referring to the following sentence by the philosopher Alfred Fouillée: 'No, because a change in the opposite direction occurs, which is no less indisputable than the other and which is characterized by the growing autonomy of the individual; we strive for variety and decentralization as much as for unity and centralization.' *La Science sociale contemporaine* (Paris: Hachette, 1880), p. 249.
61. *race moutonnière*: Race of sheep.
62. *pulchrum est paucorum hominum*: Beauty belongs to the few.
63. *a singular being*: Nietzsche's use of the grammatical category 'singular' (which *The Will to Power* (1906) misreads as 'representative of individuals') implies that 'the individual' in not a unique individual, but rather an instance of a type, or a fungible unit in an aggregate; thus demanding the rights of the individual is not demanding rights peculiar to some particular individual, but of a whole class of people. For this reason, he thinks that liberal individualism is not really individualistic at all.
64. *vivre, pour vivre pour autrui*: Live for others, an allusion to Auguste Comte. 'Live for others thus becomes the natural summary of the whole positivist morality.' Auguste Comte, *Système de politique positive: ou, Traité de sociologie, Instituant la Religion de l'Humanité*, 4 vols (Paris: Librairie Scientifique-Industrielle de L. Mathias, 1851–4), I, pp. 700–701.

65. *Dostoevsky's judgement about criminals*: See note 45, Bk III.
66. *παῖς παίζων*: *Pais paizōn*, child playing. This is a quote from Heraclitus, 'Time is a game played beautifully by children.' Heraclitus, *Fragments*, trans. Brooks Haxton (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), pp. 50–51.
67. *Beyle*: Stendhal.
68. *contiguity*: The term 'contiguity' appears in English and only appears elsewhere in Nietzsche's writings in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Essay III, § 4, in which he refers to 'psychological contiguity, to speak with the English'. The reference, presumably, is to Hume on the association of ideas. 'The qualities, from which this association arises and by which the mind is after this manner convey'd from one idea to another, are three, viz. RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place and CAUSE and EFFECT.' David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), p. 58.
69. *pudeurs*: Nietzsche's choice of the French word for a sense of modesty is in part punning on 'pudenda', to suggest that women possess not only the modesty, but the sexuality about which they are both modest and, as the sentence suggests, unconscious.
70. *an opportunity to cite Faust*: Specifically, the encounter with The Mothers in Part Two, Act I, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust: The Second Part of the Tragedy*, trans. David Constantine (London: Penguin Classics, 2009), pp. 54–67.
71. *induction psycho-motrice*: Psychomotor induction. See Féré, *Sensation et mouvement*, pp. 13–16, 83, 118, 132.
72. *suggestion mentale*: Telepathic, not hypnotic, influence.
73. *canaille*: Rabble.
74. *vers la canaille plumière, écrivassière*: To the ink-slinging, scribbling rabble. Mirabeau refers to 'the hatred of the ink-slinging, scribbling and literary clique' in an unpublished letter dated 16 June 1759. *Mémoires biographiques, littéraires et politiques de Mirabeau*, 8 vols (Paris: Auguste Auffray et Adolphe Guyot, 1834–5), I, p. 355. He also refers to 'the ink-slinging rabble' in an unpublished letter dated 11 June 1774 (op. cit., III, p. 195). Sainte-Beuve indirectly quotes Mirabeau, 'to what he called the philosophical, encyclopaedic, ink-slinging, scribbling and writing rabble', in *Causeries du lundi*, 2nd edn, 8 vols (Paris, 1853), IV, p. 4. This in turn was misquoted as 'to the ink-slinging, scribbling rabble', in Henri Joly, *Psychologie des grands hommes* (Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette et Cie, 1883), p. 64, from which Nietzsche takes it.

75. *Tous ces modernes*: 'All these are modern poets who wanted to be artists. One sought dramas in history, the other scenes of manners; this one reflects the religions, that one a philosophy.' Hippolyte Taine, *Voyage aux Pyrénées*, 9th edn (Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette et Cie, 1881), p. 345.
76. *Les Orientales* (1829) is collection of poems inspired by the Greek War of Independence.
77. The *Poetic Edda* is a collection of Norse poetry perhaps dating as far back as the tenth century BC.
78. Sir Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe* (1820) is the intended reference (although it takes place in twelfth-century England).
79. *mignardise*: Affectation.
80. *Audran*: Edmond Audran (1840–1901), a French composer sometimes described as Offenbach's successor.
81. *petits faits*: Small facts.
82. *Rahel*: Rahel Varnhagen (1771–1833), German-Jewish writer and hostess of a notable Berlin salon.
83. § 836 is from the final portion of a rough draft of *Twilight of the Idols*, 'Expeditions of an Untimely Man', § 7 and continues, 'Wagner, a piece of superstition already in his lifetime, has become so wrapped up in the clouds of the improbable, that with regard to him only the paradox inspires faith.' See *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*, p. 80.
84. *pur sang*: Pure blood.
85. *Come si dorme con questa musica*: How one sleeps with this music!
86. *half-pulled*, *half-plunging*: From Goethe's 'The Fisherman', in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Selected Poetry*, trans. David Luke (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), p. 42.
87. *Palazzo Pitti*: A palace in Florence, the core of which was constructed in 1458 and which was subsequently acquired by the Medici in 1549 and expanded. Nietzsche is likely thinking of the architect who designed the later expansions, Giorgio Vasari.
88. § 843 is a patchwork of two different notes, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, I, 309 and III, 91.
89. § 846 is a rough draft of a portion of *The Joyous Science* § 370, taken from Nietzsche's notebook W I 8, dated autumn 1885–autumn 1886, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 9, V, 89–90.
90. § 849 is intended as a rebuttal to Benjamin Constant's defence of German theatre and his criticism of French classicism. See Constant's 'Quelques réflections sur le tragédie de Wallstein et sur le théâtre allemand', in Friedrich Schiller, *Wallstein, tragédie*

en cinq actes et en vers (Paris and Geneva: J. J. Paschoud, 1809). Wagner mentions this text of Constant's in passing in *Dentsche Kunst und Dentsche Politik* (Leipzig: J. J. Weber, 1868). See *Richard Wagner's Prose Works*, trans. William Ashton Ellis, 8 vols (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1892–9), IV, p. 53.

91. *the following error in Aristotle*: See Aristotle, *The Poetics*, trans. Malcolm Heath (London: Penguin Classics, 1996), p. 10.
92. *parti pris*: Preconceived opinion.
93. *hateful . . . ugly*: Nietzsche's wordplay on 'Hassenswerthe' and 'häßlich' seems to defy translation.
94. § 853 is a patchwork of two different partial drafts of the same text, with some overlap, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, II, 435–6 and III, 318–20. Where the texts overlap we have followed the more recent draft. The book to which Nietzsche refers is *The Birth of Tragedy*.

BOOK IV

DISCIPLINE AND CULTIVATION

1. Nietzsche has crossed out the text of § 855, which is from his notebook W II 1, autumn 1887 and can be found at *KGW*, div. 9, VI, 88.
2. Nietzsche's point about honesty is far from obvious without reference to Molière's *Tartuffe*. When Tartuffe's hypocrisy as a moral adviser is revealed by his attempted seduction of Elmire, he attempts to recapture the moral high ground by accusing himself of being 'a guilty wretch, a miserable sinner steeped in iniquity, the greatest villain that ever existed' (III, vi), in Jean-Baptiste Molière, *The Misanthrope and Other Plays*, trans. John Wood (London: Penguin Classics, 1959), p. 140. Similarly, St Augustine circumvents moral critique by being unusually honest about his moral shortcomings.
3. § 870 is a patchwork, the portions of which can be found at *KGW*, div. 7, II, 99–100, 119.
4. *The Will to Power* (1906) deletes 'There are also ill-constituted peoples'.
5. *territorial instinct*: The expression in German is 'Thätigkeits-Sinn', more literally translated as 'inhabitiveness', a phrenological faculty.

6. The passage from Mill which Nietzsche quotes was from a German translation, which he modified slightly. In the original English it reads: 'Caesar had many eminent qualities, but what he did to deserve such praise we are at a loss to discover, except subverting a free government: that merit, however, with M. Comte, goes a great way. It did not, in his former days, suffice to rehabilitate Napoleon, whose name and memory he regarded with a bitterness highly honourable to himself and whose career he deemed one of the greatest calamities in modern history. But in his later writings these sentiments are considerably mitigated: he regards Napoleon as a more estimable "dictator" than Louis Philippe, and thinks that his greatest error was re-establishing the Academy of Sciences! That this should be said by M. Comte, and said of Napoleon, measures the depth to which his moral standard had fallen.' Mill, *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, p. 190.
7. *The Will to Power* (1906) omits the following material between the two paragraphs of § 891: 'NB. To what extent were the Christian centuries with their pessimism stronger centuries than the eighteenth century. Accordingly the tragic age of the Greeks – weaker, more scientific and . . . The nineteenth century (as opposed to the eighteenth century) – wherein heritage, wherein decline relative to same; less "intellectual", less tasteful, wherein progress over the same (gloomier, more realistic, stronger –).'
8. *la largeur [de sympathie]*: Breadth of sympathy. *The Will to Power* (1906) reads 'la largeur' as 'la largeur de cœur', which we instead read as 'largeur de sympathie', in light of Nietzsche's reading of Brunetière. See Bk I, note 20.
9. *The Will to Power* (1906) transforms the description of the 'Third book' and the 'Fourth book' into a note, by omitting the context and moving 'the hammer', thus: 'The hammer. *How* must such men be constituted who make the contrary value judgements? Men who possess *all* the characteristics of the modern soul, but who are strong enough to transform them into sheer healthiness. Their means to their task.' Because the transformation is so misleading, we have restored the note up to the end of Nietzsche's outline. Notice too that this outline differs from the structure ultimately chosen for *The Will to Power* itself.
10. *lazzaroni*: The underclass of Naples, often stereotyped as beggars (as Nietzsche characterizes them here), this community contributed economically by casual labour and sometimes played a decisive political and military role (e.g. resisting French

occupation in the 1790s, supporting Garibaldi in 1860); so called for their association with the Hospital of Saint Lazarus in Naples.

11. *Herrnhut Pietists*: Herrnhut, a town in East Saxony, is the world centre of the Moravian Church, occupied by members of that denomination since 1727.
12. The material from which § 914 was taken was intended for *Beyond Good and Evil*.
13. *Dîners chez Magny*: See note 25, Bk I.
14. The final paragraph of § 916 is taken from a different note drafted three years earlier; in the note that constitutes the bulk of § 916, this paragraph reads merely '(6) Death'.
15. *Il Principe*: Machiavelli's *The Prince*.
16. In the manuscript, Nietzsche has crossed out the first and second paragraphs of the note from which § 930 was taken; *The Will to Power* (1906) uses the second and third. The final sentence of the first paragraph was redrafted five times. Our transcription of the final sentence of the first paragraph differs somewhat from that of the *KGW*.
17. *Race d'affranchis*: 'Race of freedmen, race of slaves torn from our hands, dependent people, new people, licence has been given you to be free, but not to us to be noble; for us all is by right; for you all is by grace; we are not of your community; we are alone unto ourselves.' Nietzsche quotes Thierry, who in turn characterizes (but does not accurately quote) De Montlosier, in *Dix ans d'études historiques*, 5th edn (Paris: Just Tessier Librairie, 1836), p. 251.
18. *μηδὲν ἄγαν*: *Mēden agan*, nothing in excess.
19. *ἐγχράτεια*: *Enkrateia*, self-control.
20. *ἄσχησις*: *Askēsis*, self-discipline.
21. *golden nature*: 'You are, all of you in this community, brothers. But when god fashioned you, he added gold in the composition of those of you who are qualified to be Rulers (which is why their prestige is greatest).' Plato, *Republic*, 2nd edn, trans. H. D. P. Lee, reissued with Further Reading by Rachana Kamtekar (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), (415a), p. 116. Nietzsche will later contrast Homer's 'golden nature' with Plato as 'the great slanderer of life' in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Essay III, §25.
22. *mythological heroes*: The term Nietzsche uses here is 'Heroen'. Unlike English, German distinguishes between 'Heroen', 'mythological' heroes, semi-divine beings associated with quests, the founding of states, etc. and 'Helden', ordinary human beings of exemplary courage.

23. 'Von' and 'zu' are German nobiliary particles; German titles of nobility were abolished in 1919. The *Almanach de Gotha* is a directory of royalty and hereditary nobility, published from 1763 to 1945. From 1945 to 1990, Gotha fell within East Germany and the almanac was not published; publication resumed in 1998. Nietzsche's point is that although genuine nobility involves something hereditary, possession of it does not necessarily coincide with possession of a title.
24. *comprendre c'est égaler*: To understand is to equalize (or: to rise to their level). 'In fact one needs much experience of life to realize, as Raphael so aptly put it, that to understand others is to rise to their level.' Honoré de Balzac, *Lost Illusions*, trans. Herbert J. Hunt (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), p. 72. The quip 'comprendre c'est égaler' also appears in his play *Les Ressources de Quinola. Comédie en cinq actes* (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1864), p. 8.
25. *milk-soppishness*: *The Will to Power* (1906) renders 'which not with all mere benevolence and milk-sops [*welcher nicht mit alle bloße Gutartigkeit u. Milchseele*]' as 'which outweighs all mere benevolence of the milk-sops [*welcher alle bloße Gutartigkeit der Milchseelen überwiegt*]'. Clearly some sort of comparison is intended which was never completed with a verb; we have opted to transform 'milk-sops' into 'milk-soppishness' to maintain the parallelism with 'goodness' and 'benevolence', and to insert 'is more valuable than'.
26. *Paradise is under the shadow of swords*: Emerson, in 'Heroism', allegedly quoting Muhammad. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Essays and Lectures* (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1983), p. 369. The source of the quote is ultimately an early medieval Arabic epic, *Kitab Futuh al-Bahnasa al Gharra* (*Book of the Conquest of Bahnasa, the Blessed*).
27. The *KGW* follows Nietzsche's first draft of the text that would become § 954, ignoring his corrections; *The Will to Power* (1906) follows the corrected version (as revealed by examination of the manuscript). Accordingly, we follow *The Will to Power* (1906).
28. *Theages*: Nietzsche paraphrases a Platonic text of doubtful authenticity, *Theages*, in which Theages says, 'I should indeed pray, I imagine, that I might become a despot, if possible, over all men, and failing that, over as many as might be; so would you, I imagine, and everybody else besides: nay, even more, I daresay, that I might become a god; but I did not say I desired

that.' *Theages* 125e8–126a4, in *Plato in Twelve Volumes* (Loeb Classical Library No. 201), trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Ltd, 1986), XII, p. 365.

29. *The Will to Power* (1906) concludes § 959 with the sentence 'The *Romans*: beasts of the primeval forest', which properly belongs in § 996.

30. *The Will to Power* (1906) has transcribed the note from which § 963 was taken very differently than we do. Its version reads: 'The great man is necessarily a sceptic (but that is not to say that he should appear as such), provided that his greatness consists in being determined to achieve something great and the means thereto. Freedom from convictions of any kind is a part of the strength of his will, in accordance with that "enlightened despotism" exercised by every great passion. Such a passion enlists the intellect into its service; it has the courage even for unholy means; it makes one unscrupulous; it allows itself convictions, it even uses them, but never submits to them. The need for faith and for some unconditional affirmation or negation is a proof of weakness; all weakness is weakness of will. The man of faith, the believer, is necessarily a little man. From this it follows that "free-thinking", i.e. instinctive disbelief, is a prerequisite for greatness.'

31. § 972 is a patchwork of two different notes which can be found at *KGW*, div. 7, II, 256–7 and III, 340–41.

32. *Prava corrigere*: 'To correct the wrong, strengthen the right and exalt the sacred.' St Alcuin of York, in a letter to Charlemagne from 796 BC, in *Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne, 221 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Catholique, 1863), C, col. 207.

33. *Maledetto colui*: Cursed be those . . . who sadden an immortal spirit.' Alessandro Manzoni's *The Count of Carmagnola and Adelchis*, trans. Federica Brunori Deigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 154.

34. 'The philosophers are not made to love. The eagles do not fly in company. We must leave that to the partridges, the starlings . . . Soaring above and having claws, that is the lot of the great geniuses.' The ellipsis is Nietzsche's; the omitted sentences read: 'Voltaire has never loved and nor is he loved by anyone. He is feared, he has his claw and that's enough.' Galiani, *Correspondance*, I, p. 208.

35. *come l'uom s'eterna*: How a man becomes eternal. The passage from Dante reads: 'You taught me how a man becomes eternal [*m'insegnavate come l'uom s'etterna*].' Dante Alighieri, *The*

Divine Comedy: I: *Inferno*, trans. Robin Kirkpatrick (London: Penguin Classics, 2006), pp. 132–3. Elsewhere, Nietzsche writes: 'In conclusion: "To have been a teacher of" come l'uom s'eterna [how a man becomes eternal] (Inf. XV, 85).' *KGW*, div. 8, II, 5.

36. *faculté maîtresse*: Dominant faculty.
37. *de sa gaine*: From the sheath.
38. *dans l'idéal et l'impossible*: In the ideal and the impossible.
39. *et leur égal*: And their equal: his genius is of the same extent and structure; he is one of the three sovereign spirits of the Italian Renaissance.
40. *pur, cru*: Pure, raw, i.e. unadulterated with reasons.
41. *Stifter and G. Keller*: The subsequent unnamed figure after Adalbert Stifter and Gottfried Keller is almost certainly Wagner.
42. *eternal love*: From *Inferno*, III. 4–6.

> Justice inspired my exalted Creator.
> I am a creature of the Holiest Power,
> of Wisdom in the Highest and of Primal Love.

Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*: I: *Inferno*, pp. 20–21.

43. *as Goethe would say*: In *Faust: The Second Part of the Tragedy*, p. 250. (Nietzsche says 'His outlook is free [*Er hat die Aussicht frei*]', whereas Goethe has 'Here the outlook is free [*Hier ist die Aussicht frei*]', which Constantine translates as 'The outlook is open here.')
44. § 1038, a patchwork, consists of the fifth numbered paragraph of a five-paragraph note originally intended for § 20 of *The Anti-Christ*, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, III, 323–4, with an additional sentence ('The divine type' etc.) appended from another notebook, which can be found at *KGW*, div. 8, III, 17.
45. *From the military academy of the soul*: Nietzsche ultimately utilized this title for what is perhaps his most famous remark: 'What does not destroy me makes me stronger.' *Twilight of the Idols*, 'Maxims and Arrows', § 8.
46. *eating and drinking*: Compare 1 Corinthians, 11:23–5. 'For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, That the Lord Jesus the same night in which he was betrayed took bread: And when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat: this is my body, which is broken for you: this do in remembrance of me. After the same manner also he took the cup, when he had supped, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood: this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me.'

47. The surrounding context of the passage which became § 1048 suggests that this is in part Nietzsche's characterization of prior, superseded stages of his development, or of ways in which others have misunderstood him.
48. § 1050 appears to have been intended for use in an advertisement (or an anonymous review), given the fact that Nietzsche is summarizing his book *The Birth of Tragedy* and writes of himself in the third person. *The Will to Power* (1906) has appropriated this material by changing it to the first person throughout.
49. *supra-Christian*: The term 'überchristlich' is not a coinage of Nietzsche's but a term denoting heresy, with a use extending at least as far back as Luther.
50. See note 75, Bk II.
51. *A certain emperor*: Marcus Aurelius.
52. *it neither becomes nor passes away*: An allusion to the title of Aristotle's *On Generation and Corruption.*
53. *the notion of a world with an infinite past involves a contradiction*: The prototype of these arguments is Kant's 'Thesis' argument of the First Antinomy, in *Critique of Pure Reason.*
54. *Thomson*: Nietzsche is referring to Lord Kelvin's views in thermodynamics on the 'heat death' of the universe, dating back as early as 1851, but which did find popular expression in, for example, his essay 'Energy' (with P. G. Tait), in *Good Words*, 3, pp. 601–7, October 1867.
55. *most midnightly*: Although 'mitternächtlich' means 'occurring at midnight' or 'occurring every midnight', it also means 'in a northerly direction', which suggests that Nietzsche is alluding here to the 'Hyperboreans'. See note 127, Bk II.

Concordance

between *Der Wille zur Macht* and *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*

The section number from the second edition of *Der Wille zur Macht*, which we follow in this translation, is given to the left of the equals sign, and the division, volume and page number of the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, where a transcription of the source text can be found to the right. In some cases we have substituted other drafts, which we indicate in parentheses.

Preface = div. 8, II, 431–2
§ 1 = div. 8, I, 123–5
§ 2 = div. 8, II, 14
§ 3 = div. 8, II, 237
§ 4 = div. 8, I, 215
§ 5 = div. 8, I, 215–16
§ 6 = div. 8, II, 237
§ 7 = div. 8, II, 291–2
§ 8 = div. 8, I, 300–301
§ 9 = div. 8, II, 156–7
§ 10 = div. 8, II, 74
§ 11 = div. 8, II, 237
§ 12 = div. 8, II, 288–91
§ 13 = div. 8, II, 15–16
§ 14 = div. 8, II, 17
§ 15 = div. 8, II, 18
§ 16 = div. 8, II, 302
§ 17 = div. 8, II, 205–6
§ 18 = div. 8, I, 262–3
§ 19 = div. 8, I, 326
§ 20 = div. 8, II, 19–21
§ 21 = div. 8, II, 142
§ 22 = div. 8, II, 14–15
§ 23 = div. 8, II, 14–15
§ 24 = div. 8, II, 301–2
§ 25 = div. 8, II, 71–2
§ 26 = div. 8, II, 62
§ 27 = div. 8, II, 21–2
§ 28 = div. 8, II, 142
§ 29 = div. 7, I, 702
§ 30 = div. 8, II, 311–12
§ 31 = div. 7, II, 11–12
§ 32 = div. 8, I, 248–9
§ 33 = div. 8, II, 94–5
§ 34 = div. 8, I, 50
§ 35 = div. 8, II, 61–2
§ 36 = div. 8, II, 287–8
§ 37 = div. 8, II, 60–61
§ 38 = div. 8, III, 327
§ 39 = div. 8, II, 331
§ 40 = div. 8, III, 47–8
§ 41 = div. 8, III, 220–21
§ 42 = div. 8, III, 47
§ 43 = div. 8, III, 56–7
§ 44 = div. 8, III, 325–6
§ 45 = div. 8, III, 71–2
§ 46 = div. 8, III, 186
§ 47 = div. 8, III, 42–3
§ 48 = div. 8, III, 44–5
§ 49 = div. 8, III, 250
§ 50 = div. 8, III, 299–300
§ 51 = div. 8, III, 12
§ 52 = div. 8, III, 227
§ 53 = div. 8, III, 30
§ 54 = div. 8, III, 206–8
§ 55 = div. 8, I, 216–21
§ 56 = div. 8, II, 313
§ 57 = div. 7, II, 7–8
§ 58 = div. 8, I, 58
§ 59 = div. 8, I, 120
§ 60 = div. 7, III, 153
§ 61 = div. 7, I, 300
§ 62 = div. 8, II, 75–6
§ 63 = div. 8, III, 243–4
§ 64 = div. 8, II, 41
§ 65 = div. 9, IX, 32
§ 66 = div. 8, II, 240
§ 67 = div. 7, II, 64–5
§ 68 = div. 8, III, 180, 190
§ 69 = div. 8, I, 128–9
§ 70 = div. 8, I, 152
§ 71 = div. 8, II, 130
§ 72 = div. 8, III, 212
§ 73 = div. 8, II, 80
§ 74 = div. 8, II, 99
§ 75 = div. 7, III, 194–5

§ 76 = div. 8, II, 98
§ 77 = div. 8, I, 309
§ 78 = div. 8, I, 119–20
§ 79 = div. 8, II, 96–7
§ 80 = div. 8, II, 304
§ 81 = div. 8, I, 306
§ 82 = div. 8, II, 73–4
§ 83 = div. 8, II, 109
§ 84 = div. 8, II, 99
§ 85 = div. 8, III, 223
§ 86 = div. 8, II, 161
§ 87 = div. 8, II, 75
§ 88 = div. 8, II, 150
§ 89 = div. 8, III, 32
§ 90 = div. 8, III, 202–3
§ 91 = div. 7, III, 295
§ 92 = div. 7, I, 687–8
§ 93 = div. 8, III, 213–14
§ 94 = div. 7, II, 57–8
§ 95 = div. 8, II, 104–7
§ 96 = div. 8, II, 39
§ 97 = div. 8, II, 110
§ 98 = div. 8, II, 85
§ 99 = div. 8, II, 73
§ 100 = div. 8, II, 111–13
§ 101 = div. 8, II, 4–5
§ 102 = div. 8, II, 160–61
§ 103 = div. 8, I, 296
§ 104 = div. 8, III, 245
§ 105 = div. 8, I, 160, 295–6
§ 106 = div. 8, II, 375
§ 107 = div. 8, III, 289–90
§ 108 = div. 7, III, 296
§ 109 = div. 7, III, 216–17
§ 110 = div. 8, II, 134–5
§ 111 = div. 8, II, 113–14
§ 112 = div. 8, II, 134
§ 113 = div. 8, I, 299–300
§ 114 = div. 8, I, 216
§ 115 = div. 8, III, 241
§ 116 = div. 8, III, 232–3
§ 117 = div. 8, II, 71
§ 118 = div. 8, I, 293
§ 119 = div. 8, II, 191–2
§ 120 = div. 8, II, 148–50
§ 121 = div. 8, III, 281–2
§ 122 = div. 8, III, 245
§ 123 = div. 8, II, 113
§ 124 = div. 8, II, 70–71
§ 125 = div. 7, III, 312–13
§ 126 = div. 8, II, 96–7
§ 127 = div. 7, II, 261
§ 128 = div. 7, II, 267–8
§ 129 = div. 7, III, 294
§ 130 = div. 7, I, 701
§ 131 = div. 7, II, 251
§ 132 = div. 9, IV, 126 (div. 7, III, 233–4)
§ 133 = div. 7, III, 147
§ 134 = div. 8, I, 125–6
§ Intro to Bk II, pt1 = div. 8, II, 283
§ 135 = div. 8, III, 97–8
§ 136 = div. 8, III, 98–9
§ 137 = div. 8, III, 101–2
§ 138 = div. 8, I, 280
§ 139 = div. 8, III, 174–6
§ 140 = div. 8, III, 168–9
§ 141 = div. 8, III, 227–30
§ 142 = div. 8, III, 233–4
§ 143 = div. 8, III, 178–9
§ 144 = div. 7, III, 198
§ 145 = div. 7, II, 206–7; div. 8, III, 172–3; div. 8, III, 156–7
§ 146 = div. 8, I, 162

§ 147 = div. 8, II, 237–8
§ 148 = div. 8, I, 341
§ 149 = div. 5, I, 594
§ 150 = div. 8, II, 11
§ 151 = div. 8, I, 112
§ 152 = div. 8, III, 15–16
§ 153 = div. 8, II, 408–9
§ 154 = div. 8, III, 59–60
§ 155 = div. 8, II, 235–6
§ 156 = div. 8, II, 408
§ 157 = div. 8, III, 247–8
§ 158 = div. 8, III, 313
§ 159 = div. 8, II, 404
§ 160 = div. 8, II, 398–9
§ 161 = div. 8, II, 396
§ 162 = div. 8, II, 396
§ 163 = div. 8, II, 400
§ 164 = div. 8, II, 400–401
§ 165 = div. 8, II, 400
§ 166 = div. 8, II, 348
§ 167 = div. 8, II, 349–51
§ 168 = div. 8, II, 340
§ 169 = div. 8, II, 345–6
§ 170 = div. 8, II, 357
§ 171 = div. 8, III, 36–7
§ 172 = div. 8, II, 232–3
§ 173 = div. 8, III, 393–4
§ 174 = div. 8, II, 176–7
§ 175 = div. 8, II, 230–31
§ 176 = div. 8, III, 104–5
§ 177 = div. 8, III, 262–3
§ 178 = div. 7, II, 118
§ 179 = div. 8, II, 336–7
§ 180 = div. 8, II, 421
§ 181 = div. 8, II, 174
§ 182 = div. 8, II, 166–7
§ 183 = div. 8, II, 399
§ 184 = div. 8, III, 188
§ 185 = div. 8, II, 228
§ 186 = div. 8, II, 176–7
§ 187 = div. 8, II, 80
§ 188 = div. 8, II, 241
§ 189 = div. 8, II, 12
§ 190 = div. 8, II, 233–4
§ 191 = div. 8, II, 337
§ 192 = div. 8, II, 144
§ 193 = div. 8, II, 340
§ 194 = div. 8, II, 340
§ 195 = div. 8, II, 356
§ 196 = div. 8, II, 357–9
§ 197 = div. 8, II, 240–41
§ 198 = div. 8, II, 396
§ 199 = div. 8, II, 24
§ 200 = div. 8, II, 236–7
§ 201 = div. 8, II, 247
§ 202 = div. 8, II, 245–6
§ 203 = div. 8, II, 167–8
§ 204 = div. 8, II, 211–15
§ 205 = div. 8, II, 172
§ 206 = div. 8, II, 45
§ 207 = div. 8, II, 335–6
§ 208 = div. 8, II, 315
§ 209 = div. 8, II, 420–21
§ 210 = div. 8, II, 164
§ 211 = div. 8, II, 198
§ 212 = div. 8, II, 404
§ 213 = div. 8, II, 402–3
§ 214 = div. 8, II, 403
§ 215 = div. 8, II, 165–6
§ 216 = div. 8, II, 234–5
§ 217 = div. 8, II, 10
§ 218 = div. 8, II, 409
§ 219 = div. 8, I, 106
§ 220 = div. 8, II, 409
§ 221 = div. 8, II, 401–2
§ 222 = div. 8, II, 295

§ 223 = div. 8, I, 106–7
§ 224 = div. 8, II, 340–42
§ 225 = div. 8, II, 403–4
§ 226 = div. 8, III, 65
§ 227 = div. 8, III, 252
§ 228 = div. 7, III, 446–7
§ 229 = div. 8, III, 155–6
§ 230 = div. 8, III, 256
§ 231 = div. 8, III, 149–50
§ 232 = div. 8, III, 157
§ 233 = div. 8, III, 130–31
§ 234 = div. 8, I, 291
§ 235 = div. 8, II, 181–3
§ 236 = div. 8, III, 242
§ 237 = div. 8, III, 242–3
§ 238 = div. 8, III, 239
§ 239 = div. 8, II, 404–5
§ 240 = div. 8, I, 136
§ 241 = div. 8, II, 376
§ 242 = div. 8, II, 370
§ 243 = div. 8, II, 123–4
§ 244 = div. 8, II, 300–301
§ 245 = div. 8, II, 207–8
§ 246 = div. 8, III, 263–5
§ 247 = div. 8, III, 13–14
§ 248 = div. 8, III, 140
§ 249 = div. 8, II, 178
§ 250 = div. 8, II, 162
§ 251 = div. 8, III, 211
§ 252 = div. 8, II, 269–70; div. 9, VII, 174
§ 253 = div. 8, I, 145–7
§ 254 = div. 8, I, 158–9
§ 255 = div. 7, I, 704
§ 256 = div. 7, IV/2, 71
§ 257 = div. 8, III, 48
§ 258 = div. 8, I, 147
§ 259 = div. 7, II, 179–80
§ 260 = div. 7, I, 694–5
§ 261 = div. 8, I, 268
§ 262 = div. 8, III, 311
§ 263 = div. 7, III, 244
§ 264 = div. 8, II, 368
§ 265 = div. 8, I, 151
§ 266 = div. 8, I, 284–5
§ 267 = div. 8, I, 152; div. 9, V, 53
§ 268 = div. 8, III, 216; div. 9, IX, 96
§ 269 = div. 8, I, 289–90
§ 270 = div. 8, II, 193
§ 271 = div. 8, III, 78–9
§ 272 = div. 8, II, 208
§ 273 = div. 8, I, 290
§ 274 = div. 8, II, 93
§ 275 = div. 8, I, 286–7
§ 276 = div. 8, I, 200
§ 277 = div. 7, I, 699
§ 278 = div. 7, III, 382–3
§ 279 = div. 8, I, 282–3
§ 280 = div. 8, II, 140
§ 281 = div. 9, VIII, 48 (div. 8, III, 334)
§ 282 = div. 8, III, 415–16
§ 283 = div. 8, I, 342–3
§ 284 = div. 8, II, 43–4
§ 285 = div. 7, II, 279
§ 286 = div. 8, I, 281–91
§ 287 = div. 8, I, 288
§ 288 = div. 8, III, 99–101
§ 289 = div. 8, III, 102
§ 290 = div. 8, II, 207
§ 291 = div. 8, III, 163–5
§ 292 = div. 8, II, 143
§ 293 = div. 8, III, 26
§ 294 = div. 8, III, 255–6

§ 295 = div. 9, V, 53
§ 296 = div. 8, II, 91–2
§ 297 = div. 8, II, 208
§ 298 = div. 8, II, 238–9
§ 299 = div. 8, II, 44
§ 300 = div. 8, II, 44–5
§ 301 = div. 8, I, 156
§ 302 = div. 8, II, 292
§ 303 = div. 8, III, 284–5
§ 304 = div. 8, II, 266–9
§ 305 = div. 9, VII, 176
§ 306 = div. 8, I, 281
§ 307 = div. 8, II, 40
§ 308 = div. 8, II, 79
§ 309 = div. 8, II, 297
§ 310 = div. 8, II, 138
§ 311 = div. 8, II, 85–6
§ 312 = div. 8, II, 203
§ 313 = div. 8, III, 81
§ 314 = div. 8, III, 274
§ 315 = div. 8, II, 101–3
§ 316 = div. 8, II, 171
§ 317 = div. 8, II, 183–4
§ 318 = div. 8, II, 170–71
§ 319 = div. 8, II, 171
§ 320 = div. 8, III, 287–8
§ 321 = div. 8, II, 178
§ 322 = div. 8, II, 139
§ 323 = div. 8, II, 103
§ 324 = div. 8, II, 90
§ 325 = div. 8, III, 274
§ 326 = div. 8, I, 286
§ 327 = div. 8, II, 142–3
§ 328 = div. 8, II, 184–5
§ 329 = div. 8, II, 181
§ 330 = div. 8, I, 231
§ 331 = div. 8, I, 324–5
§ 332 = div. 8, II, 304
§ 333 = div. 8, I, 307–8
§ 334 = div. 8, III, 82–3
§ 335 = div. 8, II, 347–8
§ 336 = div. 8, II, 225
§ 337 = div. 8, II, 449
§ 338 = div. 8, III, 236
§ 339 = div. 8, II, 329–31
§ 340 = div. 8, II, 224
§ 341 = div. 8, II, 305–7
§ 342 = div. 8, II, 367–8
§ 343 = div. 8, I, 281–2
§ 344 = div. 8, II, 271
§ 345 = div. 8, I, 150
§ 346 = div. 8, III, 120
§ 347 = div. 8, II, 72–3
§ 348 = div. 8, II, 239
§ 349 = div. 8, II, 187–8
§ 350 = div. 8, II, 124–5
§ 351 = div. 8, III, 265–8
§ 352 = div. 8, II, 354
§ 353 = div. 8, II, 379–80
§ 354 = div. 8, III, 134–5
§ 355 = div. 8, I, 12
§ 356 = div. 8, III, 282
§ 357 = div. 9, VI, 121
§ 358 = div. 9, VI, 121 (div. 8, II, 265); div. 7, I, 344; div. 9, VI, 121; div. 9, VI, 121 (div. 8, II, 251)
§ 359 = div. 8, II, 227
§ 360 = div. 8, II, 11; div. 8, I, 152; div. 8, I, 306
§ 361 = div. 8, II, 189
§ 362 = div. 8, I, 327
§ 363 = div. 8, III, 274
§ 364 = div. 7, II, 81
§ 365 = div. 7, II, 173
§ 366 = div. 8, I, 158

§ 367 = div. 7, III, 276
§ 368 = div. 8, I, 276
§ 369 = div. 8, I, 165
§ 370 = div. 8, II, 62
§ 371 = div. 8, I, 28
§ 372 = div. 7, I, 352
§ 373 = div. 8, III, 23–6
§ 374 = div. 8, II, 187
§ 375 = div. 8, I, 311
§ 376 = div. 8, I, 345
§ 377 = div. 8, I, 333–4
§ 378 = div. 8, I, 281
§ 379 = div. 8, II, 42
§ 380 = div. 8, II, 92
§ 381 = div. 8, II, 11
§ 382 = div. 8, II, 189–91
§ 383 = div. 8, III, 139
§ 384 = div. 8, I, 35
§ 385 = div. 8, II, 248
§ 386 = div. 8, II, 217–18, 247–8
§ 387 = div. 8, II, 373
§ 388 = div. 8, II, 196–7
§ 389 = div. 8, I, 288
§ 390 = div. 8, II, 298
§ 391 = div. 8, I, 130
§ 392 = div. 8, III, 74
§ 393 = div. 8, II, 194–5
§ 394 = div. 8, III, 124–5
§ 395 = div. 8, I, 182–3
§ 396 = div. 8, III, 246–7
§ 397 = div. 8, III, 238–9, 247
§ 398 = div. 8, III, 244
§ 399 = div. 8, I, 159–60
§ 400 = div. 8, I, 343–4
§ 401 = div. 8, III, 113–16
§ 402 = div. 8, III, 244
§ 403 = div. 8, I, 212
§ 404 = div. 8, I, 210
§ 405 = div. 9, V, 31–2 (div. 8, I, 166)
§ 406 = div. 8, I, 29
§ 407 = div. 7, II, 228–9
§ 408 = div. 7, II, 174–5
§ 409 = div. 7, III, 206–7
§ 410 = div. 8, I, 141–2
§ 411 = div. 8, II, 205
§ 412 = div. 8, I, 267
§ 413 = div. 7, III, 158
§ 414 = div. 8, III, 216
§ 415 = div. 8, I, 160–61
§ 416 = div. 8, I, 111
§ 417 = div. 7, I, 344–5; div. 7, I, 703–4
§ 418 = div. 7, I, 352
§ 419 = div. 7, III, 412–13
§ 420 = div. 7, II, 269
§ 421 = div. 7, II, 151
§ 422 = div. 7, III, 252–3
§ 423 = div. 8, III, 117–19
§ 424 = div. 7, III, 244–5
§ 425 = div. 8, II, 368–9
§ 426 = div. 8, III, 22–3
§ 427 = div. 8, II, 409–11
§ 428 = div. 8, III, 83–5
§ 429 = div. 8, III, 123–4
§ 430 = div. 8, III, 80–81
§ 431 = div. 8, I, 110; div. 9, VIII, 109
§ 432 = div. 8, III, 60–62
§ 433 = div. 8, III, 60–62
§ 434 = div. 8, III, 102–4
§ 435 = div. 8, III, 63–4
§ 436 = div. 8, I, 105
§ 437 = div. 8, III, 68–70

§ 438 = div. 8, III, 282–3
§ 439 = div. 8, III, 105–6
§ 440 = div. 8, III, 214–15
§ 441 = div. 8, III, 122–3
§ 442 = div. 8, III, 116–17
§ 443 = div. 7, III, 277–8
§ 444 = div. 8, III, 54–5
§ 445 = div. 8, III, 215
§ 446 = div. 8, III, 169
§ 447 = div. 8, III, 172
§ 448 = div. 8, I, 307
§ 449 = div. 8, II, 27
§ 450 = div. 8, II, 27
§ 451 = div. 8, I, 307
§ 452 = div. 8, III, 234–5
§ 453 = div. 8, III, 254–5
§ 454 = div. 8, III, 300
§ 455 = div. 8, III, 240–41
§ 456 = div. 8, III, 137
§ 457 = div. 8, III, 236–8
§ 458 = div. 8, III, 77–8
§ 459 = div. 8, III, 248–9
§ 460 = div. 8, III, 79
§ 461 = div. 8, III, 109–12
§ 462 = div. 8, II, 6–7, 136
§ 463 = div. 7, III, 253–4
§ 464 = div. 7, III, 314–16
§ 465 = div. 8, III, 402
§ 466 = div. 8, III, 236
§ 467 = div. 8, II, 23
§ 468 = div. 8, II, 32
§ 469 = div. 9, IX, 66
§ 470 = div. 8, I, 140
§ 471 = div. 8, I, 131
§ 472 = div. 8, I, 257
§ 473 = div. 8, I, 192
§ 474 = div. 8, II, 299
§ 475 = div. 8, I, 165
§ 476 = div. 7, II, 159
§ 477 = div. 8, II, 295–6
§ 478 = div. 8, III, 126–7
§ 479 = div. 8, III, 252–4
§ 480 = div. 8, III, 93–4
§ 481 = div. 8, I, 323
§ 482 = div. 8, I, 187
§ 483 = div. 7, III, 325–6
§ 484 = div. 8, II, 215
§ 485 = div. 8, II, 131
§ 486 = div. 8, I, 102–3
§ 487 = div. 8, I, 325–6
§ 488 = div. 8, II, 55–6
§ 489 = div. 8, I, 209–10
§ 490 = div. 7, III, 382
§ 491 = div. 8, I, 110
§ 492 = div. 7, III, 370–71
§ 493 = div. 7, III, 226
§ 494 = div. 7, III, 283–4
§ 495 = div. 7, II, 134
§ 496 = div. 7, II, 181–2
§ 497 = div. 7, II, 150–51
§ 498 = div. 7, II, 183
§ 499 = div. 7, III, 421–2
§ 500 = div. 8, I, 104–5
§ 501 = div. 8, I, 213
§ 502 = div. 7, III, 376
§ 503 = div. 7, II, 162
§ 504 = div. 8, I, 303
§ 505 = div. 8, I, 105–6
§ 506 = div. 7, II, 54–5
§ 507 = div. 8, II, 16–17
§ 508 = div. 7, I, 687
§ 509 = div. 8, I, 316
§ 510 = div. 8, I, 303–4
§ 511 = div. 8, I, 104
§ 512 = div. 7, III, 365–6
§ 513 = div. 8, I, 243

§ 514 = div. 8, III, 74–6
§ 515 = div. 8, III, 125–6
§ 516 = div. 8, II, 53–5
§ 517 = div. 8, II, 46
§ 518 = div. 8, I, 104
§ 519 = div. 8, I, 321–2
§ 520 = div. 7, III, 285
§ 521 = div. 8, II, 81–2
§ 522 = div. 8, I, 197–8
§ 523 = div. 8, III, 120–21
§ 524 = div. 8, II, 309–10
§ 525 = div. 8, III, 300
§ 526 = div. 8, III, 120–21
§ 527 = div. 8, I, 214
§ 528 = div. 8, I, 209
§ 529 = div. 8, III, 122
§ 530 = div. 8, I, 272–4
§ 531 = div. 8, I, 101–2
§ 532 = div. 7, III, 366–7
§ 533 = div. 8, II, 50–51
§ 534 = div. 7, IV/2, 71
§ 535 = div. 7, III, 326
§ 536 = div. 8, III, 272–3
§ 537 = div. 8, I, 123
§ 538 = div. 8, III, 335–6
§ 539 = div. 8, III, 124
§ 540 = div. 7, III, 218
§ 541 = div. 8, III, 34
§ 542 = div. 9, VII, 180 (div. 8, III, 284)
§ 543 = div. 8, II, 296–7
§ 544 = div. 8, II, 216
§ 545 = div. 7, III, 285–6
§ 546 = div. 8, I, 136
§ 547 = div. 8, I, 141
§ 548 = div. 8, I, 160
§ 549 = div. 7, III, 286
§ 550 = div. 8, I, 99–100
§ 551 = div. 8, III, 66–8
§ 552 = div. 8, II, 47–50
§ 553 = div. 8, I, 189–90
§ 554 = div. 8, I, 133–4
§ 555 = div. 8, I, 139–40
§ 556 = div. 8, I, 138–9
§ 557 = div. 8, I, 102
§ 558 = div. 8, II, 246
§ 559 = div. 8, II, 304
§ 560 = div. 8, II, 17
§ 561 = div. 8, I, 102–3
§ 562 = div. 7, I, 691–2
§ 563 = div. 8, I, 201
§ 564 = div. 8, I, 140–41
§ 565 = div. 8, I, 244
§ 566 = div. 8, II, 266
§ 567 = div. 8, III, 162–3
§ 568 = div. 8, III, 62–3
§ 569 = div. 8, II, 59–60
§ 570 = div. 8, II, 252
§ 571 = div. 8, II, 248
§ 572 = div. 8, I, 261
§ 573 = div. 8, III, 241
§ 574 = div. 7, I, 352–3
§ 575 = div. 8, I, 131
§ 576 = div. 8, III, 336–7
§ 577 = div. 8, II, 12
§ 578 = div. 8, II, 94
§ 579 = div. 8, I, 337–8
§ 580 = div. 8, II, 32–3
§ 581 = div. 8, II, 33
§ 582 = div. 8, I, 151
§ 583 = div. 8, III, 72–4
§ 584 = div. 8, III, 128–30
§ 585 = div. 8, II, 28–32
§ 586 = div. 8, III, 142–7
§ 587 = div. 8, I, 150
§ 588 = div. 8, I, 319–20

§ 589 = div. 8, I, 137
§ 590 = div. 8, I, 95
§ 591 = div. 8, I, 172
§ 592 = div. 8, I, 316–17
§ 593 = div. 8, I, 36
§ 594 = div. 7, I, 698–9
§ 595 = div. 7, II, 83
§ 596 = div. 8, I, 213–14
§ 597 = div. 8, I, 210–11
§ 598 = div. 8, II, 293
§ 599 = div. 8, I, 112
§ 600 = div. 8, I, 118
§ 601 = div. 8, I, 131
§ 602 = div. 7, II, 142–3
§ 603 = div. 7, III, 255–7
§ 604 = div. 8, I, 98
§ 605 = div. 8, II, 23
§ 606 = div. 8, I, 151–2
§ 607 = div. 8, II, 136
§ 608 = div. 8, I, 193–4
§ 609 = div. 7, II, 226
§ 610 = div. 7, II, 192
§ 611 = div. 7, I, 700
§ 612 = div. 8, II, 68
§ 613 = div. 7, I, 537
§ 614 = div. 7, II, 88
§ 615 = div. 7, II, 208
§ 616 = div. 8, I, 112
§ 617 = div. 8, I, 320–21
§ 618 = div. 7, III, 288–9
§ 619 = div. 7, III, 287
§ 620 = div. 8, I, 141
§ 621 = div. 8, I, 103
§ 622 = div. 8, I, 110
§ 623 = div. 8, III, 166
§ 624 = div. 8, I, 322
§ 625 = div. 8, III, 94–5
§ 626 = div. 7, I, 690–91
§ 627 = div. 8, I, 100–101
§ 628 = div. 8, I, 103
§ 629 = div. 8, I, 307
§ 630 = div. 7, III, 283
§ 631 = div. 8, I, 133–4
§ 632 = div. 8, I, 135
§ 633 = div. 8, III, 65
§ 634 = div. 8, III, 49–50
§ 635 = div. 8, III, 49–50
§ 636 = div. 8, III, 165–6
§ 637 = div. 7, III, 284
§ 638 = div. 8, I, 135
§ 639 = div. 8, II, 201–2
§ 640 = div. 7, I, 698
§ 641 = div. 7, I, 692–3
§ 642 = div. 7, III, 284–5
§ 643 = div. 8, I, 137–8
§ 644 = div. 8, I, 305
§ 645 = div. 7, III, 286
§ 646 = div. 7, III, 286–7
§ 647 = div. 8, I, 312–13
§ 648 = div. 8, I, 305
§ 649 = div. 8, I, 317
§ 650 = div. 8, I, 87
§ 651 = div. 8, II, 299–300
§ 652 = div. 8, III, 153
§ 653 = div. 8, II, 127
§ 654 = div. 8, I, 34
§ 655 = div. 7, III, 284
§ 656 = div. 8, II, 88
§ 657 = div. 8, I, 213
§ 658 = div. 7, III, 235–6
§ 659 = div. 7, III, 289–90
§ 660 = div. 8, I, 94–5
§ 661 = div. 8, I, 260–61
§ 662 = div. 7, I, 687
§ 663 = div. 8, I, 103
§ 664 = div. 7, I, 689–90

§ 665 = div. 8, I, 257
§ 666 = div. 8, I, 253–4
§ 667 = div. 7, I, 693–5
§ 668 = div. 8, II, 296
§ 669 = div. 8, II, 275–6
§ 670 = div. 7, I, 699–700
§ 671 = div. 7, I, 705
§ 672 = div. 8, I, 291
§ 673 = div. 7, I, 703–4
§ 674 = div. 8, II, 281–2
§ 675 = div. 8, II, 286–7
§ 676 = div. 7, I, 695–8
§ 677 = div. 8, I, 264–5
§ 678 = div. 8, I, 259–60
§ 679 = div. 8, I, 304
§ 680 = div. 8, I, 303
§ 681 = div. 8, I, 302–3
§ 682 = div. 8, II, 199
§ 683 = div. 8, III, 79–80
§ 684 = div. 8, III, 107–9
§ 685 = div. 8, III, 95–7
§ 686 = div. 7, II, 208
§ 687 = div. 8, II, 6
§ 688 = div. 8, III, 92–3
§ 689 = div. 8, III, 52–4
§ 690 = div. 8, II, 259
§ 691 = div. 8, I, 107
§ 692 = div. 8, III, 93
§ 693 = div. 8, III, 52
§ 694 = div. 8, II, 280
§ 695 = div. 8, III, 70–71
§ 696 = div. 8, II, 279–80
§ 697 = div. 8, II, 280
§ 698 = div. 7, I, 322
§ 699 = div. 8, III, 150–52
§ 700 = div. 8, I, 319
§ 701 = div. 8, II, 272
§ 702 = div. 8, III, 152–3
§ 703 = div. 8, III, 153–4
§ 704 = div. 8, II, 294–5
§ 705 = div. 9, XIII, 124
§ 706 = div. 8, II, 8–9
§ 707 = div. 8, II, 199–201
§ 708 = div. 8, II, 276–8
§ 709 = div. 8, II, 8–9
§ 710 = div. 8, III, 74–5
§ 711 = div. 8, II, 279
§ 712 = div. 8, II, 7
§ 713 = div. 8, III, 13
§ 714 = div. 7, I, 179
§ 715 = div. 8, II, 278–9
§ 716 = div. 8, III, 173–6
§ 717 = div. 8, II, 429
§ 718 = div. 8, II, 339
§ 719 = div. 8, II, 124
§ 720 = div. 8, I, 14
§ 721 = div. 8, II, 83–4
§ 722 = div. 8, I, 232
§ 723 = div. 8, II, 340
§ 724 = div. 8, II, 36
§ 725 = div. 7, I, 268
§ 726 = div. 8, II, 79
§ 727 = div. 8, II, 79
§ 728 = div. 8, III, 170–71
§ 729 = div. 8, II, 430
§ 730 = div. 8, I, 155
§ 731 = div. 8, II, 127
§ 732 = div. 8, I, 181–2
§ 733 = div. 8, III, 291
§ 734 = div. 8, III, 409–10
§ 735 = div. 8, II, 204–5
§ 736 = div. 8, II, 69–70
§ 737 = div. 8, III, 180
§ 738 = div. 8, II, 87
§ 739 = div. 8, III, 174
§ 740 = div. 8, II, 144–6

§ 741 = div. 7, I, 700
§ 742 = div. 8, III, 171–2
§ 743 = div. 8, I, 75
§ 744 = div. 7, III, 433
§ 745 = div. 7, I, 337
§ 746 = div. 8, II, 179–80
§ 747 = div. 8, II, 226–7
§ 748 = div. 8, II, 334–5
§ 749 = div. 8, II, 176
§ 750 = div. 7, II, 100
§ 751 = div. 8, III, 65–6
§ 752 = div. 7, II, 222
§ 753 = div. 7, III, 200
§ 754 = div. 7, II, 67
§ 755 = div. 7, II, 243
§ 756 = div. 8, I, 42
§ 757 = div. 7, II, 76
§ 758 = div. 7, I, 304
§ 759 = div. 8, II, 340
§ 760 = div. 7, I, 533
§ 761 = div. 8, I, 54
§ 762 = div. 7, III, 196
§ 763 = div. 8, II, 14
§ 764 = div. 7, I, 373; div. 7, I, 536; div. 7, III, 358
§ 765 = div. 8, III, 216–20
§ 766 = div. 8, I, 232
§ 767 = div. 7, I, 705
§ 768 = div. 7, I, 9–10
§ 769 = div. 7, I, 533–4
§ 770 = div. 9, IX, 32–4
§ 771 = div. 7, I, 344
§ 772 = div. 8, II, 34–5
§ 773 = div. 8, II, 353–4
§ 774 = div. 8, I, 283
§ 775 = div. 8, II, 40
§ 776 = div. 8, II, 83
§ 777 = div. 8, II, 371
§ 778 = div. 8, III, 133–4
§ 779 = div. 8, II, 87
§ 780 = div. 8, II, 429–30
§ 781 = div. 8, II, 195–6
§ 782 = div. 8, II, 305
§ 783 = div. 7, III, 374–5
§ 784 = div. 8, II, 168–70
§ 785 = div. 8, II, 13
§ 786 = div. 8, II, 151–6
§ 787 = div. 7, I, 350–51
§ 788 = div. 8, I, 291
§ 789 = div. 8, I, 165–6
§ 790 = div. 8, II, 292–3
§ 791 = div. 7, III, 422–3
§ 792 = div. 7, III, 274
§ 793 = div. 8, II, 314
§ 794 = div. 8, III, 146
§ 795 = div. 8, I, 87
§ 796 = div. 8, I, 116–17
§ 797 = div. 8, I, 127
§ 798 = div. 8, III, 27–8
§ 799 = div. 8, III, 32
§ 800 = div. 8, III, 85–7
§ 801 = div. 8, II, 57–8
§ 802 = div. 8, II, 58
§ 803 = div. 8, I, 266
§ 804 = div. 8, II, 220–21
§ 805 = div. 8, I, 335–6
§ 806 = div. 8, I, 334–5
§ 807 = div. 8, III, 324–5
§ 808 = div. 8, III, 91–2
§ 809 = div. 8, III, 88–9
§ 810 = div. 8, II, 159
§ 811 = div. 8, III, 552–3
§ 812 = div. 8, III, 89–91
§ 813 = div. 8, III, 313–14
§ 814 = div. 8, II, 138–9
§ 815 = div. 8, III, 410

§ 816 = div. 8, III, 55–6
§ 817 = div. 8, II, 141
§ 818 = div. 8, II, 251–2
§ 819 = div. 8, I, 297–8
§ 820 = div. 7, III, 313–14
§ 821 = div. 8, III, 33
§ 822 = div. 8, III, 295–6
§ 823 = div. 8, II, 135
§ 824 = div. 8, II, 99–100
§ 825 = div. 8, II, 100
§ 826 = div. 8, II, 135–6
§ 827 = div. 8, II, 139
§ 828 = div. 8, I, 294
§ 829 = div. 8, III, 290–91
§ 830 = div. 8, II, 382
§ 831 = div. 8, II, 5
§ 832 = div. 8, II, 25
§ 833 = div. 8, II, 8
§ 834 = div. 8, III, 292–3
§ 835 = div. 8, I, 88
§ 836 = div. 8, II, 63
§ 837 = div. 8, II, 188–9
§ 838 = div. 8, III, 287
§ 839 = div. 8, II, 209
§ 840 = div. 8, III, 31
§ 841 = div. 8, III, 141–2
§ 842 = div. 8, III, 38–40
§ 843 = div. 8, I, 309; div. 8, III, 91
§ 844 = div. 8, I, 115
§ 845 = div. 8, I, 117
§ 846 = div. 9, V, 89–90
§ 847 = div. 8, II, 64
§ 848 = div. 8, II, 97–8
§ 849 = div. 8, II, 373–5
§ 850 = div. 8, II, 147–8
§ 851 = div. 8, III, 203–5
§ 852 = div. 8, II, 221–3
§ 853 = div. 8, II, 435–6; div. 8, III, 318–20
§ 854 = div. 7, II, 150
§ 855 = div. 9, VI, 88
§ 856 = div. 8, I, 130
§ 857 = div. 8, III, 275
§ 858 = div. 8, II, 262
§ 859 = div. 8, I, 288–9
§ 860 = div. 7, II, 83
§ 861 = div. 7, II, 56
§ 862 = div. 7, II, 65
§ 863 = div. 8, III, 249
§ 864 = div. 8, III, 157–62
§ 865 = div. 8, II, 162
§ 866 = div. 8, II, 128–9
§ 867 = div. 8, II, 137
§ 868 = div. 8, II, 259–60
§ 869 = div. 8, I, 6–7
§ 870 = div. 7, II, 99–100, 119
§ 871 = div. 8, II, 314–15
§ 872 = div. 7, II, 97–8
§ 873 = div. 7, II, 217
§ 874 = div. 7, II, 98–9
§ 875 = div. 7, II, 286
§ 876 = div. 8, III, 293–4
§ 877 = div. 8, II, 137
§ 878 = div. 8, II, 26–7
§ 879 = div. 8, II, 88
§ 880 = div. 8, II, 12
§ 881 = div. 8, II, 185–6
§ 882 = div. 8, II, 304
§ 883 = div. 8, II, 67–9
§ 884 = div. 8, II, 108–9
§ 885 = div. 8, II, 351–2
§ 886 = div. 8, II, 157–9
§ 887 = div. 8, II, 159–60
§ 888 = div. 8, II, 125–6

§ 889 = div. 8, II, 125
§ 890 = div. 8, II, 10
§ 891 = div. 8, II, 160
§ 892 = div. 8, III, 274 (div. 8, II, 194)
§ 893 = div. 8, II, 225–6
§ 894 = div. 8, II, 92–3
§ 895 = div. 8, II, 103
§ 896 = div. 8, II, 77
§ 897 = div. 8, I, 229–30
§ 898 = div. 8, II, 88–90
§ 899 = div. 7, III, 242–3
§ 900 = div. 7, III, 177–8
§ 901 = div. 8, II, 21
§ 902 = div. 8, I, 251
§ 903 = div. 8, II, 1
§ 904 = div. 8, II, 313
§ 905 = div. 8, I, 107
§ 906 = div. 8, I, 313
§ 907 = div. 7, II, 179
§ 908 = div. 7, II, 16–17
§ 909 = div. 8, III, 268
§ 910 = div. 8, II, 179
§ 911 = div. 8, I, 35–6
§ 912 = div. 8, III, 138
§ 913 = div. 8, I, 37
§ 914 = div. 8, I, 88
§ 915 = div. 8, II, 51–2
§ 916 = div. 8, II, 218–19
§ 917 = div. 8, II, 352–3
§ 918 = div. 8, III, 258–9
§ 919 = div. 8, III, 179
§ 920 = div. 8, II, 58
§ 921 = div. 8, II, 310–11
§ 922 = div. 8, II, 137
§ 923 = div. 8, III, 269
§ 924 = div. 8, II, 142
§ 925 = div. 8, III, 391–2
§ 926 = div. 8, II, 302–3
§ 927 = div. 8, II, 198
§ 928 = div. 8, II, 395–6
§ 929 = div. 8, III, 256–7
§ 930 = div. 8, II, 284; div. 9, VII, 161
§ 931 = div. 8, II, 197–8
§ 932 = div. 8, II, 195
§ 933 = div. 8, II, 78
§ 934 = div. 8, II, 172–3
§ 935 = div. 8, III, 415
§ 936 = div. 8, II, 307–8
§ 937 = div. 8, II, 76
§ 938 = div. 7, II, 63
§ 939 = div. 8, I, 63
§ 940 = div. 7, II, 101
§ 941 = div. 7, I, 298–9
§ 942 = div. 7, III, 412
§ 943 = div. 7, III, 265–7
§ 944 = div. 8, III, 268–9
§ 945 = div. 8, I, 205
§ 946 = div. 8, II, 12
§ 947 = div. 8, III, 274
§ 948 = div. 8, II, 315
§ 949 = div. 8, II, 263
§ 950 = div. 8, I, 73
§ 951 = div. 8, II, 188
§ 952 = div. 8, I, 73
§ 953 = div. 8, I, 211–12
§ 954 = div. 8, I, 71–2; div. 9, V, 259–61
§ 955 = div. 7, III, 171
§ 956 = div. 7, III, 234
§ 957 = div. 7, III, 306–9
§ 958 = div. 7, II, 46
§ 959 = div. 7, III, 297; div. 7, III, 351–2 (see § 996)
§ 960 = div. 8, I, 85–6

§ 961 = div. 7, III, 200
§ 962 = div. 7, III, 171–2
§ 963 = div. 9, VII, 178 (div. 8, II, 264)
§ 964 = div. 7, II, 94
§ 965 = div. 7, II, 97
§ 966 = div. 7, II, 289
§ 967 = div. 7, III, 237
§ 968 = div. 8, I, 206
§ 969 = div. 8, II, 22
§ 970 = div. 8, I, 285–6
§ 971 = div. 8, II, 257
§ 972 = div. 7, II, 256–7; III, 340–41
§ 973 = div. 7, III, 163
§ 974 = div. 7, I, 551
§ 975 = div. 8, I, 20
§ 976 = div. 7, II, 262–3
§ 977 = div. 7, III, 428
§ 978 = div. 7, III, 255–6
§ 979 = div. 7, III, 255
§ 980 = div. 7, III, 306
§ 981 = div. 8, II, 161–2
§ 982 = div. 7, II, 34
§ 983 = div. 7, II, 289
§ 984 = div. 7, II, 277
§ 985 = div. 7, III, 337–8
§ 986 = div. 8, I, 173
§ 987 = div. 7, II, 166
§ 988 = div. 7, III, 283
§ 989 = div. 8, II, 255
§ 990 = div. 7, III, 302
§ 991 = div. 8, I, 148
§ 992 = div. 5, II, 581
§ 993 = div. 8, I, 329–30
§ 994 = div. 8, II, 10
§ 995 = div. 7, II, 258
§ 996 = div. 7, III, 351–2 (see § 959)
§ 997 = div. 7, II, 278
§ 998 = div. 7, II, 78
§ 999 = div. 7, II, 102
§ 1000 = div. 7, II, 214–15
§ 1001 = div. 7, II, 208
§ 1002 = div. 8, II, 256
§ 1003 = div. 8, III, 226
§ 1004 = div. 8, II, 259
§ 1005 = div. 8, II, 18–19
§ 1006 = div. 8, II, 173
§ 1007 = div. 8, II, 34
§ 1008 = div. 8, II, 39–40
§ 1009 = div. 8, II, 203–4
§ 1010 = div. 8, I, 315
§ 1011 = div. 8, I, 249
§ 1012 = div. 7, I, 353
§ 1013 = div. 8, I, 106
§ 1014 = div. 8, I, 98
§ 1015 = div. 8, II, 180–81
§ 1016 = div. 8, III, 28
§ 1017 = div. 8, II, 122–3
§ 1018 = div. 8, I, 227–8
§ 1019 = div. 8, II, 132–4
§ 1020 = div. 8, II, 331–2
§ 1021 = div. 8, II, 121–2
§ 1022 = div. 8, II, 262
§ 1023 = div. 8, III, 46
§ 1024 = div. 8, II, 39
§ 1025 = div. 8, II, 77–8
§ 1026 = div. 7, I, 259
§ 1027 = div. 8, II, 90
§ 1028 = div. 8, II, 52
§ 1029 = div. 7, II, 29
§ 1030 = div. 8, I, 316
§ 1031 = div. 8, II, 104
§ 1032 = div. 8, I, 315–16

§ 1033 = div. 8, III, 14–15
§ 1034 = div. 8, III, 283
§ 1035 = div. 8, II, 246–7
§ 1036 = div. 8, I, 139
§ 1037 = div. 8, II, 173–4
§ 1038 = div. 8, III, 323–4; div. 8, III, 17
§ 1039 = div. 8, III, 7
§ 1040 = div. 8, III, 329
§ 1041 = div. 8, II, 121 (div. 8, III, 288–9; div. 9, IX, 141, 144)
§ 1042 = div. 8, I, 7
§ 1043 = div. 7, II, 175
§ 1044 = div. 8, I, 36
§ 1045 = div. 8, I, 200
§ 1046 = div. 7, II, 124–5
§ 1047 = div. 8, II, 261–2
§ 1048 = div. 8, I, 158
§ 1049 = div. 8, I, 111
§ 1050 = div. 8, III, 16–17
§ 1051 = div. 7, III, 414–16
§ 1052 = div. 8, III, 57–9
§ 1053 = div. 7, II, 248
§ 1054 = div. 8, I, 130
§ 1055 = div. 7, I, 130
§ 1056 = div. 7, II, 69
§ 1057 = div. 7, I, 687
§ 1058 = div. 7, I, 688–9
§ 1059 = div. 7, II, 223
§ 1060 = div. 7, II, 222–3
§ 1061 = div. 7, IV/2, 71
§ 1062 = div. 7, III, 280–81
§ 1063 = div. 8, I, 209
§ 1064 = div. 7, III, 258–9
§ 1065 = div. 8, II, 285
§ 1066 = div. 8, III, 166–8
§ 1067 = div. 7, III, 338–9

Name Index

Alcuin 546, 624
Alexander the Great 261, 422
Alfieri, Vittorio 68
Amiel, Henri Frédéric 167
Anaxagoras 245, 251
Anaximander 242, 245
Aristippus 265
Aristophanes 222
Aristotle 268, 281, 300, 480–81, 588, 601, 609–10, 612, 620, 626
Arouet, François-Marie: *see* Voltaire
Audran, Edmond 469, 619
St Augustine 71, 136, 333, 491, 620
Avenarius, Richard 611, 612

Bacon, Francis 156, 281, 478
Baeumler, Alfred xiv, xxii, xxv
Baker, Samuel White 212, 604–5
Balzac, Honoré de 530, 623
Baudelaire, Charles 64
Beecher-Stowe, Harriet 64
Beethoven, Ludwig van 73, 471, 475, 575
Bernard, Claude 36, 588
Beyle, Henri: *see* Stendhal
Bismarck, Otto von 61, 84–85, 505, 597
Blanchard, Émile 612
Bocage: *see* Pierre-Martinien Tousez
Borgia, Cesare 499
Bourget, Paul 63, 589
Bournet, Albert 591
Brahms, Johannes 73
Brosses, Charles de 72, 590
Brunetière, Ferdinand 588, 590, 594, 604, 621
Buckle, Thomas 501
Buddha 28, 46, 102, 129, 149
Bunyan, John 491
Lord Byron 51, 70, 72, 591

Caesar, Julius 222, 314, 388, 422, 545, 547, 621
Cagliostro, Alessandro 254
Caracalla 501
Cardano, Gerolamo 613
Carlyle, Thomas 26, 205, 270, 421, 541
Chamfort, Nicolas 430, 617
Charlemagne 71, 624
Chateaubriand, François-René de 72, 591

Cicero 245, 602
Cimarosa, Domenico 592
Columbus, Christopher 537
Commoro 212
Comte, Auguste 66, 84, 202, 281, 502, 512, 552, 611, 617, 621
Confucius 85
Constant, Benjamin 592, 619–20
Copernicus, Nicolaus 12
Cornaro, Luigi 614

Damocles 430
Dancourt Florent Carton 81
Dante Alighieri 559, 565, 624–5
Darwin, Charles 85, 367, 386, 389–90
King David 252
Delacroix, Eugène 72–73, 591
Democritus 245, 251, 254, 263, 266, 609
Descartes, René 65, 261, 281, 288, 311, 332–33, 610
Diogenes 277
Dostoevsky, Fyodor 59, 146, 260, 418, 443, 464, 594, 599, 605, 615, 618
Drochon, Hugo xxxv
Dühring, Eugen 83, 85, 444, 491, 584
Dumas, Alexandre, père 592

Eichendorff, Joseph von 73
Emerson, Ralph Waldo 599, 623
Empedocles 245
Epictetus 178, 241, 601
Epicurus 124, 141, 143, 254, 260–63, 265, 333,
Eschenbach, Wolfram von 193

Fénelon, Francois 72, 591
Féré, Charles 614, 618
Flaubert, Gustave 73, 450, 461, 589, 592
Flourens, J. P. M. 612
Förster-Nietzsche, Elisabeth vii–x, xii–xv, xvii, xxv, xxxv, 600
Fouillée, Alfred 436, 617
Francis of Assisi, St 140, 214
Frederick the Great 222, 601
Frederick II 499
Fromentin, Eugène 57

Galiani, Abbé Ferdinando 62, 84, 87, 549, 587, 593, 602
Gast, Peter: *see* Heinrich Köselitz
Gautier, Théophile 72, 461, 589, 591
Gluck, Christoph 73
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 13, 67, 71–73, 78, 86, 114, 202–3, 222–23, 231, 246, 331, 421, 444, 461, 464, 468, 470, 477, 478, 504–5, 559, 566, 568, 574–75, 593, 596, 603, 608, 617–19, 625
Goncourt, Edmond and Jules de, 270, 464, 589, 592
Grassot, Paul 592

Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm 73
Grote, George 254, 608
Guyau, Jean-Marie 202, 607

Hāfez 477
Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph Freiherr von 594, 611
Handel, George Frederick 505
Hartmann, Eduard von 62, 247, 398, 443, 612–13
Haydn, (Franz) Joseph 73
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich xiii, 12, 66–67, 159, 215, 223, 240–44, 246, 348, 478
Heine, Heinrich 73, 469–70, 624
Helvétius, Claude Adrien 423
Heraclitus 242, 245, 254, 263, 618
Herbart, Johann Friedrich 470
Herder, Johann Gottfried 215, 231, 478
Herrmann, Emanuel 615
Hippocrates 266
Hoffmann, E. T. A. 73
Hollingdale, R. J. xxv, xxix, xxxii, 607
Homer vii, 94, 222, 252, 426, 476–77, 616, 622
Horace 602
Horneffer, Ernst and August xii
Hugo, Victor 51, 72, 241, 466, 468, 471, 479, 493, 591–2
Hume, David 63, 71, 309, 316, 612, 618

Ibsen, Henrik 60, 421
Ingres, Jean-Auguste-Dominique 73, 591

Jacolliot, Louis 614
Jesus xxviii, 105–10, 115–16, 118, 122–23, 125, 132, 140, 594, 596, 598–99, 625
Job 464

Kant, Immanuel xiii, xx, 22, 63, 67, 71, 84, 157, 159, 161, 166, 168, 185, 196–97, 223, 240–42, 244, 249, 253, 265–66, 268, 272, 307, 318, 321, 330, 332, 396, 439, 508, 529, 601, 603, 605–6, 608, 610, 613–14, 626
Kaufmann, Walter xxvii, xxix, xxxii, 587, 604
Keller, Gottfried 563, 625
Lord Kelvin 584, 626
Kircher, Athanasius 599
Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb 231
Köselitz, Heinrich viii, ix–x, xii–xiii

Lamartine, Alphonse de 72, 591
Lammenais, Hugues-Félicité Robert de 241
La Rochefoucauld, François de 64, 160, 214, 227, 430, 441, 498, 617
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von 71, 241, 244, 505

Leonardo da Vinci 222
Leopardi, Giacomo 62, 414
Lesage, Alain-René 81
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 246
Liebmann, Otto 610–11
Locke, John 71, 496, 613
Louis XIV 65
Ludovici, Anthony 604
Luther, Martin 122–23, 131, 206, 215, 245, 421, 441, 594–95, 597–98, 607, 626

Machiavelli, Niccolò 135, 186, 622
Magalotti, Lorenzo 613
Malebranche, Nicolas 606
Manzoni, Alessandro 548, 624
Marcus Aurelius 214, 626
St Mark 106, 595
St Matthew 594–96, 598, 607
Mendelssohn, Felix 73, 470, 592
Michelangelo 559, 591
Michelet, Jules 205, 241
Mill, John Stuart xxi–ii, 28, 202, 430, 502, 522–23, 611, 617, 621
Mirabeau, Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de 463, 618
Mitchell, Silas Weir 145, 600
Molière, Jean-Baptiste 587, 620
Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de 215, 613
Montlosier, François Dominique de Reynaud, Comte de 528, 622
Muhammad 100, 544, 623
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 73, 475, 592

Nägeli, Carl Wilhelm von 610
Napoleon 26, 33, 72, 84–85, 222, 246, 276, 314, 374, 418, 422, 468, 501–2, 545, 559, 564, 608, 621
Nero 501

Odysseus 314
Offenbach, Jacques 469–70, 619
Overbeck, Christian Adolph 587
Overbeck, Franz viii, ix, 600–1

Parmenides 245, 313
Pascal, Blaise 40, 59, 71, 142–3, 150, 153, 157–58, 167, 172, 188, 206, 226–27, 241, 249, 251, 261, 333, 441, 525–26, 559, 561, 589–90, 600, 607
St Paul 103, 107–8, 110, 112–14, 116, 122, 131–32, 136, 206, 371, 596, 600
Pericles 252, 421, 616
St Peter 107
Petronius 101, 120–21, 156
Piutti, Carl 587

Plato 96, 99, 100, 122, 128, 159, 186, 219, 240, 242, 252–55, 257, 260–61, 263–64, 267, 330, 332, 366, 421, 453, 537, 543–44, 571, 607–8, 623, 622
Pliny the Younger 607
Plutarch 138
Post, Albert Hermann 615
Protagoras 254, 263
Pyrrho 254, 259–63, 265, 270

Ranke, Leopold von 84
Raphael 450, 467, 476, 575, 591, 623
Regnard, Jean-François 81
Renan, (Joseph) Ernest 84, 450
Ritschl, Albrecht 595
Ritschl, Frederich vii
Roberty, Eugène 609
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 51, 63–65, 68–71, 73, 78, 81, 202, 206, 223, 421, 558–59, 562
Rubens, Peter Paul 476–77

Sainte-Beuve, Charles Augustin 249, 618
Sales, François de 143
Sand, George 51, 72, 591
King Saul 252
Savonarola, Girolamo 421
Schiller, Friedrich 73, 205, 592, 619
Schopenhauer, Arthur vii–viii, xvii, 21–22, 42, 59–60, 62–67, 113, 167, 172, 215, 221–23, 240–241, 243–44, 246–47, 276, 349, 352, 389, 394, 420, 458, 460, 464, 471, 477, 480–81, 554, 559, 606, 616
Schulz, Johann Abraham Peter 587
Schumann, Robert 73
Schütz, Heinrich 470
Scott, Sir Walter 57, 468, 615
Seneca 245, 602
Shakespeare, William 72, 478, 541, 575, 591, 615
Shelley, Percy Bysshe 561
Simplicius 178, 241, 601
Socrates viii, 169, 251, 254–58, 260, 262, 264–66, 332
Spencer, Herbert 41, 223, 249, 313, 512, 532, 600, 611
Spinoza, Baruch 44, 67, 202–3, 240–41, 257, 332–33, 358, 392, 582, 600, 610, 613
Madame de Staël (Anne Louise Germaine de Staël-Holstein) 587
Stendhal 73, 86, 314, 450, 461, 592, 618
Stifter, Adalbert 563, 625
Stoecker, Adolf 616
Stowe, Mrs: *see* Harriet Beecher-Stowe
Strauss, David Friedrich viii, 473
Swedenborg, Emanuel 63

Tacitus 114, 590

Taine, Hippolyte 246, 467, 479, 559, 619
St Theresa 138
Tertullian 593
Thierry, Augustin 202, 528, 622
Thomson, William: *see* Lord Kelvin
Thucydides 254, 266, 608
Tieck, Ludwig 73
Timon 254
Tolstoy, Leo xxviii, 59, 260, 561, 587, 594, 596, 598–99, 614–5
Tousez, Pierre-Martinien 592

Uhland, Ludwig 73

Varnhagen, Rahel 619
Vernet, Horace 73, 591
Verri, Pietro 396, 613–4
Vigny, Alfred de 561
Voltaire xxi, 62–63, 69–70, 81, 138, 257, 421, 469–70, 589, 599, 624

Wagner, Richard vii–x, xvi, 13, 60, 63, 72–74, 193, 464, 466–75, 477, 479, 482, 485, 493, 554, 587, 592–93, 596, 619, 620, 625
Wallace, Alfred Russel 85
Wellhausen, Julius 596, 598, 604
Winckelmann, Johann Joachim 468, 478, 575

Zola, Émile 464, 467, 479, 589

'This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And even you yourselves are this will to power – and nothing besides!'

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Translated by R. KEVIN HILL and MICHAEL A. SCARPITTI
With an introduction and notes by R. KEVIN HILL

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